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I. INTRODUCTION
Modem rape scholarship has been informed by a number of em-
pirical premises concerning the operation of the criminal justice sys-
tem in rape cases. The most fundamental of these premises is that the
justice system discriminates, at every stage, against rape victims.' The
details of this charge can be briefly summarized. To begin, the case
attrition rate in rape cases is shockingly high, and very few rapists are
convicted of the crime.2 Victims often do not report the rape, largely
because they fear overbearing, hostile police,3 and-should a trial en-
sue-vicious attacks on their character.4 Although false reports of
rape are no more common than of other crimes,5 justice system offi-
cials are highly skeptical of women who claim to have been raped by
I See, e.g., SusAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975);
SusAN ESrRICH, REAL RAPE (1987). Brownmiller and Estrich, in particular, have had a ma-
jor influence on subsequent discussions about rape and rape law. See also Vivian Berger,
Man's Tria Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1. (1977);
Gerald D. Robin, Forcible Rape: Institutionalized Sexism in the Criminal Justice System, 23 CRIME
& DEtUNQ. 136 (1977).
2 See infra notes 102-13 and accompanying text (discussing high attrition rates in rape
case processing).
3 See infra notes 187-88, 226-50 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., LYNDA LyrLE HOLMSTROM & ANN WOLBERT BURGESS, THE VICrIM OF RAPE:
INsTrrTImONAL REAarIONs 56 (1978). Despite the passage of rape shield laws, evidence of a
complainant's sexual habits is still admissible in some cases, either because the law was
badly-drafted, or because the evidence is relevant for a legitimate purpose such as sug-
gesting a motive for a false accusation or providing a context for the defendant's consent
defense. See generally Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts:
A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763, 812-905 (1986).
5 See infra note 616 and accompanying text.
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acquaintances. 6 If the rape victim's conduct prior to the crime vio-
lated traditional sex-role norms, police commonly disbelieve her re-
port or blame her for the rape.7 Thus, officials deny justice to women
who have engaged in nonmarital sex,8 or other "improper" activities
such as heavy drinking or hitchhiking. 9 None of these sex-role-norm
violations is relevant to whether the woman was raped,10 but the
norms are enforced because they serve to keep women in their place'1
and because the men who control the justice system are irrationally
obsessed with the danger of false rape accusations.
12
Afraid that losing cases will look bad on their records, prosecu-
tors are excessively reluctant to prosecute acquaintance rapists. 13
When they do prosecute, the system puts the victim rather than the
defendant on trial.14 Juries, motivated by the same biases as other
participants in the system, 15 often blame the victim and acquit the
rapist.16
Most rape scholars believe that, in large measure, these travesties
ofjustice have been due to rules of law, fashioned by male judges over
the centuries, that promote victim blaming.17 Among the foremost
such rules were the requirements that the victim resist her attacker 8
6 See, e.g., EsTRICH, supra note 1, at 27-56. See generally infra notes 132-38, 154-56 and
accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Alan C. Acock & Nancy K. Ireland, Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: The
Impact of Norm Violation, Gender and Sex Role Attitude, 19 SEX ROLES 179, 187 (1983);Judith S.
Bridges, Perceptions of Date and Stranger Rape: A Difference in Sex Role Expectations and Rape-
Supportive Beliefs, 24 SEX ROLES 291, 304-05 (1991).
8 See, e.g., RIcHAm A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 388 (1992).
9 See, e.g., HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 39-43 (unfounding of rape reports
correlated with victim's drinking or hitchhiking). See generally infra notes 863-83, 952-53
and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 353-55; Berger, supra note 1, at 55-56. See also
infra note 594.
" See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 11-30; ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 5-6, 23-25, 62-
69.
12 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 5-6, 42-56. See generally infra notes 603-719 and
accompanying text (discussing false rape reports).
13 See, e.g., LINDA A. FAiRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 151-52
(1993); ALICE VACHSS, SEX CRIMES 140-43 (1993); Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims'Alega-
tions of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 Soc. PROBS. 213, 217-24
(1991).
14 See, e.g., LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE (1991); JOYCE E. WIL-
LIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT (1981); Berger, supra note 1.
15 See infra notes 516-28 and accompanying text_
16 See infra text accompanying notes 400-07 (describing juror leniency in aggravated
versus non-aggravated sexual assault cases).
17 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 19-24. For an overview of the resistance re-
quirement at common law, see ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 29-41.
18 In recent decades, the resistance requirement has been eroded by reforms. Where
they existed, requirements that the victim resist continuously and to the utmost have been
universally repealed; most states have gone further, eliminating all requirements of physi-
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and that her testimony be corroborated by other evidence.' 9 The
"cautionary instruction,"20 warning the jury about the danger of false
rape accusations, has been another impediment to justice in rape
cases.2 ' According to some scholars, the very name of the crime
"rape" has perpetuated subtly harmful myths such as the idea that the
perpetrator's motivation is sexual rather than violent.22 Worst of all,
the rule allowing testimony and cross-examination about the woman's
sexual habits23 distracted the jury's attention from the defendant's be-
havior, and often led to unjust acquittals.
24
Most scholars have contended that, although attitudinal changes
are also necessary, law reforms can play a major role in eliminating
discrimination against victims.2 5 By changing the name of the crime
to "sexual assault" or some similar term,2 6 legislatures can help to
make the public aware that the crime is motivated by a desire to domi-
nate women, not sexual hunger, thus reducing public sympathy for
cal resistance. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1123-24 (1986) [hereinafter Es-
trich, Rape]. However, most states continue to regard force as an essential element of rape
or sexual assault. See generally Cynthia Anne Wickton, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful
Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 399 (1988). As
Estrich points out, force and resistance are two sides of the same coin, since force is neces-
sary only if the woman resists. EsTRICH, supra note 1, at 58-71.
19 The Model Penal Code's version of the corroboration requirement states: "No per-
son shall be convicted on any felony under . . . [the sexual offenses] article upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1985).
Almost all states, with the exception of Nebraska, have now eliminated the requirement
that a rape complainant's testimony be corroborated in cases of forcible rape. SANFORD H.
KADISH & STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFFR, CRIMINAL LAW AND Irs PRocEssEs 402 (5th ed. 1989). See
generally ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 43-47 (overview of the corroboration requirement).
20 Although the wording varies from one state to another, Morris notes that
most cautionary instructions contain three common elements... : (1) rape is a charge
that is easily made by the victim, (2) rape is a charge that is difficult for the defendant
to disprove, and (3) the testimony of the victim requires more careful scrutiny by the
jury than the testimony of the other witnesses in the trial.
A. Thomas Morris, Note, The Empirical, Historical and Legal Case Against the Cautionary In-
struction: A Call for Legislative Reform, 1988 DuKE LJ. 154, 154-55. See infra note 606 and
accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Cheryl J. Oros & Donald Elman, Impact of Judges' Instructions Upon Jurors'
Decisions: The "Cautionary, Charge" in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RES. Soc. PSYCH. 28, 34
(1979).
22 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 14-15; ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 82-83.
23 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 1, at 12-100; Galvin, supra note 4, at 778-802.
24 See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 4, at 767.
25 See; e.g., LINDA BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 110 (1989) (the "overriding"
objective of reforms was to shift the burden of proof from the victim to the defendant); see
alsoJEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMrrs OF LAw REFoRM 21-23 (1982); Patricia
Searles & Ronald J. Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of
State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 25, 26 (1987).
26 See, e.g., Martin D. Schwartz & Todd R. Clear, Toward a New Law on Rape, 26 CRIME &
DEUNQ. 129, 135-36 (1980); Searles & Berger, supra note 25, at 26.
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the perpetrator. 27 By abolishing rules of rape law that embody sexist
assumptions, courts and legislatures can encourage victims to report
the crime, combat anti-victim stereotypes that pervade officialdom,
and empower prosecutors with the legal tools to secure convictions. 28
Not every rape scholar has explicitly subscribed to every count of this
indictment, but its main propositions have been the conventional
wisdom.
Since the 1970s, most states have responded to this critique by
enacting several reforms of their rape laws.29 As one commentator
notes, "[t]hese changes represent a shift away from laws containing
misogynist assumptions and reflecting societal skepticism about the
seriousness of rape and the veracity of women's accusations."30 For
example, the corroboration requirement is gone;31 many states have
eliminated the cautionary instruction;32 and rape shield laws, with va-
rying degrees of success, have restricted inquiries into the victim's sex-
ual history.33 In many states, rape has been redefined as "sexual
assault" or some similar term, in an effort to emphasize that rape is a
crime of violence and not due to an uncontrollable sexual passion.3 4
These reforms had multiple purposes. In part, they were
designed to alleviate victims' ordeals during rape investigations and
trials.3 5 Another purpose was symbolic and educational: to abolish
rules that were thought to embody sexist assumptions.3 6 The reform-
ers' main goals, however, seem to have been instrumental: to en-
27 See, e.g., SteviJackson, The Social Context of Rape: Sexual Scripts and Motivation, in RAPE
& SocIETY READINGS ON THE PROBLEM OF SExuAL ASSAULT 16, 19-20 (Patricia Searles &
Ronald J. Berger eds., 1995) [hereinafter RAPE & SOCIETY].
28 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 LAw & PHIL. 5 (1992) [hereinafter Es-
trich, Palm Beach Stories]; Robin, supra note 1, at 150-53; MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 21-
23; Helene Sasko & Deborah Sesek, Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is it the Solution?, 24 GLEv.
ST. L. REv. 463 (1975).
29 See generally Searles & Berger, supra note 25, at 25.
30 Id. The same authors list the goals of the rape law reformers:
1)increasing the reporting of rape and enhancing prosecution and conviction in rape
cases; 2) improving the treatment of rape victims in the criminal justice system; 3)
achieving comparability between the legal treatment of rape and other violent crimes;
4) prohibiting a wider range of coercive sexual conduct; and 5) expanding the range
of persons protected by law.
Id.
31 Almost every state has eliminated the requirement that a rape complainant's testi-
mony be corroborated in cases of forcible rape. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 19, at
402. Some retain a corroboration requirement for statutory rape. Id.
32 See RonaldJ. Berger et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. & Soc'Y REv.
329, 332 (1988). As of 1988, over half of the states still allowed a cautionary instruction in
forcible rape trials. Morris, supra note 20, at 156.
33 See generally Galvin, supra note 4, at 765-66.
34 Searles & Berger, supra note 25, at 25-26.
35 See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 75-86.
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courage reporting of rapes, and to facilitate prosecution of the
perpetrators.37
There is growing evidence that, while the performance of the jus-
tice system in rape cases may have improved,38 the legal reforms have
generally had little or no effect on the outcomes of rape cases, or the
proportions of rapists who are prosecuted and convicted.3 9 What ex-
plains this failure? Some scholars believe that the original rape law
reforms were too modest, These scholars have proposed new reforms,
a process that continues to this day. Among these "second wave" re-
forms have been proposals to base rape liability on negligence 4° or
even strict liability;41 to redefine the crime as non-consensual sex,
eliminating "force" from the definition;42 and to require that the wo-
man's consent be affirmatively given in advance of the sexual act.43 So
far, most of these proposals have not been widely adopted.
The purpose of this article is not to offer new ideas for improving
rape law. We believe reforms need to be grounded in accurate per-
ceptions of social reality, including a realistic understanding of the
reasons why criminals escape justice and an awareness of the limita-
tions of legal doctrines as instruments for changing case outcomes.
Accordingly, our aim is to lay a foundation for discussion of reforms
by reexamining the two central tenets of the rape law reform move-
ment: (1) that discrimination against rape victims pervades the crimi-
nal justice system, and is the main reason why few rapists are
punished; and (2) that the outcomes of forcible rape cases can be
substantially changed by abolishing rules of law that are thought to
foster such discrimination. In our judgment, a thorough analysis of
these assumptions is a prerequisite to intelligent evaluation of new
proposals for rape law reform.
Like most rape scholars, we will confine our discussion to forci-
ble, heterosexual rapes.44 We will not consider sentencing practices, a
7 See infra note 545.
38 See infra notes 443-45 and accompanying text.
39 See infra text accompanying notes 546-94.
40 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 94. This is already the law in a number of states.
41 Lynne N. Henderson, Review-Essay: Mhat Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
LJ. 193, 211-19 (1987-88).
42 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 84-86 (elimination of resistance requirement is
ineffective unless force requirement is also eliminated); see generally Wickton, supra note 18.
43 See, e.g., StephenJ. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond,
11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 71-77 (1992) (stating that: "nothing less than a crystallized attitude of
positive willingness should ever count as consent"); Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows,
Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599, 607 (1991) (observing
that "[s]ilence or other passive behavior by the victim would not constitute sufficient evi-
dence of consent between nonstrangers").
44 Forcible rape differs from statutory rape in that the prosecutor must ordinarily prove
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complex topic that would lead us far afield.
Does the social-scientific evidence vindicate or refute claims of
bias against victims? In Part I we discuss this question in specific insti-
tutional settings, beginning with reporting of rape and continuing
through evaluation of rape complaints by police, prosecutors, and ju-
ries. If anti-victim biases are indeed prevalent, have law reforms miti-
gated the problem? When objectionable laws are repealed or
modified, do more victims report rapes, do prosecutors file more
charges, and are juries more willing to convict? If not, why not? In
answering these questions, we will analyze data from the latest social-
scientific research.
In Part II, we consider the problem of bias from a different per-
spective, focusing on three pervasive questions that recur in every in-
stitutional context:
1. How common are false reports of rape? Most academic discus-
sions of this subject are cursory and tendentious. The prevalent as-
sumption is that only a negligible proportion of rape reports are false.
On that assumption, skepticism towards putative rape victims is hardly
ever justifiable. But does the assumption rest on a solid empirical
foundation? Here again we analyze social-scientific findings that have
not yet been discussed by legal scholars.
2. To what extent is the difficulty of securing convictions in ac-
quaintance rape cases due to the prosecution's burden of proof?. In
other words, how often is leniency towards accused rapists attributable
to genuinely reasonable doubts about the defendant's guilt, rather
than unfair biases of police, prosecutors, and jurors? This difficult
issue, though almost totally ignored in the rape literature, is central to
an appraisal of the functioning of the criminal justice system in rape
cases-not only the fact-finder's decision, but also the decisions of po-
lice and prosecutors, who often decline to pursue cases that they re-
gard as unprovable. 45
3. In an acquaintance rape case, does evidence that discredits the
alleged victim's character have genuine probative value in determin-
ing whether the sexual encounter was consensual? Many scholars
that the victim did not consent, while in statutory rape the underage victim's youth nulli-
fies her consent. 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw §§ 280, 285 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 15th ed.
1995) [hereinafter WHARTON'S]. In certain narrowly defined and relatively rare types of
cases an adult is presumed incapable of consent because of her mental defect or uncon-
sciousness or the extortionate or deceptive conduct of the rapist. See generally Ernst Wilfred
Puttkammer, Consent in Rape, 19 ILL. L. REV. 410 (1925). For a brief outline of the legal
issues involved in statutory rape, see 3 WHARTON'S, supra, § 285.
For an introductory bibliography on homosexual rape, see Panel Discussion: Men, Wo-
men and Rape, 63 FoRDRum L. Rlv. 125, 127 nn.9, 10 (1994).
45 See infra notes 225-80, 347-94 and accompanying text.
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have discussed the relevance of evidence about the complainant's sex-
ual history, particularly in connection with rape shield laws. 46 We will
broaden the inquiry to include other types of evidence commonly
used to discredit rape victims' characters.
Observers agree, for example, that juries tend to acquit men ac-
cused of raping women who violate sex-role norms by engaging in cas-
ual sex.47 Is this because jurors are unfairly biased against such
women, or because in such cases the defendant's claim that the wo-
man consented is often plausible enough to raise a truly reasonable
doubt?
Similarly, rape scholars report that, if the defendant and his ac-
cuser had previously been lovers, juries are extremely reluctant to con-
vict him.48 Is this because jurors harbor prejudices against non-
marital sex, or is it because in this type of case the defendant's version
of events-seduction rather than rape-is more likely to be plausible?
Our discussion of these issues will introduce the concept of
"ambiprobative evidence," which, we believe, sheds new light on all of
the major types of evidence used to discredit rape victims, from pro-
miscuity to mental instability, to hitchhiking or drunkenness.
Assuming that evidence of the woman's "misconduct" is irrele-
vant to the defendant's guilt, we conclude by considering whether
such information can be kept from the jury. Can law reforms force
witnesses and juries to focus on the man's conduct rather than the
woman's character?
We are not so naive as to suppose that all of these questions can
be answered unequivocally, definitively, and to every reader's satisfac-
tion. Our relatively modest ambition is to promote a more critical and
nuanced appraisal of the empirical foundations of rape law reforms.
II. FROM REPORT TO VERDICr
The social-scientific and anecdotal evidence concerning "victim
blaming" in rape cases distinguishes sharply between acquaintance
rapes and stranger rapes. This is not a legal distinction: typically,
modem statutes define forcible rape as nonconsensual sexual pene-
tration obtained by physical force, or by threat of bodily harm, or
when the victim is incapable of giving consent.49 In this definition,
46 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 1, at 12-100; Galvin, supra note 4, at 778-801.
47 See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 4, at 767. In this article, "promiscuous" means much less
sexually restrained than most women of the same age and marital status. Unfortunately,
we know of no alternative term that is either more precise or less pejorative.
48 See, e.g., SUZSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 89-93 (1987).
49 See WHARTON'S, supra note 44, § 276; Leigh Bienen, Rape RT. National Developments in
Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 170, 174 (1981). Forcible rape is often
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and in most of the other rules affecting rape cases, no line is drawn
between rapes by strangers and rapes by acquaintances, or between
rapes with and without a weapon.50 But rape scholars agree, with im-
pressive unanimity,51 that although forcible rape is nominally a single
crime, for practical purposes it is two crimes. This is because the ac-
tors in the criminal justice system-police, prosecutors, juries, judges
and even victims themselves-tend to be sympathetic towards some
types of rape victims but skeptical towards others. 52 The traditional
image of a rapist is a knife-wielding stranger. 53 If the rapist conforms
to this image, by being a stranger, or by inflicting some serious addi-
tional physical injury on the woman, 54 the public generally abhors the
crime and sympathizes with the woman. 55 But most rapes are perpe-
divided into degrees, in order to permit more serious punishment in cases in which the
offense is aggravated by physical injuries or multiple offenders. SeeWHrTON'S, supra note
44, § 284.
50 See generally WHARTON'S, supra note 44, § 276.
51 But seeJulie Homey & Cassia Spohn, The Influence of Blame and Believability Factors on
the Processing of Simple Versus Aggravated Rape Cases, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 135 (1996) (outcomes
of non-aggravated and aggravated rape cases do not differ in Detroit).
52 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1 at 17-20. Some scholars use the term "aggravated
rape" to cover rapes (1) by strangers, or (2) with multiple assailants, or (3) resulting in
extrinsic injuries. All other rapes are called "simple rape." See, e.g., ESTRiCH, supra note 1,
at 19-20; HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY 252 (1966). While we have
no serious objection to this terminology, our research indicates that for purposes of legal
sociology, gang rapes may be functionally equivalent to ordinary acquaintance rapes rather
than to the other types of aggravated rape. Although it obviously makes sense to treat gang
rapes as "aggravated" for sentencing purposes, in most rape scholarship the main point of
the distinction between aggravated and simple rape is that the justice system is thought to
work reasonably well in aggravated rape cases, while functioning poorly in simple rape
cases. See United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 475 (1994); see, e.g., Es-
trich, supra note 1, at 3-4, 60; FAIRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 151-52.
For this purpose, the correct classification of gang rapes is uncertain. Susan Estrich
believes that the criminal justice system is more sympathetic to the prosecution in gang
rape cases than in ordinary acquaintance rape cases. EsTRICH, supra note 1, at 10, 99. But
see Gary D. LaFree, Official Reactions to Social Problems: Police Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases,
28 Soc. PROBS. 582 (1981) [hereinafter LaFree, Official Reactions]. In a major study of a
police department's processing of sexual assault cases, LaFree found that:
assaults involving more than one offender were less likely to be filed as felonies. Inter-
views indicated that detectives were suspicious of sexual assaults involving more than
one offender-particularly when these cases also involved more than one victim, when
victims and offenders were acquainted prior to the incident, or when victims and of-
fenders were young. Several detectives referred to cases with these characteristics as
'party rapes,' and suggested that such incidents deserved less serious attention than
other complaints.
Id. Accord THOMAS W. MCCAHILL ET AL., THE AFrERMATH OF RAPE 112 (1979) (stating that
Philadelphia police believed "only about two-thirds of gang rape allegations"). These find-
ings suggest that gang rapes by acquaintances are not treated by the police as "aggravated"
rapes.
53 ESTRCH, supra note 1, at 8.
54 Minor injuries such as a scratch or a bruise can often be explained as self-inflicted or
due to other causes. See infra note 313.
55 See, e.g., KALvEN AND ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 252-55. Kalven and Zeisel found that
trated by acquaintances of the victim: lovers, dates, co-workers, neigh-
bors, relatives, and so on.5 6 The rapist usually does not physically
injure his victim.5 7 In these typical cases, attention usually focuses on
juries were four times as likely to convict in aggravated rape cases (where the accused was a
stranger to the victim, or extrinsic injuries to victim resulted, or multiple assailants were
involved) as they were in simple rapes. Id. See also EsTRICH, supra note 1 at 3-4, 13-14;
Judith S. Bridges, Perceptions of Date and Stranger Rape: A Difference in Sex Role Expectations and
Rape-Supportive Beliefs, 24 SEX ROLES 291 (1991) (subjects more likely to incorporate sex-
role expectations and rape-supportive beliefs into perceptions of acquaintance rape than
stranger rape; less likely to attribute causes of rape to victim's failure to control situation, to
a "misunderstanding" between parties, or to victim's desire for intercourse if parties were
not previously acquainted).
56 The National Victim Center's survey data revealed that only 22% of rape victims had
been raped by someone they had never seen before, or did not know well; 9% by husbands
or ex-husbands; 11% by fathers or step-fathers; 10% by boyfriends or ex-boyfriends; 16% by
other relatives; 29% by other non-relatives such as friends and neighbors; and 3% were
unsure or refused to answer. NATIONAL VIciM CENTER, CRIME VcriMs RESEARCH AND
TREATMENT CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA 4 (1992) [hereinafter RAPE IN AMERICA]. According
to the most methodologically sophisticated national survey of sexual practices, only 4% of
women who have been "forced to do something sexual that they did not want to do" were
victimized by a stranger. EDWARD 0. LAuMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXU-
A=. SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 338 (1994). In 9% of the incidents of
"forced" sex, the perpetrator was the woman's spouse; in another 46% he was someone
with whom she was in love; in 22% he was someone she knew well; and in another 19% he
was an acquaintance. Id. Although the authors caution that their concept of forced sex is
broader than the legal definition of rape, id. at 335, it seems clear that most rapes are
perpetrated by men who know the victim. See, e.g., FAIRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 129 (stating
that !"[M]ore than 50 percent of reported rapes were-and continue to be-assaults by men
who were known to their victims"); Mary P. Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitu-
dinal and Situational Characteristics, 9 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193, 206 (1985) (reporting that
most rapes involved acquaintances or romantic intimates). According to one estimate,
only 15% of rapes are perpetrated by strangers. JULE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHT--
MAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 51 (1993). Surveys to determine the proportion of
rapes committed by acquaintances are likely to err on the low side, unless the survey meth-
odology takes account of what Koss calls "hidden rape"-i.e., the fact that many women
whose answers to survey questions reveal that they have in fact been raped do not label the
experience as such. Koss, supra, at 206. Victimization surveys which "require that a woman
conceptualize and report her experience as rape" are therefore suspect. Id. In Koss's
study of university women, 43% of the women whose answers revealed that they had been
raped denied that they had been raped, and most of these women "were assaulted by an
acquaintance or romantic intimate." Id. Of course, researchers must also take care not to
define "rape" too broadly. See Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assaul( 103 PuB.
INEsr 54 (1991).
Some rapists are on the borderline between acquaintances and strangers: for example,
a neighbor or co-worker whom the victim recognized but had not met, or a driver who
rapes a hitchhiker after preliminary conversation. In addition, some types of acquaint-
ances are functionally equivalent to strangers because they cannot plausibly claim that the
victim consented or because the nature of the relationship is such that the public blames
the man even if the relationship was consensual. The latter type of case is often statutory
rape or incest, but if the man employed force he can be charged with the more serious
crime of forcible rape.
57 See infra notes 768-69 and accompanying text.
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the woman's character.58 If her pre-rape behavior violated traditional
norms of female prudence or morality, 59 many people blame her in-
stead of the rapist.
A complete stranger cannot plausibly claim that his victim con-
sented. Consequently, a stranger rape defendant almost always con-
cedes that his accuser was raped; his usual defense is that she honestly
misidentified him as the rapist.60 He has no acute need, therefore, to
portray her as vindictive, unbalanced, immoral, or dishonest. Because
he denies that he had intercourse with the victim, he has no occasion
to persuade the jury that she "led him on" or "was asking for it" or was
promiscuous or failed to resist his advances. In a stranger rape, the
possibility that the parties misunderstood each other's signals does
not arise. As a result, the woman's character and all the controversial
issues of appropriate sex roles and behavior in dating situations ordi-
narily are not issues. Toward the victim of a stranger rape, the public
usually feels compassion, with a correspondingly severe attitude to-
ward the rapist.
61
In acquaintance rape cases, by definition, the parties knew each
other beforehand, at least slightly. Consequently, the defense usually
is consent rather than misidentification. 62 With a consent defense,
the woman's character is inevitably a critical issue, because if their sex-
ual encounter was consensual, then her story of rape must have been
a fabrication or at least an exaggeration. In acquaintance rape cases
the defendant often seeks to portray the woman as immoral, thus
"putting the victim on trial."63 Even if the evidence suggests an honest
misunderstanding between the parties, the question of who was more
to blame for the misunderstanding will then arise, and impressions of
the woman's character probably will affect the jury's judgment on this
issue.
Most proposals to reform rape law, such as rape shield laws, have
been designed to improve the prosecution's chances in acquaintance
rape cases, and to lessen the victim's ordeal by restricting inquiries
58 See EsTRICH, supra note 1, at 4-6.
59 Many of the traditional norms of female morality can be characterized as at least
partly prudential; even today sexual activity generally entails greater risks for females than
for males.
60 See infra notes 470-71 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 11-14.
62 Other defenses-for example, diminished responsibility-are, of course, possible.
See generally WHARTON'S, supra note 44, § 286; JOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAw §§ 16.01-16.03, 24.01-24.07, 26.01-26.03 (1987).
63 See, e.g., Karen S. Calhoun & Ruth M. Townsley, Attributions of Responsibility for Ac-
quaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 57, 65 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds.,
1991) [hereinafter AcQuAINTANCE RAPE]; FARSmIN, supra note 13, at 122.
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into her relationships with other men.64 From the prosecution's point
of view, acquaintance rape cases are most difficult to win if the woman
either had engaged in consensual sex with the defendant at some time
before the alleged rape,65 or behaved in ways that violated traditional
norms of female propriety.66 Common examples include being a
64 See, e.g., EsTRICH, supra note 1, at 7, 92-104; Balos & Fellows, supra note 43, at 601-02
(arguing that rape law should incorporate the common law confidential relationship
doctrine).
65 According to one scholar, a prior sexual relationship between the alleged victim and
the defendant is a "real trump card for the defense," which makes it "practically impossible
to convince the jury that the incident in question was anything other than one in a long
series of consensual acts." ADLER, supra note 48, at 53. After studying a random sample of
English rape trials, Adler concluded that "[w]hen the victim agrees that there had been
sexual involvement [with the defendant] in the past, the defendant is almost invariably
acquitted." Id. at 91. Adler notes that the prior relationship not only discredits the claim
of rape in the jury's eyes, but also is suggestive of motives for a fabricated rape charge. Id.
at 92-93.
Some police are also swayed by evidence of a prior relationship between the parties.
Holmstrom and Burgess quote a Boston policeman: "[T]he officer said loudly, with deri-
sion and contempt in his voice, 'Her boyfriend did it. He rapes her every Monday,
Wednesday, and Friday-when she wants it.'" HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 40.
In a study of rape cases processed in the District of Columbia from 1971 to 1976, Williams
found that only 9% of defendants who were cohabiting, or were ex-spouses or ex-boy-
friends of putative rape victims, were convicted. Kristen Williams, Few Convictions in Rape
Cases: Empirical Evidence Concerning Some Alternative Explanations, 9 J. Crum. Jusr. 29, 36
(1981). On the other hand, only 10% of the defendants who were friends of the victim
were convicted and 27% of strangers. Id.
In an experimental study, L'Armand and Pepitone included three relationship condi-
tions in their rape stories: dating with prior consensual sex; dating with no prior sex; and
strangers. K. L'Armand & A. Pepitone, Judgements of Rape: A Study of Victim-Rapist Relation-
ship and Victim Sexual History, 8 PERSONALriy & Soc. PSYCH. Burr. 134, 135 (1982). Subjects
estimated victim blame for the rape on a 0-100 scale, giving the victim with prior consen-
sual sex with the defendant an average blame score of 39.3, the victim who had dated the
defendant without sex 32.5, and the victim who did not know her attacker 30.1. Id. The
sentence imposed varied significantly, with the stranger rapist receiving 13.5 years, the dat-
ing without prior sex rapist 8.5 years, and the rapist who had a previous consensual rela-
tionship with the victim 5.1 years. Id.
66 An experienced prosecutor, writing about trial preparation for rape cases, discusses
the "unpopular victim." William Heiman, Prosecuting Rape Cases: Trial Preparation and Trial
Tactic Issues, in PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INvESTIGATON 343 (Robert R. Hazelwood &
Ann Wolbert Burgess eds., 1987). According to Heiman, the unpopular victim is one,
who, by virtue of her background or lifestyle in general or because of the particular
activity in which she was engaged just prior to the rape, can be expected to elicit
biased or negative feelings from the average juror. Examples of this include prosti-
tutes, hitchhikers, drug and alcohol abusers, runaways and truants.
Id.
Also, a study conducted by a prominent rape scholar concluded that, "jurors who held
conservative notions regarding appropriate behavior for women tended to absolve a de-
fendant of guilt if the victim allegedly violated conservative notions of 'proper' female
behavior by drinking or using drugs or by being sexually active outside marriage." Gary D.
LaFree et al., Jurors' Responses to Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Tials, 32
Soc. PROBS. 389, 401 (1985).
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prostitute,67 or promiscuous, 68 or a truant or a runaway, 69 frequenting
singles bars,70 hitchhiking,71 using drugs,72 drinking heavily,73 or
wearing sexy attire.
74
What is the origin of this prejudice against "bad victims"'75 who
are raped by acquaintances? One theory is that a male ideology per-
vades the criminal justice system.76 According to this view, the re-
spectable males who dominate the system-police, prosecutors, jurors
and judges-are sincerely horrified by stranger rapes, and rapes in-
volving knives or guns.77 They also abhor rapes that occur in "inap-
propriate" relationships such as incest.7 8 In such cases, the rape
scenario does not resemble ordinary, socially acceptable sexual
relations.
In contrast, respectable men empathize with men who are ac-
67 One study compared victim responsibility ratings and sentences for the rapist of a
prostitute, divorced woman, married woman, single virgin and single non-virgin. Shirley
Feldman-Summers & Karen Lindner, Perceptions of Victims and Defendants in Criminal Assault
Cases, 3 CPM. JusT. & BEHAV. 135 (1976). Results on sentence length were insignificant
but victim responsibility ratings did differ in the expected direction. The prostitute was
assigned significantly more responsibility for the sexual assault than the married woman
and the two single women. Id. at 141. The prostitute was also assigned more responsibility
than the divorced woman, although not significantly so. Id. See also LaFree et al., supra
note 66, at 401.
68 In another study, mock jurors were given three different rape scenarios to read and
evaluate. In one scenario, no mention was made of the victim's prior sexual history; in
another scenario she was described as having limited sexual experience; and in a third she
was promiscuous. Significant differences were found over both stranger and dating rela-
tionships for recommended sentence, seriousness of the crime, and damage to the victim.
When the victim's sexual history was not mentioned, the defendant was sentenced to 8.5
years. When she was described as having limited experience, he received 7.3 years. But
when the victim was described as having had many previous casual sexual relationships, the
rapist received only 4.5 years. L'Armand & Pepitone, supra note 65, at 135.
69 Heiman, supra note 66, at 343.
70 GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL As-
SAULT 51 (1989) [hereinafter LAFREE, RAPE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
71 See LaFree, Official Reactions, supra note 52, at 586; HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra
note 4, at 43.
72 See LaFree et al., supra note 66, at 392 (if victim used drugs jurors were less likely to
believe in defendant's guilt than if she had not); ADLER, supra note 48, at 102-03.
73 Not surprisingly, studies also show that the victim's alcohol consumption affects
mock jurors' judgments about her and their recommended sentences for the rapist in a
date rape situation. E.g., Deborah Richardson &Jennifer L. Campbell, Alcohol and Rape:
The Effect of Alcohol on Attributions of Blame for Rape, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
468 (1982). If the victim of a rape was drunk, she was assigned more responsibility than if
sober. Id. at 472.
74 POSNER, supra note 8. Holmstrom and Burgess explain that sexy attire is perceived as
an indicator of sexual behavior. By wearing sexy clothing the victim was thought to be
"asking for it." HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 134-35, 178-79.
75 Cf VACHSS, supra note 13, at 90.
76 See, e.g., EsTRiCH, supra note 1, at 16, 60.
77 Id. at 3-4, 10.
78 See, e.g., id. at 32-38.
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cused of having raped a woman on a date.79 The respectable man
tends to identify with the male in a dating situation, and he can easily
imagine being falsely accused of rape, or irresistibly provoked by a
"loose woman." Accordingly, he wishes to ensure that "normal" ag-
gressive male sexuality is protected by the law.8 0
Some authors contend that men, irrationally fearing false rape
accusations, are deeply suspicious of women who claim to have been
raped by an acquaintance.8' Men (and women who have adopted the
male ideology) often express this suspicion by blaming the female vic-
tim of the rape rather than the male perpetrator.8 2 For example,
some used to claim that it is impossible to rape a woman against her
will.83 According to another rape myth, all women want to be raped;8 4
women who decline men's sexual advances are merely being coy: con-
sciously or not, they secretly crave sex.85 An equally venerable, and
probably much more widespread, idea is that rapes are caused by a
sudden, uncontrollable explosion of male desire, ignited by the be-
havior of a provocatively sexy woman.86
Some authors note that the effect of all this victim blaming is to
preserve male sexual access to women, unencumbered by fear of be-
ing punished for rape.8 7
As modem rape scholarship proliferated, it became, in one
scholar's words, "increasingly clear that rape victims were systemati-
cally subjected to institutionalized sexism, which began with their
treatment by the police, continued through the legal system, much
influenced by notions of victim precipitation, and ended with the ac-
quittal of many de facto rapists.188
We now evaluate the validity of this meta-theory as an explanation
of case attrition in rape cases, beginning with attrition statistics and
then turning to the individual stages of the attrition process: the vic-
tim's report; police "founding" of the report; filing of charges by the
79 See ADLER, supra note 48, at i29-30.
80 ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 5-6.
81 Id. at 102. Estrich states that distrust of women claiming to have been raped by an
acquaintance has been incorporated into the law through evidentiary rules such as requir-
ing corroboration and admitting evidence of the victim's norm-violating character. Id at
27-56.
82 Susan Brownmiller traces rape victim-blaming to ancient times. BROWNMILLER, supra
note 1, at 19-20, 22.
83 Id. at 311-12.
84 Id. at 311-13.
85 Martha K Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in AcQuANTANCE RAPE, supra note
63, at 30-31.
86 Id. at 32.
87 FsncH, supra note 1, at 23-25, 43, 62-69.
88 ADLER, supra note 48, at 17.
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prosecutor; and finally, the trial.
A. ATTRITION STATISTICS AND THE EQUIVALENT CRIMES FALLACY
The average citizen may suppose that when a serious crime oc-
curs the victim reports it to the police, who verify the report, try to
identify and arrest the perpetrator, and turn the case over to a prose-
cutor. The prosecutor files charges and usually proves the accused's
guilt at a trial. The judge then sentences the defendant to an appro-
priately lengthy imprisonment, taking due account of the severity of
the crime.
In practice, the system does not work that way.89 The justice sys-
tem has been likened to a giant sieve, filtering out cases at every stage
of the process.90 Many victims do not report crimes, especially those
committed by acquaintances. 91 Even if the victim reports the crime,
the perpetrator usually is not convicted.92 Sometimes the police can-
not discover what they regard as sufficient corroborative evidence of
his guilt.93 Or the victim may decide, sooner or later, not to cooper-
ate with the police, and the case may be dismissed for that reason.
94
Even if the police believe the victim's report, they often fail to
arrest the perpetrator-for instance, a stranger rapist-because they
89 See generally CALEB FOOTE & ROBERTJ. LEVY, CRIMINAL LAWv: CASES AND MATERIALS 301-
27 (1981).
90 See, e.g., id at 306.
91 Results of the National Crime Survey show that between 1973 and 1990, the percent-
age of all criminal victimizations reported to the police ranged from 32% to 38%. MARTIN
S. GREENBERG & R. BARRY RUBACK, AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAKING 7-8 (1992).
The reporting rates vary by type of crime: 75% of motor vehicle thefts were reported in
1990, compared to 54% of rapes and 29% of personal thefts. Id. See alsoJim Galvin &
Kenneth Polk, Attrition in Case Processing: Is Rape Unique?, 20J. REs. CRIME DELINQ. 126, 138
(1983) (finding that the percentage of all victimizations in the U.S. reported to the police
in 1980 ranged from 42% for rape to 57% for robbery). See infra notes 169-88 and accom-
panying text (discussing the reporting of sexual assaults).
92 In 1980, the percentage of reported offenses resulting in arrest ranged from 14% for
burglary to 72% for homicide. Galvin & Polk, supra note 91, at 138. Attrition continues as
cases progress through the system. Thus, in California, Galvin and Polk found that only
17% of those arrested for rape eventually received an institutional sentence, compared
with 3% for assault and 38% for homicide. Id. at 136. See also Martha A. Myers & Gary D.
LaFree, Sexual Assault and Its Prosecution: A Comparison With Other Crimes, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1282, 1288 (1982) (45.6% of sexual assaults proceeding to trial result in ac-
quittal versus 31.8% for other violent crimes). Analyzing data from several previous stud-
ies, Frazier and Haney concluded that 12% of reported rapes result in conviction. Patricia
A. Frazier & Beth Haney, Sexual Assault Cases in the Legal System: Police, Prosecutor and Victim
Perspectives, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 607, 617 (1996).
93 The police may "unfound" a complaint for any of several reasons. See generally infra
notes 225-346 and accompanying text (discussing the police founding decision in rape
cases).
94 See HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAw ENFORCEMENT 26 (1982).
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cannot identify him.95 If they do arrest someone, the prosecutor's of-
fice may decide, for any of several reasons, not to file charges.9 6 The
crime may be minor and prosecutors may be preoccupied with cases
they perceive as more important. A noncriminal solution, such as res-
titution of stolen property, may be worked out. In many cases the
prosecutor decides that the evidence of guilt is not strong enough to
persuade a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. To save the time and
expense of a trial, and to ensure a conviction, the prosecutor often
agrees to reduced charges (for instance, indecent assault instead of
rape) or a light sentence in return for a guilty plea. Frequently, how-
ever, the case is so weak that the prosecutor, lacking the requisite bar-
gaining power for a deal with the accused offender, simply does not
file charges.
The relatively few cases that proceed to trial often end with an
acquittal 97 or a hung jury. Even if the defendant is convicted, he may
receive a suspended sentence. If he goes to prison, the chances are
that the time served, once deductions are made for parole and good
behavior, will strike the average citizen as much too short.98
In The Limits of Law Enforcement, Hans Zeisel observed that perva-
sive patterns of felony attrition plague all criminal justice systems.99 In
a single year in New York City, for example, of every 1000 "index felo-
95 One compilation of arrest rate statistics indicates that, depending on thejurisdiction,
40% to 52% of all founded rape complaints led to an arrest. Kim Late Scheppele, The Re-
Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1095, 1097 (1987) (book review). Likewise, Frazier
and Haney found that suspects in a midwesternjurisdiction were identified in only 48% of
rape cases reported to the police in 1991; only 47% of those identified were subsequently
referred to the prosecutor. Frazier & Haney, supra note 92, at 617.
96 Galvin and Polk found that California prosecutors filed charges against 52% of sus-
pects arrested for rape, compared to 66% of homicide suspects and 4% of those arrested
for burglary. Galvin & Polk, supra note 92, at 141. A more recent study found that one-
quarter of rape cases referred to prosecutors in a midwestern jurisdiction were not
charged. Frazier & Haney, supra note 92, at 617-18. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & Aus-
TIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw §§ 4, 18 (1986) (describing the charging
decision).
97 Acquittals have historically been common for many major crimes. See KALVEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 42 (jury acquittal rates for major crimes). For a discussion ofjury
leniency in rape cases, see infra text accompanying notes 398-426. Although we lack empir-
ical studies, some anecdotal evidence indicates that juries in acquaintance rape cases are
now less prone to acquit than in previous cases. See infra text accompanying notes 443-45.
98 For example, in Minnesota, the executed sentence for aggravated robbery commit-
ted by a first-time offender would be 48 months in prison. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 244.101,
244 App. IV (West Supp. 1995). Provided the prisoner commits no disciplinary offenses,
he is released after serving 32 months-two-thirds of the executed sentence. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 244.101 (West Supp. 1995). The remaining 16 months are served on supervised
release. I&L Nationwide estimates find that on average prisoners only serve 33% of their
sentences. PATRICK A. LANGAN & RIcHARD SOLARI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONALJUDI-
CIAL REPORTING PROGRAM, 1990 tbl., at 1.5 (1993).
99 ZEISEL, supra note 94, at 17-25.
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nies," only 54% were reported to police. Of these, only sixty-five led
to an arrest, thirty-six resulted in a conviction, seventeen resulted in a
custody sentence, and three criminals were incarcerated for over a
year. 100 Although precise figures vary, a similar pattern of sharp attri-
tion holds across different jurisdictions, countries and eras: 46 to 60%
of felony arrests will result in a pretrial dismissal at some level of the
criminal justice system.10'
During the past two decades, many rape scholars have lamented
the exceedingly high rate of attrition in rape cases, especially acquain-
tance cases. According to one authority, "the likelihood of a rape
complaint actually ending in conviction is generally estimated at 2-
5%."102 Although the phenomenon of case attrition transcends
crimes and even national boundaries, 103 many scholars believe that
the problem is more acute in rape cases104 and conclude that this is
chiefly due to systemic discrimination against acquaintance rape com-
plainants.'0 5 Analysis of this hypothesis has proceeded at several levels
of sophistication.
1. Attrition in Rape Case Processing
Many commentators simply cite rape attrition statistics to buttress
their contention that the justice system, at every stage, is hostile to
claims of rape. 10 6 The attrition statistics for rape are indeed striking.
Recent crime-victim survey data suggest that each year an estimated
500,000 women are victims of some form of rape or sexual assault. 10 7
100 Id. at 18.
101 Id. at 26.
102 Joan McGregor, Introduction to Symposium on Philosophical Issues in Rape Law, 11 LAw &
PHIL. 1, 2 (1992).
103 The Vera Institute estimated that only 15% of those arrested for felonies in NewYork
were convicted of a felony. Indeed, only 2.3% of the cases went to trial and in the vast
majority of those, the conviction was for a misdemeanor or a lesser felony. The case was
almost always either dismissed (43%) or resulted in a guilty plea (55%). Of the guilty
pleas, only 5% were for the felony charged; another 20% were for lesser felonies. About
75% of all guilty pleas for felony charges reduced the offense to a misdemeanor. VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DIsPOSITION IN NEW YORK
CITY's COURTS 6 (1977) [hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE STUDY]. Only murder failed to con-
form to this pattern of attrition. Id. at 52.
104 See generally HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 152-54.
105 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 15-26; Deborah Gartzke Goolsby, Comment, Using
Mediation in Cases of Simple Rape, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1183, 1184 (1990) (stating that the
criminal justice system accepts the defendant's claim that the victim consented and now
either regrets the encounter or wishes to retaliate against the defendant); Lynne Hender-
son, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 41, 41 (1993)
(claiming that victim-blaming in the criminal justice system makes a successful prosecution
in non-aggravated acquaintance rape cases improbable).
106 See, e.g., supra note 105.
107 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
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Yet in 1994, only 102,096 rapes were reported to authorities, and ulti-
mately there were only an estimated 36,610 arrests for forcible rape. 10 8
Drawing on data from several jurisdictions, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee reported that 98% of rape victims "never see their attacker
caught, tried and imprisoned."'0 9 Studies of individual jurisdictions
have also found patterns of sharp case attrition for rape." 0
Since the 1970s, such figures have led advocates and scholars to
conclude that the criminal justice system discriminates against rape
victims. The reluctance of victims to report and prosecute rape, they
argue, can be attributed to "institutionalized sexism,""' which per-
vades a system hostile to rape complainants. Two scholars, discussing
why increased reporting has not led to more rape convictions, con-
clude that while "[t]he reasons for this tremendous lack of convictions
are complex, it is clear that a major factor is related to the judgmental
policies of the police, prosecuting attorneys and the juries."" 2 The
Senate Judiciary Committee warned that low rates of reporting and
processing of rape "provide dramatic testimony of the power of our
stereotypes of crime-how these stereotypes distort our understand-
ing of violence against women and deprive individuals of the equal
protection of our laws.""u
While these conclusions may be accurate, they are not self-evi-
dent from the attrition statistics. For the sake of illustration, suppose
that of every 100 rapes, thirty are not reported for personal reasons
that have nothing to do with anticipated official bias. In another fif-
teen cases the perpetrator was a stranger who cannot be identified.
Assume that two false rape reports have been made," 4 and that in
twenty cases the complainant, though honest, ultimately decided not
to press charges." 5 Finally, suppose that in twenty-eight cases the rap-
ist could not be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to the satis-
faction of an impartial factfinder.1 6 In that event, if only five of every
ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 1 (1995) [hereinafter VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN].
108 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1994 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 376 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 UCR].
109 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., THE RESPONSE TO
RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUALJUSTICE iii (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter THE
RESPONSE TO RAPE].
110 For a recent review of studies of rape case processing, see Ruth Triplett & Susan L.
Miller, Case Processing in the Harris County, Texas Criminal Justice System: A Comparison Across
Crime Types, 22J. CRIM. JUST. 13, 13-15 (1994).
111 Robin, supra note 1, at 142.
112 FELDMAN-SUMMERS & LINDER, supra note 67, at 135-36.
113 THE RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 109, at 13.
114 For a discussion of false rape reports, see infra notes 603-16 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 331-37 and accompanying text.
116 For a discussion of the difficult proof problems in rape cases, see infra text accompa-
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100 rapes lead to criminal convictions, the justice system may be work-
ing perfectly, screening out false reports plus a much larger number
of cases in which either the victim does not cooperate, or the perpe-
trator's identity is unknown, or his guilt cannot be proven.
But, of course, attrition statistics also are amenable to less san-
guine interpretations. For example, rape victims might have decided
to remain silent about the crime because they feared official mistreat-
ment. Also, the system might have screened out some of the truthful
complaints rather than the false ones. Detectives might have per-
suaded truthful complainants that it would not be in their interest to
undergo the rigors of a trial. 117 Police or prosecutors might have
brushed aside truthful accusations by women of whom they disap-
proved, or against ex-husbands or boyfriends," 18 while perhaps mistak-
enly believing some honest misidentifications in stranger rape
cases." 9 And, of course, cases in which officials or juries decided that
the crime did not occur, or was not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, may have been real rapes, amply proven. By themselves, rape
attrition statistics do not provide a basis for excluding any of these
hypotheses.
2. Rape v. Other Major Crimes
Some scholars have tried to improve the statistical analysis by
comparing the attrition pattern for rape with that for comparable
felonies. While these studies confirm that few rapes result in arrest or
conviction, they also indicate that the same is true of most major felo-
nies. For example, Galvin and Polk found that, in California, rape was
treated comparably to other felonies by police, prosecutors, and
judges.' 20 They concluded that, "[w]hile probably somewhat more
nying notes 720-71.
117 See infra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 307, 359-60 and accompanying text.
119 See ELIZABETH F. Lorrus, EYEwITNESS TEsTriMoNY 142-44 (1979) (stating that uncon-
scious transference can cause a witness to identify a suspect because the witness saw the
suspect, or a photo of the suspect, in a context other than the crime); StephanieJ. Platz &
Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. 972, 981-83 (1988) (discussing the inaccuracy of cross-racial identifications);
Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts About "Weapon Focus, "11 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 55, 61-62
(1987) (stating that "weapon focus" often interferes with identification capacity). See also
Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?: Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. Rxv. 969, 978-86 (1977) (describing vari-
ables that sometimes lead to misidentification).
120 Calvin & Polk, supra note 91, at 146. The researchers found that in 1980 in Califor-
nia, 43% of reported rapes were cleared by arrests, compared to 63% of homicides, 56% of
assaults, 23% of robberies, and 13% of burglaries. Id. at 141. Charges were filed in 52% of
rape arrests, compared to 66% of homicides, 54% of robberies, 43% of burglaries, and
25% of assaults. Id. Similar patterns were revealed in conviction and sentencing, leading
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rape cases experience attrition in the justice system than is true for
homicide, rape seems to show a level of loss comparable to robbery at
most points; and certainly lower levels of loss than assault or burglary.
These findings hold across time and jurisdictions."12'
Myers and LaFree reached a similar conclusion in their study of
felony prosecutions in Indiana.122 Controlling for case differences
such as evidentiary strength and crime seriousness, they found few dif-
ferences in the processing of sexual assaults or in officials' reactions to
rape complainants. 123 The differences that did exist were explained,
in their view, not by victim characteristics but by the availability of
evidence of legal guilt.
124
A Justice Department study of thirty urban jurisdictions found
that rape and aggravated assault had comparable attrition patterns.125
Like Myers and LaFree, the study concluded that prosecutors gener-
ally decide whether to prosecute a rape case by the same criterion that
they employ in nonsexual assault cases: the likelihood of obtaining a
conviction. 126 Similarly, when Steffensmeier compared the disposi-
tion of rape cases and other felony offenses across a wide range of
jurisdictions, he found that processing and conviction rates for rape
were similar to those of other major felonies.' 27
Another similarity between case processing in rape and other
crimes is the role of the victim-complainant in determining the out-
come. Several studies have pointed to victims' unwillingness to coop-
erate as a major cause of attrition in rape cases.128 This seems to
mean that the attrition is voluntary, and thus not attributable to sys-
the authors to conclude that "[ape has no unique pattern of attrition." Id. at 152.
121 Id. at 126.
122 Myers & LaFree, supra note 92, at 1288.
123 Id. at 1300.
124 Id. at 1301.
125 BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY
ARREsTS, 1988 15-23 (1992) [hereinafter PFA]. For example, in 1988 in San Diego, 42% of
rape cases and 41% of assault cases were dismissed; guilty verdicts were obtained in 55% of
rape cases and 50% of assault cases. Id. at 21. In the District of Columbia, 61% of rape
cases and 71% of assault cases were dismissed, while guilty verdicts were obtained in 29% of
rape and 25% of assault cases. Id. at 23.
126 Id.
127 DarrellJ. Steffensmeier, The Uniqueness of Rape?: Disposition and Sentencing Outcomes of
Rape in Comparison to Other Major Felonies, 72 Soc. ScI. Rxs. 192, 193 (1988). For example,
once a case was filed as a felony, rape was found to have a 73% conviction rate, compared
to 76% for homicide, 67% for assault and 86% for burglary. Id.
128 For example, of 109 reported rape cases in Boston, 26 were aborted by the victim's
request or her failure to press charges or her disappearance. This was the second largest
cause of pre-trial attrition, after the victim's inability to identify her assailant. HOLMsrrOM
& BURGESS, supra note 4, at 150-51. See also C. HuRscH, THE TROUBLE WTrrH RAPE 110-14
(1977) (finding 38% of rape victims in Denver withdrew their charges after reporting the
crime but prior to prosecution).
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temic bias; but perhaps officials sometimes discourage rape victims
from pursuing meritorious complaints. Be that as it may, the phe-
nomenon, like other sources of attrition, is not unique to rape. Ana-
lyzing national attrition data, Steffensmeier concluded that victim
non-cooperation was the single most important reason for dismissals
of all felonies except homicide, 129 a result consistent with other stud-
ies.130 The percentage of dismissals due to victim withdrawal was 51%
for rape, compared to 47% for robbery and 64% for nonsexual
assault.
1 31
3. Focusing on Acquaintance Rape
Some authors argue that attrition statistics, which do not distin-
guish between stranger and acquaintance rape, mask official bias
against victims of acquaintance rape. When separate tabulations are
made for different types of rape, the picture changes, often dramati-
cally.132 A study of Travis County, Texas, found that the probability of
indictment was much higher in stranger rape cases (58%) than in ac-
quaintance rape cases (29%).133 A study of felony filings in Hawaii
reached similar conclusions. 34 Of cases dismissed, 50% involved ac-
quaintances, 38% persons who had just met, and only 12% stran-
gers.135 Of those cases in which felonies were filed, only 28% involved
acquaintances, 20% persons who had just met, and 49% strangers.'
3 6
The single most important reason why most rapists are not pun-
ished is the failure of victims to report the crime to the police, or their
later refusal to cooperate as a prosecution witness. 3 7 Reported and
prosecuted rape cases are disproportionately stranger rapes, cases in
which the rapist inflicted additional injuries, and other "strong
cases."' 38 Therefore, one might argue that the attrition rate for re-
129 Steffensmeier, supra note 127, at 193. The author reasons that the phenomenon
does not apply to homicide "because living witnesses are unlikely to be available." Id.
130 See, e.g., ZEISEL, supra note 94, at 26, 111 (concluding that the withdrawal of victims
from prosecution is the primary cause of felony attrition); MICHAEL R. GOTrFREDSON &
DON M. GOTrFREDSON, DECISION-MAIUNG IN CRIMINALJUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXER-
CISE OF DISCRETION 154 (1980) (finding that witness problems were the most significant
reason given by prosecutors for dismissing charges for violent crimes).
131 Steffensmeier, supra note 127, at 193.
132 See infra notes 251-53, 351-53 and accompanying text.
133 Robert A. Weninger, Factors Affecting the Prosecution of Rape: A Case Study of Travis
County, Texas, 64 VA. L. Rxv. 357, 377-78 (1978).
134 Susan Meyers Chandler & Martha Torney, The Decisions and Processing of Rape Victims
Throughout the Criminal Justice System, 4 CAL. SOCIOLOGIST 155 (1981).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See Steffensmeier, supra note 127, at 195.
138 See Alan J. Lizotte, The Uniqueness of Rape: Reporting Assaultive Violence to the Police, 31
CRIME & DELINQ. 169 (1985) (analysis of NCVS results finds that the closer the relationship
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ported rapes should be lower than for other felonies; an equal attri-
tion rate does not show equal treatment by justice system officials.
Lizotte analyzed National Crime Victim Survey (NCVS) 13 9 data
on rape and assault and concluded that "factors which make a strong
case for prosecution are more powerful predictors of reporting rape
than reporting assault."140 That-is,' rape victims tend to report to po-
lice only cases Where there is strong evidence supporting conviction,
while a wider variety of nonsexual assault cases are reported. Prose-
cuted rape cases are stronger, relative to all rapes (reported or not)
than are prosecuted assaults, relative to all assaults.141 Lizotte con-
cludes from this that since only the most serious rapes are reported,
studies showing comparable attrition rates for rape and other crimes
do not rebut the theory that the system discriminates against rape
complainants.
14 2
Lizotte's data donot answer a key question: whether rape victims'
tendency to report only strong cases is because they are discouraged
by some potentially reformable aspect of the system, or because for
reasons of their own, which may or may not include unfair public atti-
tudes toward rape victims, they do not wish to seek legal redress.143
Nor does his study reveal whether a "strong" acquaintance rape case
involves as much powerful evidence of guilt, on average, as a "strong"
nonsexual assault case. For these reasons, his findings are ultimately
ambiguous.
I The difference in case attrition between crimes committed by
strangers and crimes, committed by acquaintances is not unique to
rape. In a comprehensive study of decisionmaking in the criminal jus-
tice system, Gottfredson and Gottfredson conclude that three factors
play a critical role in all phrases of felony case processing: the serious-
ness of the offense; the prior criminal conduct of the defendant; and
the existence of a prior relationship between the victim and the de-
fendant.'4 As the authors explain, the distinction between stranger
and nonstranger offenders heavily influences every major criminal jus-
tice decision:
Nearly every decision-maker in the process seeks alternatives [to prose-
cution] for criminal acts between relatives, friends and acquaintances.
The most grave dispositions are reserved continuously for events be-
tween strangers. Victims report non-stranger events less frequently, po-
between a rape victim and offender, the less likely the victim is to report the rape).
139 For an explanation of the NCVS, see infra text accompanying note 162.
140 Lizotte, supra note 138, at 181.
141 Id. at 185.
142 Id. at 185-86.
143 See infra text accompanying notes 171-86.
144 GOTTFREDSON & GOTIFREDSON, hupra note 130, at 330-33.
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lice arrest less frequently, prosecutors charge less frequently, and so on
through the system.145
This disparity in the legal processing of stranger and acquain-
tance offenders has been confirmed by numerous studies. 146 These
studies suggest that acquaintance offenses are often perceived by deci-
sionmakers as inappropriate for criminal sanctions. 147 Albonetti
found, for example, that prosecutors resist pursuing acquaintance
cases for two reasons: first, a prior relationship between a victim and
offender increases ambiguity about whether or not a crime has oc-
curred; second, prosecutors perceive an increased risk that the victim
will not cooperate in prosecution of acquaintance offenses. 148 This
perception appears to be accurate. Hans Zeisel, analyzing data from a
Vera Institute study, found that the factor most often correlated with a
victim's withdrawal from prosecution was a prior relationship between
the victim and offender.149 Conceivably, this reluctance to press
charges is partly due to systemic leniency toward violence by acquaint-
ances, but in any event the phenomenon is not unique to rape.
Victim survey figures suggest that any general bias against
processing acquaintance crimes fails disproportionately on female vic-
tims. In a 1987 comparison of violence by strangers and acquaint-
ances, the Bureau ofJustice Statistics found that 70% of violent crimes
committed by strangers, crimes which are pursued more vigorously by
the system, were perpetrated against male victims.150 National victim
survey data indicate that, in 1993, 64% of all violent crimes against
male victims were perpetrated by strangers; however, where the victim
was female, only 38% were by strangers.1 51 In that year, according to
the victim survey, only 21.2% of rapes were committed by total stran-
gers, the lowest percentage for any violent crime, compared with
80.1% of robberies and 57.7% of aggravated assaults.'
52
145 Id. at 331.
146 For a thorough review of studies comparing case processing for stranger and non-
stranger offenses, see Lenore M.J. Simon, Legal Treatment of the Victim-Offender Relationship
in Crimes of Violence, 11 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 94 (1996).
147 Id. at 94-95. See also VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 103, at 15 ("Expression of
anger results in the commission of technical felonies, yet defense attorneys, judges, and
prosecutors recognize that in many cases conviction and prison sentences are inappropri-
ate responses").
148 Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 291, 300 (1987). Albonetti argues that prosecutors prefer to avoid uncertainty, which
translates into a bias against prosecuting non-stranger offenses.
149 ZEISEL, supra note 94, at 114-15.
150 ANITA D. TIMROTS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT
CRIME BY STRANGERS AND NONSTRANGERS 3 (1987).
151 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 1993, 35 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 NCVS].
152 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 107, at 33.
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At this juncture, one might wish for a study comparing the attri-
tion rates of acquaintance rape with the corresponding rates for other
felonies committed by acquaintances of the victim. In a study making
such a direct comparison, the results were mixed. Bachman and Pa-
ternoster analyzed data from several national surveys, in an attempt to
measure the impact of rape law reforms on all phases of case process-
ing from 1979 to 1991.153 As expected, they found, in the pre-rape-
law-reform years, an "acquaintance discount" in processing outcomes
for all crimes;'54 this discount was greater for rape.15 5 More perplex-
ing, however, is their finding that in the post-reform period this ac-
quaintance discount almost disappeared for crimes other than rape,
but at 18% was virtually unchanged for rape. 15 6
Bachman and Paternoster's results are useful, but even the most
sophisticated analysis of available data cannot determine whether dif-
ferences in attrition are due to systemic bias. All such efforts rest on
what we call the Equivalent Crimes Fallacy: the dubious assumption
that, in the absence of official bias, crimes of comparable severity will
have similar attrition rates. There is no reason to assume that the at-
trition rates of various crimes, even of various crimes by acquaint-
ances, ought to be equal. Crimes differ in the rates at which they are
reported, the typical amounts of corroborative evidence, and so on.
Some of these differences can be quantified only in a crude fashion.
No one has even tried, for example, to quantify and compare the fre-
quency with which rape complainants and nonsexual assault com-
plainants change their stories during police interrogation.
In short, attrition statistics are no substitute for the difficult and
inevitably largely subjective task of trying to determine, with respect to
each stage of case processing, whether official misbehavior is a serious
problem. Here again, a caveat is needed. More often than we have
space to describe, research results are based on questionable infer-
153 Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape
Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come? 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554 (1993). The
authors used data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), the Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR), National Prisoners Statistics Program (NPSP) and the National Cor-
rections Reporting Program (NCRP)., Id. at 560-61.
154 Id. at 572 (comparing NCVS data on victims' descriptions of their relationship with
their perpetrator with imprisoned offenders' descriptions of their relationship with their
victim); id. at 562-63.
155 From 1979-86, there was a 20% difference between the expected and actual incarcer-
ation rates for acquaintance rapists, compared to a 7% difference for robbery and a 14%
difference for assault. Id. at 572.
156 The authors estimated that in 1991, 58% of those incarcerated for rape should have
been acquaintance rapists, but only 40% actually were. Id. In the same period, there was
only a 1% difference between expected and actual incarceration rates of non-stranger per-
petrators of robbery and assault. Id- at 573.
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ences from methodologically flawed investigations. Further, rape re-
search, even if methodologically sound, often covers only a single
jurisdiction (commonly a city) in a single year. Findings from Detroit
do not necessarily correspond to realities in, say, rural Texas. Not
only that: much of the research is over ten-years-old. In a field like
rape, where public attitudes and governmental practices are evolving,
it is often impossible to tell whether an empirical study still reflects
even the narrow slice of reality that it covers. We will try to minimize
this problem by seeking corroboration of key findings, or hedging our
conclusions when appropriate.
B. REPORTING
Is there really a "rape epidemic"?157 If by "epidemic" one means
an escalating incidence of rape,158 the surprising answer is that the
experts are not entirely certain. The two sources of national crime
statistics, both managed by the Department of Justice, show markedly
different trends, for rape as for some other crimes.159 One source,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's annual Uniform Crime Report
(UCR), tabulates crimes reported 160 to police departments through-
out the country. According to the UCR, the number of rapes per
100,000 inhabitants rose from 24.5 in 1973 to 39.2 in 1994.161
A different trend emerged from the National Crime Victimiza-
tion Survey (NCVS), which is based on interviews of all persons aged
12 and over in a stratified sample of households, asking whether they
had been victims of various crimes. 162 According to the NCVS, the
157 Many authors, ignoring the limitations of the UCR, cite it as authority for the propo-
sition that the incidence of rape (or crime in general) has risen alarmingly. E.g., LARRY
BARON & MURRAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN SociET' 3 (1989) (stat-
ing that "official statistics" show 440% rise in rape incidence over 28 years). Of course,
even if the incidence of rape is declining, it should be punished appropriately, so the
question has little if any bearing on law reform issues.
158 Controversy also surrounds statistics on the prevalence of rape, defined as the pro-
portion of women who have been raped during their lives. Compare Gilbert, supra note 56,
at 54-55, with Mary P. Koss, Defending Date Rape, 7J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 122 (1992).
See generally Mary P. Koss, Detecting the Scope of Rape: A Review of Prevalence Research Methods, 8
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 198 (1993).
159 See generally Gary F. Jenson & Mary Altani Karpos, Managing Rape: Exploratory Research
on the Behavior of Rape Statistics, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 363, 366 fig.1 (1993).
160 Reports that the police disbelieve (and therefore "unfound") are tabulated sepa-
rately. 1994 UCR, supra note 108, at 376.
161 Id. at 23. The number of reported rapes per 100,000 inhabitants has recently de-
clined somewhat from 42.8 in 1992 to 39.2 in 1994. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 58 tbl.1
(1993) [hereinafter 1992 UCR]; 1994 UCR, supra note 108, at 23.
162 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1991, iii (1992) [hereinafter 1991 NCVS].
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incidence of rape declined gradually during the same period in which
the UCR showed an increase.
163
By tabulating only reported crimes, the UCR understates the inci-
dence of most crimes including rape.16 4 In addition, any long-term
change in the proportion of victims who report a crime will appear in
the UCR as a (spurious) upward trend in the crime rate. The most
common scholarly explanation of the discrepancy between the UCR
and the NGVS is that rape victims have become more willing to report
the crime. 65 This hypothesis is plausible: the rise in reported rapes
coincided with the rise of modem feminism, including a great deal of
consciousness-raising about rape, the development of rape crisis cen-
ters to support victims, and improvements in the police response to
rape.1
66
Yet, the NCVS figures are also suspect. Mainly because it focuses
on households with telephones, the NCVS systematically ignores sev-
eral demographic groups that are highly vulnerable to rape and other
crimes, such as transients, the homeless, and those without tele-
phones. 167 However, these methodological flaws were constant dur-
163 Id. at 6 tbl.3.
164 No scholar contends that the number of falsely reported "rapes" exceeds the number
of unreported rapes. But, deliberately false reports are presumably more common in the
UCR than in the NCVS, since a false response to a survey serves little or no purpose.
165 In Michigan, where reported rapes rose sharply after rape law reforms in the mid-
1970s, criminal justice officials attributed the rise to "enlightened attitudes that encourage
victims to come forward," rather than to an increase in the incidence of rape. MARSH ET
AL., supra note 25, at 42-43.- Cf Jensen & Karpos, supra note 159, at 368. However, demo-
graphic changes sometimes make the NCVS figures somewhat misleading. As the propor-
tion of elderly in the population increases, the violent crime rate can be expected to
decline, because violent criminals and their victims are both disproportionately young.
Consequently, the incidence of a violent crime may decline during a period in which the
likelihood that any given youth will commit a violent crime has risen substantially. DAVID
T. LYKMEN, THE ANTIsocIAL PERSONALITIES 4 (1995).
166 See generallyJensen & Karpos, supra note 159, at 371-83. Jensen and Karpos believe
that the UCR's upward trend was mainly due to improvements in police management of
rape cases such as increased use of female and civilian investigators. Id. Other scholars
have noted that, ironically, improvements in law enforcement sometimes lead to increased
reporting of crime and thus to spurious "paper increases" in the incidence of crime. RICH-
AmD S. FRASE & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MATERIALS ON THE
ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 51 (1980). Irrespective of improve-
ments in police techniques and personnel, victims may feel more assertive and less iso-
lated-hence more willing to report-because of the feminist anti-rape campaign. Cf
Ronet Bachman, Predicting the Reporting of Rape Victimizations: Have Rape Reforms Made a
Difference? 20 CRIM.JUsT. & BEHAv. 254, 265 (1993) (victims of acquaintance rape found to
be as willing as victims of stranger rape to report the crime, probably because of legal
reforms and "media campaigns").
167 Jensen & Karpos, supra note 159, at 368. For criticisms of the NCVS, see generally
Mary P. Koss, The Measurement of Rape Victimization in Crime Surveys, 23 Ciom.JUsT. & B H v.
55 (1996); Mary P. Koss, The Underdetection of Rape: Methodological Choices Influence Incidence
Estimates, 48 J. Soc. IssuEs 61 (1992); Mary P. Koss et al., Criminal Victimization Among Pri-
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ing the period in question and therefore presumably did not create a
spurious trend. Admittedly, NCVS interviewers may have become in-
creasingly reluctant to venture into the most dangerous inner-city
neighborhoods; 68 if so, this may have contributed to the downward
trend in the NCVS rape rate. Everything considered, however, it
seems likely that the NCVS's trend is more accurate than the UCR's.
Be that as it may, scholars agree that rape is still seriously under-
reported. In apparently a large majority of acquaintance rapes, the
victim either does not report the crime or, having reported it, subse-
quently decides not to press charges.169 Estimates of the percentages
of rapes that are reported vary, ranging from a low of well under 10%
to a high of 60%.170
mary Care Medical Patients: Prevalence, Incidence, and Physician Usage, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 85
(1991). Recent reforms of the NCVS methodology, prompted by criticism of the survey's
ability to accurately gauge the incidence of certain crimes, have increased the number of
rape reports garnered by the survey. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993, at 2 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 NCVS].
The new NCVS methodology allows for more direct questioning about sexual crimes and
covers coerced and threatened sexual activity in addition to rape and attempted rape. ld-
at 150. The new methodology has "elicited information on about 3 to 4 times as many
sexual crime victimizations" as appeared prior to 1993. Id. at 2. Despite this sudden in-
crease, there is no reason to expect that the rate of reported rape measured by the NCVS
will not continue to fall in future years.
168 LYKKEN, supra note 165, at 3.
169 See infra text accompanying notes 331-37. A study in Denver found that 38% of rape
victims withdrew their charges soon after reporting the crime. HURSCH, supra note 128, at
110-14.
170 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 82 ("An unreported to reported ratio of 10:1 is
often quoted, but ratios as high as 100:1 are not unheard of."); Scheppele, supra note 95,
at 1096 ("Only slightly over half of all rapes and rape attempts by strangers are reported to
the police .. .and those figures only count the discrepancies between rapes that women
report to the police and those that women report to survey interviewers. Rapes reported to
neither simply aren't included in the figures."). Estimates of the reporting rate for ac-
quaintance rapes vary from 5% to nearly 50%. Id. See generally CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE
HoRNEY, RAPE LAw REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 18 (1992). The
NCVS states that 50-60% of rape victims report the crime to the police. BUREAU OFJUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992, at
7 tbl.5 (1993). Other studies have found lower reporting rates. See DIANA H. RUSSELL,
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 31 (1984)
(9.5%); RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 58, at 3 (16%); Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Mental Health
Correlates of Criminal Victimization, 53J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 866 (1985), cited
in Koss, Detecting the Scope of Rape, supra note 160, at 202 (29%); Crystal S. Mills & BarbaraJ.
Granoff, Date and Acquaintance Rape Among a Sample of College Students, 37 Soc. WORK 504,
506 (1992) (finding that of 20 student rape victims, none told the police and only 15% told
someone).
According to federal victimization surveys, 64.6% of rape victims (and 24.1% of at-
tempted rape victims) report the crime. The former figure is higher than the correspond-
ing figures for aggravated assault (with an injury) (58.1%) or simple assault completed
with an injury (51.6%), and for crimes of violence in general (47.9%). BUREAU OFJUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, A NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY REPORT 80 (1988). The same
source indicates that 38% of all crimes were reported to the police and that the reporting
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Scholars have advanced several reasons for victims' failure to re-
port.171 Some rape victims are too upset, or too embarrassed at the
prospect of answering a stranger's intimate questions about the inci-
dent,172 or so ashamed that they do not want anyone, even their
friends, to know about it. 173 Sometimes the victim fears retaliation by
her assailant.174 In other cases, she wishes to conceal some aspect of
rate increased for crimes in general, from 32% in 1973 to 38% in 1990; for crimes of
violence in general from 46% to 48%; and for completed rape, from 49% to 54%. 1d.
These figures, while perhaps accurately depicting trends, should be interpreted cautiously
in light of the methodological weaknesses of the NCVS. See supra notes 169-71 and accom-
panying text.
In a survey of randomly-selected university women, Koss found that, of the 38% who
reported sexual victimizations that met the legal definition of rape or attempted rape,
"only 4% of these women had reported their sexual assault to the police." Koss, The Hidden
Rape Victim, supra note 56, at 206. In Koss's study, unlike many victimization surveys, the
questions were phrased in such a way as to detect women who had in fact been raped but
who did not label the experience as "rape." Id. See also Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in 2 RAPE &
SExuAL ASSAULT 3 (A.W. Burgess ed., 1988) (8%); Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape:
Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher
Education Students, 55J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHoL. 162 (1987) [hereinafter Koss et
al., The Scope of Rape] (finding prevalence rates for rape victimization 10 to 15 times higher
than estimates from the Bureau ofJustice Statistics and that virtually none of these victims
had been involved in the justice system). But see Gilbert, supra note 56.
171 One victim survey found that the most important reason why 33% of rape victims did
not report the crime to the police was that they regarded it as a private or personal matter
or took care of it themselves informally. An additional 20% indicated that the most impor-
tant reason for non-reporting was because they believed the police would not help, for
reasons including disinterest, ineffectiveness, or bias. Another 6% of victims felt that the
police could not do anything, either because of the victim's inability to identify the rapist, or
the police's inability to find him, or a lack of proof. Finally, 13% did not report because
they feared reprisal by the victim or someone else. Bachman, supra note 166, at 263.
172 See Ho.mSTRoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 58.
173 "Victims of rape frequently hide their assault, even from significant others. For ex-
ample, 42% of women college student rape victims indicated on a self-report survey that
they had never told anyone at all about the incident." Koss et al., The Scope of Rape, supra
note 170, at 162.
The Victim Center's data revealed that rape victims were at least somewhat or ex-
tremely concerned about: (1) her family knowing (71%); (2) people thinking it was her
fault or that she was responsible (69%); (3) people outside her family knowing (68%); (4)
her name being made public by the media (50%). Id. Only 17% had a medical exam
following the assault, and of these 40% did not do so within 24 hours. RAPE IN AMERICA,
supra note 56, at 4.
Even in cases of stranger rape some victims are reluctant to report the crime because
of embarrassment. Linda Fairstein recounts the case of an 82 year-old woman who was
embarrassed that she had been raped by her 30 year-old window washer. FAiRSTEIN, supra
note 13, at 59. Another possible factor is the victim's pessimism about the likelihood of a
conviction: "In no other category of crime does the victim approach the criminal justice
system with lower expectations of a successful resolution than in the area of sex offenses."
Id. at 67. See also VACHSS, supra note 13, at 62 (victim felt guilty about pressing charges
against her father). For a thoughtful discussion of the role of shame in non-reporting of
rape, see Berger, supra note 1, at 23.
174 Interviews at Beth Israel's Rape Crisis Center indicated that 7 of 12 victims feared
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her own behavior-drug use, for example-immediately prior to the
rape.
1 75
It seems probable that unreported rapes are, disproportionately,
acquaintance rapes. 176 In some acquaintance rape cases, the victim
does not report the rape because she blames herself or does not re-
gard the crime as a "real rape. ' 177 In other acquaintance cases, the
retaliation. D.C. SILVERMAN & S.M. BOWIE, FROM OUT OF THE SHADows: DISCLOSING THE
PATrERNS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF RAPE VICrIMIZATION (1986), cited in Gail Stetekee & Anne
H. Austin, Rape Victims and the Justice System: Utilization and Impact, 63 Soc. SERV. REv. 285,
301 n.23 (1989). Another study found that 75% of minority group rape victims listed fear
of retaliation as their reason for not reporting the crime. MichaelJ. Hindelang & BruceJ.
Davis, Forcible Rape in the United States: A Statistical Profile, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE
VICTIM AND THE OFFENDER 87, 97 (D. Chappell et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter FORCIBLE
RAPE]. In one study, over one-quarter of rape victims stated a "fear of reprisal" as inhib-
iting their decision to report the rape to the police. Joanne Belknap, The Sexual Victimiza-
tion of Unmarried Women by Nonrelative Acquaintances, in VIOLENCE IN DATING RELATIONSHIPS
205, 214 (Maureen A. Pirog-Good & Jan E. Stets eds., 1989). The greatest inhibitor of
reporting rapes was, however, the view that the rape was a "private or personal matter." Id.
175 Some victims try to solve this dilemma by lying to the police, a practice that creates
problems for prosecutors. See FAIRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 205-16.
176 See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 170, at 97 tbl.3.7; Carol A. Skelton & Barry R. Burkhart,
Sexual Assault: Determinants of Victim Disclosure, 7 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 229, 229-36 (1980);
Linda S. Williams, The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report7, 31 Soc. PROBS. 459, 459-67
(1984); see also Barry Burkhart, Acquaintance Rape Statistics and Prevention, Paper
Presented at the Rape Prevention on College Campuses Conference (Dec. 1983) (stating
that fewer than 1% of acquaintance rape victims report the crime to the police). For a
contrary finding, see Belknap, supra note 174, at 212. Accord Bachman, supra note 166, at
265 (reporting not significantly influenced by victim/offender relationship; result attrib-
uted to recent feminist publicity). For a review of studies of demographic and other vari-
ables that affect the likelihood that a woman will report a rape,' see Steketee & Austin, supra
note 174. Since many acquaintance rapes are by the victim's lover, and victims often do
not label these as rapes, and often choose to continue the relationship, see infra notes 177-
79, we think it likely that acquaintance rapes continue to be underreported relative to
stranger rapes, although the gap may have narrowed somewhat as a result of anti-rape
publicity. Cf R. Barry Ruback, Comment on Bachman (1993): The Victim-Offender Relationship
Does Affect Victims' Decisions to Report Sexual Assaults, 20 CRiM. JUST. & BEHAV. 271 (1993).
177 Calhoun & Townsley, supra note 63, at 66. In one study, less than 20% of a sample of
adult women who read a description of forced sex on a date labeled it as rape. Susan H.
Klemmack & David L. Klemmack, The Social Definition of Rape, in SExuAL ASSAULT 135, 142
(Marcia J. Walker & Stanley L. Brodsky eds., 1976). See generally Koss, The Hidden Rape
Victim, supra note 56. In her study of the sexual experiences of 2016 randomly-selected
university women, Koss found that, of the 12.7% whose answers to preliminary questions
indicated that they had in fact been raped, only 57% labeled the encounter as rape in
response to a final question whether they had been raped. Id at 197. "[N]one of the
unacknowledged rape victims reported their experience to the police, a rape crisis center,
or a hospital emergency room," and "more than half of them did not reveal their assault to
anyone." Id. The victim's failure to perceive her experience as rape may be due to her
romantic involvement with the perpetrator. Id. In the acknowledged rape victim group,
only "8% of the victims reported their experience to the police, while 13% went to a rape
crisis center or hospital emergency room." Id.
Another study found that the probability that the victim would report the rape varied
directly with the amount of danger to the victim during the rape, social distance between
the offender and the victim, and the perceived probability of "compensation from signifi-
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rapist is a relative. For example, a rape by the victim's stepfather
might not be reported because the victim's mother tells her not to
notify the police. 178 Even if the rapist is not a relative, the victim's
decision about whether to report the crime is often affected by the
responses of her family or boyfriend. 179 She also may be swayed by
the perceived expectations of her social group concerning the appro-
priate behavior of victims.'
8 0
Sometimes the victim does not report because she wishes to main-
tain her relationship with the offender.' 81 One study found that 39%
of rape victims date their attacker after the rape.182 This is much less
surprising than it sounds, because many rapes are perpetrated by
lovers.' 8
3
Smith and Nelson found that the likelihood the victim would re-
port varied directly with the amount of danger to her during the rape,
the social distance between her and the offender, and the degree to
which she expected support from relatives and friends for reporting
the rape.8 4 Nonreporting was most likely if the victim and the rapist
were acquaintances, of about the same age and social class, and the
rapist did not use a weapon or commit another crime (for instance,
cant others" for reporting. Linda C. Smith & L.D. Nelson, Predictors of Rape Victimization
Reportag cited in HoLmsraoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 34, 61. Non-reporting was apt to
occur among victims whose offenders were acquaintances of approximately the same age
and social class, and who did not use a weapon or commit another crime at the same time.
Id. See generally BOURQUE, supra note 25.
17 8 JoN M. MACDONALD, RAPE: CONTROVERSLAL ISSUES 5 (1995). Kanin studied 71
white, undergraduate students who admitted that they had raped a woman on a date. Only
six were certain the rape had been reported to the police, and in every case the victim
refused to prosecute. Seven other cases were not included because the victim-offender
relationship continued for at least four months after the rape. EJ. Kanin, Date Rape 9
VIcTsMoLocY 95 (1984). Other studies have found that remarkably high proportions of
the rape victims who knew their assailant continued their previous relationship with him
after the rape. Mills & Granoff, supra note 170, at 506 (45%); R. Lance Shotland, A Theory
of the Causes of Courtship Rape, 48J. Soc. IssuES 127, 128 (1992) (39% of rape victims date
their attacker after the incident).
179 Stetekee & Austin, supra note 174, at 291.
180 Id.
181 See generally BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 45 (victims with a prior sexual relationship
with the offender are the least likely to report a rape); Mills & Granoff, supra note 170, at
506; Shotland, supra note 178, at 128.
182 Shotland, supra note 178, at 128.
183 See; e.g., Mary P. Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudina and Situational
Characteristics, 9 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193 (1985). Koss collected data from a sample of 195
women who responded to a "Sexual Experiences Survey." Id. at 195. Those subjects who
reported having ever been forced to submit to acts of intercourse against their will were
split up according to whether or not they viewed themselves as "rape victims." Id. at 196.
Koss reported that 31% of the acknowledged rape victims and 76% of the unacknowledged
victims were romantically involved with their attackers prior to, the rape. Id. at 197.
184 They excluded victims under 18 and those who did not personally report the rape.
Smith & Nelson, supra note 177, at 34.
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robbery) at the same time. 185 These findings, concluded the authors,
illustrate "the widespread internalization among the [victim] sample
of cultural stereotypes which tend to legitimate rape .... -186
Although the ultimate culprit may be cultural stereotypes, the
massive nonreporting by victims might be regarded as proof that they,
not the justice system, bear the main responsibility for the fact that
most rapists are not even charged with a crime. Many scholars be-
lieve, however, that the reluctance of rape victims to prosecute rapists
is largely due to societal and official skepticism toward victims of ac-
quaintance rape: (1) police and prosecutors who allegedly have de-
terred reporting by failing to take accusations of acquaintance rape
seriously; 18 7 and (2) ajustice system that "puts the victim on trial" and
thereby creates an ordeal that intimidates many women who might
otherwise seek redress through a criminal prosecution. 88
To the extent that this indictment refers to bad laws rather than
bad attitudes, its validity can be tested by changing the laws. During
the past twenty years or so, virtually every state legislature has enacted
some mixture of rape law reforms.18 9 One goal of these reforms, par-
185 Id. Other investigators have also found that victims are more likely to report to the
police if they experienced severe physical force or were injured during the crime. See, e.g.,
Bachman, supra note 166, at 266.
186 Id.
187 SPOHN & HoPNmE, supra note 170, at 18; Morris, supra note 20, at 158; Deborah P.
Kelly, Delivering Legal Services to Victims: An Evaluation and Prescription, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 62, 64
n.3 (1984); EsTR CH, supra note 1, at 14-15 (failure of criminal justice system to treat rape
complaints as legitimate is a major reason for non-reporting by victims). Cf HOLMSTROM &
BURGESS, supra note 4, at 39 (low reporting rate blamed partly on "horror stories" and
television portrayals of police mistreatment of victims); MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 1
(victims often discouraged from reporting and prosecuting cases because of "humiliating
and degrading treatment by hospital staff, police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges").
188 THE RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 109, at 38 ("It is the fear of what ajury will think
that drives [rape] survivors not to report, police to refuse to arrest in 'futile' cases, and
prosecutors to dismiss prosecutions as 'unwinnable.'"). Berger, supra note 1, at 24 ("The
law itself, however, is widely regarded as a prime deterrent to would-be complainants in
cases of rape.").
189 Leigh Bienen, Rape Reform Legislation in the United States, 8 V'rIMOLOCY 139, 139
(1983) [hereinafter Bienen, Rape Reform]. Between 1975 and 1980,
[t]raditionally conservative state legislatures enacted changes in state criminal law
which radically redefined the offense of rape and introduced new state statutes which
either limited the admissibility of evidence concerning the prior sexual conduct of the
victim, or required ajudicial screening before such evidence could be placed before a
jury. Often rape reform legislation redefined and recharacterized all sex offenses,
including rape, sodomy, incest, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit rape and
the sexual molestation and abuse of children. Mandatory minimum penalties were
introduced in some states; other states incorporated an across-the-board reduction of
penalties while simultaneously introducing graded, or "staircased," offenses to replace
the single category of rape. The acts constituting the most serious sex offense were
recharacterized, and in more than half of the states new offenses based upon sexual
contact were defined. These offenses had no analog in prior laws against rape.
ticularly shield laws, was to reduce the rape victim's ordeal in the jus-
tice system and thereby to increase reporting rates. 190 As we have
seen, most scholars believe that the proportion of victims who report
rapes has risen in recent decades. For example, one study concludes
that the national proportion of rape victims who reported the crime
rose by 10% between 1980 and 1990, a modest increase but one
greater than for nonsexual assault and robbery (12% decrease). 191 If
so, did legal reforms contribute to this trend?
In trying to answer this question, several possibilities should be
kept in mind. First, the local publicity accompanying passage of re-
forms might lead to a perhaps temporary increase in reporting, due
simply to victims' enhanced sensitivity to the importance of rape, or
their impression of public support. Second, local publicity might in-
crease reporting by making victims aware, for example, that their state
has a rape shield law. This awareness might or might not be transient.
Third, local reforms might improve the performance of the justice
system, a result that, if sufficiently publicized, might encourage more
reporting. Fourth, attitudinal changes due to national publicity about
rape, or rape reforms, or feminism in general, might improve the re-
porting rate, for example by persuading women that female passivity is
inimical to sexual equality.
In a careful study of the impact of reforms, Professors Cassia
Spohn and Julie Homey analyzed data from six cities: Detroit; Chi-
cago; Philadelphia; Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; and Houston. 192 The
first three cities were in states with "strong" rape law reforms, while
the last three represented states with "weak" reforms. 193 Michigan,
often described as a model reform state,'194 has by far the strongest
reforms, redefining rape, eliminating corroboration and resistance re-
Changes in the legal definition of the crime of rape, with their accompanying statutes
directed at limiting the admissibility of evidence regarding the prior sexual history of
[the] victim at trial, were enacted in response to vigorous, nationally coordinated lob-
bying by feminists.
Id.
190 See SPOHN & HoRNEv, supra note 170, at 18; Bienen, supra note 49, at 179.
191 Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 153, at 565-66. These authors relied on the
NCVS, which tabulates not only victimization data, but also the proportions of victims who
reported the crime to the police. Id. at 565. "Looking at the original data points, there was
a 28% increase in rape victims who reported to the police from 1980 to 1990," but when
these data are smoothed the increase is only 10%. Id. at 565-66.
192 SPOHN & HoNm-v, supra note 170, at 35-36. Cf Bienen, Rape Reform, supra note 189,
at 147-49 (finding "minimal" practical effects from New Jersey's repeal of the spousal ex-
emption and decriminalization of incest).
193 SPOHN & HoRN'Y, supra note 170, at 46.




quirements, and including a highly restrictive rape shield law.195 Illi-
nois' reforms were similar, but without repeal of the corroboration
requirement. 96 Pennsylvania enacted a strong rape shield law and
eliminated the cautionary instruction, and the prompt complaint, cor-
roboration, and resistance requirements, but retained a more tradi-
tional definition of rape.
197
The "weak reform" cities (Houston, Atlanta, and Washington,
D.C.) were all in jurisdictions with relatively weak shield laws, and in
these jurisdictions the resistance requirement was not abolished.198
Georgia and Washington, D.C. retained the traditional definitions of
rape. 199 Texas redefined rape and modified the corroboration re-
quirement, but these changes were much more limited than the cor-
responding changes in Michigan and Illinois.
200
The authors chose jurisdictions that had enacted their reforms at
different times, so that changes correlated with national publicity
about rape could be distinguished from changes correlated with the
legal reforms. 201 Analyzing monthly data from 1970 through 1984,
they found that legal reforms had no positive effect on rape reporting
in Chicago, Philadelphia, or Atlanta.20 2 In the District of Columbia
there was a decrease in reported rapes, no doubt coincidental, after
elimination of the corroboration requirement, and the authors found
no evidence that a new rape shield provision affected reporting
rates.203 Spohn and Homey found in Houston, the jurisdiction with
the weakest reforms, and in Detroit, with the strongest reforms, an
increase in reporting rates that appeared to be linked in some way to
the reforms. 20 4
In Detroit, reports increased fairly steadily before 1975, when
Michigan enacted its comprehensive reforms. Reporting rates
climbed even higher after the reforms, continued upward for a short
period, and then stabilized at a fairly steady rate.20 5
A potentially important difference between Michigan and some
other jurisdictions is that the Michigan reform package received a






201 Id. at 81.
202 Id. at 92-98.
203 Id. at 96-97.
204 Id. at 101. Since reports of other violent crimes did not show a similar upward trend,
Spohn and Homey decided that the rising volume of rape reports probably indicated a
rising propensity to report the crime rather than a rising incidence of rape. Id. at 86-87.
205 Id. at 86.
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great deal of publicity.20 6 Perhaps Michigan women apprehended a
sea change in societal, or at least official, attitudes toward rape. In
jurisdictions like the District of Columbia, where reforms were
achieved by judicial decisions, and at different times, rape victims
probably were unaware that the law had changed.20 7 Spohn and
Homey conclude:
[T]he increase in reports probably was not caused by the substantive
content of the rape law reforms. In both Detroit and Houston the in-
creases in reporting appeared at the time the law reforms went into ef-
fect; this suggests that the increases resulted from publicity surrounding
the reforms rather than from gradually acquired knowledge of improved
treatment of victims under the new laws.
208
Another Michigan study, statewide in scope, found that, after en-
actment of reforms in 1974, reports of forcible rape increased at a
faster rate than reports of any other serious offense.20 9 According to a
survey of Michigan judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and rape
crisis counselors, increased reporting of "marginal" cases occurred af-
ter the Michigan law reforms.210 Post-reform Michigan rape victims
were reportedly less traumatized by their experience with the criminal
justice system and "more willing to follow through on prosecution."211
Nevertheless, the authors conclude that this phenomenon was in-
dependent of the reforms and may have been due to feminist con-
206 Id. at 101-02.
207 Id. at 96.
208 Id. at 101-02.
209 MARSH Er AL., supra note 25, at 26. A similar phenomenon occurred in Canada and
California. Julian V. Roberts & RobertJ. Gebotys, Reforming Rape Laws: Effects of Legislative
Change in Canada, 16 Lw & HUM. BEHAV. 555, 561 (1992); James L. Lebeau, Statute Revi-
sion and the Reporting of Rape, 72 Soc. Sci. REs. 201 (1988). Over the five-year period prior
to Canada's 1983 reforms, the overall reporting rate of all three levels of sexual assault
increased 22%, while reports of nonsexual assault increased by 20%. Roberts & Gebotys,
supra, at 561. There was a significant increase in reporting when the legislation was intro-
duced, and a 110% increase-more than double the increase of reports of nonsexual as-
sault-in the five years after enactment of reforms. Id. at 561-63. The authors believe that
the coincidence of the 1983 legislation with a relatively sharp increase in reporting rules
out an explanation based on evolving attitudes unrelated to the reforms; they also reject
several other explanations, concluding that "it seems likely that the increase is due to a
change in victims' attitudes, brought about by the reform legislation and the publicity sur-
rounding its passage." Id. at 568.
This conclusion may not be relevant in the United States, where nearly all rape law
reform occurs at the state level, yet most media publicity is national and consequently
unrelated to passage of specific statutes. For this reason, one would expect the correlation
between reporting increases and enactment of particular reforms to be weaker in the
United States.
210 MARSH Er AL., supra note 25, at 41-43. "Marginal" means, of course, a case in which a
conviction is less likely.
211 Id. at ix.
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sciousness-raising during the same period. 212
If this conclusion is correct, perhaps the changes in Detroit's re-
porting rates had parochial causes. Spohn and Homey mention two
possibilities. In Detroit, their interviews "revealed strong support for
the reforms among criminal justice officials... [who]-in responding
to our hypothetical cases-took the strongest positions on excluding
sexual history evidence." 213 While granting that these attitudes may
have been a cause rather than a result of Michigan's strong reforms,
Spohn and Homey believe that the latter is more likely.
2 1 4
In Detroit, the Rape Counseling Center is run through the police
department, an unusual arrangement that "gives the Counseling
Center earlier and greater access to victims than occurs in many cities
and thus potentially greater influence in encouraging reporting and
pressing for prosecution."2 1 5 This relatively unheralded innovation
may be one of the reasons for the increase in rape reporting in
Detroit.
In sum, the evidence, although mixed, suggests that rape report-
ing rates are generally unresponsive to changes in a particularjurisdic-
tion's rape law, even when those changes signal a desire to reduce
victim blaming in rape trials.216 This finding may surprise some read-
ers who are familiar with the literature about rape law, which has a
pronounced reformist orientation. Reformist authors naturally tend
to highlight objectionable practices that they wish to see abolished,
for instance, cross-examination of the alleged victim about her sexual
habits.21 7 Typically, such authors claim or at least strongly imply that
objectionable rules have major instrumental effects. By the same to-
ken, they fail to emphasize-sometimes even fail to mention-those
aspects of the legal process that contribute to the same harmful result
but should not or cannot be reformed.218 Yet the emotional rigors of
a rape trial are due largely to intractable realities: the law's delay;
219
212 Id. at ix, 25, 36. Other scholars have identified several factors, other than the law
reforms, that affect reporting of rape: (1) preconceived ideas about how the criminal jus-
tice system will respond to the report; (2) situational characteristics surrounding the rape;
(3) trauma suffered by the victim; and (4) advice offered by family, friends, lovers, and
others. They conclude that "if conditions in any of these stages favor non-report, then the
victim probably will not report the crime to the police." Richard L. Dukes & Christine L.
Mattley, Predicting Rape Victim Reportage, 62 Soc. & Soc. REs. 63, 68 (1977).
213 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 170, at 172.
214 Id.
215 Id
216 See id. at 18-20.
217 See generally Berger et al., supra note 32.
218 See, e.g., Carol Bohmer, Acquaintance Rape and the Law, in AcQuAINTANCE RAPE, supra
note 63, at 317, 317-26; Henderson, supra note 105, at 87.
219 One survey of rape victims found that 50% said that they would be "a lot more likely"
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the unpleasantness of having to relive a horrifying and extremely inti-
mate experience; fear, even apart from sexual history questions, of
cross-examination, or of media publicity;2 20 and embarrassment about
the rape itself or about surrounding circumstances that inevitably will
be revealed during the trial. All this is coupled with a desire, espe-
cially in some acquaintance rape cases, to let bygones be bygones,
221
and to get on with one's life.2 22 The possibilities that the police will
be unsympathetic, that the defense will be allowed to ask about previ-
ous love affairs, and that the rapist will escape justice anger any decent
observer, but may not loom as large in many victims' calculations as
more mundane, personal considerations, 223 and in any event, as we
shall see, most reforms do not appear to have affected conviction
rates.224
It remains possible, nevertheless, that law reforms have contrib-
uted to the national attitudinal changes that appear to have triggered
increased reporting of rape. It seems likely that most rape victims are
aware of national trends, perhaps including rape shield laws, but rela-
tively hazy about local law. After all, most of the recent publicity con-
cerning rape has emphasized national perspectives. Thus, law
reforms in one state may indirectly encourage reporting in another
state by providing fuel for the great bonfire of national publicity carry-
ing the message that something is being done about rape. To the extent
that this occurs, efforts to discover a correlation between passage of
to report if the law prohibited the media from obtaining and disclosing their names and
addresses, with an additional 16% saying that they would be "somewhat more likely" to
report with these safeguards. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 6.
220 See HoLmsTrPoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 58.
221 See id. Which is not to say that 'the likelihood of a conviction, as reported to the
victim, has no effect. See Steketee & Austin, supra note 174, at 293.
222 See, e.g., VACHSS, supra note 13, at 203 (discussing a victim of a serial rapist who had
married and had a child before the trial and was reluctant to prosecute because she wanted
to put the rape behind her).
223 See Steketee & Austin, supra note 174, at 293-94. Perhaps victims in some cities be-
lieve that police will do more to solve their crimes. Rapid City, South Dakota, a prairie
community of 83,000 people, had the highest rape rate in the nation. The police chief
attributed this phenomenon to a "small town" effect: women in Rapid City, he claimed,
tend to believe that the police will do more to solve their crimes and so they are more likely
to report the rape, a judgment in which the manager of a shelter for battered women
concurred. Joe Hallinan, No Safety in Smaller Towns, Cities Have No Patent on Murder and
Rape, CI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 37. That might explain why every one of the ten
cities with the highest murder rates were in the South, while all but one of those with the
highest rates of reported rapes were in the North-half of them in Michigan, the state
with the most ambitious rape law reforms. Id. Nearly all murders are reported, but rape is
notoriously under-reported. As a consequence the reported murder rate is likely to be
highly accurate, while the "rape rate" may reveal more about victims' attitudes than about
the frequency of the crime.
224 See infra notes 545-67 and accompanying text.
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reforms in any particular state, and subsequent behavioral changes in
that state, miss the point. Spohn and Homey do not deny this possi-
bility, and it is consistent with their data.
C. THE POLICE FOUNDING DECISION
As with all crimes, the police decide whether a reported rape ac-
tually occurred, and attempt to determine who committed it. If they
want the case to go forward, they "found" the complaint and transmit
the file to the prosecutor's office.22 5 A few authors have depicted po-
lice rape investigators as sexist, tactless oafs. 2 2 6 While some policemen
clearly deserve those labels,227 a more balanced picture emerges from
a leading study of case processing. Holmstrom and Burgess studied
the cases of 146 reported rape victims admitted during a one-year pe-
riod to the emergency wards of a large Boston hospital, plus a smaller
number of victims from other sources. 228 By following these women
through the entire legal process, Holmstrom and Burgess sought to
determine "the part played in victimization by those groups and insti-
tutions that are supposed to protect the victim." 22 9 Concerning police
behavior, Holmstrom and Burgess stressed that "[t] he nature of the
material that is discussed-the details of an extremely frightening and
humiliating sexual experience-mean that the encounter [with the
police] may be unsettling for many victims even under the best of
circumstances." 23 0 The victim is female; 231 the officer usually is
225 A case is "cleared" when a suspect is arrested. The clearance rate (over 50%) is
much lower than the founding rate (92%). See 1994 UCR, supra note 108, at 24. See gener-
ally KENNETH CuLP DAVIs, DIscRETxoNARY JusTicE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3-26 (1980). In
some cases, where the rape is accompanied by another crime such as a robbery, and the
evidence of the rape is judged to be too difficult to prove, the police choose to classify the
case under the label of the other crime. Duncan Chappell & Susan Singer, Rape in New
York City: A Study of Material in the Police Files and Its Meaning in FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note
174, at 245, 256.
226 EsT~iCH, supra note 1, at 1-2, 15-16; BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 364-68.
227 Examples are legion. For instance, one policeman told a rape victim that, "[u]sually
if women are out at this time of night, it was their fault." VERNON R WIEHE & ANN L.
RIcHARDs, INTIMATE BETRAYAL- UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO THE TRAUMA OF Ac-
QUAINTANCE RAPE 32 (1995). Another declared that, "[it's not right] for a girl to go into a
stranger's apartment, drink beer, and then be upset when the guy makes advances."
HOLMSTROM & BURGEss, supra note 4, at 39.
228 HOLmssROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 9-11. Holmstrom and Burgess followed
these victims from the time they were admitted to the hospital until the final outcome of
the legal process. Id. at 1-2.
229 Id. at 4.
230 Id. at 35.
231 Like nearly all rape scholars, we choose to focus only on women as victims of rape,
and we excluded statutory rape, which raises distinctive problems. For information on
male victims of rape, see generally Cindy Struckman-Johnson, Male Victims of Acquaintance
Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 63, at 192.
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male.23 2 The victim knows that she really was raped; the officer often
does not. The police must investigate, a task that cannot easily be
combined with offering the emotional support that the victim needs.
The detective presumably wishes to avoid an injustice to a wrongly
accused individual. In addition, for reasons of professional pride, he
does his best to avoid looking naive by falling for a story that turns out
to be false.2 33 Experienced investigators also know that many rape
complainants ultimately decline to press charges, sometimes to the
dismay of a detective who has worked hard to build a case.23 4 Regard-
less of the nature of the crime, police tend to believe that people in
general are untrustworthy, and that therefore the wisest course is to
trust no one.
23 5
As Richard Posner has observed, police generally come from a
culture that has traditionally disapproved of women who engage in
casual sex:
[N]onmarital intercourse 23 6 carries a stigma in some social strata-in-
cluding those from which most police officers and many judges are
drawn. These enforcement officials aresympathetic to "respectable" wo-
men raped by members of the criminal class but often not to sexually
active women raped in compromising situations-say, while drunk on a
date while scantily clad-or to women raped by their husbands. In such
settings enforcement officials may believe that the woman has hiked up
the rape charge for a strategic advantage, such as jockeying for favorable
terms of divorce or trying to explain away a pregnancy.
2 37
Despite these potential sources of friction, Holmstrom and Bur-
gess found that most victims spoke favorably about the police who had
questioned them:238 only 10.3% expressed a negative reaction.
239
232 While historically most interviews have been conducted by male officers, some police
departments have put female officers in charge of interviewing rape complainants. See,
e.g., BRowNmiLLER, supra note 1, at 387 (New York City); LAFREE, RAPE & CIuM1NALJUsTICE,
supra note 70, at 68 (Indianapolis).
233 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 46.
234 Id. at 47-48. As one officer put it, "We go to so much trouble to work up a case and
then take it to court and the girl doesn't show and the judge gets mad and throws it out
and it makes us look foolish." Id. at 47. In Sweden, according to one scholar, 25% of rape
complainants withdrew the complaint. The closer the relationship between the parties,
and the lower the level of physical violence, the more frequent the withdrawal. For exam-
ple, one Swedish study found that of those who gave a reason for withdrawing the com-
plaint, 21% said that the investigation was mentally burdensome, 16% felt that they shared
responsibility for the alleged rape, and 12% felt that the authorities did not believe them.
Annika Snare, Sexual Violence Against Women: A Scandinavian Perspective, 9 VcrIMOOGY 195,
206 (1984).
235 HOLSTROM & BRUGESS, supra note 4, at 47.
236 It would be more accurate, today, to say "casual nonmarital sex by females."
237 PosNER, supra note 8, at 388.
238 HoI.MsmoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 51. Another study found that 68% of private
agencies that provide counsel to rape victims had an "excellent" or "good" evaluation of
police performance in rape cases, based on their own experiences and what they had
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These negative evaluations were due to a variety of complaints, in-
cluding police behavior perceived as overbearing, harsh, or
moralistic.
2 40
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between appropriately ag-
gressive investigation and tactless hostility. For example, one victim
complained about "endless" questions, 241 which may have been asked
in order to see whether the victim would change her story.
As an example of what they consider an "overbearing" approach,
Holmstrom and Burgess describe a case in which investigators asked
the complainant whether she had ever tried committing suicide, or
had run away from home, taken drugs, or been hospitalized, (and
why) .242 After this interrogation, the police concluded by telling her
that rape carries a life sentence, implying that she ought to reconsider
her report. 243 Perhaps that last observation was inappropriate,
though such remarks serve to test the woman's resolve to press
charges, a justification for which we feel some sympathy, given the
large number of rape complainants who ultimately decline to cooper-
ate with the police. 244 In any event, we have no objection to questions
about attempted suicides and the like. Any competent prosecutor will
want police to adduce any facts that may discredit the victim in the
eyes of jurors. The persuasive objection is not to asking such ques-
tions but to doing so tactlessly, or with the attitude that affirmative
answers should automatically lead to termination of the investigation.
Holmstrom and Burgess found a "striking absence" of the most
absurd rape myths among the police they studied: that all women
want to be raped, or enjoy it, or cannot be raped if they don't want to
be.245 Once they decide that a man is a rapist, the police often feel
extremely punitive toward him, preferring prison to rehabilitation or
psychotherapy. 24
6
At the same time, police are afraid of being too gullible and ap-
pearing incompetent when the woman they believed changes her
heard from victims. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 11. The proportion giving that
evaluation of prosecutors was 59%, ofjudges 46%, and of probation departments 40%. Id.
A somewhat higher proportion of the agencies said that they had an excellent or good
"working relationship" with the police (86%), prosecutors (79%),judges (68%), probation
officers (61%), prisons (27%), and parole boards (18%). Id.
239 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 51.
240 Id. at 35-37.
241 Id. at 54-55.
242 Id. at 36-37.
243 Id.
244 See infra text accompanying notes 331-37.
245 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 44.
246 Id at 45.
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story247 or decides not to press charges.248 Police also know that the
rape victim faces an ordeal in the legal system, 249 often culminating in
an acquittal or a light sentence for the rapist. Understandably, some
police harbor a sense of futility about rape cases.
250
The national unfounding rate for rape is about 8%.251 This
means that the police believe over nine-tenths of the rape reports that
they record.252 On the other hand, the proportion of acquaintance
rape complaints that are unfounded is higher than 8%.253 Moreover,
the unfounding rate for rape is roughly four times higher than for
other major crimes.254 Several scholars have tried to determine
whether this is due to police biases against certain types of victims.
For example, some scholars have tried to discover whether the police
are mainly concerned, in processing rape complaints, with legitimate
evidentiary questions. Two articles addressing this question depict the
police in a basically favorable light. Wayne Kerstetter studied the sex-
ual assault cases of the Chicago Police Department for 1979 and
1981.255 Using a lengthy questionnaire, he classified factors that of-
ficers considered relevant to case processing,256 under different head-
ings, such as "administrative" (officer making a routine discretionary
decision), "instrumental" (necessary to facilitate processing, but not
within sole discretion of officer), matters of "evidence," "offense ele-
ments," or "aggravating" variables. 257 Kerstetter then analyzed the ap-
parent effects of these variables on case processing using discriminant
analysis. 25
8
247 Id. at 46.
248 Id at 47.
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 44-50.
251 Similarly, in the United Kingdom the official unfounding rate is about 8-9%. S.
Grace et al., Rape: From Recording to Conviction, in Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzger-
ald, Rape Myths: In Review, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 133, 135 (1994).
252 Since police unfound all rape reports that they believe to be false, plus some for
other reasons, the unfounding rate overstates the proportion of recorded reports that po-
lice believe to be false. But in some jurisdictions police do not record some rape com-
plaints-that they regard as palpably false. See infra notes 646-48, 694-95 and accompanying
text.
253 See Chappell & Singer, supra note 225, at 245-71.
254 See sources cited infra notes 648-49, 663-64.
255 Wayne A. Kerstetter, Gateway to Justice: Police and Prosecutorial Response to Sexual As-
saults Against Women, 81 J. Cum. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267, 276 (1990).
256 Id. at 269-84. Kerstetter identified five major theories about the police response to
rape: formal; criminological; conflict (as to race and class); conflict (as to gender); and
instrumentalist. I& at 271-76. He selected variables calculated to test the theories' validity.
257 Id. at 282.
258 AL at 278. "Discriminant analysis is a statistical procedure for distinguishing between
two or more groups of cases by using a collection of variables that measure characteristics
on which the groups are expected to differ." Id.
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Discussing stranger rapes, Kerstetter notes that, "[w] hen a com-
plainant alleges that she was attacked by an unknown assailant, the
investigator faces three questions: (1) Did a sexual assault actually oc-
cur? (2) Who was the assailant? and (3) Where may he be found?
259
The factors which correlated most with police founding decisions in
stranger rape cases, "[W]ill the complainant prosecute?" and "[I]s the
accused in custody?" relate directly to these questions. 260 Negative an-
swers raised investigative costs and hampered prosecution. 261 As Ker-
stetter notes of the detectives in his study, "since they have more cases
than they can handle, they have little incentive to pursue a case" if the
complainant does not want to prosecute; her cooperation is crucial to
a successful investigation. 262
In acquaintance rape cases, the primary question for investigators
is whether the putative victim consented. 263 Here too, Kerstetter con-
cluded that the factors that are highly associated with the police
founding decision relate to this central evidentiary question. Police
were more likely to found acquaintance rape complaints if the suspect
was in custody (low opportunity costs of investigating his state of
mind) or if the victim had injury to her sex organs (corroborative evi-
dence supporting lack of consent).264 Conversely, the existence of
nonsexual discrediting information, such as alcohol or drug use
(lower victim credibility), often appeared to result in police unfound-
ing complaints. 2
65
Kerstetter concluded that instrumental and evidentiary variables
structure police decisionmaking in both stranger and acquaintance
rape cases. 2 66 Though these structures differ, both relate to proving
the necessary elements of the crime. Kerstetter's study suggests that
whether police found a rape complaint depends upon whether they
believe that the government can prove these elements.
259 Id. at 288.
260 Id. Although the complainant can be required to testify, if she does not wish to do
so, her attitude is likely to gravely undermine the prosecution's case, in which she is the
leading witness. LaFree, Official Reactions, supra note 52, at 588. The fact that the accused
is in custody, however, while obviously significant in stranger rape cases, because it means
that he has been identified, is presumably a consequence rather than a cause of founding
in an acquaintance rape case.
261 Kerstetter, supra note 255, at 289. It may appear callous to analyze rape processing in
economic terms, but with limited resources police inevitably ration their efforts. Kerstet-
ter's analysis suggests that in some jurisdictions part of this process involves unfounding
complaints where the chances of a successful prosecution are slight.
262 Id. at 290.
263 Id at 297.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 302-06.
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Gary LaFree reached similar conclusions after analyzing data con-
cerning all 905 forcible sex offenses reported to police in a single city
during 1970, 1973 and 1975.267 LaFree concluded that, "The two best
predictors of arrest were legal variables: the victim's ability to identify
a suspect and her willingness to prosecute."268 These findings dovetail
with the Kerstetter study in that police are most likely to act when the
elements necessary for a successful prosecution are present.
Yet, LaFree's data could just as easily be construed against the
police. Although he found that victim misconduct was rarely alleged,
he also found that such allegations, and delay in reporting, strongly
correlated with a negative decision. 269 As LaFree acknowledges,
"none of the 31 cases which alleged [victim] misconduct resulted in
arrest."270 Despite this startling finding, LaFree goes on to downplay
the importance of extralegal variables:
The literature on official reactions to sexual assault emphasizes the vic-
tim's attributes and the interpersonal context of the crime for explain-
ing variation in official decisions. For police in this city, at least, this
emphasis appears to be greatly overstated. Victim's race, the location of
the incident, victim resistance, victim injury, and witnesses had no effect
on police decisions.... For all three outcomes, [arrests, charging, felony
screening] legally-relevant variables were paramount.
2 71
The proposition that "legally relevant variables" are "paramount"
is not quite as informative as it may appear to be. One of LaFree's two
major "legal variables," the victim's ability to identify a suspect, is
nearly always present in acquaintance rapes,2 72 and therefore is un-
helpful in analyzing police decisions in those cases. The other major
"legal" variable, the victim's willingness to prosecute, may be influ-
enced by the detective's attitude toward the case.273 This in turn is
likely to be affected by matters, such as the woman's violation of sex-
role norms, whose relevance to whether she was raped is at best ques-
tionable. 274 The upshot is that LaFree's conclusions rest on evidence
that does not differ greatly from the evidence adduced by scholars
who are more critical of the police.
Even more plainly, Kerstetter's conclusion that police appraise ac-
267 LaFree, Official Reactions, supra note 52, at 583, 585.
268 Id. at 588.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 592.
272 The only exceptions that come to mind are relatively rare, for example: a victim
raped while in a drunken stupor at a fraternity party where the perpetrator might have
been any of several men without alibis.
273 See, e.g., Kerstetter, supra note 255, at 292-93; LaFree, Official Reactions, supra note 52,
at 585.
274 See, e.g., LaFree, Official Reactions, supra note 52, at 588-89.
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quaintance rape cases in light of legitimate evidentiary concerns is
open to question. In acquaintance rape cases, the fact that a suspect is
in custody seems to be, pace Kerstetter, a consequence rather than a
cause of the police decision to found an accusation of rape. (If the
police disbelieve the woman, they presumably will not arrest the
man.) Phrases like "legitimate evidentiary concerns" obscure such
critical issues as whether police give too much weight to, say, lack of
physical injury to the woman, typical in acquaintance rapes, 275 in de-
ciding whether to found the complaint.
Kerstetter also fails to distinguish between evidence that is cer-
tainly relevant to whether a rape occurred-for instance, the consis-
tency of the woman's story-and evidence of more debatable
relevance, such as her drinking. There is a world of difference be-
tween these two types of "evidentiary concerns," even though both
may affect jurors' attitudes.
Susan Meyers Chandler and Martha Torney are more critical of
the police. They stress the role of extralegal variables in founding
decisions.276 After tracking sexual assault victims treated at a large
urban hospital during the years 1976-78, they concluded that: "[t]he
behavior and lifestyle of the victim prior to the assault, as well as at the
time of the assault, are often considered by the processing agents to
be as important as the actions of the assailant during the crime."
2 77
Chandler and Torney maintain that many of the extralegal concerns
relevant to police processing of rape complaints reflect a "male bias
toward acceptable female behavior."278 They may be right, but their
own analysis shows that this proposition is sometimes arguable. The
variables that they characterize as "extralegal" are the same types of
evidence that Kerstetter calls "legitimate evidentiary concerns." As
Chandler and Torney concede, the "extralegal" variable "sobriety"
might relate to the complainant's credibility. 279 Similarly, the "past
sexual relations between the complainant and the alleged assailant"
might be thought of as legitimate evidence concerning whether the
sexual encounter was consensual or would be deemed so by a jury.
280
Hubert Feild studied the attitudes of patrol police, rapists, crisis
counselors, and citizens of a community using questionnaires
275 See generally 11 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, D. Mulvihill & M. Tumin 234-37 (1969);
Wallace D. Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Rape Reform Statutes on Prosecution: An Empir-
ical Study, 55 WASH. L. REv. 543, 590 (1980).




280 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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designed to elicit their feelings about rape and to assess their general
knowledge of the crime.28 1 He found that the police officers were
more similar to the rapists than to the counselors in their views of
rape.23 2 Police and rapists tended to agree on the basic motivation for
rape, the lack of attractiveness of a rape victim after rape, and the
mental abnormality of rapists.28 3 Feild concluded that "the results do
suggest a need for systematically evaluating the relations between po-
lice officers' attitudes toward rape and their behavior toward a rape
victim."
2 8 4
Likewise, Shirley Feldman-Summers and Gayle Palmer found that
the police officers who participated in their study began with the ex-
pectation that three of every five rape complainants are either un-
truthful or mistaken. 285 They reasoned that, "It should not be
surprising that such a belief is communicated to the victim in one way
or another, even by police officers who try to treat a rape victim with
courtesy and respect."
286
If accurate, these studies are cause for concern. However, Feld-
man-Summers and Palmer only surveyed approximately fifteen of-
ficers.287 The Feild study involved 254 officers, but its conclusion is
debatable.2 88 Underlying Feild's belief that police ought to think like
rape counselors rather than rapists is the assumption that counselors
are wiser about rape than rapists. This assumption is obviously valid
on some issues-for example, whether some women deserve to be
raped. But on some other issues, such as why men rape, conceivably
rapists' opinions are more accurate than counselors'. Indeed, some
feminists have quoted rapists' descriptions of their own motivations, as
evidence that pornography causes rape.2 89 Of course, these feminists
may be wrong about the effects of pornography, but their contention
cannot be dismissed simply by observing that rapists have the same
opinion.
A number of authors have compiled lists of reasons given by po-
lice for unfounding rape complaints, 290 while other scholars have
281 Hubert S. Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis
Counselors, and Citizens, 36J. PERSONALIT= & SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 157 (1978).
282 Id. at 169.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 176.
285 Shirley Feldman-Summers & Gayle C. Palmer, Rape as Viewed by Judges, Prosecutors, and
Police Officers, 7 CRiM. JusT. & BEHAV. 19, 36 (1980).
286 Id.
287 1d, at 25. Of the 62 officers to whom questionnaires were sent only 24.2% re-
sponded. Id. at 24-25.
288 Feild, supra note 281, at 176.
289 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 18-19 (1993).
290 See, e.g., HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 39-44; J.C. LeDoux & RR. Hazel-
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sought to determine, independently of the detectives' stated reasons
for unfounding, which aspects of a rape case correlated, in particular
cities, with decisions to unfound.291 Combining several lists of both
types, we compiled a master list of factors that have been found by at
least one scholar to be the expressed reason for, or to be associated
with, unfounding decisions in at least one city:
1. The woman (or girl) is unmarried but sexually experienced,
or (worse) promiscuous, 92 or (even worse) a prostitute.
293
2. She was drinking or taking drugs or is a drug addict.
294
3. Her story contains inconsistencies295 or she keeps changing
it,29 6 or it does not "check out."29 7
4. Police are unable to corroborate her story,298 for example, by
injuries to her sex organs.299
5. She exposed herself to risk of rape-or in the vernacular,
"she asked for it"-by accompanying the man voluntarily to the site of
wood, Police Attitudes and Beliefs Toward Rape, 13 J. POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 211, 219 (1985);
LaFree, Official Reactions, supra note 52, at 583-88.
291 See Kerstetter, supra note 255, at 286-301; McCAiL. Er AL., supra note 52, at 116-21.
292 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 40, 43. Although this variable does not
explicitly appear in the list published by McCAHiLL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116, several of
the items on their list have sexual overtones-for example, "prior trouble with the police"
sometimes means prostitution or juvenile promiscuity. MENACHEM AMiR, PATTERNS IN FOR-
CIBLE RAPE 271-72 (1971). Similarly, "victim-precipitation" cases sometimes have overtones
of promiscuity.
293 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 41.
294 Id. at 43. Cf MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (no findings concerning alcohol
or drugs, but "victim-precipitated" rapes more likely to be unfounded). Cf Kerstetter,
supra note 255, at 297 (nonsexual discrediting information such as alcohol or drug use
often led to unfounding). Kerstetter concluded, however, that police and prosecutors who
take account of a woman's drinking are motivated by evidentiary considerations rather
than their sex-role norms. Id at 305.
295 HOLMsmOM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 42 (police "most impressed" by "a consistent
and unchanging story"). Cf McCAHiLL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (32.9% unfounded if
social worker evaluated her story as partially incredible; otherwise 13.7%).
296 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 40-42. Cf McCAHmI. Er AL., supra note 52, at
116.
Even if the victim has lied in her report, she may have been raped. It is not unusual
for a victim to be embarrassed over the fact that she accepted a ride from a stranger,
so she may say that a car drew up beside her, the driver kidnapped her and raped her.
She was raped but not kidnapped.
MACDONALD, supra note 178, at 145.
297 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 46.
298 Id. at 42. Although this does not appear on the list in MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note
52, at 116, common sense tells us that a rape report is more likely to be believed when it is
corroborated by other evidence. This is a factor that may also be reflected in social work-
ers' judgments as to whether the report is "partially incredible." See id.
299 Kerstetter found that in acquaintance rape (where of course, consent looms as an




the alleged rape,300 or inviting him into her home,30' or engaging in
risky behavior such as hitchhiking.
30 2
6. She has, apart from the rape, severe mental or emotional
problems, perhaps evidenced by a history of psychiatric treatment or
an attempted suicide, or running away from home.30 3
7. She does not appear to be upset by the alleged rape.
0 4
8. She is unattractive.30 5
9. She knew the alleged rapist,306 or, much worse, had been
sexually intimate with him, voluntarily, on other occasions.
30 7
10. There is no large discrepancy between her age and his.308
11. She is at least 12 years old.
30 9
12. The alleged offender does not have a previous criminal
record.31
0
300 HoLmsTRoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 39-40, 42. Cf McCAHiL ET AL., supra note
52, at 116 (23% of cases that a social worker later evaluated as victim-precipitated were
unfounded, versus 12.3% of other cases).
301 HOLMSIROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 39-40, 42. Cf McCALL ar AL., supra note
52, at 116 (victim-precipitation associated with unfounding):
302 HOLMSTROM AND BURGESS, supra note 4, at 42-43.
303 Id- at 43; United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct 464, 475 (1994); McCA-
HILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (23.9% of cases in which victim reported to a social
worker that she had seen a psychiatrist prior to the alleged rape were unfounded versus
11.8% with no such report). Cf HoLmsTRoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 74-78 (hospital
staff's negative reactions to "mental cdses"); id. at 40 (negative police reaction to a "mental
case" who kept changing her story and had a history of psychiatric problems). Concerning
runaways, see id. at 42; McCAHiLL r ETA., supra note 52, at 116 (proportion unfounded for
runaways was 24.1 versus 13.7 for others).
304 Hor isrRoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 43.
305 McCAHILL Er AL., supra note 52, at 116 (53.3% of rape reports by obese women un-
founded, as opposed to 14.2% of reports by others); HOLmSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4,
at 67 (police more sympathetic to "pretty and articulate" victims). Perhaps police find
attractive women more likeable, or more poignant victims; or they may find rape of an
attractive woman more plausible. See generally notes 484-85 and accompanying text (for a
discussion of the effects of victim attractiveness).
306 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 40-43. Another study found that 24% of the
rape complaints in nonstranger cases were considered without merit, compared with
under 5% in stranger cases. Chappell & Singer, supra note 225, at 245-71.
307 HOLmSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 40-43; LeDoux & Hazelwood, supra note
290, at 219. Cf MARSH ET AL, supra note 25, at 98 (victim's sexual relations with accused
rapist rated more important than drinking or use of force).
308 HOLmsTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 43. This item is not on the list in MCCAHILL
ET AL., supra note 52, at 116, but the victim's age (over 12) was found to correlate with
unfounding, and presumably there is some overlap between this factor and the "different
ages" factor, id.
309 McCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (16.9% of reports by females in this age range
unfounded, versus 6.6% of reports by younger females); HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra
note 4, at 67 (police more sympathetic if victim is extremely young).
310 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 43 ("Nothing makes... [the police] more
enthusiastic about a case than to find out the assailant has other charges against him or a
prison record."). For an analysis of the admissibility of prior offenses in sex-crime cases,
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13. She herself (rather than a relative or acquaintance) con-
tacted the police.
311
14. She alleges completed penile-vaginal intercourse rather than
a lesser offense such as fondling or an attempt.
312
15. She has demonstrable scratches. 313
16. She is on welfare.
314
17. She alleges that more than one offender was involved.
315
18. She has had prior trouble with the police.
316
19. She is an African-American.
317
20. No woman (other than the complainant) was present during
the interrogation.
318
see generally David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MINN. L. REv. 529 (1994).
311 MCGAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (21.8% unfounded versus 13% when some-
one else reported the rape). This is interesting, because one possible source of false re-
ports is when a teenage girl lies to a parent in order to conceal a voluntary sexual
encounter, leading the parent to report the incident to the police. See infra notes 622-25
and accompanying text. One wonders whether political reasons lead police to regard re-
ports by parents as more credible, or as more worthy of respectful treatment.
312 McCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (16.5% unfounded versus 7% where another
crime occurred). Perhaps the police figured that anyone who is going to lie about a sexual
encounter will probably allege a completed rape rather than a mere attempt or some other
lesser offense. Or perhaps, in cases that are doubtful on other grounds, the detective is
more willing to found the report if the consequences for the man are less severe.
313 Id. (25.3% unfounded versus 13.9%). Presumably, these are cases in which the po-
lice conclude that the victim scratched herself. For an example of a false rape report by a
woman with self-inflicted injuries, see MACDONALD, supra note 178, at 86. In such cases,
"[t]he cuts usually are superficial, and are on the front of the body, the cheeks, chest,
abdomen, and thighs.... [T]he wounds tend to be within reach, at unusual angles, and
often conform to the range of motion of the person's arm or hands." Id. at 106. See gener-
ally C.P. McDoWELL & N.S. HIBLER, False Allegations, in PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INVEsrI-
GATION (R.R. Hazelwood & Ann Burgess eds., 1987).
314 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (18.9% unfounded versus 11.9%). As such,
race was not significantly associated with unfounding in this study. Id. See LaFree, Official
Reactions, supra note 52, at 592. Cf Mimi H. Silbert, Compounding Factors in the Rape of Street
Prostitution, in RAPE & SEXUAL ASSAULT II 75 (A.W. Burgess ed., 1988) (academic studies
show people discriminate against women of low respectability). A study of putative sexual
assault victims in Philadelphia revealed that of the 121 adolescents between the ages of 13
and 17, 42% were from families receiving some form of public assistance. WILIAM KRAS-
NER ET AL., VICTIMS OF RAPE (1976).
315 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116 (21% unfounded versus 13.9%).
316 Id. (22% unfounded versus 13.9%). In evaluating this correlation, one should bear
in mind that many cases of "prior trouble" involve voluntary sexual offenses such as prosti-
tution. See AmIR, supra note 292. For a critical evaluation of this factor, see infra text ac-
companying notes 853-57, 869-84. See also MAcDoNALD, supra note 178, at 145 ("A routine
part of any [police] investigation, not just of rape, is to check whether the victim or the
suspect has a criminal record.").
317 See LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 84-89. Cf Eugene Kanin,
False Rape Allegations, 23 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAv. 81, 84-85 (1994).
318 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 115-16 (finding this was the most important of 13
variables associated with unfounding: with a woman present the unfounding rate dropped
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21. The offense was not promptly reported.31 9
22. The putative victim failed a polygraph test.
3 20
23. She is uncooperative.
3 21
24. She is inarticulate.
3 22
Most of the above findings, though suggestive of improper police
biases, are inconclusive even in the jurisdictions studied. As with stud-
ies of attrition rates, the most common problem is an excessively
quantitative methodology: the scholar tabulates information from the
often-sketchy police records, and then discovers, for instance, a corre-
lation between the alleged victim's age and the founding decision.
But, of course, most of the flesh and blood of a case is not preserved
in a pithy police report, even before it has been reduced by a social
scientist to a collection of measurable data. As a result, one cannot
determine whether any particular correlate of unfounding is indica-
tive of police bias or, rather, of the fact that the group in question files
rape reports that are less credible, on average, than reports by other
women. Subjectivity, so carefully excluded at the front door of the
research design, enters triumphantly through the back door, when
the reader intuits whether a particular correlation-say, between the
complainant's social class and the unfounding decision-was due to
reasonable police appraisals of all the circumstances bearing on vic-
tims' credibility or, on the contrary, the ignorance and prejudice of
detectives.
Few of the items on our list are clearly indicative of either good
from 21.9% to 9.2%).
319 LaFree found a strong correlation between late reports and negative founding deci-
sions. LaFree, Official Reactions, supra note 52, at 588. The National Women's Study found
that, of the rapes that were reported to the police, 25% were reported over 24 hours after
the rape. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 5.
320 "Most detectives ask relatively few victims of sexual assault to take the [polygraph]
test. It is more likely to be used in an acquaintance rape case, where there is no bodily
injury, no other physical evidence, no eyewitnesses, and both victim and witness [putative
offender?] give apparently truthful accounts of the time spent together." MACDoNALD,
supra note 178, at 146-47. Although some states prohibit use of the polygraph in sexual
assault cases, detectives in other states routinely administer the test. Id. Prosecutors some-
times offer accused rapists a deal: "if you will take a polygraph test and waive your right to
have the result excluded from evidence, we promise not to prosecute you unless you fail
the test." Interview with Professor David Lykken, Psychology Depart., University of Minn.,
expert witness on the reliability of polygraph tests, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 1, 1995).
Professor Lykken believes that polygraph tests are unreliable. Id.
321 WIEHE & RICHARDS, supra note 227, at 37 ("Police generally have far more cases than
they can handle and thus are reluctant to pursue the investigation of rape cases where the
victim is uncooperative. Also, police experience suggests that a face-saving way of re-
canting a complaint is to decide not to pursue it.").




detective work, on the one hand, or indefensible bias on the other.323
Even an appropriate criterion such as the absence of corroboration
can be misused. In acquaintance rape cases, corroboration, in the
sense of evidence strongly indicating that rape rather than consensual
intercourse occurred, is often lacking. In our judgment, it would be
improper to unfound an otherwise credible acquaintance rape com-
plaint merely because of the absence of this sort of corroboration.
Yet, the rigorously quantitative social-scientific studies do not reveal
how often this occurs. We learn that lack of corroboration is a factor,
but we do not learn whether it is employed judiciously.
Conversely, even the most suspicious-sounding correlate of un-
founding decisions may have an innocent explanation. No one knows
which demographic groups, if any, are disproportionately likely to lie
to the police about rape, or at least to tell stories that sound less credi-
ble than most rape reports. We may have our suspicions, but we do
not know, for example, whether women on welfare are in fact more
likely to lie about rape. Lacking such information, we cannot tell
which of the correlations found by social scientists are due to unfair
police discrimination.
Although some studies of founding decisions are not as useful as
one might wish, several conclusions can be drawn. First, founding de-
cisions in rape cases are highly subjective. This is evident, for exam-
ple, from a study indicating that in one city the presence of another
woman during interrogation of the complainant increased the likeli-
hood that police would found the complaint. 324 Simulated jury stud-
ies reveal that appraisals of acquaintance rape scenarios are affected
by one's gender and by whether one holds sexually egalitarian
beliefs.
325
A priori, then, male-dominated detective squads are likely to be at
least somewhat too skeptical towards accusations of acquaintance
rape. This conclusion does not require us to assume that police are
uniquely biased; only that they are not uniquely free of bias. For if
anything is clear about human nature, it is that groups tend, usually
unconsciously, to interpret the world from parochial, self-interested
points of view. While we cannot say exactly how much founding deci-
323 Confining ourselves to criteria explicitly invoked by the police, and putting aside for
later analysis all of the contributory fault/morality factors, we would select the woman's
failure to act upset as perhaps the least defensible criterion of her truthfulness. This phe-
nomenon is likely to be due to differences in personality and experience among victims,
rather than to differences between truthful and untruthful reports. Interview with Profes-
sor David Lykken, Psychology Dept., University of Minn., in Minneapolis, Minn. (July 24,
1995).
324 MCGAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 115-16.
325 See sources cited infra notes 516-28.
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sions are distorted by male bias, it seems highly likely that, except per-
haps in the increasingly common sexually-integrated detective
units,3 26 some degree of distortion does occur.
Second, most observers agree that founding decisions in acquain-
tance rape cases are strongly affected by the purported victim's con-
tributory negligence, and by her perceived immorality. 327 Unlike
some of the other unfounding correlates, these recur in virtually every
study of rape case processing, and police often consciously employ
them. If police bias does indeed distort founding decisions, this ap-
pears to be the type of case in which most of the distortion occurs.
To defend the conscious use of contributory negligence/morality
criteria, one must argue either that the trait in question, promiscuity
for example, is relevant on the consent issue, or that such women are
known to be disproportionately inclined to fabricate rape charges, or
that the police should unfound these cases, regardless of their merits,
because juries are unlikely to believe such women. We discuss the first
two justifications in Part II of the article.
3 28
The third justification, difficulty of obtaining a conviction,
presumes that the police should be in the business of deciding, not
only which crimes actually occurred, but which can be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of a possibly biased jury. In
theory, such decisions are to be made by prosecutors.
329
We will not dogmatically assert that departures from the theoreti-
cal division of functions between police and prosecutors are never jus-
tifiable on practical grounds. Once the police determine that the
prosecutor is unlikely to file charges, for instance, because the wo-
man's contributory fault makes a conviction too hard to obtain, fur-
ther investigation may be a waste of time.
Reserving judgment on whether this attitude makes sense for
some other crimes, in our opinion it is not an appropriate approach
to rape complaints. Rape is one of the gravest and most devastating
offenses. It is, even more than most crimes, an offense in which the
appearance of official fairness is as important as the reality, if only
because of the long history of inadequate societal responses to ac-
quaintance rape. The rape victim's humiliation and sense of injustice
326 The trend toward use of female investigators goes back over 20 years. See Berger,
supra note 1, at 7.
327 See, e.g., HOLMSEROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 39-40, 42-43; Ledoux & Hazelwood,
supra note 290, at 219; MACDoNALD, supra note 178, at 145; MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at
98; McCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116.
328 See infra text accompanying notes 631-33, 895-934.




are likely to be compounded if she is told at the outset that nothing
will be done because she brought it on herself, say by hitchhiking, or
because she is a moral outcast whom the law does not protect. Except
when the report plainly appears to be false, the police should be as
supportive as possible, consistent with the requirements of a thorough
investigation. If it later becomes necessary to tell the woman that no
formal charges will be filed, that should be done, with appropriate
explanations, by the prosecutor. The prosecutor's claim to be moti-
vated solely by problems of proof will usually be more credible than a
comparable assertion by a detective who lacks legal training and who
is probably more likely than a prosecutor, on average, to object
strongly to the complainant's behavior on legally irrelevant moral
grounds.33
0
A substantial minority of rape complainants ultimately decline to
press charges. 331 Such withdrawals are most common in cases where,
as in many acquaintance rapes, there is a close victim-offender rela-
tionship.3 32 Holmstrom and Burgess found that only 41% of the Bos-
ton rape complainants they studied "clearly and unequivocally"
wished to press charges.33 3 Many others (31%) were ambivalent,
3 34
while a small minority (15%) definitely did not want their cases to
proceed. 335 The authors concluded that, "[i] t is the rare victim who is
unequivocally determined to press charges and who remains so
throughout the entire court process." 3
36
Complainants gave several reasons for refusing to proceed:
To avoid ordeal of court: 29 (24%)
Afraid of assailant taking revenge: 26 (21%)
To avoid sending a person to jail: 17 (14%)
What's the use-he'll get away with it anyway: 9 (7%)
Feel sorry for the guy: 9 (7%)
Just want to forget the whole thing: 9 (7%)
Scared of identifying wrong guy: 5 (4%)
Would look bad on my record: 3 (2%)
Other: 16 (13%)33
7
Judging by these figures, conventional accounts of victims' atti-
tudes overemphasize feelings of hopelessness engendered by systemic
bias against women. In this study, victims were not primarily moti-
vated by a feeling that "he'll get away with it anyway," an apprehension
330 See supra text accompanying note 236.
331 See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
332 ZEISEL, supra note 94, at 26.
333 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 56.
334 &d
335 Id,
336 Id, at 60.
337 Id. at 58 tbl.4. Cf supra note 173 (reasons given for failure to report the crime).
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that only 7% of them expressed, half as many as wanted "to avoid
sending a person to jail" and exactly the same proportion as "felt
sorry" for the rapist. To be sure, the single most common reason for
failure to press charges was to avoid the ordeal of the courtroom,
where the victim anticipated that she would be blamed for the crime
and embarrassing questions would be raised about her sexual habits-
for example, an abortion, use of birth control, and that she "slept
around."338 Still, only about one out of four gave this reason.339
It remains possible, however, that police who are unduly negative
affect the victims' decisions. A study in Denver found that 38% of
rape accusers withdrew their charges soon after filing them. Among
the reasons given was police resistance to prosecuting the case.
340
Kerstetter investigated which variables were correlated with the
victim's willingness to prosecute.3 41 He concluded that the perpetra-
tor's use of a weapon and the presence of a witness to the rape were
important factors in both acquaintance and stranger rape cases. 342 To
explain this finding, Kerstetter surmised that detectives influence the
woman's decision to prosecute. If no weapon was used, and no wit-
nesses exist, the police may feel that prosecution would be futile. In
order to decrease the number of unsolved crimes on his record, the
detective may attempt to dissuade the woman from pressing
charges.34
3
In Michigan, a study of the impact of comprehensive rape law
reforms found that the rate of unfoundings remained stable (less than
10%) after passage of the reforms.344 Between 1973 and 1977, arrests
for forcible rape rose by 61%, compared with 16% increases for both
murder and aggravated assault and with robbery, which showed a de-
cline of 8%. 345 Although the increased number of arrests was a pre-
dictable result of increased reporting coupled with a stable
unfounding rate, the authors concluded that the rising arrest rate was
also influenced by Michigan's strong rape law reforms.3
46
338 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 58.
339 Id. at 58 tbl.4.
340 Other reasons were fear of a trial and intimidation by friends of the rapist. HURSCH,
supra note 128, at 110-14.
341 Kerstetter, supra note 255, at 267.
342 Id. at 308.
343 Id. at 309.
344 MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 86. Similarly, Canadian reforms apparently did not
affect the unfounding rate. Roberts & Gebotys, supra note 209, at 571. But since the vol-
ume of rape reports rose after reforms in both Michigan and Canada, perhaps a higher
proportion of marginal cases entered the system. If so, a stable unfounding rate would be
consistent with a greater willingness to found complaints.
345 MARSH Er AL., supra note 25, at 28.
346 "The monthly pattern of arrests for forcible rape from 1972 through 1978 ... reveals
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D. THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE
Once the police clear3 47 a rape complaint, the prosecutor has, as
with other crimes, virtually unlimited discretion in deciding whether
to prosecute, whether the charge should be rape or some lesser of-
fense, and whether to plea bargain.
348
In some cases, the prosecutor dismisses the case because the puta-
tive victim has belatedly decided not to cooperate. 349 More often,
prosecutors focus on proof problems. Frohmann studied
prosecutorial decisions to reject rape cases in two West Coast commu-
nities in 1989 and 1990.350 She concluded, as have others, that prose-
cutors screen out the "unwinnable" cases in order to improve their
conviction rates, because this impresses their superiorg and, if they are
politically ambitious, the electorate. 351 As a rule, acquaintance rape
cases are more difficult to win than stranger rape cases. 352 Thus, ac-
quaintance rapes, especially those with "bad victims," are less likely
than stranger rapes to result in prosecution of the offender.
353
Holmstrom and Burgess found several similarities between the at-
titudes of police and of prosecutors. Like the police, prosecutors were
more likely to proceed with a case if the accused had a prior criminal
record,354 and if the complainant's account was consistent and un-
changed.355 District attorneys felt that their competence was on the
line when a case was tried and did not want to look foolish. The pros-
ecutors were wary, accordingly, of witnesses who did not tell the whole
truth during preparation of the case, or who belatedly changed their
stories. 35
6
a relationship between arrests and the law's enactment, and this is confirmed by the time-
series analysis." Id.
347 1992 UCR, supra note 161, at 210. A reported crime is said to be "cleared" when at
least one person is arrested, charged with an offense, and turned over for prosecution. Id
at 202.
348 See generally U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 329-33 (1967) [hereinafter THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME]; WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 13.1-13.2
(Hornbook series, student ed. 1985).
349 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 170-71 (explaining that over 15% of all rape
charges are dismissed because the victim is afraid to face her attacker and to discuss the
rape before strangers).
350 Frohmann, supra note 13.
351 Id at 215. For similar conclusions, see, e.g., FAiRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 151-52;
VACHSS, supra note 13, at 140-43; MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 101.
352 See, e.g., FAIRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 133-36 (describing the obstacles to conviction in
acquaintance rape cases).
353 See id. at 151-52; VACHSS, supra note 13, at 90-91, 231.
354 HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 138.
355 Id. at 142.
356 Id. at 145-46.
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Prosecutors looked for medical evidence of force and penetra-
tion,3 57 and took account of the woman's appearance and de-
meanor-for example, does she smile when she's upset?358 Like all
participants in the criminal justice system, the prosecutors gave weight
to the woman's character, for example, her alcoholism, and her rela-
tionship with the accused.3 59 Prosecutors Were disappointed to learn,
for example, that she had invited the accused into her apartment.3
60
Surprisingly, the prosecutors' most common judgmental com-
ments concerned the women's intelligence. Holmstrom and Burgess
speculated that perhaps prosecutors sought witnesses who could ver-
balize well.361 Given the critical importance of precise testimony
about the parties' words and actions, this explanation is plausible. An
intelligent witness may be better able to respond to a vigorous cross
examination. More broadly, intelligence may be a proxy for class. A
solidly middle-class complainant would not only be more articulate,
on average; she might also be more credible to many jurors than a
lower-class woman, especially in a consent-defense case. After all,
prosecutors want a witness whom jurors will regard as sexually re-
strained and honest, characteristics that jurors may associate with mid-
dle-class status. As an experienced sex-crimes prosecutor puts it:
Good Victims have jobs (like stockbroker or accountant) or impeccable
status (like a policeman's wife); are well-educated and articulate, and
are, above all, presentable to a jury: attractive-but not too attractive,
demure-but not pushovers. They should be upset-but in good
taste-not so upset that they become hysterical.3 62
In rape cases, critics of prosecutors have focused mainly on their
excessive use of "winnability" as a criterion for filing charges.3 63 The
basic point is well-taken, but some of this criticism strikes us as injudi-
cious. Here, for example, is a passagefrom a Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Report:
No one expects prosecutors to bring unwinnable cases-cases that could
not meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. But prosecutors
must also understand that there is more at stake in the prosecution of
rape cases than an individual "win" or "loss." In rape cases, the reputation of
the system is at stake in every prosecution. When survivors hear that prosecu-
357 1& at 144.
358 Id at 143.
359 id at 144.
360 Id
361 Id.
362 VACHSS, supra note 13, at 90.
363 See supra text accompanying notes 350-51. In general and within reason, scholars
agree than winnability is a legitimate factor. E.g, THE RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 109, at
11; FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT wrrH A CRIME 4-7,
11-19 (FrankJ. Remington ed., 1969).
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tors will not bring cases if they happen to recognize the perpetrator-
the kid down the street, the UPS delivery man, the father of a friend-
that has consequences. Why report the crime if you know it will not be
prosecuted? Why pursue a case if you know you will have to fight barri-
ers of institutionalized disbelief? Why believe in our system ofjustice at
a1l?364
This passage seems to conflate two quite different problems: satis-
fying courts and satisfying juries. "Unwinnable cases" are not usually
ones that could not meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, as
defined by courts. Even in the weakest acquaintance rape cases, the
victim's testimony usually establishes a primafacie case, so the danger is
not so much a directed verdict as an acquittal by the jury. For all its
rhetoric, the quoted passage does not say what a prosecutor should do
when a jury acquittal appears highly probable.
The authors of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report appear to
believe that prosecutors' attitudes strongly affect the reporting rate for
rape. This belief is commonly held by rape scholars,3 65 and it is not
demonstrably false, although we doubt that many victims know even
approximately how often prosecutors decline to prosecute rape
cases. 3 6 6 The Report's admonition against treating won-lost records as
the sole gauge of prosecutorial success is fair enough. But the Report
fails to consider the possibility that, if the prosecutor's pessimism
about getting a conviction is well-founded, the rape victim will be disil-
lusioned, sometimes even more sharply, by an acquittal after an emo-
tionally-wrenching trial.3 67  We do not say that this letdown is
364 THE RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 109, at 11.
365 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 15-26; HOLmsrToM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 133-
48; SPOHN & HoRNEv, supra note 170, at 18-20.
366 Our intuition would perhaps be more debatable if the question were rephrased:
What proportion of rape victims have heard about a rape case (or cases in general) in
which a prosecutor refused to file charges? Never having heard such rumors ourselves, we
doubt that they are as widespread as the Senate report implies. But perhaps in some high-
crime-rate subcultures such rumors abound, especially if one cumulates rape with other
crimes, or prosecutors' responses with those of other officials.
367 See, e.g., HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 254-55.
Surprisingly, the effect of trial verdicts on long-term response [of the victim to the
rape] has not been studied to any great extent. [One study] ... found that conviction
led to fewer symptoms 6 months later. But some researchers suggest that the verdict is
often less distressing to the victim than her experiences during the actual trial pro-
ceedings. Many victim/witness advocates, however, express frustration in attempting
to explain to a woman whose assailant was adjudged not guilty why this verdict has
been handed down; convincing her that the jury did not necessarily disbelieve her
testimony is not an easy task. It would be surprising if the verdict had little effect on
the victim.
Steketee & Austin, supra note 174, at 299. Nevertheless, these authors believe that "involve-
ment in the criminal justice system, particularly trial proceedings, potentially has a positive
effect on the victim with regard to expression of anger, emotional processing of the event,
a sense of empowerment, and reduction of feelings of victimization." Id. at 299-300. This
effect is, however, mediated by various aspects of the trial including the outcome. Id An-
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necessarily as severe as disappointment due to never having had a day
in court, only that, if ajury will not convict, the choice is not between
a bad alternative and a good one but between two bad alternatives.
The Senate Report also does not discuss the possibility that, in
order to prosecute a losing rape case, the prosecutor will have to ne-
glect other, more winnable types of cases, perhaps leaving other vic-
tims and potential victims disillusioned or unprotected.3 68 To make
these abstractions more concrete, consider a conversation between
Professor Susan Estrich and a prosecutor about a rape case:
The victim came to ... [the assistant district attorney's] office...
dressed in a pair of tight blue jeans. Very tight. With a see-through
blouse on top. Very revealing. That's how she was dressed. It was, he
tells me, really something. Something else. Did it matter? Are you
kidding!
The man involved was her ex-boyfriend. And lover: well, ex-lover.
They ran into each other on the street. He asked her to come up and
see Splash on his new VGP She did. It was not the Disney version-of
Splash, that is. It was porno. They sat in the living room watching. Like
they used to. He said, let's go in the bedroom where we'll be more com-
fortable. He moved the VCR. They watched from the bed. Like they
used to. He began rubbing her foot. Like he used to. Then he kissed
her. She said no, she didn't want this, and got up to leave. He pulled
her back on the bed and forced himself on her. He did not beat her.
She had no bruises. Afterward, she ran out. The first thing she did was
flag a police car. That, the prosecutor tells us, was the first smart thing
she did.
The prosecutor pointed out to her that she was not hurt, that she
had no bruises, that she did not fight. She pointed out to the prosecutor
that her ex-boyfriend was a weight lifter. He told her it would be nearly
impossible to get a conviction. She could accept that, she said: even if
he didn't get convicted, at least he should be forced to go through the
time and the expense of defending himself. That clinched it, said the
D.A. She was just trying to use the system to harass her ex-boyfriend. He
had no criminal record. He was not a "bad guy." No charges were
filed.
69
other author states that in Michigan, "victims who had received counseling were often well
prepared psychologically for the ordeal of a trial; and they made better witnesses." MARSH
ET AL., supra note 25, at 13.
368 Most prosecutors in urban jurisdictions are overloaded with cases. See, e.g., FAIasrEiN,
supra note 13, at 91 (stating that prosecutors use plea bargaining as a way to manage their
workload); THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 348, at 323-24 (arguing that a substantial
number of cases must be dismissed or negotiated). Prosecutors often "receive cases at the
last moment and are faced with the task of preparing several cases simultaneously." HOLM-
sTROm & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 148. One harried district attorney, evaluating the merits
of a rape case, said: "I don't want to waste a lot of time on this and have the jury come back
in two minutes with a not guilty verdict." Id In addition, a number of prosecutors work
only part-time and maintain a private practice. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 348,
at 362-63.
369 EsTRIcH, supra note 1, at 9.
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In discussing this case with Professor Estrich, the prosecutor em-
phasized the "likely response ofjuries," and he "leaned heavily on the
'neutrality' of his decision."3 70 It was, he assured Estrich, the sort of
decision he makes every day, in all sorts of criminal cases, as he de-
cides whether to file charges. The critical evidentiary factors, in his
view, were lack of resistance, the parties' prior relationship, and the
absence of corroboration. As with other crimes, he told Estrich, he
was simply calculating the odds of success in a trial.
371
Estrich rejects this explanation, not as factually inaccurate, but as
insensitive to the uniqueness of rape cases. "Because of the nature of
the crime, rape is less likely to be supported by corroboration than...
other crimes."372 Rape is also unique in that, "Because of the sex and
socialization of the victim, it may require less force and generate less
resistance. '373 Finally, "[t]o take into account prior relationship in
rape in the same way as in other crimes communicates the message
that women victims, particularly of... [nonaggravated acquaintance]
rapes, are to blame for their victimization-precisely the sort ofjudg-
ment that leads them to remain silent. '374 Since "rape is different
from assault or robbery or burglary it should be treated differently; to
treat them the same is not truly 'neutral."375
Estrich has a point. If a particular type of crime is both serious
and characteristically hard to prove, there is much to be said for pros-
ecuting more long-shot cases, especially if the crime harms a class of
people, in this case women, who have understandable suspicions of
the justice system. It should be recognized, however, that prosecutors
have often faced long odds in acquaintance rape cases. For several
reasons, conviction-rate statistics are not always available, and are not
a wholly reliable guide to understanding the problem,3 76 but a few




374 Id. at 20-21.
375 Id at 21.
376 Nearly all rape trials occur in state courts. While annual conviction rates for federal
courts are available, broken down by specific crimes, no comparable data of national scope
exists for state trials. Scholars have sometimes published such statistics, but the jurisdic-
tions studied may not be representative, and the statistics must be interpreted carefully.
Official statistics invariably lump together stranger rapes and acquaintance rapes; the diffi-
culties of the latter type of prosecution are thus obscured. This problem is not wholly
solved by compiling separate acquaintance rape figures: one wants subdivisions for each
type of case-for example, cases in which the putative victim's sexual history was in evi-
dence, cases in which she had a pre-rape sexual relationship with the perpetrator, and so
on.
Even if all this information is available, numerous questions remain: Is the jurisdiction
typical? Is the data sufficiently recent? (Scholars usually cannot say, for example, whether
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examples should suffice to instill at least a modicum of empathy with
prosecutors.
According to a nationwide study, prosecutors in the 1950s had
only a 7% conviction rate in nonaggravated acquaintance rape
cases.377 In Travis County, Texas, between 1970 and 1976, 91% of the
stranger rape defendants were convicted, compared to only 25% of
the acquaintance rape defendants. 378 In Philadelphia, researchers
found that the conviction rate varied from zero in rape cases where
there was some "victim precipitation" and no physical roughness or
weapon to about 90% where those factors were absent.3 79 A study of
rape cases processed in the District of Columbia from 1971 to 1976
found that only 9% of defendants who were cohabiting, or were ex-
spouses or ex-boyfriends of rape victims, were convicted. 380 Of de-
fendants who were friends of the victim, 10% were convicted; of ac-
quaintances,. 19%; and of strangers, 27%.311 These figures show a
attitudinal changes have made a ten-or fifteen-year-old study obsolete). If the conviction
rates are high, may this be due to the reluctance of prosecutors to try difficult cases, rather
than the willingness ofjudges andjuries to convict? Conversely, does a disappointingly low
rate mask prosecutorial aggressiveness? Due account must also be taken of plea bargain-
ing---did prosecutors inflate conviction rates by agreeing to excessively lenient deals?-and
convictions on lesser charges that may or may not be due to excessive jury leniency or
prosecutorial timidity.
One also should ask how the conviction rate compares with the rate for comparable
crimes, bearing in mind that for some purposes the "comparable" crime may be, for exam-
ple, nonsexual assaults in which the defense was self-defense and adverse character evi-
dence about the putative victim was introduced rather than nonsexual assaults in general.
Finally, and most obviously, convictiohl rates reveal what happened, not what should have
'happened. A low conviction rate may be distressing and yet partly due to legitimate
problems of proof.
Despite all these complexities, conviction rates are sometimes informative. If we
learn, for example, that juries in New York convicted acquaintance rapists in 60% of the
cases, but in none of the 50 cases in which the parties had been lovers, we can safely
conclude that the latter type of case raises difficult problems for prosecutors.
377 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 252-54.
378 Weninger, supra note 133, at 360-62.
379 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 191.
380 Williams, supra note 65, at 36.
381 Id. The victim-defendant relationship was unknown in about 20% of the cases; in
these cases the conviction rate was 41%. Id. Since the relationship was not mentioned in
these case records, probably most were stranger rapes. Other estimates of acquittal rates
vary somewhat, but are almost always lower for nonaggravated acquaintance rape than for
stranger rape. See HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 247 (citing conviction rate of
11.3% for all stranger rape cases reported to police, and 2.5% for corresponding acquain-
tance rapes); Tamar Lewin, Tougher Laws Mean More Cases Are Called Rape, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1991, at A8 (citing conviction rate of 60% for all stranger rape cases going to trial and
40% for the corresponding acquaintance rape cases); see generally Gary D. LaFree, Variables
Affecting Guilty Pleas and Convictions in Rape Cases: Toward a Social Theory of Rape Processing, 58
Soc. FORCES 833 (1980) (reporting a significant correlation between victim-defendant rela-
tionship and probability of conviction, with acquainted defendants more likely to be ac-
quitted). But see Homey & Spohn, supra note 51 (finding no difference in convictions of
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fairly linear relationship between the degree of intimacy between the
victim and defendant and the likelihood of acquittal. The figures also
show, contrary to the inference a reader of Estrich might make, that
some prosecutors are already employing the sort of flexible standard
that Estrich proposes: they have taken much greater risks of losing in
acquaintance cases than in stranger cases. To be sure, few if any are
willing to prosecute many cases in which an acquittal seems highly
probable.38
2
The question is one of degree. In the case Estrich describes, the
prior relationship of the parties, the lack of corroborative evidence,
and the woman's rather suggestive behavior made a conviction un-
likely.383 The defendant easily could have invented a motive for a
false accusation: for example, by testifying that after they had consen-
sual sex, the woman pleaded for a resumption of their old relation-
ship, which he declined, after which she bolted from the room in a
fury.
Let us assume that at least some of these weak cases should be
tried. The question then becomes how many, how weak, and for
which crimes? Judging by her unequivocal condemnation of the pros-
ecutor in the case she discusses, Professor Estrich seems to believe that
nearly all acquaintance rape cases should be prosecuted, regardless of
the odds, provided of course that the prosecutor believes the woman
and has a prima facie case.
That position would certainly make sense if losing cases had no
costs. In fact, of course, a futile prosecution entails several potential
costs. The first, arguably, is unfairness to the defendant. Estrich's
prosecutor evidently regarded a predictably futile prosecution as un-
ethical "harassment" of the defendant. On that issue, we agree with
Estrich that prosecution is ethically permissible, if the prosecutor con-
siders the defendant guilty in fact, and believes that the admissible
evidence would support a conviction if one were obtained.384 Under
such circumstances, the accused has no legal right to a directed ver-
dict by the judge,385 and we see no reason why he should have an
ethical right to what amounts to a directed verdict by the prosecutor.
This is particularly true when, as in some acquaintance rape cases, the
stranger versus acquaintance rape in Detroit).
382 This can be inferred from the small numbers of prosecutions for acquaintance rape
in the jurisdictions studied, and from anecdotal evidence.
383 See supra notes 65, 380-81 and accompanying text.
384 In deciding whether a conviction is sustainable, courts ask "whether upon the evi-
dence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence
and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt be-




predicted acquittal would be based, at least in part, on legally im-
proper or factually implausible considerations.38 6 To be sure, the jury
is entitled (in the sense that nothing will be done about it) to acquit in
the teeth of the law and the facts.38 7 But that does not mean that the
prosecutor is obligated to engage in anticipatory nullification.
In defense of Estrich's apparently unqualified desire to prosecute
difficult acquaintance rape cases, one can cite the psychological im-
portance to rape victims of tangible manifestations of official concern.
But, Estrich does not fully explore the costs of such manifestations.
She informs us that the victim in this case was willing to endure the
emotional roller-coaster of a trial and acquittal. However, she fails to
discuss the victims of other crimes, perhaps neglected because of this
probably futile prosecution. Some of those victims' stories might have
been equally poignant; some of their cases might have been more win-
nable. This is not to say that we necessarily disagree with Estrich's
conclusion that the case should have been prosecuted; only that we
want more facts about the prosecutor's options.
Undoubtedly, some prosecutors have been too concerned about
their "won-lost" statistics. This attitude obviously has a greater impact
on crimes like acquaintance rape that are characteristically difficult to
prove. But, the potential benefits and costs of unsuccessful prosecu-
tions are difficult to calculate accurately even in a single case, and vary
from case-to-case and office-to-office. For such a problem, no categor-
ical answer is defensible.
The evidence is mostly negative concerning the impact of legal
reforms on prosecutors' willingness to file charges in rape cases.
Once again, Michigan is the only state in which reforms seem to have
affected official behavior. In Detroit, Spohn and Homey found "an
increase in the percentage of reported rapists indicted even as the
number of reported cases increased."388 While conceding that this
may reflect decisions by the police rather than by prosecutors, they
think the latter is more likely, since "most of the legal changes in-
volved evidentiary rules affecting the likelihood of obtaining convic-
tions at trial."389 Anecdotal evidence supported this conclusion. 390
In Houston, however, the percentage of reported rapists indicted
decreased as the number of reports rose, perhaps because of limited
prosecutorial resources.391 In Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington,
386 See infra text accompanying notes 446-96.
387 See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 348, § 21.1(g).
388 SPOHN & HoREY, supra note 170, at 102.
389 Id. at 102-03.
390 Id.
391 Id. at 102.
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D.C., and Atlanta, law reforms had no apparent impact on indictment
rates.392
Similarly, Loh concluded that reforms in the state of Washington
had not affected prosecutors' standards for determining "con-
victability."393 Studying California data, Polk found no significant
post-reform change in the police clearance rate, but a slight increase




Criticisms of police, prosecutors, and especially judges are more
prominent in the rape literature than criticisms of jurors.
395 Of
course, legal scholars can be expected to focus on appellate decisions,
but we suspect that there are other explanations as well. Few Ameri-
cans are entirely free of the idea that "the people" are exceedingly
wise, a tribute that is less often paid to police or lawyers. Unlikejuries,
appellate judges write opinions explaining their decisions. A bad
opinion offers a much better target than an unjust but unexplained
acquittal by a jury that can only be second-guessed by someone who
attended the trial, and then only by writing a prolix discussion of the
evidence. In rape law, as in other fields, we all seek judicial opinions
that confirm our values.
If reformers wish to improve the chances of conviction, however,
the main limiting factor is not skeptical police, cautious prosecutors,
or sexist judges, but biased jurors. The empirical evidence suggests
that the kinds of cases that police tend to unfound, and in which pros-
ecutors are reluctant to file charges, and in which appellate courts
occasionally reverse a conviction, are the kinds in which most juries
are unlikely to convict.396 This is not to say that the attitudes of po-
392 Id. at 93-97.
393 Loh, supra note 275, at 613-14. An analysis of the impact of Canadian reforms found
that the rate at which rape cases led to the filing of charges rose after reforms, but since a
comparable increase occurred for other crimes of violence, this was not due to the re-
forms. Roberts & Gebotys, supra note 209, at 569.
394 Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 191,
194-98 (1985).
395 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 15-25.
396 Compare supra text accompanying notes 291-322, 349-62 (describing the types of cases
that are more often unfounded by the police and dismissed by prosecutors), with infra text
accompanying notes 389-405 (describing the types of cases that result in acquittal by ju-
ries). Our point is further illustrated by data from a study of requests by police (which
must be approved by prosecutors) for arrest warrants for criminal sexual conduct in
Kalamazoo County, Michigan from 1975 to 1977. In 64% of the cases in which the police
founded the complaint and requested a warrant, no conviction ensued, either because the
prosecutor denied the request, or because an acquittal, dismissal or nolle ended the pro-
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lice, prosecutors, and judges are always defensible, or always harmless,
but only that they generally reflect public attitudes that are also com-
mon, apparently more common,3 97 among jurors. For this reason,
coupled with the prosecution's burden of proof at trial, the biases of
police and prosecutors toward acquaintance rape victims probably do
not substantially reduce the numbers of men who are convicted of
rape. It is critical, therefore, to understand jurors'-which is to say,
the public's-attitudes towards rape.
1. Kalven and Zeisel's Classic Juy Study
Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury398 is the most comprehen-
sive study of jury verdicts in American criminal cases. As part of the
Chicago Jury Project, the authors analyzed a nationwide sample of
criminal trials. For each trial, they asked the trial judge to indicate the
jury's verdict and what the judge's own verdict would have been, if the
case had been tried without a jury. By comparing these hypothetical
verdicts (and the judges' comments) with the juries' actual verdicts,
Kalven and Zeisel were able to determine the types of cases in which
judges tend to disagree with juries.
Of the 3576 trials studied in this project, 106 involved a charge of
forcible rape.399 Analyzing the 64 cases of "aggravated rape" (stranger
rapes, gang rapes, and rapes in which the victim suffered an addi-
tional injury), Kalven and Zeisel found that the jury was more lenient
than the judge in only 9.4% of the cases. 400 In the 42 other rape
cases,401 acquaintance rapes with no aggravating factor, the jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty of rape only three times (7%); the trial
judges who heard these cases would have convicted seven ,times as
often, in about half of the cases. 402 As Professor Berger has remarked,
this is "an amazing statistic in light of demonstrated judicial skepticism
ceeding. Susan Caringella-MacDonald, Sexual Assault Prosecution: An Examination of Model
Rape Legislation in Michigan, 4 WOMEN AN POL. 65, 71 tbl.1 (1984). Thus, even in the cases
in which the police believed the complainant, the accused usually ivas not convicted. In
cases in which the police unfounded the complainant because of unjustifiable doubts
about the complainant's veracity, or because they considered prosecution to be futile, the
chances of obtaining a conviction were probably on average much weaker.
397 Although recent national studies do not exist, the conviction rate in nonaggravated
acquaintance rape cases has historically been below 50%. See supra text accompanying
notes 377-81. It follows that, in most. of the simple rape cases in which police and prosecu-
tors believed both that the complainant was telling the truth and that the case was worth
pursuing, jurors did not find her version credible beyond a reasonable doubt.
398 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52.
399 Id. at 67.
400 Id. at 253.
401 Id.
402 Id. at 253-54 & tbl.73.
12551997] RA4PE
BRYDEN & LENGNICK
toward complainants of sexual assault."40 3 Especially, we would add,
since the study took place in the 1950s, when judges probably were
much more likely to blame rape victims than they are today.
The jury acquitted when the judge would have convicted in
36.9% of all the nonaggravated acquaintance rape cases. 404 This com-
putation treated a conviction on a lesser charge as a conviction. If
such convictions are treated as acquittals, the judge-jury disparity
widens further, with the jury being more lenient than the judge in
almost 50% of the nonaggravated acquaintance rape cases.
405
Bearing in mind that the 42 nonaggravated acquaintance rape
complaints that went to trial survived scrutiny by victims themselves,
who tend to report only the relatively strong cases,406 and by police
and prosecutors, two groups with a well-documented aversion to weak
cases,407 the 7% conviction rate represents a near-total nullification of
the crime of rape in cases where the parties knew each other and no
aggravating factor was present.
For each of 42 crime categories, Kalven and Zeisel calculated the
"netjury leniency," arrived at by subtracting the percentage of cases in
which the judge was more lenient than the jury from the percentage
in which the jury was more lenient than the judge.408 The result was a
positive figure for all 42 categories, reflecting the juries' consistently
greater leniency.40 9 But, there were marked differences from one
crime to another, ranging from game-laws cases, where the net jury
leniency was highest (+43)410 to "miscellaneous public disorders,"
where the net jury leniency was only +4.411
The net jury leniency for forcible rape was +18,412 identical to
403 Berger, supra note 1, at 30. See generally Carol Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape
Victims, 57JUDICATURE 303 (1974).
404 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 253-54.
405 Id. at 254.
406 See ALLISON & WRITGHTSON, supra note 56, at 52 (stating that "more violent rapes are
more likely to be reported to the police" and that "the greater the amount of physical
violence used by the rapist, the more likely the attacker was to succeed and the more likely
the rapist was reported to the authorities"); Bachman, supra note 166, at 265-66 (conclud-
ing that victims are more likely to report rape if they experience severe physical force or
are injured); Lizotte, supra note 138, at 181-85 (stating that "victims report rape to the
police in response to factors that make the incident more serious and hence make prosecu-
tion easier").
407 For a discussion of factors affecting the decisions of police and prosecutors in rape
cases, see supra text accompanying notes 225-397.
408 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 28 n.28.
409 Id. at 69-75.
410 Id. at 74.
411 Id. at 71.
412 Id. at 70.
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simple assault,413 and lower than murder (+29),4 14 manslaughter
(+29), 415 aggravated assault (+27)416 and negligent homicide (+26),417
as well as a number of less serious crimes. 418 Like most rape statistics,
this net jury leniency includes both stranger rape and acquaintance
rape, leading to a result that is as misleading as the average tempera-
ture in a Minnesota year. Using Kalven and Zeisel's data and termi-
nology, we divided forcible rape into aggravated rape (stranger rape,
plus aggravated acquaintance rapes) and simple rape (nonaggravated
acquaintance rape). The net jury leniency for simple rape (+43)
419
tied for the highest of any crime category, and was much higher than
any crime of comparable gravity.420 Aggravated rape, by contrast,
plummeted to the bottom of the list (+2).
The comments of the trial judges about acquittals in simple rape
cases fell into a consistent pattern. Time after time the judge ex-
plained the jury's verdict by pointing to the alleged victim's behavior
prior to the rape.
Consider, for example, one judge's explanation of a case wherein
a young defendant was charged with raping a seventeen-year-old girl
and the jury acquitted:
A group of young people on a beer drinking party. The jury probably
figured the girl asked for what she got.
4 2 1
Or consider another judge's reference to the alleged victim's be-
havior through his narration of the facts:
Complaining witness and defendant were formerly married and had two
children. During the past year they had been going together with a view
toward reconciliation and remarriage. The defendant had apparently
spent much time and many evenings at the complaining witness' home.
She denied any prior intercourse during the period since the divorce,
but he claimed it continued after the divorce. The jury was of the opin-
ion that if it was in a course of conduct which she had accepted, she was
in no position to complain of her leading him on.
42 2
Kalven and Zeisel also described a series of other cases in which





418 Game Laws (+43); Indecent Exposure (+41); Gambling (+35); Statutory Rape (+32);
Fraud (+25); Drunken Driving (+25); Petit Larceny (+25); Receiving Stolen Goods (+24);
Molestation of a Minor (+21); Burglary (+21); Other Liquor Offenses (+20). Id. at 69-75.
419 See id at 253-54.
420 The nearest major crime is Statutory Rape (+32), followed by Murder (+29) and
Manslaughter (+29). Id, at 69-75.




"the point is not quite so explicit," but the judge nevertheless sug-
gested something like an "assumption of risk" on her part:
The complaining witness alleged after several beers she entered car with
defendant and three other men and was driven to cemetery where act
took place.
423
Woman involved went to public dance and was picked up by defendant.
Then went to night club and permitted defendant to take her home over
unfrequented road.., woman involved twice married and divorced, age
33.424
Prosecutrix and defendant strangers to each other; met each other at
dance hall. He undertook to take her home... rape occurred in lonely
wooded area, she drinking but not drunk. He much more under
influence.4
25
Kalven and Zeisel concluded that juries in simple rape cases in
effect rewrite the law of rape by importing the tort concept of contrib-
utory fault or assumption of risk, acquitting the defendant of rape
when they perceive that the alleged victim's conduct helped to precip-
itate the rape.426
Concerning this thesis, several comments are in order. In the
first place, the concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, though useful as shorthand terms, should not be taken too liter-
ally. The jurors' inclinations are clear, but their precise reasons are
much less so, and may be subconscious. One ingenious theory is that
people need to believe that the world is controllable.427 When they
learn that someone has suffered a minor loss, they can easily attribute
her misfortune to chance. As the loss becomes more severe, chance
becomes a more unsettling explanation, because it means that "it
could happen to me." To alleviate this fear, people tend to attribute
the victim's fate to her own misbehavior. We will call this the it won't
happen to me hypothesis. Whatever its validity in other contexts, this
hypothesis does not account for Kalven and Zeisel's finding that ju-
rors are much more lenient in nonaggravated acquaintance ("sim-
ple") rape cases than in other serious crimes including aggravated




426 Id. at 249-51.
427 Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 73, 73-79 (1966).
428 This same objection applies to two related theories: (1) that hindsight leads jurors to
overestimate the causal role of the victim's behavior; and (2) that people need to believe in
a "just world" and consequently tend to assume that the victim must have deserved her fate.
See Ronnie Janoff-Bulman et al., Cognitive Biases in Blaming the Victim, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 161 (1985) (hindsight theory); see also MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A
JusT WoRLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION (1980); MelvinJ. Lerner & D. T. Miller, Just World
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Another possibility is that jurors are consciously swayed by evi-
dence of the woman's contributory fault. Ignoring the judge's instruc-
tions, the jurors decide that victim negligence should be a defense to
a charge of rape. This might be called the conscious nullification/negli-
gent victim hypothesis. This hypothesis does not account for some typi-
cal instances ofjury leniency in acquaintance rape cases, notably cases
in which the parties had been lovers prior to the alleged rape429 -no
one would suggest that it is negligent to date your lover. Contributory
negligence also is an inapt term for cases in which the woman's char-
acter violated traditional moral standards but her conduct immedi-
ately prior to the alleged rape was reasonably careful: for instance, a
sexually-unselective woman who was raped on a date during which her
behavior was prudent.430 This suggests that "contributory negligence"
may not be the whole story.
One supposes, moreover, that contributory negligence also oc-
curs in some, perhaps many, cases of stranger rape, for instance when
the victim leaves her apartment unlocked after retiring for the night,
or walks home through a dangerous area late at night when she
should have taken a bus or hailed a taxi. Yet Kalven and Zeisel offer
no evidence that juries tend to acquit in such cases. 431 One searches
in vain for evidence that juries are lenient toward other types of
criminals-thieves, for example-who prey on negligent victims. Why
then do juries single out negligent victims of acquaintance rape?
In some cases the jury may feel that the woman teased the man
beyond endurance, so that his rape, while legally and perhaps morally
wrong, was understandable enough to deserve leniency-the provoked
rape hypothesis.
Perhaps in some types of cases, including but not necessarily lim-
ited to those in which the woman behaved imprudently, jurors regard
her as a disreputable character who might well lie about being
raped-the untrustworthy accuser hypothesis. It is not altogether clear
why this theory would not apply to stranger rapes, but one possible
motivation for a false report, to obtain revenge against the accused
Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 1030 (1978);
MelvinJ. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observers'Reaction to the Innocent Victim: Compassion
or Rejection 2, 4J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966).
429 For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 981-94.
430 For a discussion of the relevance of evidence of promiscuity, see infra notes 895-934
and accompanying text.
431 Some studies have found that contributory fault of the putative victim affects verdicts
in stranger rape scenarios as well as in date rape. Martha R. Burt & Rochelle S. Albin, Rape
Myths, Rape Definitions and Probability of Conviction, 11J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 212 (1981).
But see LaFree, Variables Affecting Guilty Pleas, supra note 381, at 833 (rape victim's character
related to verdicts in consent defense cases, but not in cases of mistaken identification).
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man, would not apply if the man was a stranger.
Perhaps juries interpret the woman's contributory negligence, or
her violation of sex-role norms, as enough evidence of consent to raise
a reasonable doubt in a case where the corroborative evidence is
weak: the evidence of consent hypothesis. Because consent is hardly ever
an issue in a stranger rape case, this hypothesis would explain the ab-
sence of comparable leniency in stranger rape cases. It may also ex-
plain why juries so often acquit in cases where the parties had been
lovers prior to the alleged rape: here too, the jury may regard prior
intimacies as enough evidence of consent to raise a reasonable doubt.
The evidence of consent hypothesis is consistent with Kalven and
Zeisel's "liberation" theory: "The jury does not often consciously...
yield to sentiment in the teeth of the law. Rather it yields to sentiment
in the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence."432 In
other words, where they regard the facts as unclear, jurors, while per-
haps influenced by subconscious prejudice, interpret evidence of neg-
ligence, or perhaps other "misconduct," as evidence of consent. Thus,
judgejury disagreement is due to a combination of a genuine "eviden-
tiary difficulty" and jurors' prejudices.4
33
In other cases, the jury may suspect that the sexual encounter was
due to a misunderstanding-the ambiguous situation hypothesis.
The lenient jurors, perhaps unconsciously, may simply be punish-
ing women who violate traditional sex-role norms, at least if the viola-
tion increased the danger of being raped. Although such violations
can occur in connection with a stranger rape, for example, if the vic-
tim walked home from a bar late at night, they may be more common
in acquaintance rape cases. This might be called the sex role norm hy-
pothesis. As we will see, this hypothesis needs some refining, because
apparently only certain types of violations of sex-role norms affect the
likelihood of an acquittal.
In legal theory, juries in criminal cases decide whether the de-
fendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, not how
important it is to incarcerate him. Butjurors may be swayed, in margi-
nal cases, by perceptions of dangerousness. 434 They may perceive ac-
quaintance rapists as less dangerous than stranger rapists, because a
432 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 165.
433 Id. at 164-65 ("The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the jury to respond
to sentiment by liberating it from the discipline of the evidence.").
434 One study found that in cases where the defendant either claims that he has been
misidentified as the rapist, or argues for diminished responsibility due to insanity or drug
use, testimony about his use of a weapon strongly inclined jurors to believe that he was
guilty; jurors told the researchers that evidence of a weapon made them anxious to incar-
cerate the defendant. LaFree, Jurors' Responses, supra note 66, at 399.
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woman has greater control over her voluntary social companions than
over a stranger who grabs her in a parking lot. Similarly, those who
rape prudent women may seem to some jurors more dangerous than
those who rape women who "asked for it." If the woman was careful,
but was raped anyway, then the rapist is potentially dangerous to all
women, including respectable women like many jurors and relatives of
jurors. If, on the other hand, the woman behaved carelessly, for ex-
ample by hitchhiking, going to the home of a stranger, or getting
drunk, some jurors may perceive the man as less threatening to the
safety of other, more prudent women. In a close case, this may affect
the verdict. Although victim negligence occurs in stranger rapes as
well as acquaintance rapes, stranger rapists are generally thought to
be psychopaths who are dangerous to all women. We label this the ess
dangerous rapist hypothesis.
A final possibility is that the jury regards the complainant (a pros-
titute, for example, or the defendant's girlfriend) as the kind of wo-
man who would not be seriously hurt by forced sex, either in general
or with this man-call this the relatively harmless rape hypothesis.
Again, this attitude may be most often decisive in cases that are close
on the merits.
These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. They overlap in
many cases, and interact with the burden of proof; usually several of
them are plausible explanations, though of course not necessarily jus-
tifications, of an acquittal. The correct hypothesis may vary from one
kind of victim "misconduct" to another. For example, Kalven and
Zeisel found evidence ofjury leniency in other types .of drinking cases:
where both parties had been drinking prior to a brawl between two
men, or a domestic quarrel between husband and wife, juries tended
to acquit the defendant even if his guilt was clear. Similar leniency
occurred in drinking cases involving robbery, auto theft, and even in a
drinking and driving scenario where the victim was a passenger even-
tually killed in an automobile accident.435 Since the victims in many
of these cases were men, it seems that hostility toward rape victims in
drinking cases is not due, or at least not solely due, to jurors' sex-role
norms. Suspicion of "loose women," on the other hand, may be due
to traditional attitudes about female sexuality.
Without purporting to resolve these difficult motivational issues,
or to pass judgment on the rape complainant's behavior, we will use
terms like "nontraditional victims" and "sex-role-norm violations" as
convenient shorthand descriptions of all rape cases in which the puta-
tive victim's behavior is likely to be criticized.
435 KAwvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 244-57.
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Most of the motivational hypotheses that we have described are
inconsistent with the law. Contributory negligence, provocation, de-
parture from sex-role norms, the "less dangerous rapist," and the "rel-
atively harmless rape" theory are all invalid defenses to rape.43 6 The
"ambiguous situation" defense is valid, in most jurisdictions, only if
the defendant made a reasonable mistake as to consent.437 While this
may have occurred in some of Kalven and Zeisel's cases, it seems un-
likely that the male trial judges of the 1950s would have wanted to
convict men where the evidence raised a reasonable doubt on this
score. Similarly, if the "disreputable accuser" hypothesis reflected
genuinely reasonable doubts about the woman's credibility, one
would expect the trial judges to share those doubts.
Likewise, if the misconduct evidence were truly suggestive of con-
sent, one would expect the trial judges of that era to think so too. In
addition, we believe that there are strong theoretical objections to this
justification, which we discuss in Part II of the article. 43
8
Many rape scholars imply that leniency in acquaintance rape
cases has no parallels in other criminal cases, at least where the victims
are male. It is probably true that victim blaming defenses are more
often successful in acquaintance rape cases than in any other type of
criminal case. But victim blaming by defense counsel also is common
in some other crimes. We have already mentioned drunken victims.
In addition, there is homicide: one judge has described "putting the
deceased on trial" as "the oldest, most common and most successful
tactic in homicide cases."439
Ultimately, whether acquaintance rape is unique is less important
than whether serious injustices often occur. Although Kalven and
Zeisel's study is badly dated 440 and has several methodological weak-
nesses, 441 it remains the best available evidence, of national scope,
436 See generally 3 WHARTON'S, supra note 44, § 276.
437 See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975).
438 See infra text accompanying notes 793-873.
439 Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1010 (Wyo. 1984) (Brown, J., concurring).
440 The trials on which Kalven and Zeisel's findings were based occurred between 1954
and 1958. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 33 n.1.
441 Kalven and Zeisel asked 3500judges to participate in the study, but only 555 did so.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 35-36. The judges who chose to participate may have
differed in some way from the larger group who were asked to participate, for instance by
being more (or less) conviction-prone. In addition, some judges submitted over 50 trial
reports, while others submitted only one. Id. at 39. Thus, the responses of these extremely
conscientious judges were weighted heavily, perhaps skewing the results.
The judges' opinions may also have been affected by their hypothetical nature: Un-
like the jurors' verdicts the judges' "verdicts" had no effect on the defendants' lives. Per-
haps the opinions of judges participating in the study were affected by their knowledge
that scholars were observing their performance.
Because Kalven and Zeisel could not observe jury deliberations, they had to rely on
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about the performance ofjuries in rape cases. Most subsequent stud-
ies and anecdotal evidence have been at least broadly consistent with
what we regard as Kalven and Zeisel's central conclusion about rape
cases: too often, jurors acquit acquaintance rapists.4 4 2 We believe,
therefore, that The American Jury's analysis of rape cases was fundamen-
tally sound.
Whether it is equally sound today is more doubtful. Kalven and
Zeisel performed their research during the 1950s, prior to the mod-
em feminist movement. At least in some states, most participants in
the criminal justice system believe that convictions for acquaintance
rape are now easier to obtain than they used to be.4 43 In federal court
rape trials, the conviction rate has risen steadily since the early
1960s.4 " Linda Fairstein, a New York sex-crimes prosecutor of long
experience, affirms that acquaintance rape juries have become sub-
stantially more sympathetic to the prosecution during recent years,
but adds that this tends to be less so in rural areas and in jurisdictions
that still lack specialized sex-crimes units in police departments and
prosecutors' offices.
445
2. Other Research on Victims and Situational Variables
For reasons of convenience and economy, most rape scholars
have eschewed'studies of actual rape trials, choosing instead to use
college students (or, rarely, members of the general public) as the
subjects of research into popular, and therefore presumably jurors',
attitudes concerning rape. Typically, the scholar asks questions
designed to elicit opinions 'about, for example, whether a rape oc-
their own interpretations of the trial judges' comments about the cases. Since the judges
usually did not explicitly ,adopt the contributory fault hypothesis, perhaps Kalven and
Zeisel's preconceptions affected their interpretations. This problem could have been
averted by adopting a coding scheme and asking independent evaluators (who were blind
to the contributory fault hypothesis) to read the judges' comments and assign them to
categories. Kalven and Zeisel could then have performed statistical significance tests on
these categorical codings. For a sharp critique of the study's methodological faults, see
Michael H. Walsh, The AmericanJury: A Reassessmen 79 YALE LJ. 142 (1969).
We would be more concerned about these methodological flaws if the evidence from
other sources contradicted Kalven and Zeisel's findings, but on the whole other studies
have reached conclusions that are consistent with Kalven and Zeisel's.
442 See, e.g., ALER, supra note 48, at 119-21; FAIRsTEIN, supra note 13, at 133-36; VACHSS,
supra note 13, at 90-92.
443 MARSH Er AL., supra note 25, at 44. One defense attorney expressed the shift in
public attitudes graphically: "Over the last five or ten years, Detroit has changed. Youjust
can't win by showing that the victim wasn't wearing underwear." Id. at 54.
444 James P. Levine, Using Jury Verdict Forecasts in Ciminal Defense Strategy, 66 JUDICATuRE
448, 455 (1983).
445 Telephone Interview with Linda Fairstein (July 19, 1996). Cf FAiPSrEIN, supra note
13, at 134-36.
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curred and if so whether the victim's behavior contributed to the
crime.
The results of such research should be accepted with caution. 446
Obviously, student volunteers are not a representative sample of the
adult population, or even, perhaps, of the student population. One's
answers to a questionnaire about a hypothetical rape do not necessar-
ily correspond to one's behavior in ajury room, where the evidence is
more voluminous, decisions are collective,447 real people are affected
by the verdict, and the judge instructs the jury to apply the correct
446 Some methodologies are high in external validity, meaning the results are generaliz-
able to the "real world," while others are high in internal validity, meaning that the cause
and effect relationship of the independent variables on the dependent variables is certain,
even though the context of the experiment is artificial. Studies that are high in both inter-
nal and external validity are very rare in the context of jury decisionmaking. The most
externally valid study would include real jurors, in real trials, actually deliberating. A
scholar would gather data on many actual trials, coding for variables such as juror sex,
defendant race, and situational factors revealed by the evidence such as the woman's drink-
ing or the degree of force employed by the defendant. Statistical analyses would then be
performed to determine whether any of the coded factors are related to the verdict, and
which are most important. While high in external validity, this methodology is low in inter-
nal validity (or ability to prove cause and effect), because the scholar has no control over
factors such as jury selection that vary among the trials.
Another type of study, fairly high in external validity, and also high in internal validity,
employs mock jurors and videotaped trials differing along the dimensions of experimental
interest. For example, mock jurors would view a tape of a reenactment of a rape trial in
groups of six (or twelve). Half of the groups ofjurors would watch a trial where the de-
fendant and the putative victim had previously had a relationship and half would see a trial
in which they were strangers. The jurors would then deliberate and reach verdicts. If the
verdicts for the two types of cases differed over many groups ofjurors, one could infer that
the type of relationship between the victim and the defendant caused the differences in
conviction rates. This type of experiment is also fairly high in realism and thus external
validity, especially if the mock jurors are drawn from an actual jury pool as opposed to a
college population. But such studies are rare because they are extremely time-consuming
and expensive.
A third type of study, the most common in the literature, is high in internal validity
but not very realistic. In this type of study, subjects read an abbreviated transcript of a rape
case or a short rape scenario. Different subjects receive different versions of the rape,
varying along the dimensions of experimental interest. Typically, the subjects are asked to
make individual judgements (verdicts, attributions of fault, etc.) without collective deliber-
ation. As a result of the experimenter's full control over the experimental variables and
random assignment of subjects to each experimental condition, this type of study has high
internal validity and cause and effect can be inferred from significance testing. But, such
experiments obviously lack realism.
447 See generally KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 489; Garold Strasser et al., The Social
Psychology ofJury Deliberations, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 221 (Norbert L. Kerr
& Robert M. Bray eds., 1982); see alsoJeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors versus
Mock Juries: The Role of Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 153 (1994). Kerwin and Shaffer found that mock juries that deliber-
ated were significantly less likely to be influenced by extralegal factors than were individual
mock jurors, who did not deliberate. Id. at 159. They conclude that "allowing verdicts to
unfold through the process of deliberation may be an important component of realistic
mock juridic research." Id. at 161.
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legal standards. 448 Another difference is that peremptory challenges
may eliminate some of the more extreme opinions from real-world
juries.
Although most studies have echoed Kalven and Zeisel's finding
that victims of acquaintance rape are judged more harshly, the results
have not been entirely consistent. Some studies have found that when
the woman knows her attacker she is held more responsible for the
rape; some have found that she is held less responsible; and a couple
that it makes no difference. 449 One possible explanation for these di-
vergent results is that some scholars have asked whether the woman
was "at fault" or deserves "blame," while others asked how "responsi-
ble" she was, a less pejorative (though still imprecise) word.450 Badly-
written scenarios may also have skewed results.451 For example, in a
famous study finding that women are blamed more when they do not
know the rapist,45 2 neither of the scenarios used involved a dating situ-
ation; in both scenarios the assault occurred as the victim walked
alone through a wooded park at 11:30 p.m. In one scenario the rapist
knew the victim; in the other he did not. Subjects may have regarded
the victim's behavior as having played a causal role in the rape by a
stranger, but not in the rape by an acquaintance, who they probably
figured would have attacked her sooner or later in any event.453 This
is an arguable assumption, perhaps, but not one that sheds light on
the behavior of real jurors, who display no tendency to treat stranger
rapists more leniently than acquaintance rapists.
In a real case, the woman's causal contribution is not evaluated in
isolation; it is intertwined with the jurors' evaluations of the defend-
ant's guilt: to the degree that the woman is thought to be responsible,
the defendant is not. In this critical respect the scenarios in the study
were extremely artificial: the men were clearly guilty of rape but the
students were asked to assess the degree to which the woman's behav-
ior had caused the rape. In the scenarios used in this study, neither
rapist contended that the woman had consented, and the students
448 Although the consensus is that jurors ignore trial judges' instructions to disregard
inadmissible evidence, experimental studies usually do not include group deliberations.
Kenvin found that mock jurors who participate in deliberations are more likely to follow
the (mock) judicial instructions that they receive. Kenvin & Shaffer, supra note 447, at 159.
449 See generally Mark A. Whatley, Victim Characteristics InfluencingAttributions of Responsibil-
ity to Rape Victims: A Meta-Analysis, 1 AGGRESSION & Vioi.mEr BEHAv. 81, 83 (1996); Susan T.
Bell et al., UnderstandingAttributions of Blame in Stranger Rape and Date Rape Situations, 24J.
APP. Soc. PSYcH. 1719, 1722 (1994).
450 Whatley, supra note 449, at 84.
451 Id. at 90-91.
452 Ronald E. Smith et al., Role andJustice Considerations in the Attribution of Responsibility to
a Rape Victim, 10 J. Rxs. PERSONALIT, 246 (1976).
453 Id. at 348.
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were not asked whether the men should be convicted and punished.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that in a real case student jurors'
causal attributions would have led to an acquittal of the acquainted
rapist.
More predictably, other scholars have found that if the rapist
knew the victim, subjects perceive her as less truthful,454 as more likely
to have desired or enjoyed the rape,455 and as more responsible for
it.456 Klemmack and Klemmack studied the attitudes of women ob-
tained from a random sampling of dwelling units listed in a city direc-
tory. They asked these women to indicate whether a rape had
occurred in each of several scenarios, all of which met the legal defini-
tion of rape. The authors found that if "any relationship is known to
exist between the victim and the accused, no matter how casual, the
proportion of those who consider the event rape drops to less than 50
percent. 457 Another study found that subjects, especially women, felt
454 See, e.g., Joyce E. Williams, Secondary Victimization: Confronting Public Attitudes About
Rape, 9 VICrIMOLOGY 66, 70-71 (1984); Cynthia E. Willis, The Effect of Sex Role Stereotype,
Victim and Defendant Race, and Prior Relationship on Rape Culpability Attributions, 26 SEX RoLEs
213, 218 (1992) (sexual egalitarians showed a stronger belief in victim truthfulness than
traditionalists, but only if accuser and accused were acquainted).
455 See, e.g., Burt & Albin, supra note 431, at 218-24; Williams, supra note 454, at 70-71.
456 With few exceptions, studies comparing victim responsibility in stranger and ac-
quaintance rape cases overwhelmingly support the hypothesis that victims of acquaintance
rape are blamed more than those assaulted by strangers. This is true over a variety of
measures of victim fault. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 449, at 1729; Judith S. Bridges &
Christine A. McGrail, Attributions of Responsibility for Date and Stranger Rape, 21 SEX ROLES
273 (1989);James D. Johnson & Inger Russ, Effects of Salience of Consciousness-Raising Infor-
mation on Perceptions of Acquaintance Versus Stranger Rape, 19 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1182,
1187 (1989); L'Armand & Pepitone, supra note 65, at 134; Williams, supra note 454; James
D. Johnson, The Effect of Rape Type and Information Admissibility on Perceptions of Rape Victims,
30 SEX ROLES 781, 787 (1994); Cynthia E. Willis & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Effects of Victim
Gaze Behavior and Prior Relationship on Rape Culpability Attributions, 10 J. INTERPEnSONAL Vio-
LENCE 367, 374 (1995).
Some studies contradict or only partially confirm the majority view that subjects treat
stranger rapists differently from acquaintance rapists. See, e.g., HoRNEv & SPOHN, supra
note 51; Willis, supra note 454, at 219-20. Willis found a difference in victim responsibility
ratings for acquaintance and stranger rapes when the victim was black but not when she
was white. She found a significant effect of prior relationship on sentence, however, with
the date rapist receiving only 8.98 years and the stranger rapist receiving a much harsher
sentence of 13.77 years. Id. at 222. In another study, subjects read a rape scenario in
which the victim and defendant were described as having dated a few times or as strangers.
Patricia Tetreault & Mark A. Barnett, Reactions to Stranger and Acquaintance Rape, 11
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 353 (1987). All subjects then viewed an identical five-minute video-
tape of the victim talking to a therapist about her rape. They were then asked to rate the
victim's responsibility for the rape on a 7-point scale. The difference in responsibility rat-
ings did not approach significance, but since the average rating was rather low (about
1.65), id. at 355, perhaps viewing the victim in therapy made subjects more sympathetic to
the date-rape victim than they would have been in a more realistic setting.
457 Klemmack & Klemmack, supra note 177, at 135, 144. See also R.D. Stacy et al., A
Comparison of Attitudes Among College Students Toward Sexual Violence Committed By Strangers
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more similar to the victims in the stranger rape scenarios than to the
victims in the date rape scenarios.
458
Studies of actual trials, though rare, generally confirm Kalven and
Zeisel's finding that rape defendants who were acquainted with the
victim are less likely to be convicted. LaFree, Reskin, and Visher inter-
viewed 331 jurors who heard cases of forcible sexual assault in Marion
County (Indianapolis).459 They asked the jurors the reasons for their
verdicts in thirty-eight forcible rape cases, and found that jurors were
less likely to believe in the defendant's guilt if the putative rape victim
had been acquainted with the defendant, however briefly, prior to the
alleged assault. 460 The authors had supposed that, where the defense
was misidentification instead of consent, evidence that the parties had
known each other would enhance rather than diminish the credibility
of the woman's testimony. But they found that "as was true for the
consent/no sex cases, any prior acquaintance between the victim and
the defendant had the opposite effect, net of the other variables."
461
Other studies have found that subjects recommend a less severe sen-
tence for a convicted rapist if there had been a prior dating relation-
ship between the parties:
462
Some scholars have stressed another factor: the victim's depar-
ture from traditional sex-role norms.4 63 Since traditional norms of fe-
male propriety coincide in varying degrees with the dictates of sexual
prudence, this factor is closely related to Kalven and Zeisel's "contrib-
utory fault" theory.464 For example, in one study participants evalu-
ated two rape scenarios. 465 In one scenario, the victim was assaulted
on her way home from a university library at dusk. This scenario was
and By Acquaintances, 18J. SEX EDUC. & THERmY 257, 259-61 (1992) (finding that both men
and women consider stranger rape to be a more serious offense than acquaintance rape).
458 See, e.g., Hou.smoM & BURGESS, supra note 4 at 279; Galvin, supra note 4, at 812-905.
459 Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors' Responses to Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual
Asault Trials, 32 Soc. PROB. 389, 393 (1985).
460 Id. at 393, 397.
461 Id.
462 See, e.g., Suresh Eanekar et al., The Acquaintance Predicament of a Rape Victim, 21 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1524, 1537 (1991); L'Armand & Pepitone, supra note 65, at 137 tbl. 1;
Willis, supra note 454, at 222.
463 See, e.g., Acock & Ireland, supra note 7, at 187; Bridges, supra note 7, at 304-05.
464 Of course, the labels have opposite pejorative innuendoes: "Contributory fault" is
explicitly derogatory, while "violation of a sex-role norm" has, at least in the modem aca-
demic culture, a mildly favorable innuendo. Even apart from their pejorative connota-
tions, both terms are inexact. "Contributory fault" sounds like negligence, but why is
victim "negligence" more important in acquaintance rapes than in stranger rapes or bur-
glaries? Similarly, if "violation of sex-role norms" were the decisive factor, one would ex-
pect to find discrimination against female professionals, in all kinds of rape cases and
presumably in other types of cases as well. It would be better, we believe, to speak of
"violation of traditional rules of female sexual prudence."
465 Acock & Ireland, supra note 7, at 184.
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designed as one in which the woman had not violated any sex-role
norm. In the other scenario, the victim was a young woman employed
at a service station who, in the middle of the night, voluntarily pro-
vided a man with a ride to his car "which had run out of gas," instead
of asking her male co-worker to attend to this task. The authors of the
study found that subjects blamed the "norm violating" victim more for
the rape, and the rapist slightly less, than those reading the "no norm
violation" scenario. On the other hand, there was no difference in
how serious the subjects rated the crime, and no significant difference
in the behavioral intentions they attributed to either the victim or the
rapist.46 6 It is not at all clear, therefore, that the backwardness of
some subjects' opinions about appropriate female behavior would
have induced them to vote for acquittal on these facts.
Researchers have found that subjects rate a woman's willingness
to have sex, and the justifiability of the rape, higher if she initiates the
date, or visits the man's apartment instead of going to the movies with
him.467 One might surmise that these findings reflect traditional sex-
role norms. But the same study found that subjects rated the woman's
willingness to have sex, and the justifiability of rape, higher if the man
paid for the date than if the woman did.4 68 This presumably was due
to some subjects' belief that a man who pays for a date is entitled to
sex in return. Yet the woman who lets the man pay all the expenses is
following the traditional sex-role norm.
If jurors were simply punishing women who violate sex-role
norms, they presumably would do so in stranger rape cases as well as
acquaintance rapes. Most of the evidence suggests otherwise. Study-
ing jurors' attitudes in actual rape trials, LaFree, Reskin and Visher
found that, where the defendant claimed either that no sex had oc-
curred or that the woman had consented (typically acquaintance
cases), the woman's moral character was related to verdicts. If she
drank, used drugs or had reportedly engaged in sex outside marriage,
jurors were less likely to believe that the defendant was guilty.
469
In contrast, when the defendant claimed that he had been mis-
identified as the rapist (stranger cases), the victim's moral character
was unimportant in the jurors' determination of guilt.470 The authors
concluded that, "contrary to feminist claims, our measures of victims'
sex-role behavior had little effect on jurors' judgments in the identifi-
466 Id. at 187.
467 See, e.g., Charlene Muehlenhard, Misinterpreted Dating Behaviors and the Risk of Date
Rape, 6J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCH. 20, 24-25 (1988).
468 Id. at 25-26.




cation-diminished responsibility [mostly stranger rape] cases."'471
In another study, the authors asked 598 adult subjects to read
one of several rape vignettes, which differed on the victim-defendant
relationship, the amount of force used, and the victim's reputation.
472
The victim was raped by either a date or a stranger, who forced her to
have sex either by covering her mouth with his hand and forcing her
onto a couch, or by holding a knife to her throat. The victim was
described as either being easy, or a virgin who did not drink alcohol.
Subjects indicated their willingness to convict the assailant, whether
the event was rape, the reasons for their judgments, and their opin-
ions about the man and the woman.
473
Using multiple regression, the authors sought to find the best
model to predict the two dependent variables, definition of the situa-
tion as rape and willingness to convict. The best predictor of subjects'
likelihood of defining the situation as rape was their opinion of the
woman in the vignette: the more positive they were about her, the
more likely they were to favor conviction. 474 The second best predic-
tor was whether the subjects thought the victim had precipitated the
event.
47 5
Research by Pugh supports the proposition that the victim's con-
tributory fault affects verdicts. 4 76 The undergraduate subjects in
Pugh's experiment read a case summary and transcripts of testimony
in a rape trial. The victim had met a man in a bar and he had gone to
her apartment thereafter. She said he came in to use the bathroom
and then raped her; he claimed that the sex was consensual. Three
versions of the transcripts, differing on the woman's moral character,
were distributed to subjects. In one version the woman acknowledged
that she had had intercourse before with men she picked up in bars;
in another she said that she had never done this; and in the third the
topic was not mentioned. Pugh asked his subjects to assess her fault
and the defendant's guilt.
With a loglinear analysis, the model that best predicted verdicts
471 Id.
472 BURT & ALBIN, supra note 431. This is one of the few studies using adult subjects
comparable to actualjurors. The average age of the sample was 42 years, with 12.8 years of
schooling. Id. at 216. Subjects indicated their opinions about the two actors in the scena-
rio on a semantic differential scale, which rates the actors on several dimensions such as
bad-good, worthless-valuable, etc. Ratings for all dimensions are added to obtain a com-
posite score of the subjects' evaluations of the actors. Id.
473 Id. at 218-19.
474 Id. at 224 tbl.3.
475 Id.
476 M.D. Pugh, Contributory Fault and Rape Convictions: Loglinear Models for Blaming the
Victim, 46 Soc. PsYcH. Q. 233 (1983).
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contained subject gender, victim contributory fault rating, and victim
moral character. Of the mock jurors who rated the victim high in
fault, 58% found the defendant guilty; of those rating her low in
fault, 86% found him guilty.
477
Studies of youths as well as adults have found considerable sup-
port for the idea that if a female "leads on" a male, raping her is at
least somewhatjustifiable. 478 Here again the explanatory power of the
concept of a "violation of a sex-role norm" depends on the nature of
the violation. True, traditional morality disapproves of sexual teasing.
But traditional sex-role norms also dictate that girls should not aspire
to be doctors or lawyers. Yet, there is no evidence that rapes of wo-
men who have careers outside the home are more likely to lead to
lenient treatment of the rapist than rapes of homemakers. It seems,
therefore, that the precise nature of the "sex-role norm violation" is
critical. In all likelihood, people object to women who "lead men on"
simply because they regard sexual teasing as unfair, if not unbearably
provocative.
Many scholars have tried to determine which attributes of the
rape victim affect subjects' sympathy for her. The most spectacular
finding concerned the victim's respectability. Common sense, rein-
forced by anecdotal evidence, tells us that, all else being equal, people
will blame respectable rape victims less than, say, prostitutes, strippers,
runaways, welfare mothers and others who lack middle class creden-
tials. Yet pioneering research with student subjects seemed to prove
the opposite: the more respectable the victim, the more she was
blamed for having been raped.47 9 To explain this amazing result,
scholars offered the 'Just world theory." People need to believe that
the world is just. A rape of a disreputable woman seems just. But a
rape of a respectable woman appears to be unjust. To reconcile this
477 Id. at 236. Females were more likely (79%) than males (64%) to convict. For the
female subjects, whether the victim had previously picked up men in bars had no effect on
their verdicts. But only 37% of the males found the defendant guilty after reading that
evidence, while 72% of the males found him guilty without the evidence. Id.
478 See, e.g., Bridges & McGrail, supra note 456, at 277-79; Megan Jenkins & Faye Dam-
brot, The Attribution of Date Rape: Observer's Attitudes and Sexual Experience and the Dating
Situation, 17J. APPLIED PsYcH. 875, 882-84 (1987); Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer, What
Is Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANcE RAPE, supra note 63, at 9, 22; Pugh, supra note 476,
at 236. Of course, the idea that a "teaser" is fair game for rape is not confined to youths.
See, e.g., R. Giarrusso et al., Adolescents' Cues & Signals: Sex and Assault (paper presented at
the Western Psychol. Ass'n Meeting, San Diego, 1979), quoted in BOURQUE, supra note 25, at
66 (54% of males and 31% of females consider aggressive sex appropriate if the woman has
"led him on"); E.J. Kanin, Date Rapists: Differential Sexual Socialization and Relative Depriva-
tion, 14 ARCHVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 219 tbl.2 (1985) (81% of rapists and 40% of controls
believed aggressive sex is appropriate if the woman is "a known 'teaser'").
479 Cathaleene Jones & Elliott Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of
Respectability of the Victim, 26 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 415 (1973).
1270 [Vol. 87
RAPE
apparent injustice with the premise of a just world, people need to
blame the victim. So they attribute fault to the respectable victim,
more so than to the disreputable victim, whose rape needs no such
explanation.
480
Other social scientists, having failed to replicate this finding, dis-
covered methodological flaws in the original 'just world" research de-
sign, and ended the silliness by concluding that society does not
discriminate against respectable women.48' On the contrary, social
science has added its imprimatur to conventional courthouse wisdom,
by confirming that subjects blame victims of acquaintance rape more
if their sexual history violates traditional norms of female restraint,
48 2
or if they are intoxicated 483 or provocatively dressed.
48 4
480 Id. at 418-19.
481 See, e.g., Feldman-Summers & Lindner, supra note 67, at 59, 146 (responsibility as-
signed prostitute greater than other women; contrary result ofJones & Aronson explained
as due to their excessively narrow range of respectability conditions); A. Kahn et al., Attribu-
tion of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of the Victim, 8 REP. REs. ON Soc.
PsYcHo. 98 (1977). Cf Charles H. Moore et al., The Effects of Physical Attractiveness and
Social Desirability on Judgments Regarding a Sexual Harassment Case, 9J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSON-
ALITY 715, 725 (1994) (mock jurors reached more frequent guilty verdicts in a sexual har-
assment case when they perceived the plaintiff to be socially desirable). See generally
Whatley, supra note 449, at 87, 90.
482 See, e.g., BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 66 (table showing circumstances in which poll
respondents believed aggressive sex appropriate); Feldman-Summers & Lindner, supra
note 67, at 141; LaFree et al., supra note 66, at 397; C. Neil MacRae &John W. Shephard,
Sex Differences in the Perception of Rape Victims, 4J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 278, 284 (1989);
Pugh, supra note 476, at 236-38; Jody Miller & Martin Schwartz, Rape Myths and Violence
Against Street Prostitutes, 16 DEvAN" BEHAV. 1, 9-17 (1995).
483 See Richardson & Campbell, supra note 73, at 472. On a seven-point scale, subjects
assigned the drunk victim a responsibility score of 2.75, and a sober victim 2.34. If the
defendant was drunk, by contrast, subjects assigned him less responsibility than if he was
sober. Id. at 472. The victim's intoxication also affected female subjects' recommended
sentences, which were shorter for one who had raped a drunk victim. Id. at 473. Male
subjects' sentences were unaffected by this factor. Id. Subsequent studies have confirmed
Richardson and Campbell's finding that victims are held more responsible if drunk, while
drunk perpetrators are seen as less culpable. See, e.g., Georgina S. Hammock & Deborah R.
Richardson, Blaming Drunk Victims: Is It Just World or Sex Role Violation?, 23J. APPLIED SOc.
PSYCHOL. 1574, 1583-85 (1993); Antonia Abbey & RichardJ. Harnisch, Perceptions of Sexual
Intent: The Role of Gender, Alcohol Consumption and Rape Supportive Attitudes, 32 SEx ROLES
297, 307 (1995). Cf William E. Snell & Lisa Godwin, Social Reactions to Depictions of Casual
and Steady Acquaintance Rape: The Impact of AIDS Exposure and Stereotypic Beliefs About Women,
29 SEx ROLES 599, 607 (1993) (subjects believed excessive drinking by male and female
equally contributed to the rape on their first date, but thought that for long-term dating
partners intoxication contributed more to the rapist's behavior than to the victim's). But
see GloriaJ. Fischer, Effects of Drinking by the Victim or Offender on Verdicts in a Simulated Trial
of an Acquaintance Rape, 77 PSYCHOL. REP. 579, 583-86 (1995) (finding college students did
not attach greater or less responsibility for an assault if either the victim or perpetrator had
been drinking, a result which may be unique to the campus context).
484 See, e.g., Deborah G. Schult & LawrenceJ. Schneider, The Role of SexualProvocativeness,
Rape History, and Observer Gender in Perceptions of Blame in Sexual Assault, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 94, 99 (1991) (subjects attributed more blame to victim of sexual assault as the
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In one study, some subjects read a scenario in which the victim's
prior sexual experience was not mentioned, while in another scenario
she had limited sexual experience, and in a third she was promiscu-
ous.48 5 When her sexual history was not mentioned, the subjects' rec-
ommended sentence for the rapist was 8.5 years; when she had limited
experience, he received 7.3 years; and when she had many previous
casual sexual encounters, the average sentence was only 4.5 years. 48 6
The subjects perceived the rape as most serious when the victim's past
was not mentioned, less serious if she had limited experience, and
least serious when she was promiscuous.
48 7
Thus, most subsequent research has supported Kalven and
Zeisel's finding that acquaintance- cases, especially those with non-
traditional victims, are more difficult for the prosecution than stran-
ger cases. However, two exceptions should be noted. LaFree, Reskin
and Visher found that although in general the putative victim's char-
acteristics were important only in acquaintance cases,488 evidence that
she drank or used drugs was associated with leniency toward the de-
victim's provocativeness intensified).
Some evidence suggests that the victim's provocative dress does not affect subjects'
responses to a stranger rape scenario. Scroggs found that subjects assigned the rapist the
same sentence regardless of whether the victim of a stranger rape was wearing a raincoat
that hid her figure or a low-cut top that displayed her "rather large bosom." James R.
Scroggs, Penalties for Rape as a Function of Victim Provocativeness, Damage, and Resistance 6 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 360, 364 (1976). Another study found that a victim's provocative dress
did not affect subjects' recommended sentences in stranger rape scenarios, but did affect
subjects' attributions of responsibility for the rape. Suresh Kanekar & Maharukh B. Kol-
sawalla, Responsibility of a Rape Victim in Relation to her Respectability, Attractiveness, and Provoca-
tiveness, 112J. Soc. PSYCH. 153 (1980). See generally Whatley, supra note 449, at 86-87, 90.
485 L'Armand & Pepitone, supra note 65, at 135.
486 Id. at 137 tbl.1.
487 Id. The pattern for the victim's psychological damage paralleled these findings. Id.
Similar findings were reported in another study, of acquaintance rapes in which the victim
was described either as a virgin or as promiscuous. Subjects rated the defendant as deserv-
ing more punishment for raping a virgin, believed the virgin was more psychologically
damaged, felt that the incident was more serious, and blamed the victim less. MacRae &
Shepherd, supra note 482, at 284 tbl.2.
The victim's sexual history may have less effect on reactions to stranger rapes, where
her sexual history is plainly irrelevant to the man's usual defense (misidentification) than
in acquaintance rapes, where the victim's experience is at least superficially relevant to the
consent defense. In addition, people may regard rape by stranger as a horrible experience
for any woman, while believing that rape by an acquaintance is less devastating if one is
accustomed to casual sex. See Hubert S. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors'Decisions: A Psycholegal
Analysis of the Effects of Victim, Defendant and Case Characteristics, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 261,
271 (1979) (with stranger rape scenario, subjects assigned virtually identical sentences to
rapist of virgin and sexually-experienced woman).
488 More precisely, cases in which the defense asserts either that no sex occurred or that
the defendant was misidentified as the rapist-typically stranger cases. LaFree et al., supra
note 66, at 397, 399.
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fendant even in stranger cases. 489 This finding is noteworthy because
it accords with Kalven and Zeisel's report that drinking leads to victim
blaming in various sorts of cases.
In a much more radical departure from Kalven and Zeisel, Spohn
and Homey recently found that in Detroit the characteristics and out-
comes of stranger rape and nonaggravated acquaintance rape cases
"are surprisingly similar, and that there is little evidence of an interac-
tion between type of case and victim characteristics." 490 Apparently,
attitudes in Detroit have evolved to the point where Kalven and
Zeisel's dichotomies between stranger rape and nonaggravated ac-
quaintance rape, and between cases in which the victim was contribu-
torily negligent and those in which she was not, have become invalid.
The weight of the evidence suggests, however, that these findings will
not be replicated in most other jurisdictions.
491
One of the more interesting lines of research involves the victim's
appearance. Some studies have found that portraying the rape victim
as physically attractive increases perceptions of the defendant's guilt,
perhaps because rape of an attractive woman seems more plausible,
and leads to increases in the sentence suggested by subjects, perhaps
because harm of a valued person is thought to warrant a more severe
penalty.49 2 But other studies have found no effect of victim
attractiveness. 4
93
489 Id. (But it only "approached statistical significance").
490 Homey & Spohn, supra note 51.
491 As the state with rape law reforms that are generally considered to be exemplary,
Michigan may be legally unique; there is also evidence that officials there are unusually
sensitive to feminist concerns about rape. See infra text accompanying notes 537-39. See
generally MARSH Er A.., supra note 25.
492 See, e.g., Sheila R. Deitz et al., Attribution of Responsibility for Rape: The Influence of Ob-
server Empathy, Victim Resistance, and Victim Attractiveness, 10 SEX ROLES 261, 274-75 (1984)
(subjects who scored low in rape empathy rated unattractive victim as more likely to have
encouraged the rape); Marsha B. Jacobson, Effects of Victim's and Defendant's Physical Attrac-
tiveness on Suhjects'Judgments, 7 SEx RoLs 247, 252 (1981) (rapist of unattractive victim less
likely to be seen as guilty); Neil Rector et al., The Effect ofPrudice andJudicial Ambiguity on
Defendant Guilt Ratings, 133 J. Soc. PsYcrH. 651, 657 (1993); Billy Thornton, Effect of Rape
Victim's Attractiveness in a Jury Simulation, 3 PERSONArrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 666, 668
(1977) (attractiveness of victim had no effect on evaluations of her credibility and responsi-
bility, but resulted in longer sentences).
493 See generally Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness,
Race, Socioeconomic Status and Gender of Defendants and Victim's on-Judgments of Mock Jurors, 24
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1325 (1994). The authors analyzed results from 80 mock
juror studies. They found that victim attractiveness had no significant effects on the judg-
ments of mock jurors. Accord Whatley, supra note 449, at 82, 87, 90.
Victim attractiveness has been used as an independent variable in several studies of
mock jurors' decisionmaking in stranger rape cases. In these studies, in addition to the
rape scenario and testimony, subjects received a photograph of the victim, showing either
an attractive or an unattractive woman, No main effects for attractiveness were found in
any of these studies. See Deitz et al., supra note 492; Feild, supra note 487, at 261; Eugenia
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Several scholars have studied the effects of racial prejudice in
rape cases. Such prejudice has been most heavily publicized in cases
where a black man is accused of raping a white woman. 494 Given the
terrible history of lynching, and of racial discrimination in trials of
black men for raping white women, 495 the resulting publicity has been
entirely appropriate. But, regardless of the race of the defendant,
when the putative rape victim is black, the jury is more likely to acquit
than when she is white.496 Since most rapes are intraracial, black rape
defendants are more likely to be acquitted than white rape defend-
ants-not, of course, because they are black but because their victims
are usually black.
a. The Defendant's Characteristics
Considerable research has been performed on the effects of vari-
ous attributes of the defendant on judgments in hypothetical (and
occasionally real) rape cases. The attributes that have been studied
the most are physical attractiveness, race, and socio-economic
status.
4 9 7
Research results consistently indicate that the rape defendant's
P. Geldes et al., Perceptions of Rape Victims and Assailants: Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Ac-
quaintance and Subject Gender, 19 SEx Roty-s 141, 150 (1988); Marsha B. Jacobson, supra
note 492, at 247; Clive Seligman et al., Rape and Physical Attractiveness: Assigning Responsibility
to Victims, 45J. PERSONALITY 555 (1977); Nora K Villemur & Janet Shibley Hyde, Effects of
Sex of Defense Attorney, Sex ofJuror, and Age and Attractiveness of the Victim on Mock Juror Decision
Making in a Rape Case, 9 SEx ROLES 879 (1983). The experimenters always have a large
number of independent raters judge the photographs for attractiveness, and often the
subjects are also asked to do so.
Jacobson did report an effect for victim attractiveness, finding that it makes subjects
more likely to regard the man as guilty, but this effect was significant only at the p < .1
level, which does not meet the usual .05 criterion for significance. Jacobson, supra, at 252.
Some of the above studies did find interactions between attractiveness and other in-
dependent variables.
494 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 210-55.
495 See generally id.
496 A district attorney told Holmstrom and Burgess that "you can't get a conviction [with
a black victim] even if you have a good case." HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 144.
Another scholar found that when the victim was black, mock jurors treated black and white
offenders equally. But, black offenders who assaulted white women received much more
severe sentences than white offenders who did so. J.S. Feild, Juror Background Characteristics
and Attitudes Toward Rape: Correlates ofJurors'Decisions in Rape Tials, 2 LAW & HuMAN BEHAV.
73 (1978).
497 See generally Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 493. The authors found jurors were
more lenient toward defendants who were attractive and/or had a high socioeconomic
status. Id. at 1319, 1325, 1327. The effect of a defendant's race on jurors' decisions varied
across crimes and punishment scenarios. Id. at 1325.
A few studies have dealt with miscellaneous attributes such as the defendant's criminal
record (of which jurors sometimes become aware), and his age. See, e.g., R Barber, Judge
and Jury Attitudes to Rape, 7 AUST. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 157 (1974).
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socio-economic status (including his unemployment) affects percep-
tions of his guilt. One study found that some subjects are more likely
to blame the rape victim if her assailant is well-dressed than if he is
badly-dressed. 498 With otherwise identical scenarios, mock jurors were
more certain of a janitor's guilt of rape than of a scientist's,49 9 and
they imposed longer sentences on "socially-unattractive" defendants
than on socially-attractive ones.50 0
Studying actual rape trials, LaFree, Reskin, and Visher created a
"loser" scale. Variables that loaded highly on this scale included being
unmarried, childless, unemployed, lacking a sexual partner, and
presenting a negative appearance to jurors.50 1 The authors found
that the losers (and those with criminal records that were mentioned
in court) were significantly more likely than other defendants to be
thought guilty byjurors.50 2 Subsequent research found thatjurors are
less likely to find the defendant guilty if he is employed.5 03 While
such findings raise legitimate suspicions of prejudice, perhaps actual
guilt is statistically associated with the same "loser" qualities.
498 A. Daniel Yarmey, Older and Younger Adults' Attributions of Responsibility Toward Rape
Victims and Rapists, 17 CANAmA. J. BEHAV. Sot. REV. 327 (1985). Young subjects and fe-
males perceived the victim as more responsible for the assault when she resisted a well-
dressed assailant than when she resisted a poorly-dressed assailant. Older subjects and
males were unaffected by this factor. Id. at 331.
499 Sheila R. Deitz & Lynne E. Byrnes, Attribution of Responsibility for Sexual Assault: The
Influence of Observer Empathy and Defendant Occupation and Attractiveness, 108J. PSYCHOL. 17,
23 (1981). However, subjects' perceptions of the janitor and scientist defendants differed
only when they were both physically attractive, perhaps because subjects found it difficult
to believe that a man who was both physically and occupationally attractive would need to
resort to force to obtain sex. Id. at 26. Describing the defendant as ajanitor or a scientist
had no effect on subjects' recommended sentences. Id. at 23. Accord Kahn et al., supra
note 481, at 104-05 (mock jurors assigned an auto mechanic and a math teacher similar
sentences in a stranger rape case); Kanekar et al., supra note 462 (subjects assigned the
same sentence to defendants described as either a manager, a watchman, or a stenotypist
regardless of whether victim knew defendant). Of course, jurors may be more inclined to
find a high-status defendant innocent, even if they do not discriminate in (mock)
sentences of those they consider guilty.
500 N.J. Barnett & H.S. Feild, Character of the Defendant and Length of Sentence in Rape and
Burglary Crimes, 104J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 271 (1978); H.S. Feild & N.J. Barnett, Simulated Jury
Trials: Students vs. "Real" People as Jurors, 104J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 287 (1978). Cf Moore et al.,
supra note 481, at 721 (socially undesirable defendants significantly more likely to be
judged guilty in a mock sexual harassment case). But see Kahn et al., supra note 481, at 98
(authors varied the "social attractiveness" of the defendant in a rape case and found no
main effects or interactions involving defendant attractiveness on mock jurors' sentencing
of the defendant.).
501 LaFree et al., supra note 66, at 36.
502 Id. at 397.
503 Barbara Reskin & Christy Visher, Research Note: The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal
Factors in Jurors'Decisions, 20 L. & Soc'v. REv. 423, 431 (1986). But this was true only if the
evidence of guilt was relatively weak; in "strong cases" the defendant's employment status
had no effect. Id. at 434-35.
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Reskin and Visher found that the defendant's race, when substi-
tuted for his employment status, showed a significant effect. However,
when they included his race in the same equation as his employment
status, race did not show a significant effect.
50 4
Studies in other contexts suggest that subjects are often more
sympathetic to simulated defendants who are good-looking, a ten-
dency that has been attributed to a "beauty is good" stereotype. 50 5 A
notable exception is when the crime could have been facilitated by
attractiveness-for example, a swindle. 50 6 Although in some cases the
defendant's good looks might be seen as having facilitated a rape, it
seems more likely, given the traditional assumption that rape is due to
sexual frustration,50 7 that jurors would conclude that a handsome
man must be innocent, because he doesn't need to resort to rape.
504 Id. at 431 n.9. Another study found that the defendant's race was not related to
verdicts in 38 rape cases, regardless of whether the defense was consent or misidentifica-
tion. LaFree et al., supra note 66, at 387. Another study, of 124 actual rape cases, found
that the defendant's race did not affect the verdict, but that African-American defendants
were significantly less likely to plead guilty than white defendants. LaFree, supra note 381,
at 844-45. LaFree speculated that the insignificant effect of race on verdicts may have been
due to multicollinearity among the variables, or in other words a high correlation between
race and other variables, which may be more related to verdicts. Id. at 845.
Some experimental studies have found that the defendant's race does not significantly
affect sentencing. Oros & Elman, supra note 21, at 34; Willis, supra note 454. In contrast,
in an experimental study using community members as subjects, Feild found that the de-
fendant's race was related to sentence in a case of stranger rape. Feild, supra note 487, at
271 (mock jurors assigned the Black defendant an average sentence of 17.67 years; the
White was sentenced to only 11.47 years).
505 Geldes et al., supra note 493, at 141-42 (discussing the "beauty is good" theory). For
an interesting example of the advantage of good looks, see D. Landy & E. Aronson, The
Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions of SimulatedJurors, 5J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSVCHOL. 141 (1969) (mockjurors in negligent automobile homicide
case sentenced the unattractive defendant to a longer prison term than the attractive one).
It would be interesting to know whether (1) subjects would discriminate against an unat-
tractive but well-dressed and evidently respectable defendant, as compared with, say, a
handsome but proletarian-looking one, and (2) whether the persons who actually commit
certain types of crimes are on average less physically attractive than law-abiding citizens.
The latter hypothesis seems plausible, given the correlations between looks and affluence,
and between certain types of crime and social class. Of course, a study of such matters
would raise difficult methodological problems, because those who have been convicted of
a certain crime are not necessarily representative of those who have committed it.
506 Geldes et al., supra note 492, at 141-42; Jacobson, supra note 493, at 248-49. For
reviews of the literature concerning crimes other than rape, see Harold Sigall & Nancy
Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of Offender Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on
JuridicJudgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 410 (1975); Mazzella & Feingold, supra
note 493.
507 One study found that males are more likely to believe that sex is the motivation for
rape, while females are more likely to believe power is the motivation. L.A. Syzmanski et
al., Gender Role and Attitudes Toward Rape in Male and Female College Students, 29 SEx ROLES
37, 55 (1993). Although feminists generally reject the traditional explanation in favor of
explanations that emphasize violent, nonsexual motivations, see infra text at notes 786-89,
Richard Posner defends the traditional view. POSNER, supra note 8, at 106-07.
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In apparent confirmation of this hypothesis (or of the "beauty is
good" hypothesis), some studies indicate that physical attractiveness is
indeed an advantage to rape defendants. 50 8 Under simulated condi-
tions, this has been found to be true even if the scenario plainly
reveals that the man raped the woman.50 9 Female subjects, though
not males, blamed the victim more if the rapist was attractive than if
he was unattractive.510 Subjects perceived the likelihood of future an-
tisocial behavior by the rapist as especially high if he was both unat-
tractive and acquainted with the victim, perhaps because "this
description fits the script of an unappetizing character picking out a
victim and waiting for an opportunity, whereas situational explana-
tions may be more plausible in the other conditions."511
Some studies have found that mock jurors' verdicts are unaf-
fected by the defendant's looks.512 But, a study of actual rape cases
found that jurors were less likely to regard attractive defendants as
508 In addition to the studies mentioned in the text, seeJacobson, supra note 492, at 251-
53 (stranger rape, misidentification defense: attractive defendant was less likely to be seen
as guilty and received a shorter recommended prison term); Rector et al., supra note 492,
at 657. But, one study indicates that the advantage of the good-looking defendant is re-
versed when the subjects have agreed to be impartial. R.M. Friend & M. Vinson, Leaning
Over Backwards: Jurors' Responses to Defendants' Attractiveness, 24 J. COMM. 124 (1974). An-
other study found that although male subjects recommended a shorter prison term for the
attractive defendant, female subjects gave him a longer term than the unattractive defend-
ant. Jacobson, suplra note 492, at 251-53. Attractiveness has also been found to decrease
the sentence suggested by subjects for a hypothetical rapist. Marsha B. Jacobson & Paula
M. Popovich, Victim Attractiveness and Perceptions of Responsibility in an Ambiguous Rape Case, 8
PSYCHOL WOMEN Q. 100, 102-03 (1983). Deitz and Byrnes found that female subjects as-
signed a longer sentence to attractive defendants, while males assigned a longer sentence
to unattractive ones. Deitz & Byrnes, supra note 499, at 23-24.
One study found that the effect of defendant attractiveness varies depending on the
presence or absence of acquaintance and the observer's gender. Geldes et al., supra note
493, at 150-51. The perceived likelihood of future anti-social behavior by the perpetrator
increased for attractive perpetrators who were acquainted with the victim. Id.
509 Subjects, 32 male and 32 female students in introductory social science courses, par-
ticipated in groups. Within each gender, subjects were randomly assigned to read one of
eight versions of a "newspaper article" accompanied by pictures of the rapist and the vic-
tim. In each story, the defendant grabbed the woman while she was walking alone at night,
raped her in a deserted stairwell, and was caught in the act by a group of students who
heard the victim's screams. Stories differed in the presence or absence of prior acquain-
tance. Victim and defendant were described as average, middle-class students in each
story; only their pictures were varied (attractive or unattractive victim, attractive or unat-
tractive defendant). Female subjects considered the victim less responsible when the de-
fendant was unattractive than when he was attractive. Geldes et al., supra note 493, at 144.
510 Id. at 146-47.
511 Id. at 151.
512 Deitz & Byrnes, supra note 499 (mockjurors in stranger rape case gave attractive and
unattractive defendants equivalent sentences on average); Geldes et al., supra note 493, at
145 (sentences imposed by mock jurors unaffected by defendant's attractiveness in both




The jury, in some cases, becomes aware of the defendant's prior
criminal record.514 The impact of such evidence in rape trials has
rarely been studied, but common sense tells us that it may tip the bal-
ance in close cases, and a few scholarly investigations have supported
this hypothesis, at least in consent-defense cases.
515
b. Jurors' Characteristics
Scholars have devised several scales to measure subjects' attitudes
toward women and rape: Rape Myth Acceptance; 516 Sex Role Stere-
otyping;517 Adversarial Sexual Beliefs;518 Acceptance of Interpersonal
Violence; 51 9 Attitudes Toward Rape;520 Attitudes Toward Women;
521
and Rape Empathy.522 Although the results have not been uniform, a
number of scholars have found, unsurprisingly, that one's general atti-
tudes on abstract questions about relations between the sexes strongly
affect one's opinions about concrete rape scenarios. 523 For example,
513 Reskin & Visher, supra note 503, at 431.
514 Although the general rule in state courts excludes such evidence, it is often admissi-
ble under any of several exceptions. See generally Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at 534-60.
515 One study found that if the accused's criminal record was mentioned in court, he
was more likely to be found guilty in consent-defense (but not in misidentification-de-
fense) cases. LaFree et al., supra note 66, at 397-400. LaFree's study of rape trials found a
highly significant relationship between a defendant's criminal record of forcible sex of-
fenses and guilt. LaFree, supra note 381, at 843, 844 tbl.3. Cf Bryden & Park, supra note
310, at 575-78 (evidence of the defendant's prior rapes has more probative value in ac-
quaintance rape cases than in stranger rapes).
516 See generally Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 217 (1980). The Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA) scale is the best-known
psychometrically-valid scale assessing beliefs about rape. To construct this scale, Burt gen-
erated numerous untrue statements about rape from several sources. She then asked a
sample of 598 adults to indicate the extent of their agreement with these myths on seven-
point Likert-type scales, and employed item analysis to select the 19 most internally-consis-
tent items, resulting in a Cronbach's alpha of .875. Id. at 223. One obtains a composite
score for each respondent by adding the scores of individual items, indicating the extent to
which the respondent holds favorable or unfavorable attitudes about rape or rape victims.
517 Id. at 222.
518 Id.
519 Id.
520 See generally Feild, supra note 281.
521 See generally Gloria J. Fischer, Cognitive Predictors of Not-Guilty Verdicts in a Simulated
Acquaintance Rape Trial 68 PSYcHOL. REP. 1199 (1991).
522 See generally Sheila R. Deitz et al., Measurement of Empathy Toward Rape Victims and
Rapists, 43J. PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372 (1982).
523 One study found that subjects high in RMA attributed more responsibility to the
victim for a rape and less responsibility to the defendant. Barbara Krahe, Victim and Ob-
server Characteristics as Determinants of Responsibility Attributions to Victims of Rape, 18J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 50 (1988). Surprisingly, RMA was not related to subjects' willingness to
convict in a sample of adults. Burt & Albin, supra note 431, at 222 tbl.2. But subjects
higher in RMA were less likely to define a forced sexual encounter as rape. Id. In the final
regression model, the authors found that the best predictors of willingness to convict were
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Hubert Feild found that the attitudinal factors measured by the Atti-
tude Toward Rape scale were more predictive of mock jurors' deci-
sions than were the jurors' demographic characteristics. 524 Subjects
imposing shorter sentences in a precipitory stranger rape case be-
lieved it was the woman's responsibility to prevent rape, that rapists
should not be punished severely, that rapists are normal men, that a
raped woman is no longer desirable, and that women should not resist
rapists. Combining all attitudinal items, the correlation between atti-
tudes and sentence was .51 in the nonprecipitory rape case and .45 in
the precipitory case-a strong relationship. All of the mock jurors'
demographic characteristics combined correlated with their sentences
of the rapist only .17 in the nonprecipitory case and .18 in the precip-
itory case-a weak relationship, albeit statistically significant.
Most research supports the commonsensical supposition that fe-
males are more likely than males to believe an accusation of rape.
525
the subjects' willingness to define the situation as rape, their opinions of the man and the
woman in the scenario, and their Acceptance of Interpersonal Violence. Id. at 224 tbl.3.
Attitudinal variables (though not RMA) were better predictors of willingness to convict a
rapist than any demographic subject variables. Id.
Mock jurors higher in Rape Empathy were found to be more certain of the defend-
ant's guilt in a stranger rape case, assigned him a longer sentence, and believed he was
more responsible for the rape than subjects lower in Rape Empathy.. Dietz et al., supra
note 522, at 380. Subjects high in Rape Empathy had more negative feelings about the
defendant, more positive feelings about the victim, and felt that the victim was less respon-
sible than those low in Rape Empathy. Id. Those high in Rape Empathy believed that the
psychological impact on the victim was more devastating and that the rape was more seri-
ous than did those low in Rape Empathy. Id. Similar results were reported in two other
studies. Deitz & Byrnes, supra note 499; Deitz et al., Attribution of Responsibility for Rape,
supra note 492.
Muehlenhard measured his subjects' traditionality by the Attitudes Towards Women
Scale, which assesses whether subjects tend to believe that women should occupy their
traditional roles. Muehlenhard, supra note 467, at 30. Those with more traditional atti-
tudes towards women thought that the man was significantly more justified in forcing the
woman to have intercourse over all dating situations, especially if the woman had violated
traditional norms by asking the man out, splitting the cost of the date, or going to the
man's apartment. Id. Of the more traditional subjects, 29.7% said that rape is sometimes
justifiable, compared to 14.7% of the more egalitarian subjects. Id. at 31. In addition, men
thought that the woman was more willing to have sex than did female subjects, across all
conditions. Id. at 26. Males (especially traditional ones) were more inclined (27% versus
17.5%) to believe that forcible sex is sometimes justifiable. Id. at 28.
524 Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape, supra note 281.
525 See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 449, at 1726, 1729; Giarrusso et al., supra note 478, at
66 (males more likely than females to consider aggressive sex appropriate in each of nine
different circumstances); Kelly McLendan et al., Male & Female Perceptions of Date Rape, 9 J.
Soc. BmEAV. & PERSONALrrY 421, 425 (1994); Schult & Schneider, supra note 484, at 99-100.
See generally Christine Brems & Patricia Wagner, Blame of Victim and Perpetrator in Rape Versus
Theft, 134J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 363 (1994).
Several studies have found that females favor longer sentences for rape than males:
Arnie Cann et al., Attributing Responsibility to the Victim of Rape. Influence of Information Regard-
ingPast Sexual Experience, 32 HUM. RELATioNs 57, 62 (1979); Feldman-Summers & Lindner,
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One assumes that both sexes tend to empathize with their own kind,
at least in an ambiguous dating situation. No citation is necessary for
the proposition that men, even if they are basically peaceful, tend to
abhor violence less than women do. Research has revealed another
gender difference: men are more inclined than women to discern sex-
ual motivations in the behavior of a woman,526 a tendency that pre-
sumably leads to a greater sympathy for some acquaintance rapists.
Nevertheless, the evidence on gender bias is somewhat mixed,527 and
the subjects' values, traditional or feminist, appear to be more decisive
than gender as such.
5 28
supra note 67, at 141; Geldes et al., supra note 493, at 145; Kanekar et al., supra note 462;
Smith et al., supra note 452, at 352. Cf Richard L. Wiener et al., Empathy and Biased Assimi-
lation of Testimonies in Cases of Alleged Rape, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 343, 347-54 (1989)
(female "jurors" in mock trial said to be more prone to base theirjudgments on sentiments
rather than the legal elements of the case). This was also true of community members (as
opposed to student jurors), those who knew a rape victim, and those who did not know a
man accused of rape. See also LONSWAY & FITZGERALD, supra note 251, at 142; Richard L.
Wiener et al., The Social Psychology ofJury Nullification: Predicting When Jurors Disobey the Law,
21 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1379 (1991) ("Numerous demographic and background vari-
ables have been examined in relation to Rape Myth Acceptance, the only consistent rela-
tionship being with the sex of the respondent.").
526 See generally BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 8.
527 See generally id. at 134-40; P. Pollard, Judgments About Victims and Attackers in Depicted
Rapes, 31 BaIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 307 (1992). Pollard reviewed research on gender differ-
ences in perceptions of acquaintance rape. He found that while there is considerable evi-
dence for the existence of gender differences in perceptions, the studies are not
unanimous. See, e.g., HUBERT S. FEiLD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 50-51 (1980).
The authors found that men and women give nearly identical answers to questions about
the appropriate legal standards in rape cases, for example whether the degree of the wo-
man's resistance should be the major factor in determining whether a rape occurred, the
significance of a delay in reporting the alleged rape, and the appropriate sentence length.
Other questions, such as whether it would do some women good to be raped, and whether
a woman's appearance provokes a rapist, elicited somewhat different replies from men and
women. Id. In the same authors' study of jurors in actual rape trials, no sex differences
were found in the likelihood of voting for conviction. Id. at 121.
Some studies have found that mock jurors do not differ by gender in the sentences
they prefer in a stranger rape. Feild, supra note 496; Jones & Aronson, supra note 479;
Scroggs, supra note 484. Another study found that males impose harsher sentences than
females on rape defendants. Richardson & Campbell, supra note 73.
528 See, e.g., Wayne P. Anderson & Kimberly Cummings, Women's Acceptance of Rape Myths
and Their Sexual Experiences, 34J. C. STUDENT DE . 53, 56 (1993) ("[w]lomen who accepted
traditional definitions of women's roles and rape myths were more likely to disbelieve an-
other woman's report that she had been raped"); Feild, supra note 487 (mock jurors' rec-
ommended sentences affected by beliefs that women should be responsible for preventing
their own rapes, that women provoke rape by their appearance or behavior, that women
should do everything they can to resist a rape, that rapists are normal men, and that rapists
should not be treated harshly); Muehlenhard, supra note 467; R. Lance Shotland & Lynne
Goodstein, Just Because She Doesn't Want to Doesn't Mean It's Rape: An Experimentally Based
Causal Model of the Perception of Rape in a Dating Situation, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 220, 224-26
(1983) (sexually egalitarian subjects more likely to label the encounter as rape and less
likely to blame victim); Snell & Godwin, supra note 483, at 606, 612 (undergraduate female
subjects with nontraditional sex-role views saw rapists as more responsible than did tradi-
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In one study, subjects read about a date where either the man
had bought the concert tickets, or the man and woman split the cost,
or they happened to meet at the concert and the woman accepted a
ride home with the man.5 29 All three scenarios ended with forced sex
in the dormitory parking lot. Subjects were then given a Sexual Expe-
rience Survey asking females about prior sexual victimization and
males about prior sexual aggression, as well as the Rape Myth Accept-
ance Scale, measuring subjects' agreement with common skeptical at-
titudes toward rape victims. The authors found that males were less
likely than females to label the forced sex as rape; males who had
themselves been sexual aggressors were the least likely to call the sce-
nario a rape.530 Both males and females who were high in Rape Myth
Acceptance were also less likely to view the encounter as rape.53' On
the other hand, females (but not males) were less likely to label the
forced sex as rape if the man had paid for the tickets rather than
meeting the woman at the concert.53
2
The critical role of traditional versus feminist values is under-
standable, at least in acquaintance rape cases, where the defense usu-
ally blames the putative victim. Traditionally, women have been
regarded as sexual gatekeepers. The woman's responsibility, in this
traditional view, is to avoid situations in which the man may misinter-
pret her desires, or lose control of his own. Accordingly, she should
not behave in a manner that men may mistakenly interpret as indica-
tive of sexual availability, and she should verbally make her position
clear. By contrast, feminists, of either sex, are more likely than tradi-
tionalists, especially if the rape occurred in a long-term dating relationship). Willis found
that sexually egalitarian subjects showed a stronger belief in the acquaintance rape victim's
truthfuilness than did traditionalists; attributed less responsibility to her; were more certain
she had not consented; were less likely to think she had promoted the incident; perceived
her suffering as greater, and perceived the perpetrator as more likely to commit further,
similar offenses. Willis, supra note 454, at 218-22. See also Abbey & Harnisch, supra note
483, at 305-06 (male subjects who were high in rape myth acceptance perceived greater
sexual intent by a female target than males low in rape myth acceptance).
Gender and values may also interact. One study found that men who were high in
rape myth acceptance perceived mundane dating behaviors more sexually (and as more
indicative of consent) than low rape myth acceptance men or women high or low in rape
myth acceptance. R.M. Kowalski, Inferring Sexual Interest from Behavioral Clues: Effects of Gen-
der and Sexually Relevant Attitudes, 29 SEx ROLES 13, 33 (1993). See also Beverly A. Kopper,
Gender, Gender Identity, Rape Myth Acceptance, and Time of Initial Resistance on the Perception of
Acquaintance Rape Blame and Avoidability, 34 SEX Rorxs 81, 90-91 (1996) (finding that the
critical variable for predicting perceptions of rape is level of rape myth acceptance, which
is generally lower for women than for men).
529 Jenkins & Dambrot, supra note 478.
530 Id. at 882.





tionalists to regard sexual equality as trumping prudential concerns,
and accordingly are less willing to endorse standards of behavior that
assign a major role in avoiding rape to the woman. Feminists are
therefore less censorious toward female promiscuity, drinking, and
the like, which often are part of the evidence in a consent-defense
case.533 At the same time, feminists are less likely than traditionalists
to accept the idea that, when the woman's conduct is highly "provoca-
tive," it may ignite uncontrollable passion in the man.
5 3 4
Age is a related factor. Women who came of age prior to the
sexual revolution of the 1960s are presumably more inclined, on aver-
age, to subscribe to relatively traditional sexual norms. 535 One might
surmise that older women are more shocked by the behavior of "bad
victims" and as a result more inclined to acquit in such cases. One
study did find that older people of both sexes are more likely to be-
lieve myths about rape.536 But on the whole the literature on this
topic is too skimpy to support any firm conclusions.
53 7
The relationship between feminist values and attitudes toward
rape cases suggests that, if the public's attitude toward sex roles be-
comes increasingly egalitarian,538 juries will be more willing to convict
acquaintance rape defendants.
c. The Evidence
Most of the literature about public attitudes towards rape cases is
devoted to identifying extralegal factors that affect jurors. Improper
biases make a better story than rational evaluation of the evidence.
533 See infra text accompanying notes 874-980.
534 See infra note 797 and accompanying text.
535 See generally LAUMANN, ET AL., supra note 56, at 194-220.
536 Burt, supra note 516, at 227 tbl.5.
537 One study that used members of the community (with an average age of 35) re-
ported a weak age effect: the older the mock juror (male or female), the more lenient he
or she tended to be. This study found no male-female difference. Feild, supra note 496, at
84. Another mock jury study investigated the effect of age on verdicts, using 257 adult
subjects, aged 21 to 67. The results of a Chi-square analysis showed a significant effect for
age, with those under 25 and those over 40 being the most likely to acquit the rape defend-
ant. A. Philip Sealy, Another Look at Social Psychological Aspects ofJuror Bias, 5 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 187, 192 (1981). However, this age effect was found for only one of two trials used
in the study. In the trial showing age and gender effects on verdicts, the defendant had
almost no evidence against him. Id. at 193. In the other trial, with a defendant who had
incriminated himself in court, no significant age or gender effects were found. Id. at 192-
93. Another study found older African-American and Mexican-Americans more supportive
of rape victims than younger ones, but found no age differences for Whites. Willis, supra
note 454, at 75-76.
538 As measured by the responses of high school students to questions about sex roles,
endorsement of feminist gender beliefs has increased in recent decades. Jensen & Karpos,
supra note 159, at 370.
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What is more, an expose of prejudice is potentially more valuable to
society. We have no quarrel with this, but obviously, the evidence in
the case may also play a powerful role. Even the most blatantly
prejudiced people are generally not entirely oblivious to reality. Ac-
cording to Kalven and Zeisel's "liberation hypothesis,"539 jurors' biases
should exert a more powerful influence in cases in which the prosecu-
tion's case is strewn with seeds of doubts that will germinate if watered
by prejudice. A more recent study of rape trials confirms the libera-
tion hypothesis, finding, for example, that when the prosecution's
case is relatively weak, juries are more likely to convict if the accused
rapist was unemployed.5 40 But if the prosecution's evidence is strong,
the defendant's employment status has been found to have no rela-
tionship to verdicts.5 41 Of course, this does not justify any unfair dis-
crimination against the unemployed,542 but it does confine its scope.
Similarly, scholars have found that racial factors are most influen-
tial in cases where the evidence is relatively weak.
543
On the other hand, one study of rape trials found that the mea-
surable quality of the prosecution's evidence, though paramount in
cases (typically stranger cases) where the defense was misidentifica-
tion or diminished responsibility, did not affect jurors' judgments in
cases where the defense was consent or that no sex had occurred (typ-
ically acquaintance cases).544
3. Effects of Rape Law Reforms on Conviction Rates
One of the main goals of rape law reforms has been to facilitate
prosecution of acquaintance rape cases. 545 In analyzing whether the
539 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 164-65. See also supra notes 432-33 and accompa-
nying text.
540 See Reskin & Visher, supra note 503, at 430-35. Some experimental studies, however,
have found that the strength of the evidence did not moderate the impact of stereotypes.
See, e.g., Randall A- Gordon, The Effect of Strong Versus Weak Evidence on the Assessment of Race
Stereotypic and Race Nonstereotypic Crimes, 23J. APPUiED Soc. PSYCHOL. 734, 747 (1993).
541 Id. at 431, 434-35.
542 Whether unemployed men are in fact more likely to be rapists than those with jobs,
and if so whether juries are excessively affected by this factor, are questions that have not
been definitively answered.
543 See Reskin & Visher, supra note 503. One study found that while African-Americans
and Whites both discriminated in favor of same-race defendants in judging rape scenarios,
the African-Americans (but not the Whites) did so even if the evidence was strong. In
other words, they tended to give the African-American defendant the benefit of the doubt
even when the evidence against him was powerful. Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial
and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERiMENTAL SOC.
PSYCH. 133, 13942 (1979). But cf. Brems & Wagner, supra note 525, at 373 (subjects attrib-
uted more fault to victims in ambiguous situations than in "clear-cut" rapes).
544 LaFree, et al., supra note 66, at 389.
545 MAMsH Er AL., supra note 25, at 22-23; Searles & Berger, supra note 25, at 25.
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reforms achieved this goal, scholars have studied trends in conviction
rates, measured either as the proportion of rape indictments that led to
a conviction or the proportion of rape reports that led to a conviction.
The former statistic, though it superficially seems to measure juries'
willingness to convict, may only reflect prosecutors' willingness to file
charges in weak cases. For example, if the conviction rates for rape
and nonsexual assault are both 75%, the most likely explanation is not
that convictions are equally easy to obtain for the two crimes, but that
prosecutors are, on average, willing to take about one chance in four
of losing, and do a good job of calculating the odds. This of course
tells us nothing about the relative difficulty of winning rape and as-
sault cases.
An upward trend in the conviction rate would be more informa-
tive. Again, however, one conceivable explanation is that
overburdened prosecutors are taking fewer tough cases.
Most of the available empirical evidence suggests that rape law
reforms are not significantly related to the percentages of indictments
that lead to convictions. In the most sophisticated study of this sub-
ject, Spohn and Homey found no evidence that the conviction rate
(as thus defined) had changed after state reforms in five of the six
cities they studied.5 4
6
The sole exception, Detroit, was factually ambiguous. Although
the authors found no increased proportion of convictions (relative to
indictments) in Detroit, the indictment rate had increased in Detroit.
Therefore, "the fact that the [conviction] rate did not decline is im-
portant," because, "if the increase in indictments represented more
borderline cases entering the system, a decline in convictions might
have followed without the evidentiary changes that were part of the
reform. 15 47 Because the number of convictions increased, Spohn and
Homey concluded that "defendants in these borderline cases are be-
ing convicted. ' 548 Whether this was due to the reforms is unclear.
Michigan judges interviewed by the authors felt that juries have be-
come more willing to convict accused rapists, not because of the legal
reforms but because of the attitudinal impact of the women's
movement.5 49
In a follow-up study, Spohn and Homey studied a random sample
of sexual assault cases bound over for trial in Detroit Recorder's Court
from 1970 through 1984, a span covering both pre-reform and post-
546 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 170, at 92-100.
547 Id. at 103 (no increase), 104 (but absence of decline is favorable sign).
548 Id. The percentage of cases in which there was a conviction on the original charge
rather than a lesser offense increased but not to a statistically significant degree.
549 Id. at 80.
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reform periods. 550 Unlike prior research on the impact of rape law
reforms, this study focused on the relationship of victims' characteris-
tics to case outcomes. The authors expected that more cases involving
nontraditional victims would be bound over for trial in the post-re-
form period than in the pre-reform period.551 Their findings partially
confirmed this hypothesis. On the one hand, there was no post-re-
form increase in the proportion of cases in which the victim had a
prior sexual relationship with the offender, or in which she did not
scream, physically resist, or report the crime promptly.552 On the
other hand, a larger proportion of the post-reform cases involved
questions about the victim's moral character 553 and evidence of risk-
taking behavior.554 The percentage of cases involving acquaintances
also increased significantly.
555
Spohn and Homey concluded that the larger proportion of non-
traditional-victim cases in the post-reform period was probably due to
a combination of two developments: (1) a greater willingness of such
victims to report the crime; and (2) a more positive attitude toward
these cases on the part of police and prosecutors. 556 Whether these
attitudinal changes were due to the reforms, or instead to the
changed public attitudes that led to the reforms, remains unclear.
The authors found, however, that the impact of most victim char-
acteristics on the ultimate outcomes of cases did not decline in the
post-reform period.557 Thus, this study's findings were consistent with
the earlier study by the same authors of the effects of reforms in
Detroit.
55 8
550 Cassia Spohn &Julie Homey, Rape Law Reform and the Effect of Victim Characteristics on
Case Processing, 9 J. QOUANTATMV CRIMINOLOGY 383 (1993). Because all of the cases in
their sample were bound over for trial, Spohn and Homey did not examine decisions
made by police and prosecutors prior to arraignment in Recorder's Court. Id. at 393 n.8.
551 Id. at 397-98.
552 Id. at 398.
553 P = 0.001. Id.
554 p = 0.01. Id.
555 p= 0.001. Id.
556 Id. at 398-99.
557 Id. at 405. The only exceptions were that (1) in the pre-reform period, prosecutors
seem to have been more willing to reduce charges as part of a plea bargain, where the
victim did not report the crime promptly, id. at 400, 405, and (2) that the parties were
strangers increased the likelihood of incarceration in the pre-reform period and had no
effect in the post-reform period. Id. at 403, 405.
558 A different result was reached by Bachman and Paternoster, who sought to deter-
mine, for two time periods, whether there were differences between the situations in which
rape occurred and the situations in which it led to incarceration. For this purpose, they
compared NCVS data concerning acquaintance rapes with national prison statistics con-
cerning the offenses committed by the convicted rapists. During the 1979-1986 period, the
NCVS indicated that 41% of rapes had been committed by acquaintances, 14% by relatives,
and 45% by strangers. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 153, at 570 tbl.I. National
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The statewide Michigan study relates that Michigan criminal law-
yers believe that the state's rape shield law made rape easier to prove
and, therefore, rape cases more winnable. 559 Supporting this anecdo-
tal evidence, the authors found a post-reform increase in the number
of rape convictions, from an average of eight forcible rape convictions
per month between 1972 and 1974 to an average of 21 per month
from 1976 to 1978.560 They concluded that this development was at-
tributable to the rape law reforms. 56 1 Spohn and Homey argue per-
suasively, however, that it was probably due to an increase in the
number of cases getting into the system, rather than a greater likeli-
hood of conviction once charges had been filed.
5 62
The more important question is whether reforms have reduced
the post-report attrition rate, or in other words the conviction rate as a
percentage of rape reports. Spohn and Homey found that in four of
the cities they studied (Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, and Washington,
D.C.) the conviction rates (as a percentage of rape reports) were virtu-
ally identical, varying only by two percentage points. 563 This is a re-
markable finding, because Illinois and Michigan had "strong"
reforms, while Georgia and the District of Columbia were "weak" re-
form jurisdictions. 564 The city with the lowest proportion of reported
rapes leading to convictions (9%) was Houston, which contrasted
sharply with Philadelphia, where 20% of reported rapes led to a con-
viction. Spohn and Homey found no evidence that either city's con-
prison statistics for 1986, by contrast, revealed that only 29% of those incarcerated for rape
had raped an acquaintance, 15% a relative, and 56% a stranger. Id. Similar data for 1987-
1990 (NCVS) and 1991 (National Prisoner Statistics) showed a greater correspondence
between characteristics of offenders and characteristics of prisoners, with 48% of the of-
fenders having raped an acquaintance (and 16% a relative), while 40% of the prisoners
had raped an acquaintance, and 17% a relative. Id. Conceming these findings, several
caveats: First, the NCVS data, based on household surveys, may understate rapes by rela-
tives. Second, Since the NGVS relied on self-classification by victims, id. at 561 n.30, it
probably understated acquaintance rapes, especially by lovers. See Koss, supra note 170, at
4. Third, because state reforms have occurred at different times "it would be virtually im-
possible to establish a single time point by which to distinguish between pre- and post-
reform periods." Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 153, at 564. If the authors had cho-
sen an earlier period for their "pre-reform" data, the change might have been much more
dramatic. Fourth, although the authors surmise that the changes "may" have been due to
reforms, id at 571, they offer no evidence to that effect. Attitudinal changes on the part of
acquaintance rape victims and justice system officials are an alternative hypothesis. Finally,
the assumption that prisoner data ought to correspond to NCVS data is true only if the
corroborative evidence is on average equally good for acquaintance and stranger rapes.
559 MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 44-45.
560 Id. at 29.
561 Id. at 43-45. This conclusion was supported both by interviews with criminal justice
system participants and by time-series analyses. Id.
562 SPOHN & HoRNEY, supra note 170, at 104.
563 Id. at 70-71.
564 Id. at 36-41.
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viction rate had been affected by reforms.
Summarizing their findings, Spohn and Homey concluded that,
"[t]he reforms did not produce an increase in the likelihood of con-
viction, and they produced an increase in reports and in the likeli-
hood of indictment in only one of the six jurisdictions."565
Gilchrist and Homey used time-series analysis to evaluate the
moderately reformed rape statutes passed by Nebraska in 1975. They
found no evidence that reforms were associated with any increase in
the conviction rate.56 6 Loh reached a similar conclusion after study-
ing data from Washington state, but he found that an increased pro-
portion of convictions were for rape rather than for another charge
growing out of the same encounter.
567
It is not difficult to find plausible explanations for the apparently
low impact of rape law reforms on conviction rates and case attri-
tion.568, Not only were reforms modest in some of the states studied;
even in states with the most impressive reforms prosecutors continue
to face weighty practical problems in many acquaintance rape cases.
Although some reformers hoped to shift the balance of power in ac-
quaintance rape trials, 569 forcing defendants to go on the defensive
for a change, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. As
one Michigan prosecutor put it: '[y]ou can't legislate a credible rape
victim.' '570 Evidence of the woman's sexual habits is still admissible in
some cases, either because the shield law contains exceptions, or be-
cause judges make a discretionary decision to admit sexual history evi-
dence when they deem it relevant. Some rape shield laws have too
many loopholes,571 but even after the loopholes are dosed some sorts
of evidence about the complainant's character and habits will inevita-
bly be available to the jury. It would be unjust to prohibit all refer-
ences to her sexual history; such evidence is sometimes necessary in
565 Id. at 160.
566 K. Gilchrist & J. Homey, Assessing the Impact of Changes in the Nebraska Rape Statutes:
Effect on Prosecution, cited in SPOHN & HoRx, Y, supra note 170, at 31.
567 Loh, supra note 275, at 591-93.
568 One scholar contends that reforms seldom achieve their instrumental goals and
serve chiefly to provide visibility and legitimacy to certain attitudes and values. SeeJOEL F.
HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENrs AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978).
569 A respected social scientist goes so far as to say that the "overriding" objective of
reforms was to "move the burden of proof from the victim to the defendant." BOURQUE,
supra note 25, at 110. We doubt that many reformers literally believed this, but some re-
formers do seem to have believed that shield laws would so sharply restrict attacks on the
victim's character that the defense, abandoning its former aggressive tactics, would be
forced to treat the victim respectfully, and to focus, with the prosecution and the jury, on
the defendants conduct rather than that of his victim. It would be hard to imagine a
better scenario for conviction, which explains both its attractiveness and its unrealism.
570 MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 52.
571 See, e.g., HoLmsRoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 279; Galvin, supra note 4, at 812-905.
1997] 1287
BRYDEN & LENGNICK
order "to provide context" or for some other legitimate purpose such
as suggesting a motive for a false accusation.57 2 Even when sexual his-
tory evidence as such has been excluded, the accuser's contributory
negligence and other nontraditional victim characteristics usually will
be revealed in the testimony about events leading up to the rape. One
cannot prosecute a man who allegedly raped a hitchhiker, for exam-
ple, without revealing how it was that the victim came to be seated in a
stranger's car. If the parties went to the woman's apartment to smoke
marijuana and then the rape occurred, the illicit purpose of the visit
cannot honestly be suppressed during the woman's testimony, and
even if it could the jury might then infer that the true purpose must
have been sexual. Not infrequently, the jury can draw speculative in-
ferences about the alleged vicitm's sexual habits from the legitimate
evidence about events prior to the rape, without having to hear testi-
mony specifically devoted to that subject. All this is not to say that
rape shield laws are wholly ineffective; only that the woman's lifestyle
will often be fairly evident to the jury even in a jurisdiction with a
reasonably tough shield law.
A few of the reformers' expectations were obviously unrealistic.
To take the most extreme example, some reformers hoped that by
changing the name of the crime from rape to "sexual assault" (or
some similar term) they could "divert attention from questions of the
victim's consent, for assault is, by definition, something to which the
victim does not consent. ' 573 Those who entertained this hope evi-
dently failed to consider that forcible rape is also "by definition, some-
thing to which the victim does not consent."
Another misguided reason for changing the name of the crime
was to draw attention "to the seriousness and the violent nature of
rape. ' 5 74 The idea that an "assault" sounds more serious, or more vio-
lent, than a "rape" is almost too fantastic to discuss. Rape has always
been regarded as a more heinous crime than assault. The problem
has been that many rapes are not regarded as, in Estrich's words, "real
rape." If there is anything to be gained by changing the name of the
crime, it can only be by making it seem less serious and therefore more
like the average juror's view of many acquaintance rapes.5 75 Kalven
and Zeisel concluded that acquaintance rape jurors, despite their bi-
572 See generally Galvin, supra note 4, at 807-12.
573 Searles & Berger, supra note 25, at 26.
574 Ronald J. Berger et al., The Impact of Rape Law Reform: An Aggregate Analysis of Police
Reports and Arrests, 19 ClM. JusT. REv. 1, 1 (1994).
575 Perhaps this is analogous to what Professor Vivian Berger meant when she suggested
that, "[s]ex-neutral redefinitions of 'rape' (or criminal sexual conduct in general) enhance
the protection of victims of homosexual attack while subtly freeing this branch of the law
from outmoded notions harmful to women." Berger, supra note 1, at 12.
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ases, often were willing to convict rape defendants of lesser crimes
such as indecent assault.576 Perhaps by calling rape "Sexual Assault,"
or "Criminal Sexual Conduct," and dividing it into degrees with varia-
ble penalties, reformers can make jurors more willing to convict de-
fendants in cases where jurors tend to perceive the man as culpable,
but not culpable enough to be punished as a "rapist."577 But, since
jurors usually do not know the maximum penalty for, say, "Criminal
Sexual Conduct: Second Degree," this hope seems dubious. By con-
trast, it will be obvious to jurors that a lesser included offense like
indecent assault carries a lesser penalty and stigma than rape, and so
they may regard it as an appropriate compromise verdict in cases in
which they believe that forcible sex occurred under extenuating
circumstances.
It is easy to understand the tendency of ordinary citizens to as-
sume that legal changes usually lead to corresponding changes in so-
cial reality. One might have expected greater sophistication from
legal scholars. On the whole, however, legal scholars have been as
credulous as other reformers about the likely effects of reforms. Of
course, lawyers and law professors cannot be expected to reject a
worldview that glorifies their own role. Even the top law schools do
very little to familiarize students with the literature about the practical
consequences of legal change. Law students and professors argue
constantly about whether Rule X is better than Rule Y. But they rela-
tively rarely discuss whether the choice between two rules of law will
often affect the outcomes of cases; still less often do they engage in
informed discussions of the effects of legal rules on social reality
outside the courtroom. If taught at all, empirical studies of such mat-
ters are customarily relegated to small, optional courses like Law and
Social Science. In regular courses, class discussions often include
wildly implausible speculation about the potential impacts of, for in-
stance, changes in criminal law rules, even in circumstances where few
would know about the rule, or where other, more powerful motiva-
tions are obviously present.
Whether legally trained or not, reformers usually do not distin-
guish between bad rules of law that are often outcome-determinative
576 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 250-54.
577 Kalven and Zeisel point out that in the simple rape cases where the jury was given the
option of convicting the defendant of a lesser charge, they found the defendant guilty of
the lesser charge in all but one. Id. Of course, instructing the jury on lesser crimes might
have an effect on juries that simply reducing the statutory penalty for rape would not have,
either because juries are influenced less by the potential sentence than by their notion of
which rapes deserve that label and its stigma, or because they do not know the statutory
maximum penalty, but do understand that it is higher than for lesser sex crimes.
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and those that are not.578 There is some evidence, for example, that
the cautionary instruction in rape cases increases the likelihood of an
acquittal.579 Other rules of law, though perhaps equally objectionable,
are less likely to be outcome-determinative. The corroboration re-
quirement, for example, has appeared in every reformist critique of
rape law, but in most states it may have had little or no effect on case
outcomes. 580 Even prior to the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, many
states had no corroboration requirement.58 1 Those that did require
some corroboration usually did not insist that every element of the
offense be corroborated.58 2 Since prosecutors and juries want some
corroboration even if it is not legally required, 583 abolition of the rule
did not necessarily make convictions easier to obtain.
584
Similarly, reformers had supposed that the resistance require-
ment was a major obstacle to convictions in acquaintance rape cases, a
supposition encouraged by many modem commentaries on rape
law. 585 Estrich, on the other hand, shrewdly observed that, since
"force" and "resistance" are two sides of the same coin, it does no
578 In Michigan, several radical feminists disassociated themselves from the rape law re-
form effort, reportedly because they felt that the males who would administer the law
would prevent it from being efficacious. MARsH ET AL., supra note 25, at 17. To the extent
that the system's performance has improved, albeit not necessarily because of particular
law reforms in individual jurisdictions, they too were unrealistic.
579 Oros & Elman, supra note 21, at 34.
580 SPOHN & HoR.NEY, supra note 170, at 24-25, 163-64. In New York, however, the excep-
tionally strict corroboration requirement appears to have been a major obstacle to convic-
tions. See Irving Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses in
New York, 40 FoRDHAm L. REv. 263, 268 (1972).
581 ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 43; Younger, supra note 580, at 264.
582 See, e.g., Donald J. Friedman, Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Re-
form, 81 YALE LJ. 1365, 1367-70 (1972).
583 See SPOHN & HoR, NEY, supra note 170, at 161-64. Commenting on repeal of the Cali-
fornia corroboration requirement, a Los Angeles deputy prosecutor remarked: "Legal the-
ory is not legal reality... and in California just like anywhere else in this country, a woman
who hopes to win a rape case better have plenty of corroboration." Chappell & Singer,
supra note 225, at 266. See also Feild, supra note 487 (mock jurors whose version of the case
included strong corroborative evidence-torn clothing and scratches-were more likely to
recommend a long prison sentence).
584 In a jury simulation study, mock jurors were given a rape case containing the same
evidence but various corroboration instructions. Juries that had received corroboration
instructions tended to be less likely to convict the defendant of rape. Analysis of the re-
corded jury deliberations revealed thatjurors who had received corroboration instructions
were not more likely to scrutinize the putative victim's credibility or the corroborative evi-
dence. Rather, the jurors who had received such instructions seemed to have a generally
more positive opinion of the defendant (and a less positive opinion of the woman). VALE-
RIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 207 (1986).
585 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 385; John Diight Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time
For "No" to Really Mean "No", 21 AM.J. CIUM. L. 3, 10-13 (1993); Lani Anne Remick, Com-
ment, Read Her Lips. An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
1103, 1110-13 (1994).
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good to abolish the resistance requirement while continuing to define
rape as non-consensual intercourse obtained by force.58 6 Without
resistance, there will be no "force." But not even Estrich discussed the
possibility that, even if neither resistance nor force were a required ele-
ment of the crime, police, prosecutors, and juries would still need to
decide whether the woman consented, and in doing so would still at-
tach great weight, in acquaintance rape cases, to the degree of force
and resistance.
58 7
Reformers also hoped that, by dividing the crime into degrees,
they would encourage plea bargaining and discourage jury nullifica-
tion.5 88 But Spohn and Homey found little or no evidence that re-
forms had this effect.5 9 Conceivably, however, the increase in the
number of cases in the system in Michigan, leading to a larger
number (though not proportion) of convictions was due in part to
definitional changes in Michigan law.
590
In Detroit, according to Spohn and Homey, prosecutors were re-
luctant to take advantage of lesser charges that had been created by
Michigan's reform, because they feared that juries would become con-
fused if they were given definitions for four different degrees of
"Criminal Sexual Conduct."591
The reader should not infer that those who drafted rape reform
legislation were unusually naive. Some feminists were pessimistic
about the potential instrumental effects of reforms. 59 2 The optimism
of the majority was characteristic, not just of rape law reformers, but
of citizen-reformers in general, including many lawyers. In fields as
586 ESrRICH, supra note 1, at 58-66.
587 See SPOHN & HoRNEY, supra note 170, at 161-64;Judith E. Krulewitz &Janet E. Nash,
Effects of Rape Victim Resistance, Assault Outcome, and Sex of Observer on Attributions About Rape,
47J. PERSoNALrrY 557, 562-64 (1979) (as victim resistance increased, subjects became more
certain that rape had occurred); Shotland & Goodstein, supra note 528, at 224 (when man
used low degree of force subjects judged woman's desire for sex as greater than when
moderate force was used). In addition to interpreting the absence of force and resistance
as evidence of consent, jurors may feel that in low force situations the woman, though not
necessarily consenting, could have averted the rape and so is partly responsible for her own
victimization. See Bell et al., supra note 449, at 1720; Kopper, supra note 528, at 89 (when
initial resistance occurred early in the encounter, subjects attributed significantly less
blame to the victim and situation and more blame to the perpetrator). To the extent that
jurors adopt either of these positions, the degree of force and resistance will be influential
irrespective of whether resistance or force is a legal element of the crime.
588 SPOHN & HoRNEY, supra note 170, at 160-61.
589 Id. at 161.
590 Spohn and Homey leave this up in the air. Compare id. at 161 (no increase in convic-
tion rate in Detroit despite definitional changes), with id. at 104 (more borderline cases in
the system post-reform, hence absence of decline in conviction rate seems to mean convic-
tions are easier to obtain).
591 Id. at 161.
592 BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 109.
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diverse as the Miranda rule and environmental rights, both sides usu-
ally talk as if legal doctrines are major determinants of what happens
in everyday life, when in fact they often do not even determine what
happens in court.593 As often as not, the fierce doctrinal battle is
largely symbolic, and the predictions (on both sides) of major practi-
cal effects are hyperbolic.
594
This is not to say that symbolic victories are meaningless; as
Holmes said "we live by symbols." A reform whose short-term impact
is purely symbolic may affect attitudes that eventually change society
in ways more subtle than we understand or can trace. On a cumula-
tive, national basis, publicity about rape law reforms may already have
helped to increase reporting of rape. Then too, a reform like a shield
law may reduce some victims' ordeals even if it has little effect on case
outcomes. Yet, it is also true that reformers, fixated on abhorrent
legal rules, frequently expect more short-term instrumental benefits
from law reform then mere laws can deliver. Like their allies in citi-
zens' groups, reformist law professors often attribute excessive impor-
tance to what the law says, frequently ignoring more decisive but less
tractable realities such as the burden of proof.595 Indeed, several
prominent rape scholars criticize "the law" when the context makes it
clear that they mean to criticize, not rules of rape law, but how those
rules are administered.
59 6
593 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
594 In the battle over conservatives' efforts to overrule Roe v. Wade, for example, both
sides seemed to believe that the clock could be rolled back to the era when legal abortions
were extremely rare.
595 See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice, 62 MINN. L. REv.
163, 163-76 (1978). Although the accusation of legal unrealism is directed most often at
liberals, conservatives are often vulnerable to the same charge. For example, consider the
National Review's farewell to Justice Brennan:
In areas as diverse as criminal justice, civil rights, federalism, pornography, the role of
religion in public life and education policy, we are governed by his decisions. And
such decisions have had consequences: urban decay, racial polarization, soaring vio-
lent crime, the growth of centralized government, deteriorating public schools, and
loss of community.
NATIONAL REviEW, Sept. 1, 1997, at 19-20. For an excellent discussion of the unrealism of
some conservative legal nostrums, see Charles Krauthammer, A Social Conservative Credo,
121 THE PUBLIC INTEREsT 15 (1995).
596 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1275 (1991) ("rape laws serve to
regulate the sexual conduct of women by withholding from rape victims the ability to in-
voke sexual assault law when they have engaged in nontraditional behavior"). As Crenshaw
states: "Rape law.., serves not only to penalize actual examples of nontraditional behavior
but also to diminish and devalue women who belong to groups in which nontraditional
behavior is perceived as common." Id. at 1280. Although Estrich says that "[t]he problem
has never been so much the terms of the statutes as our understanding of them," ESTRICH,
supra note I at 90, she seems to be talking about judicial interpretations rather than, for
example, juries' verdicts. Be that as it may, her book is almost entirely devoted to criticiz-
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Law review articles, like Hollywood movies, usually have happy
endings. In traditional doctrinal scholarship a happy ending is almost
guaranteed by the standard conception of the enterprise. Typically,
the ultimate issue is, "What should be done?" The author begins by
describing a problem-a social evil, a questionable rule of law, or a
division of authority among courts. The next step is to consider the
history of the problem, its ramifications and illustrations, and several
possible solutions. Above all, one must be constructive; the article
closes with specific proposals for legal action. One shows, for exam-
ple, that a proposed rule would be more just, or that it seems likely to
have valuable utilitarian consequences.
Ideally, a scholar tries to record the truth, including all the uncer-
tainties and grounds for pessimism about law reforms. But, there is a
triumphalist bias in reformers' legal scholarship. For a scholar trying
to publish an article, doubts about the practical importance of the
choice among possible legal rules are self-defeating: they make the
article seem pointless. In order to show the importance of their pro-
posals, many authors tend to exaggerate the effects of disfavored legal
rules, unconsciously subordinating if not entirely suppressing any evi-
dence that the objectionable rules are not outcome-determinative and
that reforms will be inefficacious. The messiness and uncertainties of
the real world, and our imperfect understanding of it, must be tidied
up, just as they are in a movie or a lawyer's brief. This leads to the
happy ending: change the law and we will improve the world.
The'triumphalist bias is most pronounced in controversial public-
law fields like rape, where readers crave solutions to newly-recognized
problems. Many student editors and professors entered the profes-
sion at least partly because they were inspired by the prospect of
achieving social justice through law. From their point of view, an arti-
cle that acknowledges a problem but offers no legal solution, or, even
worse, suggests that legal solutions are likely to fail, is at best a disap-
pointment, undermining the profession's noblest ideals, which en-
shrine the goal, not so much of understanding the world realistically,
as of changing it beneficially.
597
ing judicial decisions and legal doctrines. This of course is a legitimate enterprise, but
such criticisms of the judiciary do have the unfortunate side effect of implying that judicial
decisions are the main obstacle on the road to justice in rape cases.
597 Most public law scholars are liberals; as a result, most examples of the can-do creed
in public law scholarship involve liberal causes. See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1
CONsr. COMM. 281, 281-83 (1984) (recounting fatuous praise for Brandeis's briefs). But
conservative scholars display the same symptoms. Rather than describing liberal reforms as
ineffective, they usually prefer to warn that liberal panaceas will have terrible conse-
quences. As for the conservative agenda, what liberal hope is more forlorn than the idea
that the decline of religion can be arrested by allowing school prayers, or that abolition of
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In discussions of rape law reforms, the problem of unrealistic ex-
pectations is further exacerbated by one of the most basic rules of
criminal procedure: the state cannot appeal from an acquittal. As a
result, appellate decisions generally occur only in cases in which the
jury convicted the defendant. This greatly affects the impression cre-
ated by the cases, because it means that the court never looks more
pro-prosecution than the jury. Judging by Kalven and Zeisel's find-
ings, juries are much more inclined to acquit in nonaggravated ac-
quaintance rape cases than trial judges would be.598 If the appellate
courts were entitled to reverse rape acquittals, and of course especially
if they could do so merely because they themselves would have
handed down a different verdict, their collective performance in rape
cases probably would look vastly more "pro-victim" than it does, espe-
cially when compared with the relatively "pro-defendant" views of ju-
ries. But, since appellate courts only hear rape cases at the behest of
convicted defendants, reversals create the impression that judges are
more skeptical than juries toward victims. This in turn creates the
impression that, since judicial decisions are the problem, new rules of
law are the solution. Sometimes, of course, that is indeed the case.
But sometimes the other realities dwarf the doctrines to which legal
scholars devote most of their attention.
III. LENIENCY IN ACQUAINTANCE RAPE CASES: THREE
PERVASIVE ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
The charge of massive, systemic bias against acquaintance rape
victims rests at bottom on three assumptions:
599
1. That only a minuscule proportion of acquaintance rape re-
ports are false.
600
Miranda warnings would substantially reduce crime?
598 Perhaps part of the difference between juries' verdicts and judges' "verdicts" was that
the former but not the latter affected the defendant's fate. It is easier to be severe in
principle than in practice. Of course, this would not account for the differences in netjury
leniency among various crimes. See supra notes 408-20 and accompanying text.
599 A fourth assumption is that there are no significant differences in the appropriate
legal response to rapes by lovers or acquaintances and rapes by strangers, nor between
rapes of women who were figuratively "asking for it" and those who behaved with reason-
able prudence. This assumption can best be evaluated in a separate article.
600 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 387 (asserting that the percentage of false
rape reports is the same as for other crimes); Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror
Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 101, 106-07 (1988) (assessing sparse data about false reports of rape
and concluding that the rate of false reports is the same or lower than for other crimes);
Goolsby, supra note 105, at 1189-91 (false reports of rape are estimated at about 2%, the
same as for other crimes); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed?: Rape Myths and the
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2. That the guilt of most acquaintance rapists can be proven be-
yond a genuinely reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of unbiased
factfinders. 6
01
3. That evidence about the contributory fault and "immoral" be-
havior of the acquaintance rape complainant, and particularly about
her sexual habits, generally has no significant probative value in deter-
mining whether she consented.60 2
All of these propositions are critically important; none of them is
self-evidently true; and yet none of them, except the probative value of
sexual history evidence, has been analyzed at length in rape scholar-
ship. In this portion of the article we subject the three assumptions to
critical scrutiny.
B. FALSE RAPE REPORTS
In contemporary rape scholarship, the topic of false rape reports
is normally discussed, if at all, only in passing.603 Such discussions
usually assume that an accusation of rape is simply an assertion of his-
torical fact.60 4 This assumption is accurate enough in stranger rape
cases, where the defense is typically misidentification. With that de-
fense, either the defendant raped the complainant or he did not; one
usually cannot imagine a plausible intermediate scenario. But in ac-
quaintance rape cases, even if the historical facts were known, and the
abstract definition of rape in the jurisdiction were clear, some cases
would arise in which knowledgeable observers would disagree about
whether a rape had occurred. Some might say that the woman's
Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1013 (1991) (relying on esti-
mated 2% rate of false reports to argue that the fresh complaint rule is out-of-date).
601 See, e.g., Goolsby, supra note 105, at 1188-92 (attributing high attrition rates for sim-
ple rape cases to male biases, prior relationship issues, force requirements, corroboration
requirements, and fresh complaint requirements, but not to the burden of proof); Hen-
derson, supra note 105, at 41-43. See also supra notes 712-17 and accompanying text.
602 Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearings on H.R 14666 Before the Subcomm. On CriminalJustice of
the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 36 (1976) (statement of Mary Ann Largen)
(declaring that no "right-minded citizen" could believe that the rape complainant's prior
sexual activities are relevant); BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 370-71 (discussing the admis-
sibility into evidence of prior sexual conduct and criticizing the conclusion "[t]hat a repu-
tation of 'loose moral character' probably has a basis in fact and that a girl with such a
character is more likely than not to consent to intercourse in any given instance"); Sakthi
Murphy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim's
Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CAL. L. Rxv. 541, 552
(1991) (declaring a consensus that a woman's sexual past has low probative value, if any
value at all, in a rape trial).
603 See, e.g., ESTRcH, supra note 1, at 43-46; Goolsby, supra note 105, at 1188-91; Torrey,
supra note 600, at 1027-31.
604 See, e.g., EsrRucH, supra note 1, at 43-46; Goolsby, supra note 105, at 1188-91; Torrey,
supra note 600, at 1027-31.
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words and acts signified consent, while others disagreed. Or some
might say that the man made a reasonable mistake as to consent, while
others believed that he knew what he was doing or that his mistake
was unreasonable. Similar disagreements might arise about whether
the alleged rapist used "force" and whether the woman was too drunk
to consent.
While these ambiguities suggest that all purported tabulations of
"false rape reports," whether high or low, should be taken with a grain
of salt, the inquiry is not meaningless. For one thing, we suspect that
most "ambiguous situation" rapes and near rapes are screened out by
victims, police, and prosecutors. At least in cases that lead to formal
charges, we suspect that usually the defendant is simply lying. Be that
as it may, no one denies that there are at least a few deliberately false
rape reports. These are our present topic.
Prior to the rise of modem feminism in the 1970s, male judges
and scholars often indicated that false allegations of acquaintance
rape were common. 60 5 Rape, Sir Matthew Hale instructed an 18th
century jury, "is an accusation easily to be made and once made, hard
to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party to be accused,
tho never so innocent."
60 6
In the early 20th century, several students of the mind, including
Freud, contributed to a theory about a distinctively female type of
mendacity. Women, so the theory went, are by nature masochistic.
Subconsciously desiring to be raped, they fantasize about it, and some
of these women develop a false but unshakable belief that their fanta-
sies were actual rapes.
60 7
Evidently influenced by this sort of thinking, some prestigious
medical figures concluded that false rape accusations were wide-
605 See generally AMIR, supra note 292, at 254; ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 5-6.
606 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1778). Hale's admonition
is not literally false: it is indeed often difficult to prove that the defendant raped the puta-
tive victim and also presumably sometimes difficult for an innocent defendant, particularly
in a nonaggravated acquaintance rape case, to establish his innocence to the satisfaction of
an unbiased third party. But bias and the burden of proof usually solve the defendant's
problem while compounding the acquaintance rape victim's problem. Hale's failure to
mention this should be evaluated within his seventeenth-century English context, which
included not only the death penalty for rape but lack of a right to counsel and the rule
prohibiting defendants from testifying on their own behalf. See generally Berger, supra note
1, at 31.
607 See 1 H. DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1944); S. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY
LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1933); K. HoRNEY, FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY (1933). For a criti-
cal evaluation of this literature, see S. BESSMER, THE LAWS OF RAPE (1984); S. EDWARDS,
FEMALE SEXUALITY AND THE LAW (1981); S. Edwards, Sexuality, Sexual Offenses, and Concep-
tions of Victims in the Criminal Justice Process, 8 VICTIMOLoG 113 (1983); EJ. Kanin, Female
Rape Fantasies: A Victimization Study, 7 VICTiMoLocY 114 (1982).
1296 [Vol. 87
spread.60 A number of legal scholars endorsed this position,60 9 and
some recommended that rape complainants be routinely subjected to
psychiatric examinations. 610 Wigmore, the most prominent of these
scholars, explained:
The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds.., expression in the narra-
tion of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or
the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convinc-
ing. The real victim, however ... is the innocent man; for the respect
and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps
to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
611
Without necessarily subscribing to the details of any psychological
theory, many Anglo-American judges felt that false accusations were a
serious danger in acquaintance rape cases. Accordingly, they fash-
ioned legal rules, most obviously the resistance requirement, the cor-
roboration requirement, the fresh complaint rule, and the cautionary
instruction, designed to protect innocent defendants from convictions
based on false rape accusations.
612
The rape-fantasy theory has disappeared from scholarly dis-
course, supplanted by modem scholars' radically different analysis.
Nevertheless, some men still believe that false rape reports are com-
mon.61 3 Nearly all modem rape scholars consider such fears to be
unwarranted, 614 and routinely dismiss Hale and Wigmore as discred-
608 M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 360-63 (1952); K.A. Men-
ninger, (Menninger Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Topeka, Kansas) M.S. letter (Sept.
15, 1933), cited in 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRALs AT COMMON LAW § 924(a) (James H.
Chadboum rev., 1970).
609 3A WiGMORE, supra note 608, § 924(a); RA. Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advo-
cate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, and Character, 11 AM. CriM. L. REv. 309 (1973); M.
Juliver, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CAL. L. REv.
648 (1960).
610 R.V. Sherwin, Commentary, 7 MED. ASPECTS HUM. SEX. 193 (1973). See also GuTrr-
MACHER & WEIHOFEN, supra note 608.
611 3A WMoRE, supra note 608, § 924(a). Citing the discoveries of "modem psychia-
try," Wigmore warned that women's testimony is untrustworthy:
Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly
by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment,
partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these
complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men .... Judging
merely from the reports of cases in the appellate courts, one must infer that many
innocent men have gone to prison because of tales whose falsity could not be exposed.
Id. at 736.
612 See supra notes 18-20.
613 When Michigan's rape law reforms were being considered by the state legislature,
some male legislators expressed concern that vindictive wives would use the new law to win
property settlements in divorce proceedings. To satisfy these critics, and improve the bill's
prospects, the reformers agreed to a spousal exemption. See MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at
15. Perhaps the legislators were thinking not so much of false accusations as of true accu-
sations used to extort favorable settlements.
614 For a brief but cogent response to the idea that many women have deep-seated maso-
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ited sexists who propagated myths about rape.615 The conventional
wisdom now is that the proportion of false reports is negligible, per-
haps as low as 2%, a figure said to be comparable to that for most
other major crimes.
616
This new orthodoxy may well be correct, but, like the contrary
opinions of Hale and Wigmore, it derives more from intuition than
from common experience or scientific evidence. Although many have
tried, no one has succeeded, either deductively or empirically, in dem-
onstrating that the proportion of false rape reports is either low or
high. Consider these typical arguments:
1. The Argument From Rationality
Most people generally avoid extremely irrational, self-destructive
conduct. From this premise, some scholars have reasoned to the con-
clusion that false reports of rape must be rare.617 It is, to say the least,
foolish to file a false rape report. Any advantage the woman might
derive from a false accusation seems to be greatly outweighed by the
potential adverse consequences of this type of deceit: an unpleasant,
intrusive investigation; 618 a trial at which the defendant and his attor-
ney are likely to assail the alleged victim's character;619 possible expo-
sure as a liar, perhaps followed by prosecution for perjury, or for
falsely reporting a crime.620 Given all these hazards, a false rape com-
plaint is as reckless as it is unethical. Lacking any strong evidence that
chistic needs that lead them, subconsciously, to seek situations in which there is a high risk
of rape, see Berger, supra note 1, at 27-29.
615 See, e.g., FAIRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 15-16.
616 See, e.g., ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 56, at 205 (2%); BROWNMILLER, supra
note 1, at 386-87; SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 209
(1979) (citing unpublished study by Carolyn Hursch & James Selkin); Harry J. O'Reilly,
Crisis Intervention with Victims of Forcible Rape: A Police Perspective, in PERSPECrTVES ON RAPE
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 89, 96-97 (June Hopkins ed., 1984) [hereinafter PERSPECriFS]; Tor-
rey, supra note 600, at 1028 (asserting that rape complaints are as likely to be true as re-
ports of any other crime).
617 For a particularly nice example of this fallacy, see Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at
577. The argument presented by Bryden and Park, however, did not depend on the asser-
tion that few false rape reports are filed, but only on the far safer assumption that few false
rape reports survive screening by police and prosecutors, as well as numerous opportuni-
ties for the woman to change her mind or conclude that her lie has achieved its purpose.
618 See HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 63-156 (describing the inevitably some-
what and sometimes highly unpleasant processes of the hospital examination and the po-
lice investigation).
619 See Calvin, supra note 4, at 764-66.
620 Perjury prosecutions are rare. Barbara A. Babcock, Taking the Stand, 35 Wm. & MARY
L. REv. 1, 9 (1993). But presumably few nonlawyers know this. The woman also runs the
risk of being prosecuted for filing a false police report. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.505 (West 1994).
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rape fantasies are as common as Wigmore thought,621 it seems reason-
able to suppose that false rape reports are indeed rare.
This argument is not entirely convincing. To begin, a false accu-
sation of rape is not always as pathological or stupid as it may sound.
In some cases a false rape story provides a convenient (if short-
sighted) explanation of an embarrassing teenage affair or pregnancy,
or an adulterous liaison.622 According to one study, where the puta-
tive victim is a minor-as many, and perhaps most, forcible rape vic-
tims are623 -the rape report is almost always made by someone else,
usually a member of her family.624 Even if the victim is an adult, in
most cases someone else-family, friends, or a stranger-"made the
decision to contact the police, acted as intermediary at the request of
the victim, or persuaded the victim herself to call. ' 625 Of course, this
does not mean that the putative victim probably is lying. But it does
undercut the idea that a false rape report is necessarily a wildly irra-
tional act, committed by a woman of mature years. In many cases, the
alleged victim's only decision was to tell someone, say, her mother,
that she had been raped. Lying to your mother about why you did not
come home until 3:00 a.m. does not sound nearly as deviant, nor as
obviously dangerous, as walking into a police station with a premedi-
tated plan to make a false crime report.
Even if the woman's motivation is vindictive, it may be rational in
a sense. For example, a prostitute whose customer fails to pay for sex
may retaliate by falsely accusing him of forcible rape.62 6 This is "irra-
tional" only if she should acquiesce in her victimization, or has a bet-
ter method of revenge. No doubt the most prudent course is to forget
621 Even the author of a study finding an extremely high rate of false rape complaints
states that there was no evidence that false complaints occurred as a result of delusions.
Kanin, supra note 317, at 85.
622 This may be what happened in People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1984).
623 See RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56. According to one authority, over half of all re-
ported rape victims are under 20; three-quarters under 26. AMm, supra note 292, at 51-52
& tbl.8; D. MULVIHILL & M. TUMIN, supra note 275, at 212 & tbl.3.
624 HOLMSTROM & BURGESs, supra note 4, at 33. Of 23 victims aged 16 and under, only
two had contacted police on their own initiative. Id. at 31 tbl.I. Of 94 victims aged 17 or
older, only 22 had done so. Id.
625 Id. at 31-33. Another study found that of 761 rapes reported to police, the victim was
the one who contacted the police in only 23% of cases, followed by her mother or step-
mother (22.1%), hospital authorities (12.2%), and only small percentages of a long list of
other categories of reporters. MCGAHILL Er AL., supra note 52, at 83. See generally Richard
0. Hawkins, Who Called the Cops: Decisions to Report Criminal Victimization, 7 LAw & Soc. Ray.
427 (1973).
626 See infra note 940 and accompanying text. Nonpayment of the prostitute's fee is not
deemed to vitiate her consent to the sexual act, and therefore the customer is not guilty of
rape merely because of this misdeed. See generally WHArTON's, supra note 44, § 283 (con-
sent vitiated in certain instances of fraud). At common law, consent to intercourse is viti-
ated if the fraud is in the factum. DREssER, supra note 62, § 33.05(c).
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the incident, but there is no reason to assume that prostitutes are as
risk-averse as most lawyers or homemakers.
Many rape complainants ultimately decide not to cooperate with
the police and prosecutors. While there are other, highly plausible
explanations, 627 perhaps some of these women are motivated by a
dawning realization that a false report of rape is a dangerous business.
If so, their "irrationality" was only momentary.
Assuming arguendo that a false rape report is invariably extremely
irrational, and therefore not the sort of thing that most women would
do, it does not follow that nearly all reports of rape must be true. In
assessing the likelihood of false reports, the relevant population is not
women in general but rather women who file reports of rape.
Although it is true, as feminists have repeatedly stressed, that "any wo-
man can be raped,"628 it is not true that the women who claim to have
been raped are a representative sample of the female population.
629
As a class, rape complainants are, disproportionately, extremely young
girls or women, 630 who statistically tend to have distinctive behavioral
traits. For example, rape complainants seem to be, on average, more
sexually adventuresome than most women.631 They are, according to
some studies, much more likely to have a record of juvenile delin-
quency.63 2 This is not to say that rape complainants are necessarily
627 See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
628 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 8.
629 For an unsupported assertion to the contrary, see Jackson, supra note 29, at 16 (ob-
serving that "[a]ll the evidence suggests that Mr. Average rapes Ms. Average"). At least
with respect to incarcerated serial rapists, "Mr. Average" is a patently inaccurate characteri-
zation. For example, one study of 38 rapists incarcerated in 12 states found that 27 (71%)
reported "chronic" stealing and shoplifting as children or adolescents; "many" had broken
into nearby homes; 63% reported temper tantrums/hyperactivity; a like number acknowl-
edged "alcohol abuse"; 55% had assaulted adults; 54% were chronic liars; and 62% re-
ported "isolation/withdrawal." Janet I. Warren et al., Serial Rape: The Offender and His Rape
Career, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT III: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 275, 289 (Ann Wolbert
Burgess ed., 1991). Of course, much depends on how one defines "average." When a
serial killer is arrested, it is not uncommon for his neighbors to describe him as apparently
ordinary, but no reputable scholar has suggested that therefore serial killers are "Mr. Aver-
age." In saying this, we do not mean to suggest that date rapists are as psychologically
deviant as serial killers, but only that the concept of "Mr. Average" should not be taken
literally. See infra note 636.
630 The National Victim Center study found that most forcible rapes occurred in child-
hood or adolescence: a shocking 29% when the victim was less than 11 years old; another
32% between the ages of 11 and 17; 22% between 18 and 24; 7% between 25 and 29; and
only 6% when the victim was older than 29. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 3. See also
AMIR, supra note 292, at 61 (alleged victims in Philadelphia were generally "below the age
of marriage"). Another study, limited to incarcerated serial rapists, found that the victims'
average age for the rapist's first offense was 22.8 years, followed by 26.1 and 24.4 for the
second and last offenses, respectively. Warren et al., supra note 629, at 294.
631 See infra text accompanying notes 914-20.
632 AMIR, supra note 292, at 116-17. Amir found that 18.5% of Philadelphia rape com-
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less honest on average than women in general; only that one cannot
rule out that possibility. Of course, even if a statistical difference be-
tween putative rape victims and women in general were known to ex-
ist, it would not follow that most rape complainants are lying, nor that
most of them are disreputable in any way, nor even that young, pro-
miscuous, hitchhiking, substance-abusing runaways usually lie about
rape. Our point is simply that there is a logical jump between the
premise that the great majority of women would not lie about rape
and the conclusion that therefore it is implausible that, say, 15% of
those who file rape complaints are lying.633
In any event, the proportion of false rape reports cannot be de-
termined simply by deciding whether such reports are "rare." The
question is, rare compared to what? In the present context, the rele-
vant comparison is not to all rapes that occur, most of which are unre-
ported, but to true rape reports to the police. Yet, the same logic that
might lead us to suppose that false reports are rare might also lead to
the conclusion that true rape reports, at least of stranger rape, are
rare. After all, in most circumstances rape is an irrational act:63 4 for a
momentary pleasure, the rapist creates a risk that he will be interro-
gated, perhaps arrested and perhaps tried for a heinous crime. Even
if acquittal were certain, the crime, judged by the standards of a rea-
sonable man, would usually be imprudent as well as immoral. This is
most clearly true of stranger rape by a prior offender, where there is a
substantial risk of a lengthy imprisonment. 635 Yet, we would not say
that therefore most men accused of a second or third stranger rape
must be innocent.
However ordinary the personalities of men accused of acquain-
tance rape may seem to be, they too differ, as a class, from a random
sample of the male population.636 Thus, accused rapists may tend to
plainants had a record ofjuvenile delinquency.
633 See Kanin, supra note 317, at 89.
634 For a description of the "rewards" that rapists derive from their crime, see Diana
Scully & Joseph Marolla, "Riding the Bull at Gilley's': Convicted Rapists Describe the Rewards of
Rape, in RAPE & SociEry, supra note 27, at 58. In our view, these rewards do not gainsay the
irrationality of the actjudged by ordinary standards of prudence. After all, many forms of
imprudent behavior, for instance speeding, excessive drinking, and compulsive gambling
also have large psychic rewards, as do various crimes. See, e.g., NiCHOLAS PirEcoI, WIsEGuvs
19 (1985). Violent criminals tend to be remarkably fearless compared to the ordinary man.
See generally LyvEN, supra note 165.
635 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 (West Supp. 1995) (sentencing guidelines grid pro-
viding for a presumptive 98-month sentence for a prior sexual offender convicted of crimi-
nal sexual conduct in the first degree).
636 Since convicted rapists are not a representative sample of all rapists (e.g., minorities,
extremely violent rapists and stranger rapists are over-represented, see Judith Lewis Her-
man, Considering Sex Offenders: A Model of Addiction, in RAPE & Soc=rY, supra note 27, at 78),
the characteristics of the average rapist cannot be reliably determined by studying convicts.
1997] 1301
1302 BR"DEN & LENGNICK [Vol. 87
be less prudent and more violent than the normative reasonable man;
possibly a substantial minority of their accusers are also less honest
and prudent than a "reasonable woman," although of course they may
nevertheless be telling the truth about their rapes.
Although we are unpersuaded by the Argument from Rationality
as applied to the original report, that argument becomes increasingly
plausible the longer the putative victim persists in her accusation de-




Discussions of false rape accusations may seem pedantic or even
heartless to women such as counselors in rape crisis centers, who have
been raped or who have comforted rape victims. We do not doubt the
value of practical experience in judging the veracity of rape com-
plaints. But practical experience has not produced a consensus about
the danger of false rape reports. Some policemen have concluded,
after many years of investigating rape charges, that false rape reports
are very common.638 For all their biases, the police deal with every
formal rape complaint, and so their database, for an analysis of formal
rape complaints, is superior to those of rape counselors and prosecu-
tors. Rape counselors talk to some women who never report the
But several studies of reported (or self-acknowledged) rapists reveal ways in which they
differ, statistically, from men in general. One study found that rapists are more hostile
toward women than nonrapists. N.M. Malamuth et al., Characteristics of Aggressors Against
Women: Testing a Model Using a National Sample of College Students, 59 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCH. 670 (1991). Boys who commit sexual assaults are likely to belong to a peer
group that accepts all forms of interpersonal violence. SuzANNE AGETON, SEXUAL ASSAULT
AMONG ADOLESCENTS 106-12 (1983). Young men who acknowledge a completed or at-
tempted rape are more likely than other men to endorse "rape-supportive attitudes."
A Swedish study found that one-quarter of all accused rapists were unemployed, and
that "close to 70%" had an arrest record, "as opposed to an expected 10%." Snare, supra
note 234, at 198. Since rape, especially acquaintance rape, is grossly underreported, the
characteristics of accused rapists are not necessarily representative of the characteristics of
all offenders. It would not be surprising, therefore, if the proportion of unemployed men
among actual rapists were much lower than among reported rapists. See Herman, supra
note 630, at 79.
637 See supra text accompanying notes 331-37.
638 A California police manual described rape as one of the most often falsely reported
crimes, and claimed that most second-day reported rapes never happened. BROWNMILLER,
supra note 1, at 364. Holmstrom and Burgess found that some Boston police have reached
similar conclusions. HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 50. It seems likely, however,
that some police confuse the question whether a rape occurred with the question whether
the victim was contributorily negligent or provocative. For example, Adler quotes an Eng-
lish policewoman who told a rape victim that "she had been in the force for seven years,
and not once had she come across a genuine rape case. We get a lot of people who claim
to have been raped, girls who hitchhike and ask for trouble and then are surprised when
they get it.... ." ADLER, supra note 48, at 5. Police skepticism may be less common today
than it was twenty or thirty years ago, prior to the modern feminist movement. Se4 e.g.,
Jensen & Karpos, supra note 159, at 373.
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crime to the police, and do not talk to some who have reported it but
who choose not to seek help from rape counselors. Depending on
their motivations, women who have filed false rape reports may hardly
ever talk to rape counselors. Prosecutors deal only with cases that
have already been founded by the police, and where the victim has
not changed her mind about pressing charges. 63 9 It seems certain,
therefore, that police hear a substantially higher proportion of false
rape reports than do prosecutors. Although some police are unduly
suspicious of rape complaints, 640 some prosecutors and counselors
may also be biased by their roles and gender.
2. The Argument From Underreporting
Many rape victims do not report the crime.641 Although the pre-
cise incidence of rape is uncertain, scholars agree that rape is much
more common than police statistics, based on reported rapes, re-
veal.6 42 Susan Brownmiller cites this underreporting as one of her
reasons for rejecting concerns about false rape accusations.643 But
Brownmiller's argument mixes apples and oranges. To be sure, if one
were trying to estimate the number of rapes that occurred in a given
year, the frequency with which victims fail to report rapes would be an
extremely important datum. For that purpose, one supposes that un-
reported rapes would greatly outnumber falsely reported rapes. But,
when one is trying to determine, not how many rapes occur, but what
proportion of rape reports are false, the number and proportion of
unreported rapes are of little or no value. Unreported rapes and
falsely reported rapes may both be common;644 they presumably in-
volve different types of women and girls-some perhaps too fearful,
and some not fearful enough.
645
3. The Argument from Unfounding Rates
The ratio of true to false rape reports cannot be determined by
deductive logic. Can it be calculated empirically? Despite the obvious
difficulties, several scholars have attempted to estimate how often rape
reports are false. The conclusions of these studies vary radically, with
639 See supra text accompanying notes 331-37.
640 See supra text accompanying notes 236-37.
641 See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
642 See supra text accompanying notes 157-70.
643 BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 387.
644 One survey indicates that the police surgeons of Great Britain believe both that false
rape reports are common (31.4% of all reports) and that rape is vastly under-reported
(10:1 ratio of unreported to reported rapes). Robley Geis et al., Police Officer or Doctor?:
Police Surgeons'Attitudes and Opinions About Rape, in PERSPEC~rVEs, supra note 610, at 58-59.
645 Cf LvxsN, supra note 165.
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the estimated percentages of false reports ranging from 2%646 to
41%.647
The simplest way to count "false" reports is by relying on police
evaluations. Since the F.B.I. compiles police unfounding rates, bro-
ken down by crime, this solution has the apparent advantage of pro-
viding a definitive, national answer. Relying on unfounding rates,
Professor Alan Dershowitz argues that false rape reports are more
common than false reports of other crimes:
According to FBI crime statistics, 8.4 percent of all reported rapes turn
out to be "unfounded." That percentage translates into more than eight
thousand false rape reports each year. This number is dramatically
higher than the number of false reports of other serious crimes. The
comparable figures for assault, for instance, are 1.6 percent; burglary,
3.8 percent; larceny, 1.2 percent; motor-vehicle theft, 4.2 percent; mur-
der, 2.3 percent; and robbery, 3.5 percent.
648
The accuracy of Professor Dershowitz's Argument from Unfound-
ing Rates depends on the extent to which police departments make
accurate determinations of whether reported rapes actually occurred
and report to the FBI as "unfounded" only those reports that they
believe were false. In both respects, Professor Dershowitz's faith in
the FBI figures is unwarranted. For several years, the UCR figure for
unfounded rape reports has been about 8%,649 but it formerly was
15%.650 Does Professor Dershowitz believe that women have become
more truthful?
No one knows how often the police mistakenly conclude that the
alleged victim is lying. This much is clear: evaluating the truthfulness
of a rape complainant is often a difficult and highly subjective enter-
prise. Perceptions of the complainant's truthfulness seem to be influ-
enced by the investigator's gender,651 experience, 652 and attitude
toward the role of women in society.653 According to many studies,
the police tend to disbelieve rape reports by women who suffer from
646 KATZ & MAZUR, supra note 616, at 209.
647 Kanin, supra note 317, at 84-85.
648 ALAN DERSHowITz, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 275 (1994).
649 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1995 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 24 (1996); 1994 UCR, supra note 108, at 24; FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993 UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS 24 (1994); 1992 UCR, supra note 161, at 24; FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991 UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 24 (1992).
650 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1974 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 10 (1975) [hereinafter 1974 UCR].
651 See supra notes 525-28 and accompanying text.
652 See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
653 See supra note 523 and accompanying text.
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mental problems 654 or whose conduct was contributorily negligent or
violative of traditional moral standards or who are black or poor.
655
Conceivably, some or even all of these groups are indeed dispropor-
tionately likely to file false rape reports. However, since they are all
groups against which it is plausible to suppose that some detectives are
biased, the elevated unfounding rates are at least suspicious. To the
extent that improper biases lead to unfounding of truthful rape re-
ports, police statistics are inaccurate, perhaps grossly so.
Even if we were to assume that police investigators generally
make accurate appraisals of the woman's veracity, unfounding rates
often do not reflect those appraisals. Police departments employ the
term "unfounded" to cover not only reports that they believe to be
false, but also cases that they choose not to pursue for various other
reasons, 656 such as the lateness of the victim's report to the police,
lack of corroborative evidence, lack of cooperation by the victim or
some other witness, reporting in the wrong jurisdiction, the victim's
drunkenness, her drug usage, or the police perception that she is a
prostitute. 657 "[S] ome police agencies report all of their unfounded
rape cases to be due to false allegation, while other agencies report
none of their unfounded declarations to be based on false
allegation. '6
58
654 See, e.g., HOLMSrROM & BURGESS, sulra note 4, at 43; McCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52,
at 116.
655 See, e.g., HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 39 (negative police reaction to rape
complainant who went to stranger's apartment to drink beer); id. at 40 (negative reaction
to teenage girls who had considerable freedom to be out on their own late at night and
were considered promiscuous as well as drunk); id. at 41 (rapes of prostitutes not consid-
ered "real"); MCCAHiLL ET AL., supra note 52, at 112 (police often disbelieve young blacks'
allegations of gang rape); id. at 116 (police more likely to unfound if complainant is a
welfare recipient). A police officer can express sympathy for the victim's situation, listen to
her claim seriously, not make any derogatory remarks, "but still not see it as a rape case
worth pursuing through the courts." HoLMsTRoM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 41. Simi-
larly, Adler quotes an English policewoman who regards rapes of hitchhikers as not "genu-
ine" because such women are "asking for it." ADLER, supra note 48, at 5.
656 The FBI's instructions for local police, though not always perfectly clear, generally
seem to equate "unfounded" with "false." The UCR says that forcible rape complaints, like
reports of other crimes, are unfounded if the police determine that they are "false or
baseless." 1992 UCR, supra note 161, at 24. Complaints of crime that are determined
through investigation to be unfounded or false are eliminated from an agency's count. Id.
Thus, if the police believe a rape occurred, but the victim refuses to cooperate because of
fear of embarrassment, the police should found her complaint. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JusTIcE, UNIORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK 11
(1984). But when we asked an FBI official what the police should do if they believe that
the report is true, but the woman would not be a credible witness, he said that they should
unfound her report. Telephone Interview with George Dixon, Training Instructor, Uni-
form Crime Reports, Crim. Just. Info. Services Division (Jan. 27, 1995).
657 Kanin, supra note 317, at 81-82; ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 15-16.
658 Kanin, supra note 317, at 89 ("[s] ome of these [police unfounding] policies are re-
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It is unlikely that most police investigators distinguish sharply be-
tween deciding that a rape complainant is not credible, meaning that
she seems to be lying about having been raped; deciding that she is
not credible, meaning only that she would not be a good witness, for
example because she is promiscuous or "a mental case" or was "asking
for it"; and deciding that "it's her word against his" and therefore no
jury will convict.6 59 In theory, the decision about whether a case is
worth prosecuting is made by the prosecutor's office, 660 but in prac-
tice the police often unfound rape complaints by disreputable wo-
men, even when there is no additional reason for doubting their
stories. 661 In some jurisdictions, prosecutors advise police about un-
founding decisions,662 a practice that seems likely to blur even further
any distinction between what is true and what is thought to be prova-
ble beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a skeptical jury.
The UCR's rape unfounding rate has declined over the years.
663
Moreover, in any given year there are sometimes enormous differ-
ally nothing more than statistical and procedural legerdemain").
659 For a poignant example of such a case, see WIEHE & RIcHARDs, supra note 227, at 32-
33.
660 Estrich, Rape, supra note 18, at 1159 (stating that prosecutors carefully consider the
rape victim's credibility when deciding whether to charge someone with rape); Kerstetter,
supra note 255, at 282 (describing prosecutorial consideration of whether to file a felony
charge, which is based, in part, on the victim's credibility as a witness).
661 Kerstetter concluded that founding decisions in Chicago were strongly influenced by
evidentiary variables that related more to whether the crime could be proved than to
whether it occurred-for example, the presence of a witness, the perpetrator's use of a
weapon, and the complainant's willingness to prosecute. Kerstetter, supra note 255, at 267.
Of course, some of these variables do offer additional assurance that the complainant is
telling the truth, but their absence is not indicative of a false report.
662 In Philadelphia, for example, a police investigator may discuss the case with the pros-
ecutor if he or she is unsure of what the charge should be. McCAsiLL ET AL., supra note 52,
at 94.
663 In 1974, the FBI reported that 15% of rape complaints were unfounded. 1974 UCR,











Unfounded Offenses 1983-1991, In-House Table, FEDERAL BuREAu oF INVESTIGATION,
UNITED STATES DEP'T oFJusTiCE (1992). In 1992 and 1993, the unfounded rate steadied
out at an estimated 8%. See sources cited supra note 649. The discrepancy between the
7.6% figure shown at the table above for 1991, and the 8% figure at supra note 639 for
1991 is probably due to rounding by the department.
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ences in unfounding rates from one city to another. 664 The most
plausible explanation of inter-city variations is that different depart-
ments employ different founding criteria, and sometimes even differ-
ent definitions of "rape," which they periodically revise. Two recent
newspaper stories illustrate this phenomenon. One article discusses a
rather high number of unfounded rape reports in the Washington,
D.C. area.665 The article notes that in the Northern Virginia suburbs,
the city of Fairfax had the highest rate of unfounded rape reports,
apparently because Fairfax, unlike other nearbyjurisdictions, includes
cases in which the victim decides not to cooperate in prosecution.
666
Since the alleged victim's decision not to press charges may be moti-
vated by other considerations, 667 it is not a reliable measure of the
veracity of her original report.
The second article discusses an Oakland police department deci-
sion to reopen 90% of the cases that they unfounded in 1989 and
1990.668 The department stated that among their reasons for the un-
foundings were victims who were uncooperative, difficult to locate, en-
gaged in prostitution, or known to their assailants, and lack of time to
conduct proper investigations. 6
69
The lesson, in brief, is that unfounding criteria vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, and the UCR figures are not a reliable tabulation
of false rape reports. This is not to say that the UCR's unfounded rate
necessarily overstates the percentage of false rape reports. It may, but
this cannot be proved. Some police departments do not even record
the complaints that they regard as least credible, 670 creating the possi-
bility that some false reports are not tabulated at all. The point, in
other words, is that unfounding rates are untrustworthy evidence of
the proportion of false reports, not that they are necessarily too high.
664 See MCCAHILL ET AL.., supra note 52, at 108.
665 Stephen Buckley, Unfounded Reports of Rape Confound Area Police Investigators, WASH.
PosT, June 27, 1992, at B1.
666 1d
667 See supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text.
668 CandyJ. Cooper, Oakland Admits 184 Rapes Ignored, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 1, 1991, at
Al.
669 Id. Police in Berkeley, California, "take every woman's case so seriously that not one
[in 1989] was found to be false." CandyJ. Cooper, Berkeley Unit Takes All Cases as Legitimate,
S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 16, 1990, at A10. During the same year, 24.4% of Oakland's rape
cases were classified as unfounded. CandyJ. Cooper, Nowhere to Turn for Rape Victims: High
Proportion of Cases Turned Aside by Oakland Poli 4 S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 16, 1990, at Al.
670 McCAHILL ET AL, supra note 52, at 112-13, 115. In Philadelphia, the "true" rate of
police unfounding (50%) was once estimated to be far in excess of the official rate (20%).
Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been Committed-Rape in Phila-
delphia, 117 U. PA. L. Ray. 277, 279 n.8 (1968).
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4. Other Empirical Research
Undaunted by the obvious difficulty of the task, several scholars
have tried to calculate the proportions of false rape reports in various
samples. Arthur Frederick Schiff studied 100 cases of alleged rape
seen in the Dade County (Florida) Medical Examiner's Office over a
fourteen-month period. He concluded that "seven percent were defi-
nitely not rape and fifteen percent were questionable." 67
1
In a more comprehensive 1977 study,672 Geis, Wright, and Geis
obtained the opinions of 128 of the approximately 500 members of
the Association of Police Surgeons of Great Britain. "In your estima-
tion," asked the authors, "about what percentage of these claims [of
rape that you examined during the past year] were false (that is, no
crime had taken place)?" 673 Of 1361 rape reports seen by these physi-
cians, 426 (31.4%) were judged to be false.6 74 For the five female sur-
geons, however, the proportion of perceived false complaints fell to
43 out of 185 cases (23.2%).675 Agreeing almost exactly with these wo-
men, the dozen surgeons who had examined the most complainants
(655 in all) thought that 155 (23.5%) had made false charges of
rape. 676 But the three surgeons who had seen the very largest number
of cases (cumulatively 300) thought that only 12 (4%) were based on
false complaints. 677 As the authors concluded, "the wide discrepancies
in estimates suggest that in all probability something other than (or in
addition to) the realities of the situation contributed to the
answers." 678
Further evidence of the subjectivity of "false-report" figures is pro-
vided by a study done by the New York City Sex Crimes Analysis
Squad.679 This investigation covered all allegations made to the Unit
over a two-year period. They found that the rate of false allegations
for rape and sexual offenses was around 2%, which was comparable to
671 Arthur Frederick Schiff, Statistical Features of Rape, 14J. FORENSIC SCI. 102, 108 (1969).
672 The authors sent questionnaires to police surgeons attending the annual meeting of
the Association of Police Surgeons of Great Britain, obtaining 54 responses; another 74
responded to an inquiry by mail. Geis et al., supra note 644, at 57.
673 Id. at 58.
674 Id.
675 Id.
676 Id. A similar conclusion was reached in a recent Scottish study which analyzed the
outcome of 196 reported incidents of sexual assault, finding that the police had classified
22% of them as "no crime," a "very much higher" rate than for other crimes. ADLER, supra
note 48, at 5-6.
677 Geis et al., supra note 644, at 58.
678 Id. For a summary of other, equally inconclusive British studies, see ADLER, supra
note 48, at 25.
679 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY RAPE ANALYsIs SQUAD, cited in POLLY PATrULLO, JUDG-
ING WOMEN 18 (1983).
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the rate for other crimes.
Susan Brownmiller cites the New York experience as evidence
that "false" rape reports are due mostly to male bias: "When New York
City created a special Rape Analysis Squad commanded by police-
women, the female police officers found that only 2 percent of all
rape complaints were false-about the same false-report rate that is
usual for other kinds of felonies."68
0
At least for academic purposes, it might be more revealing to give
rape reports credibility ratings rather than conjectural "true" or
"false" designations. In the only example we found of this methodol-
ogy, investigators asked social workers to interview 577 women who
had reported rapes to the Philadelphia General Hospital. (Evidently
they did not interview the alleged rapists.) Twenty-four of these wo-
men admitted to the social workers that their rape reports had been
false. 68' The social workers rated the credibility of all 577 cases, on a
scale of one to four, with one and two defined as "partially incredible"
and three and four as "credible." (The lower scores signified inconsis-
tencies in the women's stories, but not necessarily that they had not
been raped.) On this basis, the social workers gave high credibility
ratings (three or four) to all but 12.7%.682
In some jurisdictions, even the police seem to believe nearly all
rape reports. Carolyn Hursch andJames Selkin studied Denver police
records for 1973. They designated rape reports as false "only if (1)
the victim finally admitted that she had originally lied about being
attacked, or (2) the police concluded from other evidence that she
had lied."683 Employing these criteria, Hursch and Selkin found that
only 2 to 3% of rape reports were false.
684
Professor Eugene Kanin reached a drastically different conclu-
sion after examining the 109 consecutive rape reports during a nine-
year period in a "small metropolitan community."68 5 He labeled a
complaint false only if the complainant later admitted to the police
that no rape occurred.68 6 In the city Kanin studied, departmental pol-
icy forbade police officers to use their discretion in deciding whether
to officially acknowledge a questionable rape complaint. 687 The re-
cantations tallied by Kanin "did not follow prolonged periods of inves-
680 BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 366.
681 MCCAHiLL ET AL., supra note 52, at 113.
682 Id.
683 KATZ & MAZJR, supra note 616, at 209.
684 See id.; HURSCH, supra note 128, at 84.
685 Kanin, supra note 317, at 81.
686 Id. at 84.
687 Id. at 83.
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tigation and interrogation" 688 and those who chose to recant were
subsequently "informed that [they would] be charged with filing a
false complaint, punishable by a substantial fine and a jail
sentence."68
9
Kanin's finding was perhaps the most striking and counter-intui-
tive in the history of rape scholarship: of 109 forcible, completed
rapes, 45 (41%) were false by his definition. 690 He found no evidence
that false rape charges were made by delusional women or for the
purpose of extortion. 69' Instead, "false rape allegations appear to
serve three major functions for the complainants: providing an alibi,
seeking revenge, and obtaining sympathy and attention."692
The false complainants were all white, and largely of lower socio-
economic background (only three had any post-secondary educa-
tion). Their mean age was twenty-two. From the sketchy information
available, Kanin could discern no difference between the characteris-
tics of this group and rape complainants who had not recanted.693
Of the forty-five charges that were recanted, 56% "served the
complainants' need to provide a plausible explanation for some sud-
denly foreseen, unfortunate consequence of a consensual encounter,
usually sexual, with a male acquaintance. ''694 Kanin provides several
examples of these "alibi" cases:
688 Id. at 85.
689 Id. Kanin discusses the possibility that the recantations were false and due to the
complainants' desire to avoid aggressive police investigations. He thinks this unlikely.
First, with very few exceptions, these complainants were suspect at the complaint or
within a day or two after charging. These recantations did not follow prolonged peri-
ods of investigation and interrogation that would constitute anything approximating a
second assault. Second, not one of the detectives believed that an incident of false
recantation had occurred. They argued, rather convincingly, that in those cases
where a suspect was identified and interrogated, the facts of the recantation
dovetailed with the suspect's own defense. Last, the policy of this police agency is to
apply a statute regarding the false reporting of a felony. After the recant, the com-
plainant is informed that she will be charged with filing a false complaint, punishable
by a substantial fine and ajail sentence. In no case, has an effort been made on the
part of the complainant to retract the recantation.
Id.
690 Id. at 84.
691 Id. at 88.
692 Id. at 85-87. Kanin stresses that his characterizations of the women's motives were
not speculative; they were based on the women's own recorded reasons for having filed
false charges. Id. at 85.
According to four experienced detectives in a sex crimes unit, the motives for false
reports of rape, in order of frequency, are: (1) to provide an alibi or excuse; (2) revenge;
(3) financial or other gain; and (4) attention and sympathy. MAcDoNAD, supra note 178,
at 87. Examples of "alibi" cases are when a married woman has an affair and contracts a
venereal disease from her lover, or when an unmarried girl or the wife of a prison inmate
becomes pregnant because of an affair. Id. at 88.
693 Kanin, supra note 317, at 84.
694 Id. at 85.
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[(1)] A divorced female, 25 years of age, whose parents have custody of
her 4-year-old child. She lost custody at the time of her divorce when
she was declared an unfit mother. She was out with a male friend and
got into a fight. He blackened her eye and cut her lip. She claimed she
was raped and beaten by him so that she could explain her injuries. She
did not want to admit she was in a drunken brawl, as this admission
would have jeopardized her upcoming custody hearing.
[(2)] A 16-year-old complainant, her girlfriend, and two male compan-
ions were having a drinking party at her home. She openly invited one
of the males, a casual friend, to have sex with her. Later in the evening,
two other male acquaintances dropped in and, in the presence of all,
her sex partner "bragged" that he had just had sex with her. She quickly
ran out to another girlfriend's house and told her she had been raped.
Soon, her mother was called and the police were notified. Two days
later, when confronted with the contradictory stories of her companions,
she admitted that she had not been raped. Her charge of rape was pri-
marily motivated by an urgent desire to defuse what surely would be pub-
lic information among her friends at school the next day, her
promiscuity.
[(3)] A 37-year-old woman reported having been raped "by some nig-
ger." She gave conflicting reports of the incident on two occasions and,
when confronted with these, she admitted that the entire story was a
fabrication. She feared her boyfriend had given her "some sexual dis-
ease," and she wanted to be sent to the hospital to "get checked out."
She wanted a respectable reason, i.e., as an innocent victim of rape, to
explain the acquisition of her infection.
695
Relying on the women's own verbalizations during recantation, as
recorded in police files, Kanin calculated that 27% of the false rape
reports were motivated by a desire for revenge against a male who had
rejected the complainant, either initially or after an affair.696 For ex-
ample, "a 16-year-old reported she was raped, and her boyfriend was
charged. She later admitted that she was 'mad at him' because he was
seeing another girl, and she 'wanted to get him into trouble.'
' 697
According to Kanin, about 18% of the false charges clearly served
the function of getting attention or sympathy for the complainant.
698
For example, "[a]n unmarried female, age 17, had been having vio-
lent quarrels with her mother who was critical of her laziness and style
of life. She reported that she was raped so that her mother would,
'get off my back and give me a little sympathy.'m699
Kanin later examined police records of all forcible rape com-
plaints during the previous three years at "two large Midwestern state
695 Id. at 86.
696 Id.





universities." At both universities "the taking of the complaint and the
follow-up investigation was the exclusive responsibility of a ranking fe-
male officer. Neither [university] employed the polygraph and
neither declared the complaint false without a recantation of the
charge. '700 Of sixty-four forcible rape complaints in the two universi-
ties, exactly half had been recanted.
7 0 '
Regrettably, Kanin's tabulations did not distinguish between ac-
quaintance rapes and stranger rapes. 70 2 Is there a more basic flaw in
his research design? It seems unlikely that he happened to study
three exceedingly atypical jurisdictions, and he assures the reader that
the city he studied was not distinctive in any obvious way such as being
a resort town.70 3 Why, then, have other scholars failed to uncover sim-
ilar recantation rates in other jurisdictions? Professor Kanin's expla-
nation is that the chief of police in the city he studied insisted that
every rape report, however implausible, be thoroughly investigated, a
practice that was feasible because of the low crime rate in that city.
70 4
In other cities, busy police sometimes do not even record the most
obviously false rape reports.
70 5
One possibility is that the women who retracted their accusations
in the jurisdictions Kanin studied are largely the same women who are
described in other studies as simply unwilling to press charges. Other
scholars have found that a sizeable proportion of those who report
rapes are highly ambivalent about whether to press charges; 70 6 many
of them ultimately decide not to do so. 70 7 Perhaps many of these wo-
men and girls had filed false reports; their subsequent unwillingness
to cooperate with the prosecution may have been motivated by fear of
exposure as a perjurer, or by a feeling at some point that the false
accusation had achieved its purpose without a trial. This hypothesis
does not explain why, in the jurisdictions that Kanin studied, the wo-
men who had filed false reports chose to recant rather than offering
less embarrassing explanations for their decisions not to press
charges.
700 Id. at 90.
701 Id. According to the women's recantations, 53% were motivated by the need for an
alibi after consensual sex had led to unanticipated problems, 44% were for revenge, and
only one was due to a need for attention or sympathy. Id.
702 The "revenge" cases must have involved acquaintances, but we suppose that in most
of the other types of cases those who filed false reports found it more expedient to claim
that they had been raped by a stranger. See supra note 692.
703 Id. at 83.
704 Id.
705 See Geis et al., supra note 644, at 58-59.
706 In one study, 38% of the putative victims refused to cooperate with the authorities at
some stage. See Hursch, supra note 128, at 110-14.
707 See supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the recantations rather than the original accusations
were false. Although Kanin was not present during the interrogations,
he effectively rebuts the possibility that recantations were signed by
women trying to escape overbearing police.708 However, he does not
consider the possibility that the police said or implied that without a
recantation the case would proceed to trial irrespective of the wo-
man's wishes to the contrary.70 9 That sort of police policy might well
generate a spate of false recantations, motivated by a desire to with-
draw the complaint for some reason other than its falsity. At the same
time, such a policy would presumably eliminate the phenomenon of
investigations terminated because of the victim's failure to cooperate.
The bnly conclusion that safely can be drawn from these studies is
that false rape complaints may be much more common than most re-
cent rape scholars have supposed. If Kanin's findings are replicated
by other researchers, 710 the skepticism of police and prosecutors to-
ward some rape complaints may appear to be based on a wise ap-
praisal of the facts rather than an improper bias against certain types
of victims. But, it would not follow that innocent men are being con-
victed of rape, nor that many acquittals in rape trials are justifiable.
All that Kanin found was that many false reports of rape are made and
later retracted. As Kanin acknowledges, this claim does not entail the
quite different claim that many false reports are made, never re-
tracted, and believed by police, prosecutors, and juries. We do not
know, for example, what proportion of the rape complaints that were
retracted in Kanin's study would have been founded by the police if
they had not been retracted. In some of Kanin's false-charge cases,
708 See supra note 689.
709 Kanin, supra note 317, at 83.
[A]gency policy forbids police officers to use their discretion in deciding whether to
officially acknowledge a rape complaint, regardless how suspect that complaint may
be. Second, the declaration of a false allegation follows a highly institutionalized pro-
cedure. The investigation of all rape complaints always involves a serious offer to poly-
graph the complainants and the suspects. Additionally, for a declaration of false
charge to be made, the complainant must admit that no rape had occurred. She is the
sole agent who can say that the rape charge is false. The police department will not
declare a rape charge as false when the complainant, for whatever reason, fails to
pursue the charge or cooperate on the case, regardless how much doubt the police
may have regarding the validity of the charge. In short, these cases are declared false
only because the complainant admitted they are false.
Id.
In response to our questions, Kanin assured us that the police in the jurisdictions
studied would dismiss a case whenever the woman, for whatever reason, asked them to do
so. Telephone Interview with Eugene Kanin (Feb. 15, 1996).
710 Kanin suggests that the major difference between the city he studied and cities stud-
ied by other scholars may be that "his" police conducted unusually thorough investiga-
tions. Kanin, supra note 317, at 90. Cf WIEHE & RIcHARDs, supra note 227, at 37 (stating
that "police experience suggests that a face-saving way of recanting a complaint is to decide
not to pursue it").
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the woman claimed that she had been raped by a stranger, whom she
never identified. 711 Obviously, such cases would not have led to a
prosecution. In the remaining cases, Kanin reports: "These women
were not inclined to put up a steadfast defense of their victimization,
let alone pursue it into the courtroom. Recantation overwhelmingly
came early and relatively easily. '7
12
One supposes that the purposes of false rape accusations can usu-
ally be achieved without the trouble and risk of accusing an acquain-
tance and testifying in court. For example, if the putative victim is a
girl who craves attention and sympathy from her parents, she presum-
ably need only persuade them that a stranger raped her. Similarly, if
she needs an excuse for venereal disease or pregnancy, an imaginary
attack by an unidentified stranger suffices. Even if her motive is re-
venge, she may feel satisfied after the male has been embarrassed,
grilled by the police, and perhaps forced to retain counsel.
Considering the high pre-trial case attrition rate, 713 the skepti-
cism of some police toward acquaintance rape accusations, 7 14 the
large numbers of women who eventually decide not to cooperate with
the prosecution, 71 5 the reluctance of prosecutors to take on weak
cases,71 6 and the historic reluctance ofjurors to convict men charged
with acquaintance rape,717 mistaken convictions may well be less likely
in acquaintance rape cases than in, for example, stranger rapes and
other cases based on eyewitness identifications.718
Nevertheless, it is important to find out whether Kanin's findings
can be replicated. A false accusation of rape is an injustice, even if
later withdrawn. While there are many reasons, including Kanin's
study, for concluding that few false report cases will be pursued to trial
and conviction, the pressures on a rape complainant are not all in the
direction of abandoning the case; having made the accusation, she
sometimes comes under pressure from police and others to assist in
711 In cases of false reports motivated by a desire for attention and sympathy "no one was
identified as the rapist." Kanin, supra note 317, at 87. This was also true in at least some of
the "alibi" cases. Id. at 85-86.
712 Id. at 88.
713 See supra text at notes 107-10.
714 See supra text accompanying notes 236-37.
715 See supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text.
716 See supra text accompanying notes 349-60.
717 See supra text accompanying notes 398-420.
718 See generally JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICANJuRY 259 (1987)
(stating that general conclusion of researchers to be that "eyewitness testimony is relatively
unreliable"). Eyewitness testimony increases conviction rates, but jurors appear to do a
poorjob of distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses, relying largely on
the self-confidence of the witness, an attribute that has been found to be irrelevant to
accuracy. Id, at 259-60.
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the prosecution.71 9 If the rate of false accusations is found to be high,
this will inevitably color one's judgments about uncorroborated accu-
sations. Indeed, if the rate of false accusations is even half as high as
Kanin found, the literature about official discrimination against rape
complaints will need some major revisions.
C. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Rape scholars commonly ignore the burden of proof, treating
bias against victims as the major cause of attrition in rape cases.720
Beyond question, bias is a serious problem, but to focus exclusively on
bias is misleading, because many acquaintance rapes present difficult
proof problems that help to explain the high attrition rate.
Consider, for example, a fairly realistic hypothetical case. Sally
and Ted were college students on a date. After watching a movie, they
went to his room for a drink and conversation. Sally says that when
she resisted his advances, Ted raped her. He claims that he seduced
her with professions of love but then told her that he did not want to
be "tied down" to one woman, "and so we'd better not date anymore."
Sally became angry and got revenge, Ted's lawyer suggests, by telling
the police that he had raped her. She had a scratch on her left fore-
arm but no other physical injury.721 She filed her rape report
promptly, or, if you prefer, she did not.7 22 Both parties sound sincere
and tell stories that are internally consistent and consistent with the
physical evidence.
On this evidence, ajury may choose to believe Sally rather than
Ted, or vice-versa.7 23 In that, sense, the prosecution has carried its
719 See, e.g., HOLmsTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 49.
720 See, e.g., Henderson, supra, note 105, at 41 (describing acquittals in recent rape cases
as evidence that men are not being held "responsible for raping women," with no discus-
sion of burden of proof). In stranger rape cases the normal defense is misidentification
and the prosecution's proof problems are mitigated by the well-documented tendency of
jurors to overrate the probative value of eyewitness identifications, an advantage that does
not apply when the parties are acquainted and the standard defense is consent rather than
misidentification. See generally Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at 576-78.
721 See infra notes 766-69 and accompanying text. Psychological damage is more com-
mon among rape victims than physical injuries. Compared to women in general, rape
victims are more likely to have Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or a major depression, or to
have considered suicide. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 7.
722 The National Victim Center's survey of rape victims found that, of those who had
reported the crime to the police, 25% did so more than 24 hours after the crime. RAPE IN
AMERICA, supra note 56, at 5.
723 Legally, corroboration is no longer required for rape prosecutions; in practice, how-
ever, juries usually seek corroborative evidence when assessing a complainant's credibility.
See supra notes 580-84 and accompanying text. See generally J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE




burden of proof. But to appraise the jury's behavior, one needs to
ask, not merely what the jury was legally entitled to do, but what it
should have done. (After all, the jury is also legally entitled to acquit.)
In our hypothetical case, with proof problems that are presumably typ-
ical of many acquaintance rapes, what should the jury do?
Certainly one can make a powerful argument for acquittal. In
the first place, there should be no criticism of "victim blaming" until
the legal standard of proof has been met. To rebuke those who
"blame the victim" is to assume the very point at issue in a consent-
defense case: that a rape rather than a seduction occurred. We do
not doubt the defendant's factual guilt in the great majority of crimi-
nal cases, including rape. But of course, the presumption of inno-
cence requires the jury to focus, not on whether Ted is probably guilty
in fact, but on whether the prosecution has proved his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. To the extent that the difficulty of convicting ac-
quaintance rapists is due to genuinely reasonable doubts about de-
fendants' guilt, case attrition is not evidence of a malfunctioning
criminal justice system. Quite the contrary, under such circumstances
the rapist's escape from justice, while deplorable in a sense, is evi-
dence that the system is functioning exactly as it should.
Despite the centrality of proof problems, the most influential
modern book about rape law, Estrich's Real Rape, alludes to the bur-
den of proof only in passing, and never intimates that it might be
responsible for much of the difficulty of punishing acquaintance
rape.7 24 Given Estrich's reformist agenda, we do not criticize her for
confining her discussion to rules that she thought needed to be re-
formed. But, the inevitable effect of focusing on questionable rules of
law is to imply that the main obstacles to rape convictions are egre-
gious judicial doctrines and the cultural attitudes that the doctrines
express. The reader is led to understand that the problem is solvable,
if not by changing rules of law then by changing the attitudes that law-
interpreters bring to their task. Nothing so intractable and sacrosanct
as the burden of proof stands in the way.
Estrich's failure to deal with the burden of proof is typical of
modem rape scholars. For example, some authors complain that, as
one book puts it, "[t]he victim is placed in the precarious position of
having to prove that her reaction [to the rapist's advances] was suffi-
cient to establish nonconsent. ' ' 725 That sounds unfair. Why should
724 ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 42-56.
725 RITA GUNN & CANDICE MINCH, SEXUAL ASSAULT: THE DILEMMA OF DISCLOSURE, THE
QuEsrIoN OF CONVICrION 29 (1988). "By virtue of the relationship of the perpetrator and
victim, the burden of proof appears to shift toward the victim." WIEHE & RicHARDs, supra
note 227, at 95. A Swedish scholar has expressed the same complaint: "[T]he rape victim is
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the victim have to prove anything? The answer, of course, is that the
law presumes that she is not a victim, unless and until the jury finds
the defendant guilty. Because Sally is the prosecution's leading wit-
ness, and the prosecution has a heavy burden of proof, "she" quite
properly "has to prove" beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
raped her. So let us rephrase the scholars' complaint: "In rape, the
prosecution must prove the essential elements of the crime, including
the alleged victim's nonconsent, beyond a reasonable doubt, relying
chiefly, especially in the absence of strong corroborative evidence, on
credible testimony by the alleged victim." As thus rephrased, the
proposition is unremarkable and connotes no unfairness. Yet the es-
sential practical difficulty remains: the burden of proving nonconsent
is on the government and therefore, in a loose sense, on the govern-
ment's leading witness.
Since suspicion of acquaintance rape complaints is observable
even outside the criminal process, and sometimes is carried to outra-
geous extremes, it seems clear that improper biases do hamper some
rape prosecutions. Our point is that the two elements, legitimate bur-
den of proof concerns and excessive suspicion, are often hard to dis-
entangle. Indeed, both elements tend to peak in the same sorts of
cases: acquaintance rapes with little or no corroborative evidence, and
a woman whose behavior was at least slightly suggestive of consent.
Arguably, police and even prosecutors should pay less attention than
they often do to a jury's likely verdict, and thus to the burden of
proof. But one's evaluation of these officials is likely to be more chari-
table if many or even most of the cases that they decline to pursue are
ones in which a jury neither would nor should return a verdict of
guilty.
It is obviously impossible to determine precisely what proportion
of the men who commit rape could be proven guilty beyond a genu-
inely reasonable doubt. That the prosecutor's burden is a serious ob-
stacle, however, seems clear. Even without an instruction on the
burden of proof, most jurors would surely vote to acquit in cases in
which they felt some doubt about the defendant's guilt. Until rela-
tively recently, rape was a capital offense in some jurisdictions,726 and
it still carries an enormous stigma and a relatively severe maximum
actually placed on trial with the burden of proving her innocence." Snare, supra note 234,
at 206-07. See also HoLMsTrom & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 157 ("victim is as much on trial
as the defendant").
726 In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Supreme Court declared that the death
penalty is an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence for a rape conviction. At the
time of this decision, Georgia was the only state to authorize the death penalty for rapes,
but several years earlier 16 states imposed capital punishment in rape cases. Id. at 594-96.
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penalty.727 The reluctance ofjurors to convict a man of such a serious
crime on the basis of the largely uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness is at least somewhat understandable, and does not necessarily
signify discrimination against women.
To be sure, even in a simple dating situation, there may be a great
deal of additional evidence. But as the televised William Kennedy-
Smith case illustrates, the reasonableness of doubts may still be debat-
able. The alleged victim met Smith in a bar in Palm Beach, Florida.
728
She later drove him to the house where he was staying with several
members of the Kennedy family.7 29 They went for a late-night walk
along the beach.730 She testified that he suddenly disrobed, went for
a swim, and as she tried to depart he tackled her and raped her.7 3 1
He testified that the sexual encounter was consensual, and continued
until, by a slip of the tongue, he called her "Cathy," which was not her
name. 73
2
Smith's accuser claimed she was raped on the lawn in front of the
Kennedy house, and that she yelled while being attacked.733 Stephen
Barry, a Manhattan prosecutor and friend of the Kennedy family, was
staying in a bedroom of that house with his wife on the night of the
alleged rape.7 3 4 He testified that from the bedroom he had often
overheard conversations of people sitting on a bench near the area
where the alleged rape occurred.735 Yet on the night in question he
heard no screams nor sounds of any struggle.736 Senator Edward Ken-
nedy echoed this testimony. He testified to hearing no screams, even
though his bedroom windows were open.
737
Jean Smith, the defendant's mother, was also in the house on the
727 For example, under Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines, first degree criminal sexual
conduct is assigned a severity level of eight on a scale of 10. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 41 (1993). The
maximum sentencing range for first degree criminal sexual conduct under the guidelines
is 153-183 months, surpassed only by the ranges for murder (up to 246 months for third
degree or felony murder, up to 433 months for second degree, and mandatory life sen-
tence for first degree). The maximum sentencing range for manslaughter does not sur-
pass the range for first degree criminal sexual conduct. Id.
728 Timothy Clifford, Smith on Stand: I Got Picked Up. Says Sex Consensual; Calls Accuser a






734 Paul Richter, Heard No Noises, Smith Case Witness Says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at A20.
735 Id.
736 Id.




night of the alleged rape.738 She testified to hearing nothing. 739 The
defense added to the impact of this testimony by calling a Miami me-
teorologist to the stand.740 He said that on the night of the rape,
there was little wind.741 His testimony suggested that if the woman
had been raped where she said she was, someone would have heard
her.742
Perhaps the most controversial of the defense witnesses was
Raphael Good, a professor at the University of Miami. 743 Smith's ac-
cuser alleged that Smith's penis was only partially erect during the
rape, and that she struggled to prevent him from penetrating her.
744
Good testified that under such circumstances, penetration would be
highly unlikely.745 Yet Smith's semen was found inside his accuser. 746
This suggested that penetration did occur, and that perhaps it was
consensual, as Smith claimed.
As further evidence that the encounter was consensual, the de-
fense introduced the woman's undamaged clothing. After the trial,
one juror pointed to this evidence as a reason for the acquittal. 747 To
explain why the clothing was not ripped, the prosecution called a
forensics expert in the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department. 748
She testified that clothing is damaged in only about 10% of rape
cases.749
Because Smith claimed that he and the woman were intimate on
the beach, much of the trial concerned the evidence of sand found in
the woman's underwear. The head of Michigan State University's fo-
rensic science programs testified that the inorganic material "could
not have come from the lawn, but could have come from the
beach." 750 An FBI authority on sand and soil countered by noting
that sand "can go wherever wind, water and people move it, including
the oceanfront lawn."751
738 Shirley E. Perlman, Experts on Sex, Sand, Sky, NEWSDAY, Dec. 10, 1991, at 3.
739 Id.
740 Mary Jordan, Smith Expected to Testify Today; Queries on Other Women Unlikely, WASH.






746 Pernman, supra note 738.
747 Mary Jordan, Smith's Lawyer Credits Kennedy's 'Charisma. Prosecution's Use of Senator
Called a Mistake, WASH. PosT, Dec. 13, 1991, at A3.
748 Tye, supra note 737.
749 Id.
750 Richter, supra note 734.
751 Tye, supra note 737.
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Because the woman claimed that Smith attacked her on the lawn,
grass was also a major issue. A botanist testified that "tiny traces of a
plant like material did turn up on the woman's clothing."752 How-
ever, the defense's botanist testified that fragments of grass could have
easily blown onto the beach.7 53 Also for the defense, the director of
the Connecticut State Police crime laboratory testified that had Smith
actually thrown the woman to the lawn, trace material would have re-
mained on her outer clothing, not just inside her panties.
75 4
Smith's attorney emphasized a number of alleged gaps and in-
consistencies in the putative victim's account of the rape. For exam-
ple, she told police that she thought they had kissed after Smith
emerged nude from his ocean swim; in court, she testified that the
kiss occurred before he went swimming.755 She was unable to recall
whether Smith had any clothes on after he went for his swim, when he
chased her.
75 6
The prosecution had one important piece of uncontroverted
physical evidence. The alleged victim's panties were covered with
Smith's semen, though Smith claimed she removed them before the
encounter.
757
When one considers the evidence at trial plus inadmissible evi-
dence of three prior sexual attacks by Smith, 758 it seems probable that
he did rape the complainant. Even without the evidence of prior sex-
ual assaults by Smith, we believe that his guilt was established by a
preponderance of the evidence. But we are not at all sure that the
jury should have convicted him under the reasonable doubt standard.
At best, the prosecution's case was exceedingly close to the reasonable
doubt borderline. Yet the major law review article on the case, by Pro-
fessor Estrich, does not even discuss the burden of proof. To Estrich,
the verdict reveals "how far we have yet to go," "how difficult it still is
for a woman to be believed," and that the public "presumes" that vic-
752 Id.
753 Perlman, supra note 738.
754 Richter, supra note 734.
755 MaryJordan, Smith Defense Hammers at His Accuser's Account, WASH. PosT, Dec. 6, 1991,
at Al.
756 Ken Ringle, Trial Diary: The Women Behind the Mask, WASH. Posr, Dec. 6, 1991, at DI.
757 Clifford, supra note 728.
758 Two of the women reported that Smith suddenly became aggressive, pinned them
down, and pawed them, but that they were able to repulse him. A third woman reported
that after she became intoxicated at a party that she and Smith attended, they returned to
Smith's apartment where he made unwelcome sexual advances and, although she tried to
fight him off, he forced her to have intercourse with him. Larry Tye et al., Alleged Assaults
by Smith Described: Accounts By 3 Women Are Similar To Charges In Palm Beach Rape Case, Bos-
TON GLOBE, July 24, 1991, at 8.
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tims of date rape are lying.759
One traditional way to deal with swearing contests in rape cases
was the much-criticized corroboration requirement. Similar require-
ments have been imposed in a few other circumstances. For example,
in some states a conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses
cannot rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.760
Many states do not allow criminal convictions on the uncorroborated
testimony of alleged accomplices.
761
In general, however, a crime victim's testimony need not be cor-
roborated,762 and most of the handful of exceptions seem to reflect
distrust of certain types of allegations-for example, hearsay state-
ments by alleged victims of child abuse763-rather than a general prin-
ciple of proof. Unless false rape accusations are extraordinarily
common, abolition of the corroboration requirement was justifiable.
To break the evidentiary stalemate in a swearing contest, one nat-
urally focuses on the relative credibility of the parties. The accused
has a motive to lie. Does the accuser? If the defendant offers no plau-
sible theory as to why he has been falsely accused, then the prosecu-
tion may well prevail. That is what happens when, for example, a
store clerk identifies the defendant as the one who robbed him. (In
fact, misidentification is often a plausible defense, but juries are noto-
riously inclined to overrate eyewitness testimony.) 764 Unfortunately,
the acquaintance rapist often can concoct a fairly plausible story of a
seduction followed by a false accusation. By its nature, the crime oc-
curs in private. Kalven and Zeisel found that eyewitnesses other than
759 Estrich, Palm Beach StorNs, supra note 28, at 10-12. Estrich never flatly states that in
her judgment the jury should or should not have acquitted the defendant. At times, she
implies that the evidence left reasonable grounds for doubt: "I'm not sure any of us knows
for sure what really happened at the Kennedy compound...." M at 9. "Even if the jury
was right to acquit, they were certainly wrong to do it because she could not remember
exactly who said what and when." Id. at 30. But for the most part she stresses that'the
moral of the case is that the public has yet to decide that "date rapists deserve to be pun-
ished." Id. at 9. Absent evidence of a defendant's other rapes, prosecutors face "the over-
whelming reluctance of jurors, or the public for that matter, to believe a woman when
others do not come forward to support her." Id. at 26. Thejury may have held Bowman to
a "higher standard" of testimonial consistency than victims of other crimes. Id. at 29. She
closes by asserting, once again, that "the question" is whether we are ready to punish date
rapists rather than merely deploring the crime in the abstract. Id. at 32-33.
760 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 532 (West 1996); IDAHO CODE §19-2116 (1995); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 175.261 (Michie 1995).
761 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
762 The general rule is that the testimony of a single witness is a legally sufficient basis
for a verdict of guilty. 7J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2034, at 259 (3d ed. 1940).
763 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-34 (1995); CAL. EVID. CODE § 136 (West 1996); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803 (West 1996); MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02 (West 1996).
764 See infra note 119.
1997] 1321
BRYDEN & LENGNICK
the victim testified in only 4% of rape trials, much less frequently than
in cases of homicide (44%) or burglary (20%).765 (For acquaintance
rape, the figure might have been even lower than 4%.)
Some studies indicate that the level of violence and injury in ac-
quaintance rapes tends to be greater than in stranger rapes.766 How-
ever, other studies find violence more common in stranger rapes.
767
In any event, most rape victims are not physically injured,768 and mi-
nor injuries such as bruises and scratches usually can be explained
away as due to drunken stumbling, rough (but consensual) sex,
sports, or accidents. 769
In the kinds of acquaintance rape cases in which convictions are
most difficult to obtain, the consensual sex scenario offered by the
defense usually is not inherently implausible. In such cases the parties
are of a similar age, and the woman is obviously sexually active-some-
times even a prostitute. Voluntary sex, unlike, say, large gifts of
money to strangers on the street, is a common activity. Proof that
intercourse occurred does not help to rebut a consent defense. Since
ex-lovers frequently become bitter enemies, and people often wish to
conceal nonmarital, consensual sex, the defendant often can easily in-
vent a grievance or other motive for his usually very youthful accuser
to lie. In the absence of powerful corroborative evidence, it is his
word against hers, and to a respectable citizen sometimes both parties
look unsavory.
To make matters worse, rape complainants sometimes give in-
765 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 142 tbl.40. A study of rapes in the District of
Columbia found that witnesses were present in 9% of the cases. KATz & MAZUR, supra note
616, at 198-99.
766 Snare, supra note 234, at 197. Another study found that at least half of the victims of
acquaintance rape reported receiving bruises, cuts, or black eyes, while 7% received inter-
nal injuries or were knocked unconscious, and 40% reported requiring medical attention.
JOANNE BELKNAP, supra note 174, at 212. One reason this finding is counterintuitive is that
the reader may unconsciously think of an "acquaintance" as a college boy on a date, forget-
ting that the rapist may instead be a violent lover. According to a Justice Department
survey injuries are almost twice as likely to occur if the attacker was a husband or boyfriend
rather than a stranger. Most Women Knew Their Attackers, NEWSDAY, Jan. 31, 1994, at 17.
Stranger rapes might be less violent on average because the stranger's threat, for example
with a knife, induces a terrified compliance, while the acquaintance relies more often on
actual rather than threatened force.
767 Joan M. McDermott, Rape Victimization in 26 American Cities (1979), cited in Eleanor R.
Hall & PatriciaJ. Flannery, Prevalence and Correlates of Sexual Assault Experiences in Adolescents,
9 VICTIMOLocy 398, 404 (1985). McDermott found that nonstranger rapes were "less likely
to involve a weapon," and "less likely to involve physical injury aside from the rape."
768 In a national survey, 70% of the rape victims reported no physical injuries, 24%
reported minor injuries, and only 4% said that they had suffered serious physical injuries.
RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 4.
769 Ironically, women's increasing participation in traditionally "male" activities, such as
sports, make such explanations often plausible.
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consistent testimony or lie about some of the circumstances of the
date, for example in order to hide embarrassing conduct (drugs, "pro-
vocative" behavior, infidelity, etc.), seriously undermining their credi-
bility on the consent issue.
770
Most lawyers seem to believe thatjuries can resolve swearing con-
tests by considering the demeanor of the defendant and his accuser.
A mass of social-scientific evidence suggests that this is a myth: people
generally cannot determine whether someone is lying by observing his
or her demeanor.
771
Thus, the evidence in an acquaintance rape case will often be
inconclusive. If both the defendant and his accuser offer plausible
accounts of what transpired, one might say that, while legally free to
decide either way, the jury ought to conclude that the prosecution has
not met its heavy burden of proof.
Rape is not the only crime that is difficult to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt without corroborative evidence. In several other types
of cases that are at least arguably analogous to typical acquaintance
rapes, most civil libertarians would surely favor acquittal. For exam-
ple, what if Sally had accused Ted of soliciting the crime of theft? Ac-
cording to her story, they went to her room for a drink after a movie.
During conversation about teachers, they discovered that they both
knew Professor Dixby. Sally was Dixby's research assistant; Ted was
enrolled in one of Dixby's courses. After a few drinks, Ted offered to
pay her $500 for a copy of the forthcoming exam in the course, which
he suggested that she could find in Dixby's office some evening. She
refused, and promptly reported the incident to the police.
Ted told a different story. In his version, Sally had made sexual
advances to him, which he had rudely turned aside, making some tac-
tless comments about her homeliness. Incensed, she had ordered
him to leave, and the next day he found himself charged with solicit-
ing theft.
As in the Sally-Ted rape hypothetical, ajury would be legally enti-
tled to believe Sally and disbelieve Ted. But we think that in the ab-
sence of corroborative evidence most juries should and would acquit.
Consider, for another example, what would probably take place
if, instead of prosecuting Ted for rape, the government prosecuted
Sally for filing a false report. In that event, the evidentiary shoe would
770 See FAIRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 213-16. "In Michigan a prosecutor opined that the
incident usually starts consensually and ends forcibly. In cases like these, he continued,
the victim may be likely to falsify certain aspects of the crime or events which preceded the
assault in order to strengthen her case." MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 94-95 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
771 See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. R v. 1075, 1104-05 (1991).
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be on the other foot and the jury probably would acquit her. In that
kind of case, the man would be the accuser; usually his character
would come under vigorous attack by the defense, and in most cases it
would be fairly easy to raise a reasonable doubt about his credibility. 772
To obtain firsthand accounts of similar proof problems, we inter-
viewed several veteran criminal lawyers in the Twin Cities (Minne-
sota). Each was asked to, "Name some crimes where it is difficult to
obtain a conviction because the only strong evidence is the victim's
testimony, thus reducing the trial to a swearing contest." The lawyers
were then asked to recall the usual outcome of such cases in their own
experiences.
All the lawyers named nonsexual assault as a crime where swear-
ing contests often occur. One defense attorney observed that such
cases, "generally involve a race to the courthouse where whoever wins
is the 'victim." 773 He noted that in his experience the prosecutor's
burden of proving the elements of nonsexual assault beyond a reason-
able doubt creates a strong advantage for defendants.774 The same
attorney explains that, "without statements indicating premeditation,
the constitutional burden of proof makes it nearly impossible for the
prosecutor to prevail. '775
A prosecutor agreed:
We have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and this tips the
scales in favor of the defendant. As prosecutors, we try to counteract this
by turning the trial into a credibility game, and asking the jury to simply
find for who they believe. If we didn't, it would be hard to get a convic-
tion in assault cases."776
A public defender concurs that defendants can often raise a reason-
able doubt in a nonsexual assault case, by attacking the character of
the alleged victim.
7 77
Such comments are impressive in light of a study finding that
prosecutors enjoy certain advantages in nonsexual assault cases, as
772 Two experienced criminal lawyers had never heard of such a prosecution and con-
sidered it nearly impossible to prove the woman's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Inter-
view with Julius Nolan, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct.
3, 1995). Interview with Stephen Simon, Director of the Misdemeanor Prosecution and
Defense Clinics at the University of Minnesota Law School, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 5,
1995).
773 Interview with Professor Stephen Simon, Director of the Misdemeanor Prosecution
and Defense Clinics at the University of Minnesota Law School (Nov. 10, 1994).
774 ld.
775 ld.
776 Telephone Interview with E. George Widseth, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney
(Nov. 14, 1994).




compared to rape cases: witnesses are more often available; victims
tend to be older; and the assailants are more often strangers whom
the victims had resisted and who had inflicted physical injuries.778
Recalling several cases in which he defended women charged
with prostitution, another attorney notes that, in his experience, the
female defendant usually prevails despite the testimony of a male un-
dercover officer, in the absence of physical evidence to support his
claim that the woman offered sex for money.779 If bias against women
who have violated traditional morality were overriding all other fac-
tors, the contrary should be true: juries should tend to rule against
women charged with prostitution, most of whom are obviously prosti-
tutes, or at least "loose women," even if not guilty on the occasion in
question. That jurors often acquit such women suggests that at least
in some contexts the burden of proof is more decisive than the wo-
man's respectability.
An experienced prosecutor claims that even in child sexual abuse
cases, where the victim is most sympathetic, convictions are difficult to
obtain. 780 "Without physical evidence, a past history of abuse [by the
accused], or some other type of corroborative evidence, often the al-
leged perpetrator won't even be charged because we can't realistically
prove the case. The child's claim that he was fondled simply isn't
enough."781
If the presumption of innocence protects suspects who are
charged with sexual abuse against children, where the child's past sex-
ual history is not an issue, it may also protect suspects charged with
rape, even when a rape shield law makes the complainant's past sexual
history inadmissible. Certainly, it presents an alternative explanation
to claims of systemic bias against rape victims. To be sure, the alleged
victims of forcible rape are usually adults or at least teenagers, less
suggestible and possessing much better memories than small chil-
dren. Yet in some cases they may also seem more likely to have a
motive to lie, even if in fact they are telling the truth.
In assessing the legitimate role of the burden of proof, much de-
pends on how one phrases the question. If the question is why ac-
quaintance rapes are not punished more often, the burden of proof is
an important part of the answer. Even Estrich stresses the difficulty of
corroborating the testimony of an alleged victim of acquaintance
rape. In Estrich's view, this difficulty justified abandoning the corrob-
778 BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 102-03.
779 Simon interview, supra note 773.




oration requirement.78 2 But it is also a reason why, even without a
corroboration requirement, not all rapists can be punished-a reality
that legal scholars seem loath to acknowledge.
If we focus instead on the cases that survive screening by police
and prosecutors, the role of the burden of proof is presumably less
great. As Estrich notes, pure swearing contests rarely get to court.
7 83
The weakest rape cases are either unreported, unfounded, or dis-
missed by prosecutors who insist on corroborative evidence, even
though it is not legally required, in order to improve the chances of
obtaining a conviction.7
8 4
With powerful reasons to fear the investigation and the trial, and
many opportunities to change their minds, few women are likely to
persist in a false accusation of rape all the way through the criminal
process. In this important respect, swearing contests in rape cases are
not precisely analogous to, say, a dispute between a policeman and a
prostitute or between two men with conflicting stories about who
started a fight. The lying woman has more to fear (and perhaps less
to gain?), especially in the kind of case where her character is most
vulnerable to attack. For these reasons, the prosecutor's burden of
proof, though significant at both stages, is more cogent as an explana-
tion of case attrition prior to trial than as ajustification of acquittals at
trial.
How often is the corroborative evidence introduced in a simple
rape trial strong enough to remove all truly reasonable doubts about
the defendant's guilt? The best way to obtain an informed, disinter-
ested answer to this question is by comparing jury verdicts with the
conclusions of the trial judges who heard the same evidence. Kalven
and Zeisel's study of judge-jury disagreement found that juries were
more lenient than trial judges in almost 50% of nonaggravated ac-
quaintance rape cases. 785 Of course, trial judges are fallible. Perhaps
the judges were mistaken and the juries were right to acquit in these
cases. But we believe that that possibility is remote. Although most
782 See ESTRiCH, supra note 1, at 21-22.
783 Id. at 56.
784 "Both analogue and clinical studies indicate that greater force and injury were associ-
ated with higher probability of reporting to police." Steketee & Austin, supra note 174, at
288. "[Flactors that make a strong case for prosecution are more powerful predictors of
reporting rape than of reporting assault." Lizotte, supra, note 138, at 185. Cf Arnold S.
Kahn et al., Rape Scripts and Rape Acknowledgment, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 53 (1994) (unac-
knowledged rape victims tend to have been raped in a less forceful manner than acknowl-
edged victims). See also Kerstetter, supra note 255 (police try to dissuade "weak case"
victims from pressing charges).
785 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 253-54.
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observers believe thatjudges are on average less lenient than juries, 78 6
the trial judges of that period were almost all men. Both common
sense and social scientific research indicate that men tend to be rela-
tively suspicious toward acquaintance rape accusations.787 Indeed, the
rape literature is peppered with anecdotes about male judges who
were crudely biased in favor of acquaintance rape defendants.
788
Kalven and Zeisel's study was conducted prior to the anti-rape cam-
paign of the women's movement, in an era when men were less afraid
to blame rape victims. 7 89 One supposes, therefore, that the judicial
bias in these cases, if any, would tend to favor the male defendant,
perhaps strongly so. Indeed, the trial judges themselves favored ac-
quittal in about half of the nonaggravated acquaintance rape cases in
the study.790 Equally important, trial judges can be expected to take
account of the prosecution's burden of proof. They are not likely to
disagree with a verdict merely because they intuit that the defendant is
guilty in fact.
Despite some methodological shortcomings, 791 Kalven and
Zeisel's study remains the best available evidence of national scope on
the propriety of acquittals in acquaintance rape cases. It is supple-
mented, moreover, by more recent anecdotal evidence to the same
effect.792 Our conclusion is that the prosecution's heavy burden of
proof has played an important role in the justice system's treatment of
acquaintance rape cases, but so have public biases against certain
classes of alleged rape victims. To neglect either source of case attri-
tion is to distort reality.
786 Conventional courthouse wisdom holds thatjuries in criminal cases tend to be more
lenient than judges. Levine, supra note 444, at 457. Although Kalven and Zeisel's findings
support this conclusion, another scholar suggests that in felony cases juries are more prone
to convict than judges. Compare supra text accompanying notes 408-20, with Levine, §upra
note 444, at 464-66, andJames P. Levine, Jury Toughness: The Impact of Conservatism on Crimi-
nal Court Verdicts, 29 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 71 (1983). Professor Levine contends that
felony juries have become more conviction-prone as a result of increasingly harsh public
attitudes toward crime. Id.
787 See supra text accompanying notes 525-26.
788 According to one study, where the evidence shows third-party sexual relations by the
complainant, prior consensual sex with the accused, or a delayed rape report, many trial
judges disbelieve the woman or conclude that she got what she deserved. Bohmer, supra
note 403, at 304-07.
789 The view of the women's movement did not become orthodox in educated circles
until roughly the 1970s and 1980s.
790 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 253-54.
791 Deservedly famous though it is, the Kalven & Zeisel study is weakened by several
methodological flaws. See supra note 441.
792 E.g., FAmRSTEtN, supra note 13, at 131-36.
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D. VICTIM BEHAVIOR AS AMBIPROBATIVE EVIDENCE
By nearly all accounts, the prosecutor's proof problems are most
acute when the putative acquaintance rape victim's behavior violates
traditional standards of female morality or prudence. Indeed, one
major study of rape cases found that, in cases where the victim's truth-
fulness is a primary issue, jurors are influenced more by her character
than by the corroborative evidence introduced by the prosecution. 793
To the extent that negative evidence about the alleged victim's
behavior has genuine probative value on the consent issue, the leni-
ency of acquaintance rape juries may be justifiable, especially in the
absence of strong evidence corroborating the woman's account. If,
however, the evidence used to discredit rape complainants lacks genu-
ine probative value, the jurors' leniency in such cases is much harder
to defend, given that contributory negligence and "provocation" are
not, as such, defenses to rape.
One might suppose that rape shield laws should put to rest con-
troversy about such matters, but the terms of those laws vary enor-
mously and judges sometimes ignore them and admit evidence that
they consider relevant.794 Besides, shield laws are limited to sexual
history evidence and do not cover other matters such as hitchhiking,
truancy, and drug or alcohol use.7 95 As well, a great deal of evidence
about the putative victim's behavior is admissible in order to provide
context by explaining the circumstances leading up to the rape.
7 96
We believe that the kinds of evidence that are typically used to
discredit the rape complainant's character are generally devoid of de-
monstrable evidentiary value on the issue of whether she consented to
sex with the defendant. We reach this conclusion by a very different
route than most commentators, and we disagree with a number of
arguments that are commonly invoked to demonstrate that the puta-
tive victim's violation of sex-role norms has no bearing on whether she
consented. Although our theory has obvious implications for evi-
dence law, we will not try to deal with all of the evidentiary issues
raised by the theory. Our purpose is to evaluate, in an exploratory
fashion, a possible explanation of jurors' leniency in victim "miscon-
duct" cases, not to rewrite the rape shield laws.
Responding to popular prejudices against "bad victims," rape
793 The measures of evidence that were found to have little effect on jurors' pre-deliber-
ation beliefs about the defendant's guilt included eyewitnesses, the number of prosecution
witnesses and exhibits, the use of a weapon and injury to the victim. See LaFree, supra note
66, at 397-99.
794 Galvin, supra note 4, at 774.
795 Id at 765-66.
796 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 193 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992).
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scholars have often adopted a dismissive or argumentative stance
about the subject. For example, many scholars have endorsed an un-
tenable, generic objection to such evidence. The objection, voiced
repeatedly in rape literature, is that "victim blaming" shifts our atten-
tion away from the man's conduct, leading us to focus instead on the
woman's conduct. Not only is this diversion helpful to the defense, it
is based, say many authors, on a popular myth about rape. To de-
scribe and rebut this so-called myth, scholars often argue as follows:
797
1. Evidence about the rape complainant's character, and her
conduct immediately prior to the rape, is usually calculated to show
that she "led him on" or that she was "asking for it."
2. The implicit major premise of such evidence is that rape is the
result of an uncontrollable explosion of sexual desire, precipitated by
the woman's provocative conduct.
3. In fact, however, rape is a crime of violence, not of sex.
7 98
Men rape out of a desire for power over women, not because they are
sexually needy.
4. Evidence about the woman's supposedly provocative conduct
is therefore irrelevant in a rape trial.
The idea that rape is a crime of violence, not of sex, has become a
shibboleth in rape literature.7 99 On one level, the shibboleth is obvi-
797 E.g, Deanna Crawford, The Rape Shield Law: Making It Work, 24 N.H. BARJ. 109, 111
(1983). As Crawford explains:
Experts agree that the myths about rape support the defense attorneys' practice of
delving into the rape victim's life. Perhaps the most persistent myth about rape is that
it is a sexually motivated crime, an act of passion, when, in fact, it is a crime of vio-
lence. The rapist is attempting to prove his strength and power, to control and ex-
ploit, to express his hostility toward women and to compensate for feelings of
inadequacy. No one denies the complexity of the rapist's motivation or the variety of
social and psychological causes for it. But the fact remains clear that although sex may
be the result, it is not the cause of this crime. Every time rape is misconstrued as
sexually motivated, it detracts [sic] attention from the offender to the victim. Every
time this attention shifts from the offender to the victim, some of the blame is shifted
as well. The result is to lessen the blame on the offender and to diminish the credibil-
ity of the victim.
Id. See also ADLER, supra note 48, at 9.
798 "[T]he feminist perspective views rape as not primarily a sexual act but rather a
crime of violence and humiliation." WIEHE & RicHARDs, supra note 227, at 80. This theory
is sometimes combined with the idea that consensual heterosexual intercourse is also more
political than sexual. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 27, at 16, 19 (observing that "[s]exual
conquest becomes an acceptable way of validating masculinity, of demonstrating domi-
nance of and superiority over women ... If sexuality was [sic] not bound up with power
and aggression, rape would not be possible"). Such statements are commonly coupled
with insistence that rapists are simply ordinary men. See, e.g., id. at 16. Rape is thus per-
ceived as similar to ordinary heterosexual acts, whose purpose is political and oppressive,
not to "relieve an itch." A thorough evaluation of this ideology is beyond the scope of the
present article.
799 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 14-15; ESTICH, supra note 1, at 82-83; GER-
MAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH, 247-48 (1970).
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ously true: by definition, forcible rape is a crime of force or
threatened force and thus of violence. Although the most interesting
cases today often involve minimal force,800 and many scholars now
seek an expanded definition of rape,801 it remains true that adult
rape, as defined by most people (and courts) is almost always a crime
of violence.80 2 But this truism sheds no light on the rapist's motiva-
tion; just as robbers usually employ violence, not for its own sake but
to obtain money, perhaps most rapists employ violence simply in or-
der to obtain sex.80
3
Authors sometimes describe rape as a crime of violence in order
to stress that acquaintance rape is a serious matter, not a mere sexual
peccadillo.80 4 Again, this truism sheds no light on the more problem-
atic argument that the alleged rape victim's sexual history, and her
conduct prior to the sexual encounter, are irrelevant to whether she
was raped. In this latter context, the idea that rape is a crime of vio-
lence refers to the rapist's motivation. If he rapes because he is sex-
starved, then some will regard him as a sympathetic character led on
by a provocative woman. If, on the other hand, he rapes because he is
violent, or wants to control and dominate women, then the woman's
behavior looks irrelevant, the rape no longer even half-resembles in-
nocent lovemaking, and people will feel less empathy for the man.
Despite these rhetorical advantages, speculation about the moti-
vations of rapists805 sheds no light on the probative value of evidence
about the woman's conduct. First, the crime-of-violence theory does
not even purport to address the defendant's nominal defense. The
defendant in an acquaintance rape case contends that the complain-
ant consented, not that she provoked a rape. At least formally, the
issue is whether a rape occurred, not why it occurred. In strictly legal
terms, what needs to be rebutted is the proposition that her behavior
prior to the rape suggests that she consented, not the proposition that
her conduct caused and justified his rape. True, the jury may use the
evidence for the latter, improper purpose, but that danger does not
necessarily justify depriving the defendant of the opportunity to offer
800 E.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 424 A.2d
720 (Md. 1981); State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (NJ. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), affd in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
801 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 102-03 (arguing that the definition of rape should
be expanded to include "extortionate threats and misrepresentations of material fact").
802 There are a few narrowly-circumscribed exceptions to the requirement of force (or
threat of force), such as where the victim is unconscious. See generally Puttkamer, supra
note 44, at 417.
803 The topic is obviously too complex for adequate treatment here.
804 See supra notes 797-98 and accompanying text.




the evidence for a legitimate purpose. 0 6
In any event, to appraise the likely prejudicial effect of evidence it
is necessary, first, to consider the extent to which it has genuine pro-
bative value.807 One cannot avoid this task simply by characterizing
rape as a crime of violence. Suppose for the sake of argument that
rape is indeed basically a "crime of violence, not of sex."808 It does
not follow that the victim's sexual allure cannot have been one of the
causes of the crime. Research has shown that even homicide, the
most violent of crimes, is often provoked, though of course not neces-
sarily excused, by the victim's behavior, sometimes even by the victim's
sexual behavior.80 9
The "crime of violence" maxim sets up a false dichotomy between
sexual and other motivations. Rape is not simply "violence"; it is sexual
violence. Even if the rapist's underlying motivation is to control, hu-
miliate, dominate or hurt the victim, we need to account for the fact
that he does so by a sexual assault rather than an ordinary assault. Not
only that, unless he is sexually aroused, he cannot consummate the
assault. Castration, whatever its defects from a humanitarian perspec-
tive, prevents recidivism.810 For all these reasons, the acquaintance
rapist's motivation, even in the relatively rare cases where it plainly
goes beyond mere sexual lust, must be at least partly sexual.81'
We need not decide how often the rapist's motivation is exclu-
sively or primarily rather than only secondarily sexual. For a rapist
who desires to control, hurt, or degrade a woman in a sexual manner
may be aroused by the same sorts of sexual stimuli that arouse men
who have no desire to harm women. Like other men, most (though
806 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. .. ." FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 codified
the common law power of the judge to exclude relevant evidence that "arouses the jury's
hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence."
McCoRmicKr, supra note 796, § 185, at 340.
807 Id.
808 Richard Posner argues to the contrary, that "rape appears to be primarily a substitute
for consensual sexual intercourse rather than a manifestation of male hostility toward wo-
men or a method of establishing or maintaining male domination." POSNER, supra note 8,
at 384.
809 MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 206-07 (1958).
810 See generally N. Heim & C. J. Jursch, Castration for Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punish-
nent?: A Review and Critique of Recent European Literature, 8 ARCHVES SEX. BEHAV. 281, 300
(1979).
811 Although we have no statistical data on the proportion of acquaintance rapes that
include some clearly gratuitous violence, there is evidence that the woman usually suffers
no extrinsic physical injury. See Ian T. Bownes et al., Rape: A Comparison of Stranger and
Acquaintance Assaults, 31 MED., Sci., & THE L. 102, 104-06 (1991) (52% of sampled victims




not all) rapists prefer women who are young. Even if the rapist wants
to hurt or control women, he may prefer to do so with "sexy women,"
rather than all women, or maybe he intuits that the easiest marks for
his violent impulses are imprudent or sexually liberal women.
One must also consider the possibility, rejected by many femi-
nists, that different types of rapists have different motivations. Vague
umbrella concepts like "control over women" obscure important dif-
ferences among rapists. Although stranger rapists sometimes inflict
gratuitous, sadistic injuries,812 such terror for the sake of terror is
much rarer in acquaintance rapes.813 One need not accept the near
equation between sex and rape that has been advanced by a few au-
thors,814 to recognize that the motivations of a drunken fraternity boy
who rapes his companion may be at least approximately similar to the
motivations of a drunken fraternity boy who seduces his companion,
especially in cases that are close to the rape-seduction borderline.
Check and Malamuth found that male subjects were sexually
aroused to the same extent by written descriptions of consensual sex
and acquaintance rape, while a description of a stranger rape elicited
significantly less arousal. In addition they found that male subjects'
self-reported likelihood of committing acquaintance rape correlated
with their degree of sexual arousal from reading the description of
such a rape, a result that was not found in the stranger rape condi-
tion.815 These findings suggest that the motivation for acquaintance
rapes is closer to ordinary sexual desire than is the motivation for
stranger rapes.
According to some scholars, rapists often misinterpret their vic-
tims' verbal resistance as mere coyness; the rapist thinks that "'no'
812 Although the typologies overlap to a large degree, Nicholas Groth first described
stranger rapists' motivations as coming in three types: the power rapist; the anger rapist;
and the sadistic rapist. See ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 56, at 54-55. The power
rapist is motivated by a desire to overcome his own sense of inferiority and inadequacy; he
achieves control and authority through rape. Id. at 56. The anger rapist uses sex as a
weapon to vent the extreme rage built up inside him; he often humiliates the victim and
uses much more force than is necessary to overcome the victim's resistance. Id. at 55. The
sadistic rapist gratifies himself by brutally torturing his rape victim, and sometimes even
culminates the ritual by murdering her; he is the least common, but the most violent type
of rapist. Id. at 57-58. As thus stated, none of the three motivational theories explains why
the rapist does not simply batter or kill his victim.
813 See id. at 65 (stating that acquaintance rapists tend to employ "more subtle types of
coercion" and "verbal 'manipulation'" rather than threats, physical violence, or weapons).
See also supra note 811.
814 E.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 18 (1981); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
SIGNS 635, 650 (1983).
815 See J.V. Check & N.M. Malamuth, Sex-Role Stereotyping and Reactions to Depictions of
Stranger Versus Acquaintance Rape, 45 J. PERSONALnY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 344 (1983).
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doesn't mean no."8 16 If so, the motivation of these rapists seems to be
sexual. For if their motivation were solely to hurt or dominate the
woman, presumably the rapists would be more aroused by a "no" that
they perceived as sincere than by one that they interpreted as mere
coyness.
Two other standard responses to evidence of the woman's viola-
tion of sex-role norms are also inadequate. Some scholars point out
that the mere fact that a woman engages in careless or provocative
behavior does not give a man the right to rape her.817 This is of
course true, but the question we are considering is not whether he
had a right to rape her but whether her behavior is some evidence
that he did not rape her.
Some scholars point out that the woman's consent to sex on pre-
vious occasions does not "prove" consent on the occasion in ques-
tion.818 That argument confuses relevance with conclusiveness.
Other scholars contend that the probative value of, say, evidence of
the woman's promiscuity, 19 is only slight.8 20 In most cases, this is a
fair characterization, but it remains possible that, if the prosecution
lacks strong corroborative evidence, "slight" evidence of consent suf-
fices to raise a reasonable doubt. It is in the weak cases, where corrob-
orative evidence of the defendant's guilt is lacking, that juries are
most strongly influenced by evidence about the putative victim's
character.82
1
Inescapably, then, scholars must consider whether the putative
victim's violation of sex-role norms casts any light on the consent is-
sue. We now offer a new approach to that question as we examine the
most common types of "victim blaming."
1. Contributory Negligence
Kalven and Zeisel argue that the explanation forjudgejury disa-
greement in simple rape cases is thatjurors do not limit themselves to
the legal issues of penetration and consent. Rather, juries in effect
816 See e.g., WIEHE & RicHARDs, supra note 227, at 77, 96; Scheppele, supra note 95, at
1110-11. See generally BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 7.
817 See, e.g., HELEN BENEDICT, VIRGIN OR VAMP 16 (1993).
818 E.g., MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 2.
819 By "promiscuity" we mean an unusually high propensity to engage in casual,
nonmarital sex, or in other words a lack of sexual selectivity that is extraordinary by con-
temporary standards. As thus defined, the term, applied to females, may be less clear at
the margin than, say, "negligence," but some behavioral patterns certainly meet our defini-
tion. We regret its pejorative innuendo, but have not found a concise synonym.
820 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 1, at 55-57.
821 Reskin & Visher, supra note 503, at 435-36. Cf KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at
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nullify the law of rape by importing the tort concept of contributory
negligence or assumption of risk into the criminal case, acquitting the
defendant when they believe that the victim behaved carelessly.
8 22
Kalven and Zeisel discovered a similar phenomenon in homicide
prosecutions growing out of drag racing accidents in automobiles, or
Russian roulette. When one participant is killed, and his confederate
is prosecuted for manslaughter, juries tend to acquit even if the de-
fendant's legal guilt has been plainly established.8 23 The juries be-
lieve, evidently, that the victim assumed the risk. This belief, although
not sanctioned by the law of homicide, seems to be factually accurate.
In drag racing, as in Russian roulette, the one who dies usually has
"lost" in accordance with the rules of the game as understood by the
parties. For independent reasons of public policy, the law of homi-
cide seeks to override the parties' rules. Rightly or wrongly, the juries
disagree, and nullify the law by enforcing the parties' deal.
Is a similar analysis applicable to rape? Even if one believes that a
rape complainant "led him on," that sort of negligence is not closely
analogous to drag racing. The victim's negligence in an acquaintance
rape case is more analogous to a homeowner who negligently fails to
lock her front door or a banker who strolls through Central Park at
midnight carrying a wallet full of $100 bills. No one suggests that a
burglar who takes advantage of an unlocked door, or a mugger who
attacks an imprudent banker, ought to be acquitted, and we have
found no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that juries often acquit
thieves whose victims were negligent.8 24
On the other hand, the analogy to theft is often carried too far by
rape scholars intent on demonstrating bias against rape victims. Here,
for example, is an imaginary cross-examination, written by a scholar
trying to show the unfairness of focusing on the woman's behavior
prior to the rape:
"Mr. Smith, you were held up at gun point on the corner of First
and Main?"
"Yes."
822 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 249-50. In a more recent research project, Hubert
Feild asked a sample of 896 white adults to respond to a six-page summary of a rape case.
Different respondents received different summaries; all were asked to recommend a prison
sentence. Feild found that subjects who read that the woman voluntarily allowed a (stran-
ger) rapist into her apartment gave the rapist a lighter sentence than subjects who were
told that the rapist forced his way into the apartment. Feild, supra note 487. Perhaps the
subjects regarded the rapist who forced his way in as more dangerous to the average wo-
man than one who talked his way in, a debatable assumption.
823 KALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 243-44.
824 Interview with Professor Stephen Simon, Director of the Misdemeanor Prosecution
and Defense Clinics at the University of Minnesota Law School (Mar. 7, 1996); Telephone
interview with John Stuart, Minnesota State Public Defender (Mar. 11, 1996).
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"Did you scream? Cry out?"
"No. I was afraid."
"I see. Have you ever been held up before?"
'No."
"Have you ever given money away?"
"Yes, of course."
"And you did so willingly?"
"What are you getting at?"
"Well, let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in
the past. In fact, you have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can
we be sure that you weren't contriving to have your money taken from
you by force?"
"Listen, if I wanted..."
"Never mind. What time did this holdup take place, Mr. Smith?"
"About 11:00 p.m."
"You were out on the street at 11:00 p.m.? Doing what?"
"Just walking."
"Just walking? You know that it's dangerous being out on the street
that late at night. Weren't you aware that you could have been held up?"
"I hadn't thought about it."
"What were you wearing at the time, Mr. Smith?"
"Let's see.., a suit. Yes, a suit."
"An expensive suit?"
Well-yes. I'm a successful lawyer, you know."
"In other words, Mr. Smith, you were walking around the streets late
at night in a suit that practically advertised the fact that you might be a
good target for some easy money, isn't that so? I mean, if we didn't
know better, Mr. Smith, we might even think that you were askingfor this
to happen, mightn't we?"
82 5
The suggested analogy between rape and robbery is less apt than
the author implies. In a consent-defense rape case the defendant, at
825 The Legal Bias Against Rape Victims, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975) (Connie K. Borkinhagen
speaking to the House of Delegates). Cf Estrich, supra note 1, at 59 (observing that "if a
thief stripped his victim, flattened that victim on the floor, lay down on top, and took the
victim's wallet orjewelry, few would pause before concluding forcible robbery"). In a simi-
lar vein, another scholarly work says that there is "no other crime in which consent figures
in the law as an issue." NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN SCHURR, SEXuAL ASSAULT: CoNRaoNTING
RA'E IN AMERICA 139-42 (1976). Of course, the statement is not literally true: consent is a
defense to, for example, theft, kidnaping, and nonsexual assault (sometimes called box-
ing). To be sure, defendants rarely raise the consent defense in prosecutions for theft and
kidnaping, but that is because in such crimes (unlike date rape) the circumstances usually
make the consent defense patently untrue. In nonsexual assault cases, defendants com-




least formally, claims that consensual sex occurred, not that he com-
mitted ajustifiable rape. If a robbery defendant were to offer a similar
consent defense, for instance by claiming that he was a panhandler
and the "victim" freely gave him $300, then it would surely be appro-
priate to inquire into the putative victim's habits, particularly any pro-
pensity to make large gifts of money to panhandlers or other
strangers, perhaps even seeking them out for that purpose late at
night. In such a case, the hypothetical cross-examination would not
seem ludicrously inappropriate. Of course, in real robbery cases no
such defense is offered, because the circumstances almost always make
it extremely implausible; hardly anyone gives large sums of money to
strangers on the street. In this respect, robbery is analogous to stran-
ger rape. But in stranger rape cases, as in robbery cases, people rarely
blame the victim.
Does a woman's contributory negligence sometimes raise a rea-
sonable doubt about whether she consented to sex? Consider again
the imprudent banker who walks through Central Park late at night.
One difference between the banker and a woman who is careless
about the danger of being raped is that, although some psychologists
might surmise that the banker has a subconscious desire to be
mugged, the risky stroll is not an ambiguous signal. No one is going
to rob the banker under the illusion that it was a consensual transac-
tion and the banker's protestations to the contrary were merely
coyness.
In an acquaintance rape case, on the other hand, the woman's
adventuresome conduct may indeed, in some circumstances, create a
more or less reasonable inference that she will consent to sex. But we
are considering cases in which the woman's signals are at least some-
what ambiguous. For example, a couple meet in a bar and she accepts
his invitation to have one last drink in his apartment at 1:00 a.m. At
this juncture, let us assume for the sake of argument that it would be
reasonable for the man to predict that the woman will later consent to
sex. If his prediction turns out to be mistaken, this is not a "reason-
able mistake" in the legal sense. It is one thing to predict a favorable
response to a sexual request and quite another to dispense with the
legal necessity of obtaining that response before having intercourse.
In order to have a legally valid defense, the defendant must be reason-
ably mistaken, not about whether the woman will consent, but about
whether she is consenting at the time of the rape.
In some cases, the woman does indeed deserve censure for im-
prudence or for having created sexual expectations, not altogether
unreasonable, that she does not intend to fulfill. Blaming the victim is
not always wholly unjust. But, as with other crimes, victim blaming
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should be divorced from perpetrator-absolving: to say that a rape vic-
tim's conduct was foolish and irresponsible is not to say that the per-
petrator should be acquitted. Many criminals prey chiefly on careless
victims.
In a dating situation, the man can resolve any uncertainty about
his companion's desires by asking, just as he would if he were a buyer
of jewelry who felt sure, perhaps on reasonable grounds, that the
owner was ready to sell it. If instead he rapes her, it makes no sense to
say that she tacitly agreed that rape would be an acceptable outcome.
It may be foolish for a woman to hitchhike or to drink several beers
and then visit the apartment of a man she met only an hour earlier in
a bar, but without other indicia of consent there is no good reason to
treat this negligence as tantamount, either factually or legally, to con-
sent to sexual intercourse. Granted, the woman's conduct may have
kindled a flame of desire, and in some cases she may even have been
wrong to do so, but in our sex-saturated culture a man who does not
control his sexual desires when "unfairly" aroused is both highly ab-
normal and highly dangerous.
Of course, the defendant in an acquaintance rape case does not
concede that he forced the woman to have sex, or in other words that
he treated her perhaps imprudent behavior as consent to sex. In most
cases, he testifies that she explicitly consented or at least that she did
not resist his advances. The real question, therefore, is what weight
the jury should give to her imprudence in determining who is telling
the truth. As such, contributory negligence is not a defense, but does
it have some tendency to prove that the defendant's story is true? If
so, does this circumstantial evidence of consent help to explain the
high acquittal rate in such cases?
Evidence is considered relevant for purposes of the rules of evi-
dence only if it is both probative and material. It is material if it re-
lates to an issue in the case, such as whether the rape complainant
consented. To be probative, the evidence must tend "to establish the
proposition for which it is offered or-to be predise -- if the proposi-
tion is more likely to be true given the evidence than it would be with-
out the evidence."8 26
Is evidence of the complainant's sexual habits usually relevant to
whether she consented to sex with the accused? At common law, the
woman's general reputation for chastity and specific instances of prior
sexual activity were admissible evidence that she had consented to sex
with the defendant.8 27 Modem scholarly and judicial opinions about
826 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 19, at 24.
827 ROLILIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 158 (2d ed. 1969).
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this issue fall into three groups, corresponding to the three standard
characterizations of evidence whose relevance is challenged. Some
say that the sexual history evidence does indeed tend to show con-
sent;82 8 some say that it does not;8 29 and some say that, while the
evidence tends to show consent, its probative value is very slight and
greatly outweighed by the danger of prejudicing the jury.
8 30
All three of these positions assume, in accordance with standard
evidentiary analysis, that the probative value of relevant evidence cuts
in favor of one party's position and against the opposing position
taken by the other party. We believe, to the contrary, that evidence
about the rape complainant's sexual history usually "cuts both ways"
on the issue of consent and that common experience usually affords
no basis for saying which of the two opposing inferences is stronger.
We will call such evidence "ambiprobative."
Consider an example from another field of criminal law. Sup-
pose thatJones has been charged with murdering Smith. His defense
is self-defense; he killed Smith while fending off a murderous attack
by Smith. In this case, is evidence of a previous affair between the
defendant and Smith's wife relevant? We have no doubt that a court
would admit such evidence, 831 but notice that it bolsters both the
828 Today the issue is largely governed by rape shield laws. Apart from such laws, many
scholars and jurists have considered such evidence relevant. See, e.g., 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 62 (3d ed. 1940) (general character for unchastity); 3A WIGMORE, supra note 723, § 924
(specific acts of unchastity). "Fortunately the character of the woman as to chastity or
unchastity is admissible in evidence because of its probative value in judging whether she
did or did not consent to the act in question." PERMINS, supra note 827, at 158. For illustra-
tive judicial opinions, see Brown v. State, 280 So. 2d 177, 179 (Ala. Grim. App. 1973) and
People v. Stephens, 310 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). See generally AMIR, supra note
292, at 22-23; Galvin, supra note 4, at 783 n.96 (referring to a former Californiajury instruc-
tion that stated "[a] women of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape but it
may be inferred that a woman who has previously consented to sexual intercourse would
be more likely to consent again"). Cf Men, Women and Rap 63 FoRDHAM L. Rxv. 125, 142
(1994) (remarks of Professor Donald Dripps) (observing that "[s]o long as the law requires
the jury to focus on the victim, rather than the defendant, the shield laws are pretty diffi-
cult to justify on the basis of relevancy, at least in some of their more interesting
applications").
829 MARSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 22-23 (victim's sexual history with other men is irrele-
vant and prejudicial). See also Berger, supra note 1, at 15-22; Estrich, Palm Beach Stories,
supra note 28, at 26 (past sexual encounters with others are irrelevant except perhaps if
defendant knew of them); Abraham P. Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual
Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 90, 97-102
(1977).
830 E.g-, Leon Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology and the California Rape Evidence Laws,
54 S. CAL. L. REv. 35, 57-58 (1980).
831 See Covington v. State, 342 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977). In a murder
prosecution, the defendant claimed self-defense, stating that the victim attacked him with a
knife, and he shot the victim to defend himself. Id at 1341. The wife of the victim testified
that she and the defendant had been having an affair for some time. Id. at 1340. No issue
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prosecution's charge of murder and the defendant's plea of self-de-
fense. The affair supplies a motive for Jones to kill Smith, but also a
motive for Smith to have tried to kill Jones.
In conjunction with other evidence, ambiprobative evidence may
be more helpful to the prosecution than to the defense, or vice-versa,
but it is not intrinsically more probative of either side's version of the
facts. For example, if a woman is charged with having murdered her
husband, and she pleads self-defense, evidence that he had battered
her on other occasions would tend to prove both that she acted in self-
defense and that she had a motive to murder him even if he was not
attacking her at the time. Since men are, as a rule, much more violent
than women, her claim of self-defense sounds more plausible than the
prosecution's charge of murder. Of course, there may be other evi-
dence that suggests murder: for example, evidence that he was asleep
on a couch when she killed him. In such a case, the main gap in the
prosecution's evidence might be lack of an apparent motive for mur-
der, and the prior batterings might fill that gap. The defense might
need the evidence .less, because it possessed independent evidence
that the husband planned to attack the wife. But unless the evidence
that the husband was sleeping is conclusive, his prior attacks would
also tend to corroborate her version of the killing.
Another example of ambiprobative evidence is when a personal
injury plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence that the defendant had
liability insurance. The plaintiff may argue that the insurance is rele-
vant on the negligence issue because insured people have less incen-
tive to avoid liability and therefore presumably tend to be less
careful.832 In contexts where the defendant himself would not be en-
dangered by his own negligence, this theory is at least moderately
plausible. The defendant may respond by suggesting a countervailing
inference: the prudent type of person who buys insurance is less likely
to be negligent.
If the only problem in such a case was the ambiprobative quality
of the evidence, courts might let the jury choose between the two
competing inferences.833 The main problem, however, is not that the
evidence is ambiprobative, but that the jury is likely to use it for the
forbidden purpose of finding in favor of the plaintiff because the in-
surance company will bear the cost. Given this third possibility, courts
was raised as to whether the wife's testimony was admissible. Id.
832 The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 411 states that the infer-
ence of fault from the fact that a person carries insurance is tenuous. Rules of Evidence
for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.RD. 183, 230 (1973).
833 One wonders, however, whether a jury can know which inference is stronger.
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wisely exclude such evidence. 83 4
We regard the insurance cases as analogous to many "bad victim"
rape cases. As in the insurance cases, the evidence is ambiprobative,
the jury lacks sufficient basis in common experience for choosing be-
tween the inferences, and the danger that the jury will misuse the evi-
dence is great.
Most evidence treatises ignore the problem of ambiprobative evi-
dence.835 We suspect that there are several reasons for this. First, the
phenomenon is relatively rare. Second, the opposing party, instead of
objecting, may cite the evidence as probative of its own position.
Third, in some cases one of the two conflicting inferences may seem
stronger than the other. In such situations the net probative value
cuts in favor of one party and the evidence is relevant by the ordinary
definition because it makes one side's position more plausible than it
would otherwise have been.8 36 In other cases, including rape, the
ambiprobative nature of the evidence is not obvious or well-known
and so the opposing lawyer usually either does not object to the evi-
dence, or objects on some other ground. In acquaintance rape cases,
for example, objections to sexual history evidence are usually on the
ground that it lacks probative force (in any direction) and is too preju-
dicial.837 Finally, even if the ambiprobative quality of the evidence is
apparent, we can safely assume that many lawyers and judges believe
that the jury should decide which of the two conflicting inferences is
stronger.
Two treatise writers do address the problem. Wigmore discusses
evidence that could support either of two opposite conclusions; he
indicates that many courts admit such evidence only if the inference
for which it is offered is more probable than the opposing infer-
ence.838 Jones also mentions the problem of what he calls "equivocal"
or "ambiguous" evidence.8 39 He believes that such evidence should
be admitted, allowing the jury to assess its value.
840
834 See McCoRmicK, supra note 796, § 201. The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude such
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 411.
835 Concerning the meaning of relevancy, see McCoRMIcK, supra note 796, §§ 184-185;
see also 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 83 (1995);
1 MICHAEL GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 401-404 (3d ed. 1991); IRVING
YOUNGER & MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 44-49 (1984); GRAHAM C. LILLY,
AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 21-28 (1978); 1 EDWIN C. CONRAD, MODERN
TRIAL EVIDENCE §§ 21-37 (1956).
836 See FED. R. EVID. 401; MCCORMICK, supra note 796, § 185.
837 See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 4, at 791-801; Murphy, supra note 602, at 552-53.
838 IA WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 32 (Tillers rev. 1983).
839 2 JONES, EVIDENCE § 11.8 (Clifford S. Fishman ed., 7th ed. 1992).
840 Id.
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The caselaw on this issue is sparse and divided.841 We have not
found a rape case in which the issue was raised. For present purposes
it suffices to note that in a typical rape-victim "misconduct" case the
jury has no basis in common experience for choosing between the
conflicting inferences. For example, consider again the negligent
rape victim. If the issue before the jury were simply whether two peo-
ple had consensual sex on a particular occasion, the woman's antece-
dent suggestive behavior would indeed be relevant, though of course
not conclusive, evidence that they did. Imagine an observer who is
trying to guess whether a man had consensual sex with a woman who
entered his apartment at 1:00 a.m., shortly after having met him in a
bar. Plainly, their behavior is not conclusive proof that the parties
engaged in consensual sex. But all else being equal, the woman in
this scenario is much more likely to have consented than a woman
whose conduct was more circumspect. On these facts, with no allega-
tion of rape, an observer probably would have at least a reasonable
doubt about whether consensual sex occurred.
Rape scholars often deny, or at least seem to deny, this obvious
truth,8 42 no doubt because they suppose that such a concession under-
mines any subsequent accusation of rape, either by falsely implying
that the woman must have consented, or by leading to the conclusion
that even if she didn't exactly consent, she "got what she was asking
for." These scholars seem to assume that any evidence that has a ten-
dency to show consent must have a corresponding tendency to show
that no rape occurred. That assumption, though superficially axio-
matic, ignores the possibility that certain kinds of evidence are sugges-
tive both of consent and of rape.
In most acquaintance rape cases, the jury must make a compara-
tive evaluation of two conflicting scenarios. According to one scena-
rio the woman consented and later falsely accused the man of rape;
according to another she was raped. Anything that increases the like-
lihood that one scenario is true, but equally increases the likelihood
that the other is true, has no bearing on which of the two scenarios is
more credible. In our hypothetical case, the woman's behavior in-
841 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 575 F. Supp. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (tape-re-
corded reaction of defendant after being told that an associate had named him as perpe-
trator held admissible despite defendant's claim that it was merely an angry reaction to a
false accusation); Standafer v. First Nat'l Bank, 52 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Minn. 1952) (evidence
should be excluded unless one inference outweighs the other); People v. Yazum, 196
N.E.2d 263, 264-65 (N.Y. 1963) (attempted escape from custody admissible to show guilt
even though defendant was also being held for another crime).
842 In other words, rape scholars customarily and understandably focus on whether the
woman's conduct justifies rape, or proves that she consented, rather than on whether it has
some tendency to indicate that consent will occur or did occur.
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creases the plausibility of the consent scenario but also increases the
plausibility of her accusation of rape. After all, most observers would
regard her conduct as imprudent, precisely because it increased the
danger of rape, unless she wanted to have sex.
Admittedly, consensual sex is much more common than rape.
8 43
When the couple in our hypothetical enter the man's apartment, an
observer, knowing nothing about the parties, would probably consider
the likelihood of consensual sex much greater than the likelihood of
rape. But this does not mean that if the woman later reports that she
was raped, her story is less credible than the man's defense of seduc-
tion. Assuming that most accusations of rape are true, an accusation
alters the balance of probabilities, probably very greatly, although we
cannot say by precisely how much. A denial of that accusation, on the
other hand, is what we would expect of a rapist, no less than of an
innocent man, and so it scarcely affects the probabilities.
The woman's contributory negligence, though not increasing the
likelihood that she consented, may have played a causal role in precip-
itating the crime. Research has demonstrated that the victim's behav-
ior is one of the causes of many crimes.8 44 A "victim precipitated"
crime is one that might not have occurred but for the victim's con-
duct: for example, leaving his window open while he was absent on
vacation, or insulting a gang leader.8 45 Female victims are not promi-
nent in most of the literature about victim precipitation. Indeed, vic-
tim precipitated homicides, as compared to other homicides, are
disproportionately ones in which the victim was male.
8 46
A judgment that the crime was victim precipitated does not logi-
cally entail absolving the perpetrator. Most traditional types of volun-
tary manslaughter are by definition victim precipitated: 47 for
example, when the defendant catches his spouse in adultery and kills
her or her lover.8 48 Since the crime would otherwise be murder, one
can say that victim precipitation reduces the gravity of the offense, but
843 Some feminists contend that in our society women are not truly free to decline heter-
osexual relations, and therefore heterosexual sex is inherently coercive. E.g., CATHERINE A.
MACKINON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE 168-69, 171-83 (1989); LORENNE M.G.
CLARK & DEBRAJ. LEwis, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SExuALrTY 125-32 (1977).
844 See AmIR, supra note 292, at 259-76 (discussing the victim's contribution to forcible
rape); HANS VON HENTIG, THE CRIMINAL AND HIs VicrrM 383-450 (1948) (discussing the
"duet frame of crime"); WOLFGANG, supra note 809, at 245-65 (discussing victim precipi-
tated homicide).
845 SeeJamesJ. Gobert, Victim Precipitation, 77 COLUm. L. RPv. 511, 518 (1977).
846 WOLFGANG, supra note 809, at 255.
847 Wharton defines voluntary manslaughter as an "intentional killing in the heat of
passion as a result of severe provocation." WHARTON, supra note 44, § 155. See generally icL
§§ 155-66.
848 See id. § 165; see also Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
1342 [Vol. 87
RAPE
it remains one of the most serious crimes. A thief who goes through
an open window is guilty of burglary under modem statutes, notwith-
standing the victim's precipitative role.84 9 Likewise, in rape cases, the
woman's contributory negligence is not a defense unless the man
makes a reasonable mistake, 850 not as to whether she is likely to con-
sent, but as to whether she does consent.,51, To speak of a "victim pre-
cipitated rape" is, therefore, not oxymoronic. I
Yet much of the literature about victim precipitation has strong
pejorative overtones. Especially in the context of rape, the very term
"victim precipitated" has an innuendo -that the victim was the main
culprit and that the perpetrator's actions were a normal response to
her provocation. Further, the concept of victim precipitation is often
applied to cases in which the victim (usually a male) was careless at
best and a bully or a cheat at worst. One type of victim precipitated
homicide, for example, is where the victim starts a fist fight and is
then killed by the defendant.85 2 Definitions of victim precipitation
usually exclude involuntary and status risk factors such as age, race,
gender, physical condition and wealth,8 53 further contributing to the
vaguely pejorative innuendo of the term.
As these examples suggest, the concept of victim precipitation in-
volves several distinct questions. The first question is, non-pejorative:
Did any aspect of the victim's character or conduct increase the risk
that she would be raped? Another possible question is whether she
should be criticized for this. We would not criticize her, for example,
for being young, though that increased the risk of being raped, nor
for dating men, though that too increased the risk. But a relative or
friend mightjustly criticize her for, say, going camping-with a man she
had just met, and with whom she had no desire for sex. Finally there
is the legal question: Did her conduct partly or wholly excuse the
defendant's behavior?
In rape cases, commentators of all ideologies usually conflate all
these questions, treating the victim as responsible for the crime in
every sense or in none. The oft-quoted list of "Rape Myths" exempli-
fies this problem. SteviJackson, for example, asserts that the popular
myth that males have an "uncontrollable" sexual response that, once
849 See, e.g., Gobert, supra note 845, at 518-21.
850 People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (holding that a rea-
sonable mistake about consent is a defense to forcible rape); WHARTON, supra note 44, § 47
(stating that the contributory negligence of the rape victim is no defense).
851 Mayberry, 542 P.2d at 1346.
852 See generally WOLFGANG, supra note 809, at 247-52.
853 See, e.g., Gobert, supra note 845, at 513-14 & n.11 (excluding from definition of victim
precipitation factors over which the victim has no control but that increase the likelihood
of victimization, such as poverty and age).
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set in motion, leaves the man "totally at the mercy of his desires" is
merely a "technique of neutralization available to the rapist: denial of
responsibility.854 If a man attributes this to himself, perceives himself
as a helpless slave to his desire, then he will be less inclined to curb
himself in the face of a woman's refusal and more inclined to resort to
force to attain his ends." 855
Jackson's purpose, as she makes plain, is to insist that the rapist
be held accountable for his crime. We applaud that goal, but why
should one suppose that any idea that can be invoked by a rapist in an
effort to escape accountability must be false? That the truth may be
misused does not make it a myth. The notion of "uncontrollable" sex-
ual desires may indeed be false-as with most issues of free will no one
really knows-but the notion that the conduct of a woman sometimes
increases the risk that she will be raped is surely true. Our point is
simply that certain types of behavior by potential victims increase the
risk of victimization, for rape as for every crime. Whether a potential
victim should therefore change her behavior is a different question,
and whether to exonerate a man who rapes her is yet another
question.
Another so-called "myth" is that, "[w] hen women go around bra-
less or wearing short skirts and tight tops, they are just asking for
trouble." 856 This is called a myth, presumably, because some men
falsely believe that provocatively-dressed women invariably want sex or
even want to be raped. But those are not the only reasonable inter-
pretations of "asking for trouble." If the phrase means "creating a
potentially misleading impression of a desire for casual consensual
sex, which may lead to unwanted and perhaps even violent sexual ad-
vances by men," the proposition doesn't sound mythical at all. Com-
mon male attitudes, as many scholars have stressed, create precisely
those dangers.
Perhaps the best example of the myth-that-may-not-be-a-myth
genre is a proposition used by a scholar testing the attitudes of police
and other citizens toward rape. The proposition was that, "A woman
should be responsible for preventing her own rape."8 57 Although the
meaning of "responsible" in this proposition is obviously ambiguous,
an affirmative answer was interpreted as evidence of a "pro-rape" atti-
tude. 858 This interpretation is correct only if one reads some word or
phrase like "solely" or "rather than the rapist" into the proposition.
854 Jackson, supra note 27, at 19-20.
855 Id
856 Burt, supra note 516, at 217-30.




Otherwise, the "myth" is just as true as the proposition that, "a home-
owner should be responsible for preventing burglaries of her house."
As with a homeowner, some precautions are obviously called for, some
are obviously excessive, and some are debatable.
Feminists are not the only ones who confound the various issues
raised by victim precipitation. Even greater confusion appears in
Menachem Amir's pathfinding study of Patterns in Forcible Rape.
85 9
Amir, the leading student of victim precipitatedrape, defines the term
twice. First, he says it means "that in a particular situation the behav-
ior of the victim is interpreted by the offender either as a direct invita-
tion for sexual relations or as a sign that she will be available for
sexual contact if he will persist in demanding it."860 He excludes "situ-
ations where no interaction was established between the offender and
the victim, and when the offense was a sudden event which befell the
victim."861 Thus, stranger rapes are excluded even if the woman was
negligent, and acquaintance rapes are included, apparently even if
she was not negligent, whenever the man interprets her behavior as
suggestive: "Whether it is really so is not as important as the of-
fender's interpretation of her actions within the then current situa-
tion. Because even if erroneous, it leads to action."8 6 2 So if a woman
invites a man with whom she has a platonic relationship to dinner in
her apartment, and he interprets the invitation as a sexual overture,
any subsequent rape was "victim precipitated"!
In another passage, Amir tries again to define victim precipitated
rapes:
The term "victim precipitation" describes those rape situations in which
the victim actually, or so it was deemed, agreed to sexual relations but
retracted before the actual act or did not react strongly enough [in
whose opinion?] when the suggestion was made by the offender(s). The
term applies also to cases in risky situations marred with sexuality, espe-
cially when she uses what could be interpreted as indecency in language
and gestures, or constitutes what could be taken as an invitation to sex-
ual relations.
8 63
Amir's second definition, like his first, appears to exclude most of
all stranger rapes even if the victim was negligent, while covering virtu-
ally any acquaintance rape preceded by drinking, a visit to the man's
apartment, or other even very mildly suggestive behavior depending
on how the vague language about "risky situations marred with sexual-
ity" is interpreted. Noting that the law of rape "does not recognize
859 AMIR, supra note 292, at 259-76.
860 Id. at 260-61.
861 Id. at 261.
862 Id.
863 Id. at 266.
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precipitation, provocation, and seduction,"'' 64 Amir suggests that, "[i] f
any causal connection exists between precipitation and rape, we must
assess it with the aim of educating the law to recognize it too."8 65 The
implication seems to be that victim precipitated rapes should not be
punished, or perhaps should be punished less severely than other
rapes. Since Amir seems to define victim precipitation broadly
enough to cover cases in which the woman was not even negligent, his
suggestion that victim precipitation should be a defense is patently
unjustifiable.
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Vio-
lence published crime-specific definitions of victim precipitation. For
forcible rape, the definition was, " [w]then the victim agreed to sexual
relations but retracted before the actual act or when she clearly in-
vited sexual relations through language, gestures, etc."8 6 6 Whereas
Amir, with his vague and apparently broad definition of victim precip-
itation, concluded that 19% of all the rape cases he examined had
been victim precipitated,8 67 a Commission task force concluded that
only 4.4% of rapes are victim precipitated, a lower figure than for
homicide (22%), nonsexual assault (14.4%), armed robbery (10.7%)
or unarmed robbery (6.1%).868
Susan Brownmiller discusses three situations in which some
might say that a rape was victim precipitated. First, a homemaker ac-
cepts a strange man's offer to rake her lawn for a fee, and when he
later asks for a glass of water, she lets him into her living room. Sec-
ond, a female hitchhiker. If a rape ensues, Brownmiller "would con-
sider the housewife and the hitchhiker insufficiently wary, but in no
way would I consider their actions provocative or even mildly precipi-
tant. '869 Finally, Brownmiller argues that a woman should not be
deemed guilty of precipitant behavior if she "engages in sex play but
stops short of intercourse.8 7 0 The reader is left to wonder whether
Brownmiller would ever describe a rape as "victim precipitated." Evi-
dently, she regards use of the term as tantamount to excusing the
rape.
Recognizing the pejorative innuendo of the concept, many schol-
ars avoid-indeed, frown upon-discussions of the rape victim's role
in precipitating the crime.871 Although this attitude is eminently un-
864 Id. at 265.
865 Id. at 266.
866 BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 354.
867 AMIR, supra note 292, at 266.
868 BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 355.
869 Id. at 354.
870 Id.
871 See, e.g., ESTRiCH, supra note 1, at 24-25 (noting that "[in rape] when we ask 'Who
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derstandable, some rapes do involve negligent victims. 872 As with a
homeowner who fails to lock a door, this sense of the term does not
logically entail absolving the perpetrator: unless the man made a rea-
sonable mistake about consent, the woman's negligence has no bear-
ing on his legal guilt.873 Nevertheless, it seems best to eschew
negligence and other normative terminology, particularly in a field
like rape, where evolving conceptions of gender equality complicate
the task of determining what precautions a "reasonable woman"
would take. To emphasize this point, we will avoid loaded terms like
"victim precipitated." Instead, we will refer to "risk factors" for rape or
the woman's "vulnerability to rape." These terms refer to any attri-
bute of the victim or her conduct, whether voluntary and blamewor-
thy or not, that increased the likelihood that she would be raped: her
age, her income, her drinking, her sexual habits, her companions, her
hitchhiking, and so on. Thus, our definition is broader but less pejo-
rative than the definitions others have employed.
2. Alcohol and Drugs
"Candy is dandy, but liquor is quicker," wrote Ogden Nash.87
4
Folk wisdom holds that alcohol reduces sexual inhibitions and so in-
creases the likelihood of consent. Of course, sex with an unconscious
victim is rape, but if the woman was conscious, but intoxicated, nu-
merous authorities hold that she may have been capable of validly
consenting to sex.875 Even if she does not in fact consent, a woman
started it?' we imply that if the woman agreed to give the man a ride home, or to go to his
office or apartment, she is to blame for her subsequent rape and should not complain").
872 See AMIR, supra note 292, at 259-66 (reporting that of the 646 rapes studied, 122 fit
the definition of victim- precipitated). Cf ALuSON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 56, at 244-54
(discussing strategies of rape prevention that address behaviors of the potential victims
while still acknowledging that rape victims are not to blame for attacks against them).
Even Susan Estrich has noted that the.rape victim is sometimes negligent. EsTric, supra
note 1, at 24.
873 WHARTON, supra note 44, § 47 (stating that the contributory negligence of the rape
victim is no defense). See also People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975) (holding that
a reasonable mistake about consent is a defense in a forcible rape prosecution).
874 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 855 (15th ed. 1980).
875 See generally Karen M. Kramer, Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing
Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 126 (1994). When a woman's abil-
ity to appraise her own sexual conduct is impaired by the voluntary use of intoxicants or
drugs, any resulting intercourse cannot be charged as rape, unless "the victim is manifestly
unable... to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness charged to
constitute the offense." WAYNE R LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAw § 5.11 (1986). See, e.g., Coley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. App. 1993) (sexual bat-
tery conviction reversed despite evidence of victim's inability to consent because of cocaine
use, based on "an absence of evidence to show ... that it was apparent to defendant that
the victim was unable to give a knowing and voluntary consent").
Most state codes have rape provisions that include scenarios where the victim was
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who has been drinking may respond in ways that give the impression
of consent and so mislead her partner into an arguably reasonable
mistake. Perhaps for these reasons, rape juries are less likely to con-
vict if the evidence reveals alcohol (or drug) use by the woman.8 76
Indeed, Kalven and Zeisel found that drinking by the woman was the
factor that most often induced jurors to acquit in rape cases. 87 7 As
one would expect, some prosecutors are leery of such cases.878
A few scholars have tried to brush this problem aside by observing
that, "the fact that some victims of such assaults had taken drugs or
had one drink too many ... does not mitigate the seriousness of the
act [of rape]. "879 This perfectly reasonable assertion assumes that a
rape occurred and the only question is whether to excuse ("mitigate")
it. At some, perhaps subconscious level, that may indeed be the ques-
tion. However, it is not the legal issue: rather, in most acquaintance
rape cases, the defendant claims that no rape occurred. What if the
defendant's lawyer argues that the woman's drinking, prior to the sex-
ual encounter, tends to support the defendant's testimony that she
consented? Let us assume that she was not so drunk as to be legally
incapable of consent. Her drinking is not dispositive evidence of con-
sent, but is it not relevant? It would be relevant evidence of subse-
quent negligence in, say, driving a car, because people who drink are
more likely, all else being equal, to drive carelessly.880 Aren't they also
more likely to consent to sexual propositions? What is the difference?
One important difference is that in the case of rape, we deal not
only with an obvious causal connection, but also with a contested so-
cial construct: valid consent. At least in the context of heavy drinking,
consent is less a condition of the drinker's mind than a reaction in the
observer's mind. The point at which pre-coital libations invalidate
what would otherwise be consensual conduct cannot be resolved by
any merely empirical observation.
We suggest another perspective on the problem. In the automo-
drunk to the point of being unconsciousness. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (A)-(C)
(1985) (defining one kind of rape as a male having sexual intercourse with "a female not
his wife if the female is unconscious"). Note, however, that the degree of required incapac-
itation is extreme. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985) commentary at 318-19. Defense
counsel often suggest that the woman's drinking is evidence of consent, or of impaired
memory. See Adler, supra note 48, at 103-04.
876 Drinking also affects police founding decisions. See supra note 294.
877 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 254-57.
878 See FAiRSTE-IN, supra note 13, at 151-52; HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 144;
Frohmann, supra note 13, at 215.
879 ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 56.
880 See, e.g., J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAw: LABILITv & LITIGATION
§ 3.25, at 87 (rev. ed. 1988) (asserting that driving a car under the influence is evidence of
negligence when there is a causal connection with the injury).
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five context, the probative force of evidence of drinking cuts in only
one direction, while in the context of rape it is ambiprobative. Drink-
ing prior to driving is not conclusive proof that one committed any
subsequent negligent act such as failure to signal a turn, but it does
increase the likelihood of negligence. Drinking may also increase the
likelihood of genuine or at least apparent consent to a sexual over-
ture. But in the sexual context evidence of prior drinking is
ambiprobative. In addition to increasing the likelihood of consent, it
also increases the likelihood of rape.88' In what appears to have been
a conservative estimate, Amir found that in Philadelphia at least 31%
of those who reported a forcible rape had been drinking prior to the
rape.8 2 He listed drinking as one of several "situational" factors that
make rape more likely to occur.88 3
Why should this be so? In the first place, the woman's drinking
881 See, e.g., Charlene L. Muehlenard & Melaney A. Linton, Date Rape and Sexual Aggres-
sion in Dating Situations: Incidence and Risk Factors, 34J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 186, 187 (1987);
M.B. Myers et al., Coping Ability of Women Who Become Victims of Rape, 52J. CONSULTING &
CUN. PSYCH. 73 (1984) (rape victims exhibit higher rates of pre-rape alcohol and drug
abuse). On one college campus, female victims of unwanted sexual contact reported male
use of alcohol for over 75% of all types of experiences, and reported their own use of
alcohol in over half of all experiences. Sally K. Ward et al., Acquaintance Rape and the College
Social Scene 40 FAMiLY RELATIONS 65, 68 (1991). According to another study, 73% of men
and 55% of women involved in acquaintance rapes had been drinking or taking drugs at
the time of assault. Koss, supra note 56, at 16. Of college men who acknowledged having
raped a woman, 74% said that they were drinking or using drugs at the time of the assault,
and 75% recalled that their victims were doing so. Id. at 35, 45. Another study found that,
of 236 rapists 142 (60%) were using alcohol or drugs at the time of the rape, and another
6% may have been. Of the victims, 36% indicated that they had been using drugs or
alcohol. WiEHE & RICHARDS, supra note 227, at 17. For a discussion of other studies reach-
ing similar conclusions, see Shotland, supra note 178, at 139-40. See also Snare, supra note
234, at 199-200 (most Swedish men accused of rape had been drinking, as had 30% of the
alleged victims, 10-15% of whom were "highly intoxicated"). Cf VACHSS, supra note 13, at
91 (asserting that "[rlapists... look for whatever vulnerability might insulate them from
capture and punishment."). In other words, sexual predators-like all predators-have an
eye for vulnerability, and situations that are suggestive of consent increase vulnerability.
The National Victim Center reports higher rates of drug and alcohol consumption
among rape victims, who are 5.3 times more likely to have used prescription drugs non-
medically (14.7% vs. 2.3% of general population); 3.4 times more likely to have used mari-
juana (52.2% vs. 15.5%); 6 times more likely to have used cocaine (15.5% vs. 2.6%); 10.1
times more likely to have used hard drugs other than cocaine (12.1% vs. 1.2%); and 6.4
times more likely to have used hard drugs or cocaine (19.2% vs. 3.0%). RAPE IN AMERICA,
supra note 56, at 7. However, for most victims, the age at which the first rape occurred was
younger than the age at which they first became intoxicated or began using marijuana or
cocaine. "Only 21% first became intoxicated at an earlier age, and only 32% of those who
used marijuana did so earlier than their first rape. The corresponding figure for cocaine
use was 11%." Id at 8. In some instances, the rape may have been a cause of the drug or
alcohol use. In others, intoxication may have been a cause of the rape, and in still others,
there may have been a common cause, such as delinquent peers or abusive parents.
882 AMiR, supra note 292, at 99.
883 Id. at 258.
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may be associated with rape because it is associated with the man's
drinking, which is perhaps the real catalyst. Just as one would expect,
studies show that the man's drinking greatly increases the likelihood
that he will try to rape his companion.8 84 Alcohol reduces men's inhi-
bitions against violence, including sexual violence. 885 The woman's
drinking may also play a causal role: alcohol may make her less able to
ward off the rapist.8 6 In addition, some people regard forcible sex as
more acceptable when the victim is drunk.887 Amir speculated that by
drinking in public places with strangers, a woman "defines herself as
'prey' to her drinking companions."8 88 There must also be some wo-
men who drink precisely in order to reduce their own inhibitions.
(Whether this is as common as some men suppose is a different ques-
tion.) In such cases, any subsequent consent is genuine by the usual
standards of voluntary behavior.
It seems that a drinking woman is more likely to apparently or
actually consent, more likely to be raped, and more likely to enter a
legal twilight zone where the proper characterization of what oc-
curred is debatable. Since we do not know which of these alternative
inferences is generally strongest, and since the subject is full of tricky
normative and factual questions, it seems best not to dogmatize.88 9
Granted, by conventional standards, there are probably a lot more in-
stances of inebriated consensual sex890 than of inebriated forcible
rape, but this does not mean that accusations of the latter are likely in
fact to be the former.
Kalven and Zeisel found that victims' use of alcohol negatively
affected jurors' perceptions of them in cases involving various of-
fenses, with both female and male victims. 89 1 One might surmise,
therefore, thatjurors' skepticism rests, not so much on sex-role stereo-
types, as on doubts about the accuracy of the recollections of one who
had been drinking prior to the encounter. 892 On the other hand,
884 "The degree of intoxication of the man is the single most important factor in deter-
mining whether acquaintance rape will occur." Parrott & Bechhofer, supra note 478, at 23.
Cf MAcDoNALD, supra note 178, at 57 (50% of rapists drank beforehand, the majority
heavily).
885 Muehlenard & Linton, supra note 881, at 187.
886 Id. See also AxmI, supra note 292, at 343.
887 Id. One study reported that if the woman is stoned or drunk, 29% of males and 18%
of females consider aggressive sex to be appropriate. Giarrusso et al., supra note 478, at 66.
888 AsiR, supra note 292, at 343.
889 For an impressive analysis from a pro-prosecution point of view, see Kramer, supra
note 875.
890 See supra note 875 (discussing the legal relevance of alcohol use to the element of
consent).
891 See supra note 435.
892 See Kerstetter, supra note 255, at 274. Kerstetter does not consider a third alternative:
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since the man usually has also been drinking, one would suppose that
such skepticism would undermine his credibility as much as hers. Yet,
social-scientific research indicates that when both parties drink many
observers are more inclined to blame the woman for the rape than
when neither party engages in drinking.8 93 In a trial context, this phe-
nomenon might be due to the burden of proof,8 94 but in the context
of attitudinal research by opinion polls based on rape scenarios, it
seems to reflect notions about the appropriate roles of the victim in
preventing certain crimes-notions that are not, however, limited to
rape cases nor to cases in which the victim is female.
3. Promiscuity and Prostitution
Promiscuity is perhaps the most effective charge that a rape de-
fendant can level against his accuser.895 Prior to the advent of rape
shield laws, courts generally regarded the woman's "character for
that the jurors blame drunken victims, whether male or female, for helping to precipitate
the crime, rather than supposing that they cannot recall such an important detail as
whether their sexual resistance was forcibly overcome.
893 See supra note 483.
894 It is unclear how often the victim's drinking casts doubt on her claim that she was
raped. Of course, much depends on how inebriated she was. The nature of the conflict in
the evidence is also important. In the Kennedy-Smith case, for example, the woman
claimed that the defendant had tackled her from behind as she was leaving the Kennedy
property, and then raped her. He claimed that he had not tackled her and their encoun-
ter was consensual. When the difference between the parties' stories is so stark, it is un-
likely to be due to alcohol-impaired perceptions or memories. On the other hand, one
can imagine cases in which the parties' stories were virtually identical, except for a gesture,
a word, or a facial expression. In such a case, the victim's intoxication might well create a
reasonable doubt.
895 According to Estrich, "[t]he defendant lucky enough to find out, albeit later, that his
victim was sexually experienced could and would try to hide behind that fact at trial, if she
was willing even to proceed to trial." ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 53. Similarly, Fairstein notes
that, "[a]s most people are aware, and as Susan Brownmiller's history describes in exquisite
detail, the most common defense in sexual assault cases-and one that had worked for
centuries-was an incorporation of details or innuendos about the sexual history of the
victim." FAiSTrN, supra note 13, at 122. See also ADLER, supra note 48, at 94 (observing that
"[i]nsofar as a sexually active woman will be seen as a 'bad' woman, and therefore an
unlikely rape victim, it becomes important for the defense in the trial to portray her as
such").
In ajury simulation study, subjects from the Minneapolis-St. Paul area saw a videotape
of a mock rape trial, condensed into about two hours. The defense was consent. Some
subjects received information about the putative victim's sexual relations with other men;
others did not. Jurors who had received such information inferred that the woman had
consented to sex with the accused. They evaluated the woman's conduct more carefully,
more unfavorably, and attributed more responsibility to her for the encounter. Even in
scenarios where the defendant's guilt was highly probable, jurors who had learned of the
woman's sexual history were reluctant to convict. Eugene Borgida, Legal Reform of Rape
Laws, in 2 APPLIED Soc. PsYcH. ANNUALr 211 (L. Bickman ed., 1982).
Judges have also been prejudiced against rape complainants with "loose" habits. Boh-
mer, supra note 403, at 306.
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chastity," her propensity to engage in nonmarital intercourse, 896 as
relevant to whether she had consented.8 97 Despite shield laws, juries
often become aware of the alleged victim's sexual habits. 898 Does
such evidence serve any legitimate purpose? Wigmore thought so:
"The character of the woman as to chastity is of considerable proba-
tive value in judging the likelihood of consent."899 Even today, it is
not hard to find men, including legal scholars, who privately agree
with Wigmore. But, modern rape scholars usually argue that sexual
history evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial. They maintain that the
complainant's sexual history has little or no tendency to show consent,
because nonmarital sex has become common,900 and consent to sex
on one occasion, with one man, is not evidence of consent on another
896 State v. Bird, 302 So. 2d 589, 592 (La. 1974).
897 See WcIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 200 (3d ed. 1940). To show lack of chastity, most courts
allowed reputation evidence, but not testimony about specific sexual acts. WIGMORE, supra
note 723, at 682. An exception allowed such testimony with regard to the defendant. See,
e.g., Bedgood v. State, 17 N.E. 621 (Ind. 1888). Most courts held that lack of chastity,
though relevant to consent, could not be used to impeach overall credibility. This distinc-
tion seems devoid of practical importance in this context because, in most cases, proof that
a woman consented is proof that she is lying or exaggerating. At least some of those courts
which allowed evidence of promiscuity to impeach the woman's credibility did not apply
this rule to men, an apparent case of sex discrimination. Berger, supra note 1, at 16. But
the real problem is the tacit assumption that one type of violation of conventional ethical
norms imports another. See id. at 17; Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at 561-81. If this
assumption is accurate, then the differential treatment of men and women was compelled
by the ethical double standard. Since male promiscuity is not condemned by society, pro-
miscuous men have not displayed a willingness to flout society's norms. Promiscuous wo-
men, by contrast, were flouting a societal norm, however unfair that norm may have been.
This violation may not shed much light on willingness to violate an unrelated and more
defensible norm, and its prejudicial effect on the jury is likely to be great in some cases.
898 Exceptions built into rape shield laws permit limited admission of evidence of the
victim's sexual history. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the federal rape shield
law, and state laws patterned thereafter, permit evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior
in two situations. First, the defendant may offer evidence of the victim's sexual activity
with someone other than the defendant to explain the presence of physical evidence of
rape, such as semen, injury, or disease. FED. R. EvID. 412(b) (2) (A). Second, when the
defense is consent, the defendant may offer evidence that the victim engaged in sexual
behavior with him in the past. FED. R. EVID. 412(b) (2) (B). Other exceptions have been
created by state statutes and judicial decisions. See generally Galvin, supra note 4, at 883-93
(discussing in detail the federal rape shield law and similar state laws).
899 WiGMoPE, supra note 723, § 62. However, even Wigrnore recognized that, "[t]he fact
that a woman may have been guilty of illicit intercourse with one man is too slight and
uncertain an indicator to warrant the conclusion that she would probably be guilty with
any other man who sought such favors of her." Id. § 200 (quoting Rice v. State, 17 So. 286,
287 (Fla. 1895)).
900 See, e.g., Lisa Van Amburg & Suzanne Rechtin, Rape Evidence Reform in Missouri: A
Remedy for the Adverse Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Victims, 22 ST. Louis U. LJ. 367, 385
(1978); Berger, supra note 1, at 55-56; Evelyn Stroufe, Evidence-Admissibility of the Victim's
Past Sexual Behavior Under Washington's Rape Evidence Law-Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.150
(1976), 52 WAsH. L. REV. 1011, 1031-32 (1976); Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented
Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 127, 138-43 (1976).
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occasion or with another man.9 01 Estrich, for example, would exclude
evidence of the woman's past sexual encounters with other men be-
cause "most women, like most men, have had past sexual encounters"
and so "unless the pattern is indeed peculiarly close, they don't prove
a thing."
90 2
Such arguments are not an adequate justification for describing
evidence of promiscuity as irrelevant. To be sure, research confirms
the popular impression that a "sexual revolution" beginning in the
1960s and 1970s has led to a much higher incidence of nonmarital sex
than in previous eras.90 3 But to say that sexual mores have evolved is
only to say that the baseline of normalcy should be changed, 90 4 not
that evidence of a major departure from the new baseline is irrelevant.
If, by the standards of our time,90 5 the alleged victim was sexually un-
restrained, why is this not relevant (albeit inconclusive) evidence that
she consented?
An issue that some regard- as analogous arises when the prosecu-
tion seeks to introduce evidence that an accused rapist has committed
other sexual assaults. Urged on by feminists, Congress has amended
the Federal Rules of Evidence to enlarge the circumstances in which
evidence of the accused's alleged prior sexual assaults is admissible.
90 6
901 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 1, at 55-56.
902 Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, supra note 28, at 26. Estrich grants that if these en-
counters were known to the defendant they may be relevant to his mens rea. Id. We be-
lieve that this is so only if the circumstances and testimony raise the possibility that the
defendant made a reasonable mistake about whether the woman had consented, which is
not the same as the far more common reasonable mistake about whether a woman will
consent.
903 See generally LAumAN r AEA., supra note 56, at 172-224.
The women [like the men] also exhibit quite different proportions of having many
partners, with only 2.6 percent of the 1933-42 [birth] cohort, nearly 18 percent of the
1943-52 cohort, and over 22 percent of the 1953-62 cohort having had five partners
[by the age of thirty]. Here again, there is quite' compelling evidence of a period
effect on numbers of sex partners that can indeed be considered a sexual revolution.
IM at 200.
904 For example, a national survey found that of women born between 1963 and 1972,
only 13.3% had five or more partners by the age of twenty. Id. at 198. Although this
proportion was higher than in previous birth cohorts, it would still be accurate to describe
such behavior as unusual. Similarly, "Over 90 percent of the women... in every [birth
year] cohort report fidelity within their marriage, over its entirety." Id. at 214. Therefore,
it is still true that a married woman who has had several affairs is unusual. Even among
single women, some patterns of sexual behavior are still extraordinary.
905 Estrich points out that prior rapes are more powerful evidence of guilt than prior sex
is of consent. Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, supra note 28, at 25. We agree, even if the promis-
cuity is extreme. However, we are discussing the relevance of the evidence, not its proba-
tive weight, and Estrich's observation does not rebut th evidence's relevance. Estrich also
asserts that the jury is more likely to overrate sexual history evidence than prior crimes
evidence. Again, we are inclined to agree, though this is debatable. See generally Bryden &
Park, supra note 310.
906 See FED. R. EvD. (1996) (referring to Rule 413 added Sept. 13, 1994, Pub.L. 103-322,
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Yet some of the same arguments that are commonly used to justify
excluding evidence of the woman's sexual history could also be in-
voked by a defendant to justify exclusion of evidence about his prior
crimes. He could say, for example, that 'Just because a man raped
one woman, on one occasion, doesn't mean that he did it on another
occasion, with another woman."
The beginning of wisdom on this subject is to recognize that, in
Paul Meehl's words, "behavior science research.., shows that, by and
large, the best way to predict anybody's behavior is his behavior in the
past."90 7 Suppose that the defendant in a nonsexual assault or mur-
der case claims that he acted in self-defense. He is permitted to intro-
duce character evidence to show that his victim had a reputation for
attacking other men.908 It would be ridiculous to exclude such evi-
dence on the ground that 'Just because he attacked people in the past
doesn't prove he did it this time." Again, that argument confuses rele-
vance with conclusiveness. Admittedly, the probative value of the past
assaults is probably much greater than the probative value of a puta-
tive rape victim's promiscuity, but we are discussing the admissibility
of the evidence, not its relative strength.
It is true, of course, that consent on one occasion does not
Title XXXII, § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 2135, effective July 9, 1995). Rule 413 now provides
that for a criminal defendant accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of his com-
mission of another sexual assault is admissible. Jurors may consider this evidence for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. Id. See generally Bryden & Park, supra note
310.
907 Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript): Some Reflections of a
Clinical Psychologist, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 521, 532 (1989).
908 The admission of character evidence is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 404.
Generally, evidence of prior misconduct by the accused is not admissible to prove he acted
in conformity with his character, although it may be admitted for other purposes. FED. R.
EvID. 404(b). See generally Bryden & Park, supra note 310.
Evidence about a victim's character may be admitted under certain circumstances.
Rule 404(a) (2) provides:
(a) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion, except:
(b) CHARACrER OF VICTIM. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.
FED. R. EID. 404(a) (2) (emphasis added).
As McCormick points out, in murder and assault cases, when the identity of the first
aggressor is in doubt, the probative value of evidence of a victim's character normallyjusti-
fies the risk that ajury could erroneously conclude a victim got what he deserved. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 796, § 193. In cases of rape or sexual assault, prior misconduct evidence
to prove a victim's character is admissible if it is probative of consent; however, since the
1970s, such evidence cannot be admitted merely to establish (or rebut) the victim's chas-
tity, which is no longer considered pertinent. Id. See also FED. R. EvID. 412 (allowing the
admission of evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior to prove consent).
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"prove" consent at another time or with a different man, even if the
woman often engages in casual "one-night stands." Like all character
traits, promiscuity is a relative term. Just as a "liar" usually tells the
truth, and a "violent" person usually behaves peaceably, a "promiscu-
ous" woman usually does not desire sex with the nearest man. Nor,
for that matter, does a rapist attack most of the women he encounters.
Even lovers spend most of their leisure time doing something else,
and from time to time they decline each other's advances. None of
this shows, however, that sexual history evidence is irrelevant, as op-
posed to inconclusive.
Many people think the evidence is relevant. As an English legisla-
tor put it, "a woman with a past.., is less likely to be the victim of rape
than a maiden aunt, an unpromiscuous virgin, or a respectable mar-
ried woman."90 9 Evidently, jurors agree. According to a study of Eng-
lish rape trials,
There is a staggering difference in the conviction rates of those de-
fendants whose victims were virgins, or of whose sexual past the jury
knew nothing, and those accused of raping women known to have had
prior experience. This highlights the perceived importance of chastity
in the (genuine) victim of rape: virginity all but guarantees a conviction.
In this sample [of 81 randomly-selected trials], only one out of a total of
seventeen defendants was acquitted of the rape -of a virgin or a woman
whose sexual past was not referred to during the trial. That is a convic-
tion rate of 94 percent.
At the other end of the spectrum, the conviction rate among those
accused of raping a woman whose sexual reputation was markedly dis-
credited during the trial was 48 percent. This includes women who had
in the past suffered from sexually transmitted diseases, those who had a
reputation in the local community for being sexually available, those
who had been involved in sexual intercourse with a number of persons
within a short period of time and those who were alleged to be prosti-
tutes. It is also interesting.., that nearly all those defendants who were
acquitted on the judge's direction . . .were accused of raping women
alleged to have such sexual histories. 91
0
Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that American juries, like
their English counterparts, are powerfully influenced by the com-
plainant's sexual habits, and that, despite rape shield laws, defense
counsel often manage to get such evidence before the jury.91'
If one were simply trying to calculate the likelihood that a given
woman would consent to a sexual proposition, her sexual selectivity
(or lack thereof) would be useful, albeit far from conclusive, evidence.
909 ADLER, supra note 48, at 36. See also AMIR, supra note 292, at 22-23 (lack of chastity is
strong evidence of consent).
910 ADLER, supra note 48, at 101.
911 See supra note 898 and accompanying text; see also FAiRSTIN, supra note 13, at 139-54.
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It is no answer to say that "even a prostitute is entitled to decline sex;"
the issue is not her undoubted right to do so, but whether she exer-
cised that right on a particular occasion. The case for admitting evi-
dence of the alleged victim's sexual history is, therefore, stronger than
many scholars have acknowledged, provided that the evidence reveals,
not merely an ordinary amount of sexual experience, but an unusually
high propensity, judged by contemporary standards, to engage in cas-
ual sex.
We see two major justifications for excluding the evidence. The
first is the well-known argument that the probative value of the evi-
dence is outweighed by the danger that it will prejudice the jury. As
there is copious evidence of jury prejudice against sexually adventur-
ous women, we believe that this argument is usually valid, subject to
exceptions that need not be discussed here.
In judging the relevance of sexual history evidence, the ultimate
issue is not the woman's propensity to consent, viewed in isolation,
but rather the relative plausibility of her account of rape and his ac-
count of consent. Evidence of the woman's promiscuity is ambiproba-
tive. It enhances the plausibility of the defendant's tale of seduction,
but it also, much less obviously, enhances the plausibility of her tale
of rape. That is the critical difference between evidence that the puta-
tive victim of a nonsexual assault is a bully who beats people up, and
evidence that the putative victim of a rape is promiscuous. In most
cases, the violent tendencies of a bully-"victim" tend to corroborate
the defendant's claim of self-defense, and not the government's claim
that the defendant himself was the aggressor.912 Evidence that the
putative victim of a rape is promiscuous, by contrast, tends to corrobo-
rate both parties' versions of the encounter-and therefore neither's.
First, the woman's failure to accuse any of her prior lovers of rape
tends to show, albeit weakly, that she does not make false rape accusa-
tions: "If the victim has had twenty instances of prior sexual conduct
with rock stars . . .without claiming rape, in the absence of other
evidence of motivation the most reasonable inference is that she
claimed rape this time because she was raped."
913
912 One can imagine a case in which such evidence would be ambiprobative: for exam-
ple, if the prior assaults by the putative victim had been on the defendant. In such a case,
we concede, one is tempted to admit the evidence despite its ambiprobative quality, on the
theory that some other evidence will reveal the superiority of one of the two conflicting
inferences. Like promiscuity evidence in a rape case, this evidence may prejudice the jury
against the victim, but we doubt that the problem is as severe in this context. Moreover, we
think that in the case of the bully, the inference of a retaliatory assault is probably less
strong than the inference of yet another assault by the bully. Therefore, the evidence may
be relevant rather than ambiprobative.
913 22 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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More important, sexual permissiveness is associated with rape vic-
timization. The best predictor of whether one will be a rape victim,
according to research by Koss and Dinero, is a composite model based
on a history of child sexual abuse, liberal sexual attitudes, higher-than-
average alcohol use, and above-average sexual activity.914 In other
words, the women who are most likely to consent are also the women
who are most likely to be raped when they do not consent.
Similarly, Essock-Vitale and McGuire found a relationship be-
tween rape victimization and the victims' voluntary sexual practices.
Women who reported being raped or molested had almost twice as
many consensual sexual partners (14.2) as those who had not been
raped or molested (7.2).915
Philip Belcastro investigated the sexual behavior patterns of 437
female college students9 16 in order to determine whether the 40 who
had been raped had different sexual habits from the 397 who had not.
Belcastro found that the raped and never-raped groups were similar
on a number of demographic variables, 917 but the raped students re-
ported significantly more (1) heterosexual partners; (2) heterosexual
partners whom they had exclusively dated for six months or longer;
(3) heterosexual cohabitation partners; (4) self-masturbation; (5)
use of contraceptive techniques; and (6) coitus on the first date with
a man.918 The raped group was also significantly younger at their first
pregnancy than the nonvictim group.91 9 The most interesting finding
was that the rape victims had more homosexual experiences than the
nonvictims. Unfortunately Belcastro was unable to determine
§ 5287, at 594 n.51 (1980).
914 M.P. Koss & T.E. Dinero, Discriminant Analysis of Risk Factors for Sexual Victimization
Among a National Sample of College Women, 57 J. CONSULING & CLINICA PSYCHOL. 242
(1989). Cf Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim, supra note 56, at 208 (survey of university women
found that the acknowledged rape victims reported significantly more liberal sexual values,
a greater number of sexual partners and an earlier age for first intercourse than nonvic-
timized women did). Conceivably, these findings merely reflect the fact that, all else being
equal, those who date the most are at the greatest statistical risk of rape. Koss reports that
"38% of the rape victims had never had sexual intercourse before their sexual assault." Id.
Cf Muehlenard & Linton, supra note 881, at 192 (college women who had experienced
sexual aggression had less traditional attitudes toward women than those who had not,
while men who had been guilty of sexual aggression had more traditional attitudes than
those who had not).
915 S.M. Essock-Vitale & M.T. McGuire, Women's Lives Viewed From an Evolutionary Perspec-
tive 6 ETmoLoG & Soc. 137 (1985).
916 Philip A. Belcastro, A Comparison of Latent Sexual Behavior Patterns Between Raped and
Never Raped Females, 7 VicmrMLOG, 224, 225 (1983). The sample was limited to non-virgins
who had never been married. Victims of homosexual rape were excluded as were rapes by
multiple assailants. Id.
917 Id.




whether these experiences were pre-rape or post-rape. 920
Belcastro's findings do not necessarily mean that, on any given
date, a woman with more sexual experience is more likely to be raped.
Conceivably, the more sexually active women were more vulnerable to
rape at least partly because they had more dates. But whatever the
causal chain, Belcastro's research suggests that there is no reason to
be extraordinarily suspicious of a rape report by a woman who has had
an unusually large number of sexual partners.
Amir collected data for all cases of forcible rape listed by the Phil-
adelphia police in 1958 and 1960. He found that, of 640 women who
reported rapes to the police, 124 (19%) had an arrest record, and
37.9% of these arrests were for sexual misconduct including "promis-
cuity" and prostitution.921 Ifjuvenile misconduct is counted, 56.4% of
the rape complainants with a criminal record had engaged in sexual
misconduct.922 About 20% of all reported victims had a "bad" reputa-
tion.923 Perhaps some of these "bad" women lied about being raped,
but Amir surmised that rapists had intuited that the criminal justice
system would not punish them for raping such women.924 Confirming
Amir's explanation, a study of gang rape found that the rapists usually
select victims known to have a "bad reputation."
9 25
Several studies of women who have been raped more than once
have found that multiple victimization is associated with multiple con-
sensual sexual partnerships.
926
A recent, comprehensive, national survey of sexual practices
found that nearly 22% of American women have been "forced" to
have sex with a man.92 7 As a group, the women who had been forced
920 Id. at 226.
921 AMIR, supra note 292, at 116. A Swedish study found that 15% of reported rape
victims had a criminal record (predominantly for property crimes), as compared to an
expected 3%. Snare, supra note 234, at 200.
922 AMIR, supra note 292, at 116-17.
923 Id. at 117. Another study of Philadelphia sexual assault victims included 121 adoles-
cents between the ages of 13 and 17. Over half of them had intercourse before the sexual
assault, 30% had been truant, 23% had run away from home, and 19% had prior police
trouble. ERASNER ET AL., supra note 314.
924 AMIR supra note 292, at 257. Street gangs and motorcycle gangs often select a girl
with a promiscuous reputation for a gang rape. MACDONALD, supra note 178, at 69.
925 Scully & Marolla, supra note 634, at 58, 69.
926 Catalina Mandoki & Barry R. Burkhart, Sexual Victimization: Is There a Vicious Cycle?, 4
VIOLENCE & VIcrIMs 179 (1989), cited in Susan Sorenson et al., Repeated Sexual Victimization,
6 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 299, 301 (1991).
927 LAUMANN El" AL., supra note 56, at 335. The respondents in this survey were asked
whether they had ever been "forced to do something sexual that they did not want to do."
Id. at 338. The authors caution that "the reported experience involving force may not
constitute rape in a legal sense or in the minds of the female respondents." Id. at 335. In
ordinary usage, the word "forced" is often employed loosely to cover situations in which
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to engage in sex were more likely to have had more than ten sex
partners in their lifetime than women who had never been forced.1928
They were also more adventuresome in their sexual practices.929
The demographic groups that are disproportionately likely to en-
gage in consensual sex are also disproportionately likely to be raped.
For example, consensual sex is statistically more common among
young women than among middle-aged women, but so is rape.930
Similarly, poor, single, inner-city residents may be on average more
sexually active than the general female population.931 Perhaps, at
least partly for this reason, police may be more skeptical of rape accu-
sations by such women.93 2 But according to some studies poor, single
women are also statistically more likely to be raped than other wo-
men,933 so one could just as easily regard their rape accusations as
there is pressure but no physical violence or threat of violence. For example, some might
say that a boyfriend who threatened to terminate the relationship unless his sexual request
was granted "forced" his girlfriend to accede. Similarly, if a woman threatened to termi-
nate a relationship unless the man married her, some might say she "forced him" to marry
her.
928 Id. at 339.
929 They were more likely to have engaged in group sex, active and receptive oral sex,
and anal sex. Id.
930 Rape victims and women who have had numerous sexual partners both tend to be
younger, more urban, and poorer than the general population. Kathryn Kost &Jacqueline
D. Forrest, American Women's Sexual Behavior and Exposure to Risk of Sexually Transmitted Dis-
eases, 24 F A. PLAN. PERSP. 244, 24647 (1992) (stating that the women most likely to have
many sexual partners are 20-34 years of age, with an income below the poverty level, and
living in an urban area). According to another study, 16-19 year-olds are the group with
the highest rape victimization rate, followed by 20-24 year-olds. Koss et al., The Scope of
Rape, supra note 170, at 162. Amir found that rape victims in Philadelphia were generally
"below the age of marriage." AMIR supra note 292, at 61. Rape victimization rates are
"clearly related to family income," and higher in low-income families. Id. at 169. National
Crime Survey data confirm this assertion. Belknap, supra note 174, at 209-10. Data from a
national survey of reported sexual violence in Sweden led one scholar to characterize rape
as "an urban phenomenon." Snare, supra note 234, at 196. Half of the Swedish victims fell
in the 15-25 age group. Id. at 199. Amir concluded that in Philadelphia "the potentiality
of the Negro female to become a victim of rape is almost twelve times greater than that of
the white female." AMiR, supra note 292, at 44. "Women with incomes at or above poverty
level are less likely to report having had more than one partner than are those with in-
comes below poverty level" but there is no difference between low-income and middle-
income groups, and there is no difference by poverty status in the proportion of women
who have had more than 10 partners." Kost & Forrest, supra, at 245-46. "Women living in
urban areas are more likely than rural residents to have hadmore than one partner and to
have had more than 10." Id. The greatest proportion of women with multiple partners
during the past three months were 20-29 years of age, and 86% lived in urban areas. Id. at
249.
931 Id.
932 See McCA uILL Er A., supra note 52, at 112 (police suspicion of gang rape complaints
affects chiefly poor, black victims); Id. at 116 (police more likely to unfound case if victim
is a welfare recipient). See generally Crenshaw, supra note 596, at 1251, 1267-69 (describing
violence against victims who are women of color).




Prostitutes are the most extreme example of the ambiprobative
quality of evidence that the woman was promiscuous. Judges often
admit evidence that the rape complainant was a prostitute, on the the-
ory that it is relevant on the issue of consent.93 5 Juries are sometimes
reluctant to convict men charged with raping prostitutes.936 Is this
defensible?
In analyzing the cases involving prostitutes, one should distin-
guish among several ways in which a rape defendant or an official may
seek to discredit the prostitute's testimony. Some have said that rape
of a prostitute is a contradiction in terms.937 Perhaps they mean that a
prostitute, by definition, is willing to have sex with anybody and there-
fore cannot be raped; strictly speaking, the "rapist" is guilty, at most,
of failing to pay (theft) which is a lesser crime. According to this the-
ory, even if the defendant overpowered the prostitute he did not com-
mit rape. This argument is an obvious nonsequitur: merchants are
usually willing to sell to anyone, yet theft of a merchant's wares is a
crime. Similarly, "theft" of a prostitute's services, if forcible, can be
punished for that reason.
A slightly more sophisticated theory is that, since prostitutes are
inured to indiscriminate sex with strangers, rape does not cause them
as often among unemployed women, proportionate to their number, as it does among
women who are either employed or "housekeepers." CRIMINAL VICrIMIZATION SURVEY 31-32
(1981). A study of Philadelphia rape victims, including 121 adolescents between the ages
of thirteen and seventeen, found that in 42% of the cases, the victim's family received some
form of public assistance. KRASNER ET AL., supra note 314. See generally BOURQUE, supra
note 25, at 40 (some studies indicate young, poor, single, non-Anglo women are at greatest
risk of being raped). But see id. at 40-42 (data challenging the idea that lower-class minority
women are overrepresented among rape victims); Hall & Flannery, supra note 767, at 404
(found no relationship between race or class and sexual assault victimization).
934 We have omitted from consideration the possibility that poor people are, as a statisti-
cal matter, less honest than affluent people, an inquiry that would take us far afield, partic-
ularly in view of the literature suggesting that character traits are situational, so that one
may tend to be dishonest concerning some matters yet honest about others. For a discus-
sion of this problem, see Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at 561-65.
935 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 487 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio 1986) (evidence of victim's reputa-
tion as a prostitute held admissible to impeach her testimony that she had not consented);
ADLER, supra note 48, at 69, 83 (even the "most enlightened" English judges admit such
evidence). Cf Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 187 (Mass. 1981) (evidence of
complainant's prostitution inadmissible to show consent but admissible to show motive to
lie). See also Galvin, supra note 4, at 828-902.
936 Although the law is to the contrary, prostitutes-in the opinion of many-cannot be
raped. Silbert, supra note 316, at 75. Some prosecutors describe prostitute-rape cases as
"difficult," but some jurors and officials take these cases seriously. BOURQUE, supra note 25,
at 5.
937 E.g., BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 4 (quoting judge to the effect that a prostitute by
definition cannot be raped); Adler quotes an English judge who regarded rape of a prosti-
tute as "like a contradiction in terms." ADLER, supra note 48, at 3.
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the anguish that gives the crime its peculiar horror and therefore calls
for a penalty that is among the most severe in our law.938 The short
answer to this argument is that the law is to the contrary: a man who
obtains sex by force or threat of force is guilty of rape even if his vic-
tim is a prostitute.93 9 This is surely just. Although prostitutes are in-
ured to sex with strangers, they are not necessarily less traumatized by
the forcible aspect of the assault, and the violation of their autonomy.
Furthermore, analogous "harmless rape" arguments have been re-
jected by courts in cases where the parties were lovers.
A different analysis is required if the defendant claims that he did
not employ force; rather, he cheated the prostitute by failing to pay
her fee. She concocted her accusation of rape as a retaliatory mea-
sure. Although the criminal nature of the transaction does not pre-
clude a theft charge, this sort of sex by deception is generally held not
to be rape.940 Some police believe that it is a common explanation of
rape reports by prostitutes. 941 In any event, this defense, in combina-
tion with lack of corroboration of the prostitute's story, may some-
times produce an evidentiary stalemate leading to a genuinely
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt of forcible rape.
Regardless of its bearing on the issue of consent, evidence that
the complainant was a prostitute may be admissible in order to "pro-
vide a context" explaining the circumstances of the complainant's en-
counter with the accused and the ground for his claim that she is lying
about forcible rape.
94 2
The most difficult question is whether the mere fact that the com-
plainant is or used to be a prostitute is relevant on the issue of
whether she consented to intercourse with the defendant. By occupa-
tion, prostitutes have an abnormally high propensity to consent to sex
and therefore acquittals in cases involving prostitutes have a superfi-
938 "[T]o speak of sexual intercourse with a prostitute without her consent as an 'out-
rage to her person and feelings' is in the nature of mockery." PERKINS, supra note 827, at
158.
939 E.g., Haynes v. State, 498 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); 4 W. BLAcSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 213 (1765).
940 See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 205, 1080 (3d ed. 1982).
941 See BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 364-65; HOLMSTROM & BURGESS, supra note 4, at 49-
50. This theory is not limited to policemen who reject all rape accusations by prostitutes.
According to a newspaper account, the area in Los Angeles with the largest number of
rape reports abuts corridors known for drug-dealing and prostitution. A policeman ex-
plains that, "[tJhere are some people out there that don't like women, period, and use
prostitutes as a real up-front, easy-to-identify example of their hatred." But the same po-
liceman "said some rape reports filed by prostitutes turn out to be false claims against men
who don't pay, including drug dealers who offer quick hits of heroin and crack cocaine in
exchange for sex, then renege on their promises." Leslie Berger, Prostitutes are Prime Victims
in Leading Rape Area, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at B1.
942 McCoRmicK, supra note 796, § 193, at 350.
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cially rational explanation. As one court put it,
Who is more likely to consent to the approaches of a man, the unsullied
virgin and the revered, loved, and virtuous mother of a family, or the
lewd and loose prostitute, whose arms are open to the embraces of every
coarse brute who has enough money to pay for the privilege.
9 43
Although it is easy to dismiss such nineteenth-century rhetoric as
absurd and sexist, the court's logic is impeccable as far as it goes. For
a price, prostitutes obviously are more likely to consent to casual,
nonmarital sex than virgins and homemakers. But just as an urban
grocer is more vulnerable to robbery than, say, a professor, a street-
walker is more vulnerable to rape, because she frequents dangerous
places and interacts with sexually aggressive males, some of whom
probably believe that prostitutes are fair game for rape.9 44 Conse-
quently, prostitutes are more likely than the average woman to be for-
cibly raped.
945
It is therefore fallacious to assume, merely because a woman is a
prostitute, that her accusation of rape is necessarily even slightly less
likely to be true than a similar accusation by another woman. To be
sure, prostitutes, though more likely to be raped, may also be much
more likely than other women to file false rape reports. On average,
prostitutes' rape allegations may be less truthful than those of other
women. But, that intuition is not self-evidently valid, and it may even
be the reverse of the truth.
Mimi Silbert studied 200 juvenile and adult street prostitutes in
the San Francisco Bay area.9 46 Even though the study excluded rapes
by the prostitutes' customers,947 Silbert found that almost three-
fourths (73%) of the subjects had been raped, a total of 193 rapes.
948
Of these rapes, 71% occurred after the women became prostitutes.949
Not only were prostitutes more likely to be raped than the average
woman, 950 a large majority of these rapes (84%) were by strangers.95 1
943 State v. Camp, 3 Ga. 417, 422 (1847).
944 Kurt Weiss & Sandra S. Borges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, 8
ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY 71, 95 (1973).
945 A study in Winnipeg found that 78% of the city's prostitutes had experienced non-
sexual assaults, while over 50% had been victims of both types of assault, since becoming a
prostitute. GUNN & MINCH, supra note 725, at 24.
946 Silbert, supra note 314, at 221.
947 The 73% figure did not include attempted rapes, rapes by customers, or other sexual
abuses. Id. at 87.
948 Id. at 79.
949 Id.
950 The number of women who are victims of sexual assault has become a controversial
subject. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 158, at 57-65 (arguing that variances among findings
are a result of confusing incidence rates and prevalence rates, or broad versus narrow
definitions of sexual assault). The 1-in-4 figure often appearing in feminist literature in-
cludes attempted rapes as well as completed rapes. See, e.g., Andrea Parrot & Laurie
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In most cases the prostitute-victim suffered some physical injury,952
and the emotional impact of the rapes seemed to Silbert to be even
greater for prostitutes than for other women. 953 Only 1-9% reported
their rapes to the police.
9 54
Summarizing her findings, Silbert noted that "the rapes in the
study.. ., especially those occurring after the subjects entered prosti-
tution, involved more rapists who were strangers, more use of force,
and more serious injury to the victim than rapes of women who were
not prostitutes (as described in published research on rape).,,955
Having excluded .rapes by customers, Silbert concluded that the
extraordinarily high rape rate revealed in this study was not directly
due to the women's work as prostitutes. "Instead, the rapes were asso-
ciated with the victims' vulnerability as women living in high-crime
areas of the city and working during high-crime hours."95 6 Given
these findings, it makes no sense to treat prostitutes' rape complaints
as patently less credible than those of other women.
In other words, on average, rape victims tend to be less sexually
restrained than non-victims. Sexually adventurous women are, it
seems, both more likely to consent and more likely to be raped. That
is why evidence of the alleged victim's nontraditional sexual habits,
standing alone, does not necessarily justify skepticism toward her
Bechofer, Preface to ACQUAINTANcE RAPE, supra note 63, at ix. Prevalence studies have ar-
rived at various conclusions. One study found that over 27% of the women interviewed in
Cleveland, Ohio, had been victims of rape or attempted rape since the age of 14. Mary P.
Koss et al., Criminal Victimization Among Primary Care Medical Patients: Prevalence, Incidence,
and Physician Usage, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 85, 90 (1991). Half of these women had been
victims of rape and half of attempted rape. Id. In a Los Angeles study, 25% of the Black
women interviewed had experienced rape or attempted rape since the age of 18. Gall
Elizabeth Wyatt, The Sociocultural Context of African American and White American Women's
Rape, 48J. Soc. Issuzs 77, 82 (1992). Of white women, 20% had been raped or subjected
to an attempted rape, a non-significant difference between the two racial groups. Id. In a
larger Los Angeles study of 3000 adults, 16.7% of the women and 9.4% of the men had
experienced completed or attempted sexual assault. Susan B. Sorenson & Judith M.
Siegel, Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexual Assault: Findings from a LosAngeles Study, 48J. Soc. Issus
93, 96 (1992). In Russell's study of 930 women in San Francisco, 24% of the women had
experienced completed rape in their lifetimes. RUSSELL, supra note 170, at 35. Other stud-
ies have found lower prevalence rates of rape. Gordon and Riger found that 6% of volun-
teers surveyed by telephone and 11% of volunteers surveyed by interview had experienced
rape. Stephanie Riger & Margaret T. Gordon, The Fear of Rape: A Study in Social Control 37
J. Soc. IssuEs 71, 76, cited in Koss, Detecting the Scope of Rape, supra note 158. Another study
found that 8.8% of women surveyed by telephone in Charleston, South Carolina had ex-
perienced forcible rape or attempted forcible rape. Kilpatrick et al., supra note 170, at 866.
951 Silbert, supra note 314, at 79.
952 Id. at 81.
953 Id at 84.
954 Id. at 83.





One must distinguish, however, between questions of probative
value and questions of admissibility, and between the usual case and
the exceptional one. We have been discussing the probative value of
evidence of promiscuity on the consent issue in the general run of
cases. There are situations in which, notwithstanding our generaliza-
tions, evidence of promiscuity should be admissible. In some excep-
tional cases, evidence about the victim's sexual history offers
substantially more support to the defendant's version of events than to
the complainant's. 957 Even in the more typical case, where the oppos-
ing inferences seem equally plausible, a few precedents from other
legal contexts uphold admission of arguably analogous ambiprobative
evidence, trusting the jury to decide which of the conflicting infer-
ences is stronger.958 Further, the evidence may be offered for some
purpose other than to show that the complainant has a propensity to
consent. For example, in some cases the complainant's sexual history
is relevant evidence of a motive to falsely accuse the defendant of
rape.959 The evidence may also be necessary in order to "provide con-
text" by explaining how the parties met and what they were doing
957 If Jones, an artist, accuses Smith of having stolen a painting from him, Smith may
contend that Jones gave him the painting. At least if the painting is valuable and the
parties know each other only slightly, this explanation is likely to strike the fact-finder as
implausible. To correct this assumption, Smith should be permitted to offer evidence that
Jones has previously given away valuable paintings to mere acquaintances. The same logic
applies, in some cases, to the rape complainant's sexual history. As Park explains:
Suppose that a rape prosecution arises from sexual intercourse that occurred on the
pavement of a parking lot on a cold rainy night. The jury is likely to think that the
complainant would not have consented because of the circumstances. Evidence that
she had consensual intercourse with another man on the same pavement earlier in the
evening, however, leads to inferences that help the defense more than the prosecu-
tion, even if she did not claim rape on the earlier occasion.
Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right
About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FoRDrHAm UitB. L.J. 271, 278 (1995).
A more realistic (and more difficult) case would be one in which the complainant was
a respectable married woman-perhaps even a minister's wife-and the consent-defense
rape defendant sought to introduce evidence of previous affairs in order to rebut the infer-
ence of nonconsent that might be drawn from her marital status and apparent moral
stature.
958 See supra text accompanying notes 831-34. Exclusion of evidence of the putative vic-
tim's promiscuity can be justified on grounds of extrinsic policy: to encourage reporting of
rape and to preserve the woman's privacy. Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at 568. In
addition, the jury is likely to overvalue such evidence. See supra note 895. Therefore, exclu-
sion of the evidence can be justified even if one believes that ambiprobative evidence gen-
erally should be admissible.
959 If she was a prostitute, the defendant may claim that she falsely accused him after a
dispute about her fee. If she and the defendant were once lovers, their breakup may give
rise to a dispute that, according to the defendant, motivated a false accusation. Cf POSNER,
supra note 8, at 388.
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immediately prior to the rape.9 60
For example, if the defendant offers to prove that the alleged
victim used to be a prostitute, that evidence usually should be ex-
cluded as irrelevant and prejudicial. But what if he claims that their
sexual encounter was consensual and that he then refused to pay the
agreed sum (for instance, a heroin dealer reneged on a promised
"fix"), which led to her false rape report?961 It is difficult to see how
that sort of testimony can be excluded without violating the defend-
ant's due process right to make his defense. 962 In this hypothetical
case, he cannot even tell his version of their encounter without testify-
ing that she was a prostitute. The evidence, therefore, should be ad-
mitted to "provide context" and to supply a motive for a false
accusation, even though, in our judgment, the fact that she was a pros-
titute, without more, does not enhance the credibility of his claim that
no rape occurred.
4. Hitchhiking
Several authorities report thatjuries tend to disbelieve rape accu-
sations made by female hitchhikers.963 In support of this result, one
might speculate that hitchhikers are less risk-averse and more willing
to violate traditional norms of female behavior. Therefore, the argu-
ment might go, they probably are statistically more likely to engage in
casual sex. Even if this conjecture is valid, it does not follow that a
960 MCoRMicK, supra note 796, §§ 193, 350.
961 See supra notes 940-41.
962 Cf State v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212, 1216-17 (N.H. 1988). In Colbath, the defendant
was convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault after the judge instructed the jury that,
under the state's rape shield law, evidence of the complainant's behavior with other men
was irrelevant to the issues before them. The evidence in question indicated that the com-
plainant directed sexually provocative attention toward several men in a bar, including the
defendant. The defendant testified that he had fondled her breasts and bottom and she
had "rubbed his crotch" before the two of them eventually left the tavern and went to the
defendant's trailer, where sexual intercourse occurred: consensual by his account, forcible
by hers. The two of them were joined unexpectedly by a young woman who lived with the
defendant. Suspecting that the defendant was indulging in faithless behavior, she came
home at an unusual hour. With her suspicion confirmed, she flew into a rage and as-
saulted the complainant. As soon as the complainant returned to town, she accused the
defendant of rape. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge (later
Justice) Souter, held that evidence of the complainant's behavior immediately prior to the
rape, apparently inviting sexual advances from other men, such as sitting in one man's lap,
was relevant on the issue of consent. Judge Souter explained that "the jury could have
taken evidence of the complainant's openly sexually provocative behavior toward a group
of men as evidence of her probable attitude toward an individual within the group," and
"the sexual activities of a complainant immediately prior to an alleged rape may well be
subject to a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence." Id. at 1217.




rape accusation by a hitchhiker is less likely to be true than an accusa-
tion by another woman. Hitchhiking is a risk factor for rape.
964
Therefore, even if one assumes that hitchhikers are on average more
likely than other women to engage in casual sex, the evidence is
ambiprobative and provides no basis for treating rape complaints by
hitchhikers as less credible.
5. Delinquency and Delinquent Peers
Some scholars report that police are more likely to unfound a
rape complaint if the woman or girl has a police record.965 Beyond
that, evaluations of rape victims' characters are also inevitably affected
by the kinds of people with whom they associate. In the context of
rape, the temptation is to assume that a woman or girl who associates
with delinquent peers is a less credible rape complainant. Perhaps
such women do tend to be less honest and less sexually selective, but it
is equally plausible to suppose that they are more likely to be raped
than women who have no police record and who keep better
company.
One research project supports this supposition. By comparing
victims of sexual assaults with a control group of nonvictims, Professor
Suzanne Ageton sought to determine the best predictors of vulnera-
bility to sexual assault. 966 The single best predictor, by far, was expo-
964 A study of 55 rape victims found that 20% had been hitchhiking. QUEEN'S BENCH
FOUNDATION, RAPE VICTIMIZATION STUD. PREUMINARY RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 13 (1975), cited in BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 186 [hereinafter RAPE VICnMIZA-
TION STUDY]. Two sociologists who examined police reports in Boston and Los Angeles
found that gang rape was more common in the latter city. They attributed this difference
to a transportation and mobility problem that encourages the practice of hitchhiking in
Los Angeles. Id. at 186. According to data compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, many rapes of college students occur while hitchhiking. Id. at 350. Brownmiller is
surely correct in asserting that "[r] ape-minded men" would consider hitchhiking "tanta-
mount to an open invitation." Id. at 354. One study of convicted rapists' attitudes found
that a number of them regarded hitchhiking by females as "a signal of sexual availability."
Scully & Marolla, supra note 634, at 66.
A common kind of gang rape is hitchhike-abduction rape. As Scully & Marolla note:
In these cases, the gang, cruising an area, 'looking for girls,' picked up a female hitch-
hiker for the purpose of having sex. Though the intent was rape, a number of men
did not view it as such because they were convinced that women hitchhiked primarily
to signal sexual availability and only secondarily as a form of transportation. In these
cases, the unsuspecting victim was driven to a deserted area, raped, and in the majority
of cases physically injured.
Id. at 69. Cf Hall & Flannery, supra note 767, at 404 (hitchhiking found to be "significantly
related" to sexual assault).
965 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116. A prior felony conviction also may affect the
complainant's credibility.
966 Suzanne S. Ageton, Vulnerability to Sexual Assault, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT II,
supra note 314, at 221.
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sure to delinquent peers.967 Less predictive, but also a factor, was the
victim's own delinquent behavior.968 Professor Ageton concluded:
These findings suggest that the cumulative effect of associating with
delinquent peers and engaging in a fair amount of delinquency may be
to raise substantially the risk of sexual assault. We speculate that there
are two primary reasons why this may be so. First, the settings and cir-
cumstances in which delinquency occurs are likely to be conducive to
many forms of deviance. For example, even though a female victim may
have intended only to steal some drugs and get high with her friends,
the situation could easily evolve into one that ends with a forced sexual
experience. Second, a female involved in delinquent behavior may pro-
ject a generally deviant image, which carries with it expectations about
sexual behavior. Consequently, she may not be successful in restricting
her deviant behavior to nonsexual acts.969
If this study is accurate, 970 the very sort of young woman whose
rape report is often viewed with suspicion because of doubts about her
character and that of her associates is, in fact, more likely to be raped
than a woman of impeccable character and associations. Once again,
evidence that seems to discredit the complainant proves on closer in-
spection to be ambiprobative.
6. Mental Problems, Runaways, and Truants
One of the major evidentiary issues in modem rape trials con-
cerns evidence of the putative victim's mental problems and her rec-
ord, if any, of psychiatric care.9 71 By portraying her as "troubled,"
defendants seek to discredit her testimony and render their own
fabricated-charge scenario more plausible.9 72 Most courts authorize
release of the putative victim's psychiatric records under "extreme cir-
cumstances," leaving the evidentiary door at least slightly ajar.
9 73
Although post-rape psychological problems are obviously distin-
guishable, common sense seems to dictate admission of at least some
967 Id. at 239. Cf Hall & Flannery, supra note 767, at 402 (finding a slight but statistically
significant reiationship between the "sexual climate of the peer group" and sexual
victimization).
968 Ageton, supra note 966, at 238.
969 Id at 238-39. Another study found that while rape victimization was significantly
related to membership in a sexually active peer group, the relationship was "very slight."
Cf. Hall & Flannery, supra note 767, at 403. By the same token, some studies indicate that
religious females, with fewer sexually active female friends, are statistically less likely to be
raped. Id. at 405.
970 Ageton's definition of rape was vague and her methodology has been criticized.
BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 132-33.
971 See Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, supra note 28, at 14-20.
972 Id. at 15. This was done, in the press and in court filings, prior to the Kennedy-Smith
trial. Id.
973 Id. at 16-17.
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sorts of evidence about the complainant's pre-rape mental instability.
In the first place, some women who are mentally retarded or have
psychiatric problems are easier to seduce than the average woman. 974
At least in extreme cases, this is relevant to the consent defense. In
addition, Wigmore believed that mentally unstable women often
make false rape accusations.975 Even if Wigmore exaggerated this
phenomenon, it is hard to deny that mental instability sometimes af-
fects veracity. Given these arguments, it comes as no surprise that
police often reject the rape claims of women with a psychiatric
history.
976
On the other hand, evidence of mental problems may well be
ambiprobative: some unstable women are more vulnerable to rape
than the average woman, 977 and no one knows whether that vulnera-
bility is less significant than any enhanced propensity to consent or to
lie.978 Since the answer may vary from one syndrome to another, it
seems best to deal with these issues on a case-by-case basis.
The criminal justice system tends to reject accusations of rape by
runaways and truants.979 Perhaps such youths are indeed more likely
than other females to fabricate a rape charge, but it is at least equally
plausible to suppose that they are also more likely to be raped.980 Fe-
974 This may be because they are dependent on caregivers and thus reluctant to resist,
because they are unusually passive, or because they have difficulty expressing their lack of
consent. See generally Sherene Razack, From Consent to Responsibility, From Pity to Respect: Sub-
texts in Cases of Sexual Violence Involving Girls and Women With Developmental Disabilities, 19
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 891 (discussing the difficulty of applying traditional consent standards
to victims with developmental disabilities).
Of course, these qualities also may render mentally ill and mentally retarded women
more vulnerable to rape. A study of sexual abuse trends analyzed results from several Ca-
nadian and American studies and found the rate of sexual abuse and assault for develop-
mentally disabled women was four times greater than the national average. CHARLENE Y.
SENN, VULNERABLE: SEXUAL ABUSE & PEOPLE WITH AN INTELLECrUAL HANDICAP 4-8 (1989).
975 See supra note 611.
976 MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at 116.
977 One study reported that rape victims, when compared to controls, had higher rates
of pre-rape suicidal thoughts and psychiatric hospitalization. Myers et al., supra note 879,
at 76. A nationwide Swedish study concluded that 10% of rape complainants "seem to
have had some serious mental problems prior to the rape incident." Snare, supra note 234,
at 200. Of 55 American rape victims, 40% had psychiatric problems prior to the rape.
RAPE VICTIMIZATION STUDY, supra note 948, at 19. Estrich perceptively adverted to the pos-
sibility that psychiatric evidence about the rape accuser cuts both ways because perhaps
.rape victims may be especially likely to have led lives of trauma or pain; that rapists may
sense, and prey, on the vulnerable and the needy . Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, supra
note 28, at 17.
978 For an extreme example, see the dialogue reproduced in HOLMSTROM & BURGESS,
supra note 4, at 75.
979 See sources cited supra note 316.
980 E.M. Ellis et al., An Examination of Differences Between Multiple- and Single-Incident Vic-
tims of Sexual Assault, 91J. ABNORMAL PsYCH. 221-24 (1982) (multiple-incident victims signif-
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male juvenile delinquents presumably tend, more often than other
girls, to associate with violent boys and men and are therefore at
greater risk of becoming victims of violence.
7. Prior Intimacy with the Defendant
Evidence that the defendant and the complainant previously
were lovers is extremely effective in persuading police not to investi-
gate a rape complaint981 and jurors not to believe it.982 Judges also
have been known to take a dim view of such cases.98 3 Although previ-
ous consensual sex is obviously not conclusive evidence of consent on
the occasion in question, nearly all commentators regard it as rele-
vant, including thinkers as diverse as Susan Brownmiller, Herbert
Wechsler, Susan Estrich, and Menachim Amir.9 4 At least superfi-
cially, this sort of evidence seems superior to evidence of intercourse
with other men. There are, after all, two grounds on which one may
decline a sexual overture: 'You're the wrong person" or "this is the
wrong time." Evidence of sex with the defendant appears to eliminate
the former possibility, something that evidence of sex with other men,
or even of promiscuity, never does. Of course, the second possible
ground for a refusal remains open, but once we know that the com-
plainant previously had been receptive to sex with the defendant, we
icanty more dysfunctional in six of eight areas of functioning, and significantly more likely
to have attempted suicide). But see Sorenson et al., supra note 910, at 299-308.
981 MAmRS ET AL., supra note 25, at 96.
982 See supra note 65 (reviewing the impact of prior intimacy with the defendant on a
victim's credibility); note 380 and accompanying text (9% conviction rate).
983 See, e.g., Bohmer, supra note 403.
984 According to Brownmiller, although evidence about the complainant's sexual history
with other men should be excluded, "[p]rior consensual intercourse between the com-
plainant and the defendant does have some relevance, and such information probably
should not be barred." BROWNMiLLER, supra note 1, at 386. Similarly, Wechsler claimed
that "it simply ignores reality to suggest that past practice with the accused is not relevant
to the issue of consent on a given occasion, though it is equally a distortion to regard proof
of such experience as dispositive." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentary at 350 (1980).
See also AMIR, supra note 292, at 231.
Estrich offers a somewhat different rationale for admitting the evidence. In her view,
"evidence of any relationship between these two people is almost invariably relevant to his
state of mind, or mens rea, as to consent." Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, supra note 28, at 26. It
is true, of course, that a previous relationship might include events that tended to vali-
date-or for that matter, to rebut-a defendant's claim that he made a reasonable mistake
as to the woman's consent. But this is not necessarily what the defendant will claim, or the
evidence will plausibly suggest, actually occurred, in a rape case involving former lovers.
For example, the woman may testify that after they had separated the man requested sex,
she declined, and he then overpowered her. Unless he testifies that this sort of behavior
was a recurrent and apparently mutually enjoyable feature of their relationship, we fail to
see the relevance of that relationship to his "state of mind." In most cases, he will testify
that she unambiguously assented. Cf supra text accompanying note 369 (discussing such a
case from Estrich's REAL RAPE).
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seem to have advanced the inquiry considerably. One might contend,
therefore, that the consent defense is most plausible in cases where
the defendant was the husband or lover of the alleged victim. This is
why rape shield laws, either explicitly or by judicial gloss, contain an
exception for testimony about prior sexual relations between the com-
plainant and the defendant.
985
What legislators and rape scholars have overlooked is the possibil-
ity that evidence of prior intimacies is ambiprobative. True, the fact
that the defendant and the complainant were lovers is much more
probative of consent on the occasion in question than evidence of
intimacies with other men. A prior relationship may also supply a mo-
tive for a false accusation. But apparently men are more likely to rape
women with whom they previously have been intimate than women
with whom no such relationship existed. Koss found that 31% of ac-
knowledged rape victims, and 76% of those who in fact were raped
but did not regard it as rape, had been involved romantically with the
offender.986 According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of rape
victims, 28% of rapists were current or former husbands or boyfriends
of the victim. 987 If such figures are even approximately correct, then
985 The least controversial exception to rape shield laws allows testimony about prior
intimacy between the parties. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 48, at 86-87 (such inquiries per-
mitted under English law); Galvin, supra note 4, at 807 (observing that "[e]ven the most
ardent reformers acknowledged the high probative value of past sexual conduct.., when
the defendant claims consent and establishes prior consensual sexual relations between
himself and the complainant"). The theory behind this exception seems to be, not that
such testimony is an inevitable preliminary to testimony about the encounter in question,
but that it is relevant to whether the alleged victim consented. Adler, supra note 48, at 88.
Adler argues that this sort of evidence,
relies on the rather dubious assumption that once a woman agrees to intercourse with
a man, the likelihood is that she will continue to consent at any later stage in their
relationship or indeed when the relationship has ended. The rationale here is rather
reminiscent of Hale's famous dictum regarding the permanent nature of consent
given on marriage.
Id.
But, there is a huge difference between a rule that a married woman is not entitled to
decline sex and a rule that merely allows the jury to learn about the marriage in determin-
ing whether she in fact declined. It is true, of course, that prior intimacy between the
parties is far from being conclusive evidence that consent was given on the occasion in
question. But Adler's argument does not explain why such evidence is irrelevant rather
than merely inconclusive. If the issue were whether the woman had agreed to go fishing
with the man on a particular occasion, or had agreed to sell him widgets, evidence that she
had often done so in the past would be useful, even though she might have declined on
the occasion in question. It is only by focusing on the ambiprobative aspect of the evi-
dence that one can plausibly describe it as irrelevant. But it will probably be admissible
anyway, "to provide context."
986 Koss, supra note 170.
987 Most Women Know Their Attackers, supra note 766, at 17. Another survey found that
9% of victims had been raped by their husband or former husband, and another 10% by
boyfriends or ex-boyfriends. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 4.
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it would not be implausible (though it might be mistaken) to specu-
late that the false proportion of rape reports directed at former lovers
is lower than the false proportion of rape reports directed at other
men.988
A thought experiment may serve to illuminate the point. Imag-
ine that a woman has confided to you that last night her boyfriend
raped her. Then, as an alternative hypothetical, imagine that the
same woman has instead confided that one of her colleagues at work,
with whom she had never been sexually intimate, raped her. Assume
that both men, questioned by the police, denied the accusation and
claimed that the intercourse was consensual. All else being equal, is
the accusation against the boyfriend less credible than the accusation
against the colleague?
Even if there have been no prior intimacies, a long-term dating
relationship increases the popular acceptability of forced sex. In one
survey of high-school students, 43% of the males (and 32% of the fe-
males) said that it is acceptable for a man to force a woman to have
sex if they have dated for a long time.989 According to a study of col-
lege students' attitudes, if a woman has been sexually intimate with a
man on ten previous occasions, a subsequent incident of forcible sex
is less likely to be deemed rape than if the parties had no previous
intercourse.990
In appraising this phenomenon, one should bear in mind that in
988 It is probably impossible to fashion a research design that would resolve this issue.
What scholars have studied, instead, is a related question: whether most rape victims are
raped by strangers, casual acquaintances, dates, or steady boyfriends. Even on this rela-
tively simple issue the findings are mixed. Some studies find that most rapes occur on
casual dates. Belknap, supra note 174, at 205; Ward et al., supra note 881, at 65. Others
find that more rapes occur in long-term relationships. C. Kirkpatrick & E. Kanin, Male Sex
Aggression on a University Campus, 22 Am. Soc. REv. 52 (1957) (more advanced forms of
sexual aggression found to have occurred in more durable relationships); Mary P. Koss et
al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There Differences in the Victim's Experience, 12 PsYcHoL.
WOMEN Q. 1 (1988); Muehlenhard & Linton, supra note 879, at 186; R. Lance Shotland &
Lynn Goodstein, Sexual Precedence Reduces the Perceived Legitimacy of Sexual Refusal: An Exami-
nation of Attributions Concerning Date Rape and Consensual Sex, 18 PERSONAry & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 756 (1992). The most methodologically sophisticated, national survey of
sexual practices found that, of the women who had been "'forced to do something sexual
that they did not want to do,'" 46% were victimized by someone with whom they were in
love, and in another 9% of the incidents the perpetrator was their spouse. LUMANN ET
AL., supra note 56, at 338. This finding is highly suggestive, but "forced," as understood by
the respondents, does not necessarily mean raped in the legal sense. Cf Shotland, supra
note 178 (39% of victims dated the rapist after the rape).
989 Goodchilds et al., Adolescents and Their Perceptions of Sexual Interaction Outcomes, in
RAPE AND SEXuAL. ASSAULT II, supra note 314, at 245-70.
990 Shodand & Goodstein, supra note 988, at 756. Such attitudes are not confined to
students. See Giarrusso, sup-a note 525, at 66 (43% of men and 32% of women consider
aggressive sex appropriate if the parties have dated a long time).
1997] 1371
BRYDEN & LENGNICK
some of the cases involving prior intimacy, the parties had separated
prior to the alleged rape.991 No doubt prior intimacy increases the
likelihood that the woman would consent, except perhaps in some
cases of unusually acrimonious separation, but it probably also in-
creases the likelihood that the man would feel entitled to force him-
self upon the woman. In addition, the quarrel that led to the
separation, perhaps coupled with sexual frustration, may have in-
flamed the man's anger, further increasing the risk of violence toward
the object of his hostility.
Prior intimacy may give the man a proprietary feeling. At com-
mon law, this feeling was sanctioned, for married men, by the rule
that married women were not entitled to decline their husbands' re-
quests for sex.992 Even in jurisdictions that have abolished this rule,
the underlying attitude presumably persists in some husbands and lov-
ers.993 The man may feel that it isn't really rape if the two have previ-
ously been intimate. Further, a prior relationship may give him a
greater sense of security. He may know (or think he knows) that "she
would never go to the police." Of course, this attitude is especially
likely if he has raped her before. He may also intuit that, because of
their prior relationship, "no one will believe I raped her."
In rare circumstances, a prior sexual relationship might provide a
basis for a reasonable-mistake defense. For example, suppose that two
lovers have previously had forcible sex, but the woman acted after-
wards as if she enjoyed the experience. In such an unusual relation-
ship, the man might reasonably come to believe that the woman's
verbal or even physical resistance does not signify nonconsent. The
parties have developed, so to speak, a private language. He might
have a valid mistake defense if, contrary to her previous practice, she
suddenly decided to treat one of these encounters as rape. Apart
from such exceptional cases, we see no reason to assume, though it
may be so, that those who know each other well make more mistakes
than those who do not.
One mightjustify admission of evidence of a long-term prior rela-
tionship on the ground that such evidence is less likely to be prejudi-
cial than evidence of promiscuity, especially in an age when
monogamous, nonmarital sex has become very common. But the is-
991 See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 52, at 250.
992 See DRESSLER, supra note 62. The Model Penal Code retains the common law rule
that a husband cannot rape his wife. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985).
993 ESTRiCH, supra note 1, at 107 n.3. Fifteen states had abolished the marital exemption
for rape as ofJanuary, 1990. In 23 states it is punished less severely than non-marital rape,
and in eight states, it is punishable only if the couple was living apart and in the process of
legal separation or divorce. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 375-82 (1990).
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sue of prejudice arises, theoretically, only after a preliminary judg-
ment that the evidence is relevant.994
This is not to say that the evidence of a prior relationship should
be excluded. Even more often than in cases in which the woman is a
prostitute, it may be essential to mention the prior relationship in or-
der to provide a context for testimony about such matters as why they
were together on the evening of the alleged crime. To take an ex-
treme case, it would be absurd to exclude evidence that they were
husband and wife, forcing the jurors to speculate about why they occu-
pied the same house. A prior relationship may also furnish a possible
motive for a false accusation. But acquittal of the defendant cannot
be justified on the theory that a prior relationship increases the likeli-
hood that the sexual encounter was consensual. We do not know
whether that is true.
8. Summary
The types of evidence that are commonly used to discredit rape
complainants do indeed often tend to show at least a slightly above-
average propensity to consent to sex, either in general or with the
defendant. But they also tend to show an above-average vulnerability
to rape, either in general or by the defendant.
As an empirical matter, one of these conflicting inferences may
be much stronger than the other. For example, it is possible that sex-
ually unselective women are more likely than the average woman to lie
about rape.995 Judge James Horton, in his memorandum granting a
new trial in the infamous Scottsboro Case,996 treated this as common
knowledge: "History, sacred and profane, and the common experi-
ence of mankind teach that women of the character shown in this case
994 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded). See also McCoRMIcK,
supra note 796, § 185.
995 On the other hand, the character of the average rape defendant is probably more
suggestive of dishonesty than that of the average rape complainant, regardless of her sex-
ual habits. Moreover, if he is guilty, he has an obvious, extremely powerful motive to lie
about the rape, while in her case the suggested motive for a false accusation is usually
weaker and more speculative. Given the burden of proof, however, any strong correlation
between promiscuity and dishonesty about forced sex would tend to justify, if only sightly,
acquittals in such cases.
The converse question also arises. What if the woman's character is exemplary, and
she is a churchgoer? There is some evidence that churchgoers are less likely to be raped.
BOURQUE, supra note 25, at 49. But this may be more than offset by their presumptively
greater truthfulness, a possibility that raises multiple difficult issues, including whether
characteristics such as honesty are general or situational, and, even if the suggested infer-
ence is valid, to what degree juries are likely to overrate its probative force. See generally
Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at 561-65.
996 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Patterson v. Alabama 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
1997] 1373
BRYDEN & LENGNICK
are prone to make false accusations both of rape and of insult upon
the slightest provocation or without even provocation, for ulterior
purposes."
997
Modern scholars invariably regard this sort of folk wisdom as pa-
tently sexist and mythical. They may be right, but in the present state
of our knowledge it would be more accurate to say that (1) the pro-
portion of chronic liars among promiscuous women may be much
higher than among women in general; but (2) this is not demon-
strated by "history" or "common experience;" and (3) even assuming
arguendo that such women are on average less honest, we have no way
of knowing whether this outweighs, statistically, the contrary inference
that one can draw from their enhanced vulnerability to rape.
By the same token, a rape accusation by a man's girlfriend or wife
in fact may be more (or less) likely to be false than an accusation by
another woman; but nothing in common experience or the currently
available academic research provides a firm basis for such a
conclusion.
Most lawyers probably would argue that ambiprobative evidence
should be admitted, allowing the jury to decide which inference is
superior. One problem with that position is that it seems to invite
unwarranted speculation on the jury's part. Another problem, partic-
ularly acute in acquaintance rape cases, is that ambiprobative "miscon-
duct" evidence seems to have a severely prejudicial effect. In other
words, juries treat the evidence as if it were much more helpful to the
defense than to the prosecution. Of course, the trial judge could in-
struct the jury that the evidence is ambiprobative, but in some other
contexts analogous instructions have not been highly effective. 998
For these reasons, we favor a general rule excluding all
ambiprobative "misconduct" testimony if offered as evidence on the
issue of consent. However, even if this radical reform were adopted, it
probably would not affect the outcome of many cases. Most types of
ambiprobative evidence in rape cases can be offered for some purpose
other than as evidence of consent. For example, evidence that the
woman had been drinking would be relevant to the reliability of her
memory. For this purpose, the evidence would not be ambiprobative.
More often than not, ambiprobative evidence is essential to provide
997 A NEw DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1004 (H.L. Mencken ed., 1942).
998 See, e.g., S. Penrod & E. Borgida, Legal Rules and Lay Interference, REV. PEas. & Soc.
PSYCH. 151 (1983); S. Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated
Jurors: A MoralDilemma, 4J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 345 (1973); S. Wolf & D.A. Montgomery,
Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level ofJudicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of
Mock Jurors, 7J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 205 (1977). For a recent review of the research on the
effectiveness ofjury instructions, see Kerwin & Shaffer, supra note 447, at 153-55.
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context by explaining how the parties met (they were lovers, or she
was a prostitute or a hitchhiker) or why they behaved as they did (the
reason they went to his house was to smoke marijuana, etc.).
Perhaps the public antipathy toward nontraditional rape victims
can be justified by combining some of the arguments that appear to
be specious or inadequate when examined individually. Consider, for
example, a case in which the complainant is a hitchhiking, promiscu-
ous, substance-abusing, teenage runaway. While it is true that such a
woman is statistically more vulnerable to rape than most women, it
may not be true that this enhanced vulnerability totally offsets her pre-
sumptively enhanced propensity to consent, coupled with the possibil-
ity that such a woman is more likely than the average woman to be a
chronic liar.999 Taken together, these two grounds for viewing her
uncorroborated rape complaint with some suspicion may outweigh
the rape-vulnerability reason for presuming that her accusation is ex-
traordinarily credible.
The question is empirical rather than logical. We must therefore
rely, so the argument might go, on the judgments of police and juries
who have immersed themselves in the facts of individual cases. The
biases of such decisionmakers, serious though they sometimes are,
may be outweighed by the advantages of having investigated concrete
cases. Only such decisionmakers are in a position to perceive nu-
ances-for example, of evasion and inconsistency-that for all we
know may correlate with one or more of the "bad victim" traits. If
these decisionmakers tend to disbelieve the "bad" woman's rape com-
plaint, perhaps that recurrent disbelief reflects a cumulative wisdom,
distilled from many thousands of individual cases and evaluators, that
no cloistered theorist or social-scientific experiment can match.
We think this argument has some merit. This is a field in which
first-hand experience in investigating rape complaints would be inval-
uable, but there is no consensus among those who have immersed
themselves in the facts of rape cases. 1000
The social-scientific literature canvassed earlier in this article
demonstrates that many people, especially men with traditional val-
ues, blame the rape victim for legally irrelevant reasons. 1001 There-
fore, it seems certain that, as feminists contend, some detectives and
jurors are improperly predisposed to reject accusations of acquain-
tance rape. While the opposite bias undoubtedly exists, it appears to
be much less common.
999 The experts disagree about whether character traits such as honesty are situational
rather than general. Bryden & Park, supra note 310, at 561-65.
1000 See supra text accompanying notes 603-719.
1001 See supra text accompanying notes 446-96.
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Jurors who are lenient toward men accused of raping a nontradi-
tional victim may not be expressing ajudgment about the comparative
plausibility of the prosecution's rape scenario and the defendant's se-
duction-fabricated charge scenario. Their motivation instead may be
a combination of legally appropriate concerns about whether guilt has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and legally inappropriate
(but common) feelings that not all rapes are equally harmful, and not
all rapists are equally dangerous. Consider, for example, a case in
which the complainant and the defendant used to be lovers. She
claims that he raped her; he claims that the sex was voluntary and that
later, after he told her that he didn't love her any more, she fabricated
a rape charge. Assume that neither story is patently untrue. Why is it
that jurors are especially likely to acquit in such'cases?
It is hard to believe that modern juries strongly disapprove of mo-
nogamous, nonmarital sex. Absent other discrediting evidence, we
doubt that jurors regard the woman in this type of case as morally
repugnant. But, if they are uncertain about who is telling the truth,
decision theory tells us that they will try to take account of the poten-
tial impact of an erroneous verdict. That is, they will seek to minimize
their expected regret from having reached an erroneous decision. 1 02
If they erroneously acquit the defendant, they will have failed to pun-
ish a man who raped a woman with whom he had previously been
intimate. Although many authors stress that this sort of rape can have
a devastating psychological impact,100 3 it seems probable that most ju-
rors are not terribly disturbed by the prospect of having failed to in-
carcerate a single rapist of this sort. 00 4 For retributive purposes and
1002 RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE
162 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing prejudice in terms of regret matrix of jurors).
1003 Women who are raped by someone they know have to cope not only with the physi-
cal violation of their bodies, but also the betrayal of trust. JEAN O'GoRMAN HUGHES &
BERNICE R. SANDLER, "FRIENDS" RAPING FRIENDS: COULD IT HAPPEN TO You? 6 (1987) (ex-
plaining the adverse effects of date and acquaintance rape on the victims); MARY P. Koss &
MARY R- HARVEY, THE RAPE VICTIM: CLINICAL AND COMMUNITY APPROACHES To TREATMENT
42 (1987) (discussing the difficult post-rape adjustment for acquaintance rape victims). In
addition, acquaintance rape victims are more likely to be blamed for being raped, and
therefore they may receive less emotional support from others, than women who were
raped by strangers. Id. See also ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 65 (1988) (citing
a study by researchers at the Urban Institute that concluded acquaintance rape victims rate
themselves less recovered than do stranger rape victims for up to three years following
their rape experiences). On the other hand, some studies indicate that a substantial mi-
nority of rape victims continue to date the rapist, suggesting that acquaintance rapes are
sometimes less devastating than modem scholars uniformly assert. See supra notes 181-82
and accompanying text.
1004 Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985) commentary at 307 (stating that "when previ-
ous sexual liberties have been allowed and the persons involved are voluntary companions
on the occasion of the offense, the gravity of the wrong is arguably less severe"). The MPC
classifies aggravated rapes as first degree rape and simple rapes (parties acquainted, no
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deterrence of the defendant ("specific deterrence"),1005 they may re-
gard the ordeal of being publicly accused and tried as sufficient.
Without necessarily condoning the man's conduct, or even feeling
that it should not be a crime, jurors may be comfortable taking the
risk of an erroneous acquittal in this type of case if they are unsure
what occurred. This acquittal has a price, but it is not like the risk of
acquitting an armed serial rapist who has terrorized a city.10 0 6 If, on
the other hand, they make the opposite mistake, convicting an inno-
cent man falsely charged with raping his girlfriend, they will have "de-
stroyed an innocent man's life." Decision theory predicts that on
these assumptions jurors who aren't quite certain what happened will
vote to acquit,10 0 7 and that is indeed what they usually do. 100 8 The
same sorts of feelings may explain acquittals in some other nontradi-
tional victim cases, particularly those involving prostitutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The major premises of the first wave of rape law reforms were
that the criminal justice system discriminates against victims of nonag-
gravated acquaintance rape, and that law reforms can substantially al-
leviate the problem. To provide a foundation for consideration of
more recent reform proposals, we reevaluated those premises from
several perspectives. We began by considering evidence of anti-victim
bias. The attrition rate in acquaintance rape cases is extremely high,
but acquaintance cases have high, attrition rates for all crimes, and,
given the uniqueness of each crime's proof problems, there is no rea-
son to expect equal attrition rates in, for example, sexual and nonsex-
ual assaults by acquaintances.
The main source of case attrition in acquaintance rape cases is
the victim's reluctance to pursue legal redress. A substantial, if not
enormous, majority of acquaintance rape victims either do not report
the crime or, having reported it, later decline to press charges. Schol-
physical injury) as second degree. It seems likely that many jurors agree that acquaintance
rapes are less serious. If so, they presumably are more willing, all else being equal, to
acquit in close acquaintance rape cases.
1005 Criminal law jurisprudence customarily distinguishes between general deterrence,
deterring potential offenders in the community through the threat of punishment, and
specific deterrence, deterring the defendant himself from committing the crim6 again by
punishing him. See generally KAnisH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 19, at 149.
1006 Jurors seem to be understandably eager to incarcerate rapists who use weapons. See,
e.g., LaFree et al., supra note 66; LaFree, supra note 381.
1007 LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 1002, at 162.
1008 The psychological impact of a rape on a prostitute is perceived by many as being less
acute than the impact on other victims. Silbert, supra note 314, at 76. The same authority
believes that in reality the emotional impact of rape is compounded when the victim is a
prostitute. Id. at 82-83.
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ars often attribute this phenomenon, in large part, to victims' fears of
a hostile or overly skeptical criminal justice system, and especially the
practice of "putting the victim on trial" by exposing her sexual history.
So far, empirical studies indicate that this hypothesis exaggerates the
role of legal rules in deterring reporting of rape. The weight of the
evidence suggests that (1) the incidence of rape has declined in re-
cent decades; (2) the proportion of victims who report the crime has
risen during the same period; and (3) this rising propensity to report
has been due, mainly if not entirely, to attitudinal changes associated
with the women's movement rather than law reforms, such as shield
laws, in individual jurisdictions. Although we cannot be certain, our
guess is that rape reporting is inhibited chiefly by nonlegal factors
such as embarrassment about having been raped, or about the sur-
rounding circumstances, self-blaming, fear of the investigatory and ad-
versarial processes (quite apart from the specific rules of law criticized
by reformers), the victim's desire to resume a normal life, her peers'
and family's attitudes, and often even her desire to preserve her rela-
tionship with the rapist. For an increasing percentage of victims,
these disincentives are outweighed by a commitment to see justice
done. Although this commitment generally does not appear to be en-
hanced by legal changes in the jurisdiction where the crime occurred,
law reforms throughout the country may have contributed, cumula-
tively, to a growing sense that the victim is not to blame, will be treated
fairly, and may prevail. In this indirect way, reforms in one state may
encourage reporting in other states. If so, reforms may be somewhat
more effective than they appear to be when studied in individual
states. We simply do not know.
Some police detectives are suspicious of reports of acquaintance
rape, especially when they disapprove of the woman's character or
conduct prior to the rape. In our judgment, this bias cannot be justi-
fied by any presently available evidence that rape complaints by norm-
violating women tend to be less credible. Nor can it be justified by the
difficulty of obtaining convictions in such cases: that sort of decision
should be made by prosecutors rather than by police, although to the
extent that police accurately predict prosecutorial decisions we cannot
confidently say that this procedural point matters much to victims. In
any event, there is some evidence that most women who report rape
have a favorable opinion of their treatment by the police.
Several studies have found correlations between the police re-
sponse to a rape complaint and the complainant's race, her welfare
status, her age, her lifestyle, and other presumably irrelevant factors.
These studies, however, typically cover only one police department
during a short period and are often ten or twenty years old. More
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fundamentally, the studies of police unfounding decisions do not
(and obviously cannot) reveal which rape complaints were untruthful.
Typically, the studies are rigorously quantitative and do not even re-
veal what proportion of rape complaints contain inconsistencies or
other indicia of untruthfulness. Lacking such information, it is impos-
sible to saywhether a correlation between some attribute of the puta-
tive victim and the likelihood that her complaint will be unfounded is
due to fabricated complaints, truthful but suspicious sounding com-
plaints, unjustifiable police bias, or some combination of the three.
Nor do the studies provide evidence from which a reader can infer
how often police unfound a rape complaint that might have led to a
conviction. Since prosecutors often decline to file charges, and juries
often acquit, even in the relatively strong cases in which the police
regard the complaint as credible, it seems probable that police atti-
tudes, however mistaken they may be in some or even many cases, are
rarely outcome determinative.
This is not to say that excessive police skepticism is harmless. Un-
fair treatment of a crime victim is still unfair, even if it does not affect
the likelihood that the offender will be punished. Recognizing this,
many police departments have created sexually-integrated units to
deal with rape and other sex-crime investigations. Some scholars be-
lieve that this administrative change has contributed to victims' will-
ingness to 'report rapes.
Prosecutors naturally seek high conviction rates, and conse-
quently are reluctant to prosecute cases in which the odds are long
against a conviction. Given the difficulties of corroborating accusa-
tions of acquaintance rape, this prosecutorial attitude has a more se-
vere impact on such cases than it does in most other areas of the
criminal law. For this reason, we concur with scholars who urge prose-
cutors to take more chances in acquaintance rape cases than they cus-
tomarily do in other types of cases. Comparative conviction-rate data
suggest that in some cases prosecutors are already doing so. In any
event, the potential benefits of a futile prosecution should be bal-
anced against potential psychic costs to the rape victim, and missed
opportunities to pursue other, possibly more winnable cases.
There is a great deal of anecdotal and social-scientific evidence of
public (and jury) bias against norm-violating victims of acquaintance
rape. This bias is most prevalent among people, especially but not
exclusively males, with traditional sex-role values. Given the variety of
such evidence, the methodological weaknesses of individual studies
and sources do not seem fatal.
This bias appears to have declined in recent decades, with the
result that juries are at least somewhat more sympathetic to the prose-
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cution in acquaintance rape cases. Although we lack definitive, na-
tional studies, the role of law reforms in achieving this result appears
to have been peripheral: as with reporting rates, rape conviction rates
have not been highly responsive to legal reforms. This should not be
surprising. We favor rape shield laws, for example, but it is a major
mistake to suppose that, with a properly-drafted shield law, "victim
blaming" will or should disappear from the courtroom in acquain-
tance rape cases. Given our adversarial system, the defendant in a
consent-defense case will inevitably try to discredit the alleged vic-
tim. 100 9 How else can he account for the fact that, as he contends, she
has falsely accused him of rape? Even if he claims that the "rape" was
due to a misunderstanding (rather than a fabricated accusation), he
will try to persuade the jury that his mistake was reasonable, or in
other words that the woman was partly if not entirely to blame for the
misunderstanding.
Thus, the law cannot simply "shift the focus of the trial from the
woman's conduct to the man's," as so many reformers have urged. 01 0
To a considerable degree, evidence about her conduct will be admit-
ted and weighed as evidence about his state of mind and conduct. In
consent-defense rape cases, as in civil contracts cases, the two are in-
separable. The jury, after all, has to decide who is lying or, if the evi-
dence suggests an honest mistake as to consent, whether the mistake
was reasonable. There is no way to engage in this inquiry without ex-
amining both parties' alleged behavior.
1009 See, e.g., this cross examination:
Q: Isn't it a fact that at the point when your girdle came off, you assisted in the taking
of that girdle off?
A- Assisted? I wouldn't use the word assisted,
Q: Did you participate in taking that girdle off?...
Q: Did you in any way pull that girdle down?
A: No, I wouldn't say that, sir.
Q: Isn't it a fact that you helped those men take that girdle off your body? ...
Q: Isn't it a fact, further, that you did not resist their taking off those underpants from
your body?
A: That's not true. That's not true....
Q: Is it not a fact that on the occasion of the third intercourse, you said to the man
.come on, come on"? ...
A: If I used the words "come on," it meant please leave me alone, come on, don't do
this to me .... But I didn't say "come on" in the sense the other way.
United States v. Thorne, 406 F.2d 995 (D.D.C. 1969), quoted in Richard A. Hibbey, The Trial
of a Rape Case, in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 180-81 n.48 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1975). This is an
example of the sort of brutal cross-examination that is permissible, and should be permissi-
ble, notwithstanding shield laws and other reforms. Although the questions all focus on
the putative victim's behavior, they are all relevant both as to whether she consented and
whether the defendants reasonably believed so. Our point is not that shield laws are use-
less, but that one should not expect a rape trial to focus on the defendant's behavior to the
exclusion of the victim's behavior.
1010 CHARLEs W. DEAN & MARY DEBRUYN-KoPs, THE CRIME AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
RAPE 86 (1982) (finding that rape trial victims are treated worse than defendants).
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The problem is not thatjuries focus on the woman's conduct but
that they sometimes draw unwarranted inferences of consent from her
violation of sex-role norms. It is difficult to see how this can be pre-
vented by rules of law. To be sure, a well-drafted shield law will ex-
clude certain kinds of evidence about the woman's sexual history with
other men. Such laws are desirable even if they do not change many
case outcomes. But defendants still have opportunities, many of them
legitimate or inevitable, to discredit the rape complainant's character.
Even without formal sexual history evidence, the jury will learn, for
example, that the woman was hitchhiking, or that the parties had
been drinking, or that the woman had behaved in a "lewd" manner
shortly before the rape, or that she had been the defendant's girl-
friend, or even, sometimes, that she was a prostitute.
Even without a formal corroboration requirement, juries still
want some corroboration. And even without an instruction that resist-
ance by the victim is an essential element of the crime, juries will still
consider the degree of resistance in determining whether the woman
consented or at least misled the defendant.
For all these reasons, conviction rates cannot easily be changed
by waving a legal wand. This is not a counsel of despair. Even when
law reforms are ineffective, attitudinal changes, perhaps indirectly
helped along by the reforms, may achieve the desired result. Besides,
conviction rates are a poor measure of the success of a criminal justice
system. Few readers will need to be reminded that fairness to defend-
ants is also important. No less important, and traditionally under-
emphasized in most of the criminal law literature, is fairness to
victims. Whether the rapist is punished may be less important to his
victim than whether she perceives that officials have responded em-
pathetically and fairly to her report of a terrible crime. In this respect,
there have been some improvements in the justice system,1011 and no
doubt further progress can be made.
In Part II of the article we evaluated three general defenses of
leniency in acquaintance rape cases, beginning with the formerly pop-
ular idea that many rape reports are false. Although most scholars
seem to believe that this issue has been settled by common sense, or
by research showing that nearly all reported rapes actually occurred,
1011 See, e.g., FAIRSTEIN, supra note 13, at 270-73 (remarking upon the urgent need to
continue striving for improvement). See also Cassia Spohn & Julie Homey, "The Law's the
Law but Fair is Fair:" Rape Shield Laws and Officials' Assessment of Sexual History Evidence, 29
CRMrNoLoGY 137 (1991); Wade Barber & Pat DeVine, Prosecuting Cases of Sexual Assault 5
PoputAtR Gov. 1, 1-5 (1985). The authors stress the positive effects of a number of reforms
designed to make the victim's experience more bearable-for example, steps to protect
the her from unnecessary interviews and court appearances and to advise her weekly about
the progress of the case. Id. at 4-5.
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the question is still open. There is no consensus among the handful
of scholars who have tried to evaluate the veracity of a sample of rape
complaints. Nor is there any way to demonstrate, deductively, that the
proportion of false reports is minuscule.
While it is impossible to know exactly what proportion of rape
complaints are false, some scholars have tabulated the percentages of
complaints that were subsequently retracted. These studies covered
only a couple of jurisdictions and yielded radically different results.
Pending the results of further research, we can only say that the pro-
portion of rape reports that are false may be higher than modern
scholars usually suppose.
At first blush, this possibility seems to threaten the whole edifice
of modem rape scholarship. If false reports are common, the oft-criti-
cized public and official skepticism will indeed appear in a much
more favorable light. But false reports do not necessarily lead to mis-
taken convictions. There is no reason to suppose that many women
and girls make false reports, do not retract them, and manage to
deceive a detective, a prosecutor, and a jury. On the contrary, the
most impressive "false report" study was based on quickly-obtained re-
cantations during police investigations and therefore provides no evi-
dence that false reports survive the screening process. Although any
such claim is necessarily speculative, the anecdotal and social-scientific
evidence both suggest that the proportion of erroneous convictions in
acquaintance rape cases may be lower than in many other types of
criminal cases, especially those in which the government relies on an
eyewitness.
We considered the possibility that acquittals in acquaintance rape
cases are attributable to the prosecution's heavy burden of proof, and
the difficulty of winning a "swearing contest." We found that the pros-
ecution is at a disadvantage in pure swearing contests, not only in ac-
quaintance rape cases but in some other crimes as well. The burden
of proof is a legitimate reason for case attrition in those acquaintance
rape cases where both parties' versions of the encounter are plausible
and corroboration of the alleged victim's account is lacking. Although
uncorroborated accusations probably are not a high proportion of the
rape cases in which charges are filed, they presumably are common
among rapes that are not reported or that do not survive pre-trial
screening by police and prosecutors. In such cases the problem is not
the oft-criticized corroboration requirement, but rather the difficulty
of eliminating reasonable doubts without corroboration.
We are not suggesting that it is often legally impossible to secure a
conviction for an acquaintance rape. Ordinarily, the victim's testi-
mony is sufficient to create a jury issue. Our point, rather, is that ju-
1382 [Vol. 87
ries, even if they have no improper biases, are likely to acquit if the
prosecution lacks strong corroborative evidence and the defendant
suggests a plausible motive for a fabricated rape charge. In such cases,
much depends on whether the jurors find the defendant's "false accu-
sation" scenario plausible. This in turn depends partly on jurors' intu-
itions about the rate of false rape charges.
According to Kalven and Zeisel's data, trial judges in the 1950s
frequently disagreed with acquittals in nonaggravated acquaintance
rape cases. This finding is broadly consistent with most of the more
recent anecdotal and social-scientific evidence about acquaintance
rape cases, particularly those with "nontraditional" victims. It seems
clear, therefore, that the burden of proof does not fully explain the
historic leniency of juries in these cases. Some evidence suggests that
excessive leniency has substantially declined in recent years, but the
reports are fragmentary, and regional variations probably persist.
Approaching the problem from a different perspective, we in-
quired whether rape complaints are less credible when the evidence
reveals prior intimacy with the accused,, contributory negligence, pros-
titution, promiscuity, substance abuse, hitchhiking, or some other vio-
lation of traditional norms of female conduct. To analyze this subject,
we introduced the concept of ambiprobative evidence. Applying that
concept to rape-victim-norm-violation evidence, we concluded that in
most if not all such cases the woman's behavior is indeed at least
slightly suggestive of consensual intercourse. None of the conven-
tional grounds for rejecting this inference is wholly persuasive. But
the same evidence is, we submit, suggestive of vulnerability to rape.
Perhaps one of these inferences is empirically stronger than the other,
but we know of no basis for that surmise in the academic literature or
common experience. This being so, jurors' tendency. to acquit the
defendant in these types of cases is not defensible by reference to the
known probative value of the evidence.
Once more, however, the potential effect of law reform is limited.
Although we believe that courts should usually exclude ambiprobative
evidence when offered to show consent, such evidence must often be
admitted to provide context by explaining the circumstances of the
parties' encounter. The evidence may also be admissible for other
legitimate purposes such as to show a motive for a false accusation.
Once the evidence is admitted, it is difficult to prevent juries from
misusing it.
We have speculated that acquittals in nontraditional victim cases
are sometimes due to mixed motives. Uncertain who is telling the
truth, jurors may prefer to run the risk of having acquitted the rapist
of a prostitute, or of a former lover, rather than running the risk of
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ruining an innocent man's life. While we might balance the interests
differently, in close cases this is an understandable choice. It is diffi-
cult to see how new rules of law would alter these perhaps uncon-
scious calculations; such reasoning is already legally improper,
because the law makes no such distinctions among victims.
We conclude that although official bias has played an important
role, most rape-case attrition appears to be due to a combination of
the victim's unwillingness to seek legal redress, the prosecution's bur-
den of proof in criminal cases, and jurors' attitudes. The first and
third factors are affected by evolving public attitudes toward rape,
which in turn may be enhanced by national publicity given to law re-
forms. But in most individual jurisdictions changes in legal rules do
not seem to generate noticeable changes in case outcomes in that
jurisdiction.
In sum, there is good news and bad news. The bad news is that
rape law reforms appear to play a much more secondary instrumental
role than legal scholars like to believe. The good news is that, for
whatever reason, progress has occurred: the rape rate appears to have
declined since the 1970s; victims seem to be more willing to report to
the police; police and prosecutors are more likely to employ special-
ized sex-crimes units with expertise in the emotional as well as the
legal aspects of the crime; and there is anecdotal evidence that juries
have become more sympathetic to acquaintance rape victims.
From the victims' perspective, these developments are as wel-
come as they would be if they were mainly due to law reforms. From
the legal reformer's perspective, realism about the limits of law reform
is essential if false hopes are to be avoided. In our next article, we will
revisit this theme as we examine the latest proposals for changing rape
law.
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